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To gather together is a natural human activity shared by all people. The majority of 
these activities take place without the involvement of the government, and is of no 
interest to the law. In South Africa, the right to assemble peacefully, to demonstrate, 
to picket or to present petitions, is protected in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. When people gather, be it peaceful or violent, participants run the risk of 
being arrested for committing offences. The way the government of the day reacts to 
gatherings influence the policing, prosecution and adjudication of offences arising from 
the right to gather. Current legislation and common-law offences utilised to curb 
disorder in South Africa are measured against international and regional case law and 
guidelines. Most of these case law and guidelines linked to international and regional 
instruments are similar in many respects, and can be deemed as universally 
acceptable.  
It is proposed that the government revisits the mixture of current offences utilised by 
the prosecution during dissent, public violence or protest action, and that specific 
public order offences are created, providing for specific unlawful conduct with 
corroborating sentences. Police powers must furthermore be clearly defined to 
strengthen the hand of the police to secure law and order, serve as guarantee for the 
rights and freedoms of everyone, and to create legal certainty. The government must 
organise applicable public order offences in a single public order act. Legislation 
applicable to public order must be accessible and easily understandable since protest 
may be the only avenue for a member of the public to bring his or her plight under the 
attention of the government. Existing guidelines from applicable international and 
regional instruments which guide and monitor executive conduct must be included 
since these guidelines qualify as public order offences.  
 
KEY WORDS: Assembly, Constitution, demonstration, gathering, guidelines, 
international and regional instruments, incitement, intimidation, limitation, offence, 
petition, picket, protest, public violence, regulation, sedition, traffic offences, 
trespassing.  
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1.1 Background information 
To gather together is a natural human activity shared by all people. On a daily basis, 
activities such as family gatherings, church sermons, festivals, sporting events, school 
concerts, or students attending classes take place. These acts may be without any 
financial implications, or involve recompense. Many of these activities take place in 
online gathering spaces. The majority of these events transpire without the 
involvement of the government, and is of no interest to the law. There are, however, 
gatherings that concern the law. The right to assemble peacefully, to demonstrate, to 
picket, or present petitions are protected by most countries in their constitutions. The 
right to gather peacefully, together with the rights to freedom of expression and 
association “constitutes the very foundation of a system of participatory governance 
based on democracy, human rights, the rule of law and pluralism”.1 Therefore, it is 
important that governments take proper care when policing this right.  
In South Africa, section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) guarantees the right to assemble, 
demonstrate, to picket,2 and to present petitions.3 This right is utilised by communities, 
citizens, organisations, or groups, to draw the attention of the media, key role players, 
or the government to voice their discontent by means of protest action when their rights 
as guaranteed in the Constitution are infringed, or their demands are not met.4 When 
these peaceful gatherings with a common expressive purpose are ignored or not 
tolerated by governments, participants may resort to violence or crime to further 
bolster attention to their plight. In this regard, assemblies not only:  
                                                          
1  ICCPR General Comment No 37 on the right of peaceful assembly para [1]. 
2  Primary and secondary picketing is often used by organised labour to bring management to heel. 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 affords trade unions and their members’ statutory protection 
with respect to the right to picket in and about the private property of an employer. 
3  For the purpose of this study, this right is referred to as the right to gather. If not otherwise specified, 
assemblies, demonstrations and pickets are included in the term ‘gathering’.  
4  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 379.  
2 
…serve as warning to the government of the unpopularity of some of its policies, it 
also enables the government to identify pressing problems that arise in the time 
between elections.5  
On the other hand, this right may also be misused and commercialised ‒ by ‘renting’ 
jobless people, in exchange for transport, money or food to protest on request of a 
beneficiary, or to commit organised crime under the cover of a gathering being 
protected under the Constitution. The failure to appreciate this right: 
…undermines the ability to achieve the South African constitutional vision of a 
society based on dignity, equality and freedom, and strikes at the very heart of the 
ability to make democracy work.6     
It is consequently of the utmost importance that citizens employ this right responsibly. 
The government, in particular, has an important role to play in assisting and educating 
citizens when utilising the right to gather peacefully and unarmed. However, as no one 
lives in a perfect world, there are various reasons why the government prefers certain 
gatherings not to proceed, and furthermore also reasons why citizens keep their 
intention to gather secret. In practice, it seems that many service delivery protests 
catch the authorities off guard.7   
When people gather, be it peaceful or violent, participants run the risk of being arrested 
for committing certain offences. The manner in which the government of the day reacts 
to gatherings influences the policing, prosecution and adjudicating of offences that 
stem from the right to gather. This study will first focus on the various offences that 
stem from the right to gather in South Africa, as well as in selected jurisdictions. As a 
signatory to several international and regional instruments, South Africa is obliged to 
follow the obligations as set out in these documents. The research further concerns 
the question whether the offences rising from the right to gather are adequate to 
provide for current concerns. These type of offences can be distinguished from other 
offences since they are qualified by a wealth of guidelines and case law from regional 
and international instruments.   
                                                          
5  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 379.   
6  Chamberlain 2016 AHRLJ 384. 
7  See, e.g., the recent attack on Tyefu police officers in the Eastern Cape, where six officers were 
locked up by the villagers, who were fed up with the high crime rates, and poor and unreliable 
service from these officers. They were charged with public violence, malicious damage to property, 
and contravening disaster management regulations governing Level 3 of the Covid-19 lockdown. 
See Dayimani https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/ news/angry-eastern-cape-villagers-
attack-police-station-lock-up-useless-unreliable-cops-20210127 (Date of use: 28 January 2021). 
3 
1.2 Problem statement 
South Africa has been referred to as having one of the highest levels of popular protest 
and strike action;8 the country has been described as ‘the protest capital of the world”.9 
It seems that the right to a public demonstration is the only peaceful means which 
disenfranchised South Africans possess in order to make a powerful political 
statement.10 To demonstrate is a fundamental right of democratic citizenship, similar 
to the right to take part in political campaigns. This was also the conclusion of the 
Goldstone Commission,11 in affirming that public demonstrations of support for or 
opposition to a policy, organisation, or leader are as essential a part of democratic 
government as political campaigning and political parties. Where the purpose of the 
demonstration is protest, the demonstration is at the core of free expression in a 
democracy. A democratic public can justly insist on demonstrations and protests being 
carried out peacefully and without violence.12 Non-violent and non-destructive 
demonstrations are thus not a form of anarchy, but a method of democratic expression 
which is an essential right in any egalitarian society. People participating or engaging 
in protest are troubled people expressing their legitimate concerns on a variety of 
social or political issues, such as the environment, housing, abortion, ethnic- or racial 
concerns, and political rights.13 Even a truly democratic government will have to 
anticipate that violent organised demonstrations by persons of different persuasions 
may occur.  
                                                          
8  See Bohler-Muller et al 2017 SA Crime Quarterly 81. 
9  Roberts et al 2017 SA Crime Quarterly 63. 
10  Heymann Towards peaceful protest in South Africa vii. 
11  In terms of s 2 of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 139 of 1991, the Goldstone 
Commission was appointed to inquire into the phenomenon of public violence and intimidation in 
the Republic, the nature and causes thereof, and what persons are involved therein. The 
Commission also had to inquire into any steps that should be taken in order to prevent public 
violence and intimidation, and make recommendations to the State President regarding (i) the 
general policy which ought to be followed in respect of the prevention of public violence and 
intimidation; (ii) steps to prevent public violence and intimidation; (iii) any other steps it may deem 
necessary or expedient, including proposals for the passing of legislation, to prevent a repetition 
or continuation of any act or omission relating to public violence or intimidation; (iv) the generation 
of income by the State to prevent public violence and intimidation as well as the compensating of 
persons who were prejudiced and suffered patrimonial loss thereby; (v) any other matter which 
may contribute to preventing public violence and intimidation. 
12  Heymann Towards peaceful protest in South Africa ix. 
13  Heymann Towards peaceful protest in South Africa 1. 
4 
On the Goldstone Commission’s recommendation, a statute to regulate public 
demonstrations was instituted in South Africa. The Regulation of Gatherings Act14 
(hereinafter the Gatherings Act) administers the holding of public gatherings and 
demonstrations at certain places. The Act also confirms the right to assemble with 
other persons, and to express views on any matter freely in public. While so doing, the 
assemblers will enjoy the protection of the state, but the exercise of such right must 
take place peacefully, and with due regard to the rights of others.15 With the 
implementation of these rights, the Gatherings Act have suffered some impediments, 
especially during the last two decades. One of the biggest challenges is that the Act 
is mostly ignored by demonstrators.  
Section 12 of the Gatherings Act provides for offences and penalties in relation to 
public gatherings and demonstrations. This section reads as follows: 
(1)  Any person who ‒  
(a)  convenes a gathering in respect of which no notice or no adequate 
notice was given in accordance with the provisions of section 3;16 or  
(b)  after giving notice in accordance with the provisions of section 3, fails 
to attend a relevant meeting called in terms of section 4(2)(b); or  
(c)  contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of section 8 in regard 
to the conduct of a gathering or demonstration; or  
(d)  knowingly contravenes or fails to comply with the contents of a notice 
or a condition to which the holding of a gathering or demonstration is 
in terms of this Act subject; or  
(e)  in contravention of the provisions of this Act convenes a gathering, or 
convenes or attends a gathering or demonstration prohibited in terms 
of this Act; or  
(f)  knowingly contravenes or fails to comply with a condition imposed in 
terms of section 4(4)(b), 6(1) or 6(5); or  
(g)  fails to comply with an order issued, or interferes with any steps taken, 
in terms of section 9(1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) or (2)(a); or (h) contravenes or 
fails to comply with the provisions of section 4(6); or  
(i)  supplies or furnishes false information for the purposes of this Act; or 
(j)  hinders, interferes with, obstructs or resists a member of the Police, 
responsible officer, convener, marshal or other person in the exercise 
of his powers or the performance of his duties under this Act or a 
                                                          
14  Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (hereafter the Gatherings Act) commenced on 15 November 1996. It 
is interesting to note that the Gatherings Act was introduced after the commencement of the 
transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 on 27 April 1994. The Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 was inaugurated on 4 February 1997, three months after the 
Gatherings Act became operational. 
15  Preamble of the Regulation of the Gatherings Act.  
16  Section 12(1)(a) was declared unconstitutional in Mlungwana and Others v S and Another 2019 
(1) SACR 429 (CC) (hereinafter Mlungwana). For further discussion, see paras 2.3 and 3.4. 
5 
regulation made under section 10,  
shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine not exceeding R20 
000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine 
and such imprisonment.  
(2)  It shall be a defence to a charge of convening a gathering in contravention 
of subsection (1)(a) that the gathering concerned took place 
spontaneously.17 
Practical problems are experienced with some of the offences listed in this section, 
and these complications reduce the possibility of a successful prosecution. This study 
will probe these impairments in order to provide amicable solutions thereof.  
In an illegal gatherings case, there is usually a choice to proceed with the offences as 
listed in section 12 of the Act above, or with the common-law offences regulating some 
form of gathering, or both; yet it seems that the prosecution frequently proceeds with 
a charge of public violence.18 This research will investigate why this is indeed the case. 
The crime of public violence is categorised by Snyman under the sub-group of “crimes 
against the state and public order”,19 where the crime is grouped together with two 
other offences, that of high treason and sedition as crimes against the state.20 This 
categorisation of public violence as a crime against the state produces some confusion 
amongst the general public, and contributes to the perception that this offence is a 
political crime. Other countries seem to have moved away from common-law offences 
such as public violence, and enacted specific legislation for particular social problems 
experience with gatherings. This research will examine and evaluate selected 
jurisdictions’ legislation to ascertain if these laws can be successfully and positively 
implemented in the South African context. Legislation of other jurisdictions that make 
specific provision to regulate gatherings will furthermore be compared to the South 
African Gatherings Act. 
This study will also revisit some of the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission 
in order to ascertain if these proposals are still relevant today. For example, in the 
Third Interim Report21 on violence in the Taxi and Minibus Industry, the Commission 
recommended that the principal of communication should be established between 
                                                          
17  Gatherings Act s 12(1), (2). 
18  Public violence is a common-law offence. See Chapter 5, footnote 6 for a definition of public 
violence. 
19  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law Chapter IX. 
20  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law Chapter IX.  
21  Goldstone Third interim report 4.  
6 
associations (jointly as a committee with community members), and not only between 
chairpersons.22 It was advised that members of different associations and taxi 
operators should practice tolerance and refrain from provocative acts. It was 
furthermore accentuated that what is needed is more discussion by means of 
mediation and negotiations23 to resolve problems, less anger, and greater respect for 
the rights of others. In short, unless every person wants peace and works toward it, all 
efforts to combat violence are doomed to failure. The Commission also proposed that 
municipalities should pay urgent attention to the implementation of the most suitable 
way to establish an answer to the problem as an important priority, for the benefit of 
the communities.24 During gatherings, a suitable procedure to ensure the orderly and 
efficient passage should be implemented, and marshals should be neutral and not 
members of the associations.25 As to the policing of gatherings, the recommendation 
was that fair, firm and consistent law enforcement is necessary to combat the general 
lawlessness and lack of discipline that have become rife in South Africa.26 The 
possibility to implement these recommendations will be investigated to curb violence 
during gatherings and to appropriately manage gatherings. 
The Goldstone Commission urged that assemblies, if peaceful, must proceed and 
continue – even if no permission for the gathering was obtained. The Commission was 
also of opinion that sentences must be as lenient as possible. It is questionable if these 
considerations are part of the training of presiding officers. Also, the political 
perception of the presiding officer can cloud sentencing options if a political motive is 
seen as an aggravating factor in sentencing. The study will compare the factors that 
must be considered during sentencing procedures, relating to crimes arising from 
assembly, demonstration, picket and petition in other countries.  
One of the central responsibilities of the South African Police Service (SAPS) is to 
facilitate the right to demonstrate, and to see that demonstrations are nonviolent.27 In 
this regard, the South African Police Service Act (SAPS Act)28 intended to bring about 
change in the policing approach with the introduction of community-based policing, 
                                                          
22  Goldstone Third interim report Ibid 10. 
23  Goldstone Third interim report 12. 
24  Goldstone Third interim report 12. 
25  Goldstone Third interim report 13. 
26  Goldstone Third interim report 14. 
27  Heymann Towards peaceful protest in South Africa ix. 
28  South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (hereafter called the SAPS Act). 
7 
and the need to expunge the apartheid-policing style and associated stigmas.29 The 
country has experienced a growing number of protest action and unrest which, in some 
instances, are accompanied by serious provocation, intimidation, public violence and 
even elements of criminality. In order to curb the unrest, a policy30 was introduced by 
the Minister of Police on 29 August 2011. After the implementation of the policy, it 
seems that no further progress has been made. Technically, the public order policing 
(POP)31 unit does not exist anymore as a specialised public order policing function, as 
envisaged in the SAPS Act.32 This study will probe the reasons for the inoperativeness 
of the policy, especially as the main difficulties are still education, training and 
management.33 
This research will furthermore investigate the manner in which the legislation 
regulating gatherings is interpreted and applied by prosecutors. This will be 
accomplished by evaluating recent court decisions and academic submissions from 
legal scholars. Recommendations will also be proposed regarding the requirements 
that courts should consider when adjudicating on all types of gatherings.  
The study will lastly consider whether there is a need for further legislative or judicial 
regulations to ascertain a uniform, accurate approach in determining whether 
assemblers are guilty in criminal court cases. Since assemblies, demonstrations, 
picketing and petitions are on the rise in this country, the South African criminal law 
                                                          
29  Ministry of Police http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/policies/policing_public_ protests 
_2013.pdf (Date of use: 29 October 2020).  
30  Ministry of Police http://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/downloads/policies/policing_public_ protests 
_2013.pdf (Date of use: 29 October 2020). 
31  In terms of the SAPS Act s 17, the National Commissioner is obliged to establish a national public 
order policing (POP) unit, and maintain the same. Such a unit was established during 1996. 
Standing Order No 262 on Crowd Management and The National Municipal Policing Standard for 
Crowd Management are also applicable. Standing Order No 262 states that the use of force must 
be avoided at all costs, and members deployed for the operation must display the highest degree 
of tolerance. The use of force and dispersal of crowds must furthermore comply with the 
requirements of ss 9(1) and (2) of the SAPS Act. 
32  During 2002, the POP units were subject to SAPS restructuring and aligned to function at a policing 
area level as the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). During further restructuring in 2006, the 
policing areas were disbanded and policing resources ‘released’ to supplement much needed 
capacity at station level. The ACCUs were affected, and the name was changed to Crime 
Combating Units (CCUs). The restructuring also had the effect that the CCUs were incorporated 
as a section under the division Operational Response Services. The CCUs were drastically 
rationalised, and more than half of its members were deployed to police station level to strengthen 
the ‘local crime combating’ initiatives. The remaining half found themselves in a situation where 
they had to cover bigger areas with lesser resources. Although the CCUs are still utilised for crowd 
management, its primary function remains crime combating. 
33  Institute of Criminology Crowd management: Civilian and police conduct 4. 
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must be amended to accommodate the various new and complex forms of gatherings 
that are constantly emerging. It subsequently becomes imperative to research and 
submit recommendations for legislative reform as to illegal gatherings, and the 
determination of criminal liability by the courts in such cases. This is because it is 
conclusive that the requirements advanced by the courts are understated or 
insufficient to cover a whole range of criminal cases, especially new ones. 
1.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
The main research question of this study is: Do the current offences arising from the 
right to gather adequately regulate these types of acts, and how does the legislation 
impact on the prosecution of such offences? Further questions arising from this 
research question are:  
 What specific conduct constitutes the act of gathering?  
 From a structural and practical perspective; what are the challenges with the 
existing legal framework regulating gatherings? 
 How do the courts interpret and apply the requirements of the Gatherings Act in 
order to hold an accused criminally liable? 
 What can South Africa learn from the experience of international law and other 
jurisdictions’ efforts when dealing with illegal gatherings? 
 Are law reforms necessary, and if found to be so; which policy and legislative 
response might regulate gatherings? 
The hypotheses essential to the research in this study are the following: 
 The regulation of gatherings has never satisfactorily been dealt with by South 
African legislation and courts.  
 The legislative framework that currently regulates gatherings is inadequate or 
incoherently implemented in South African criminal law as different prosecutors 
employ different types of offences to charge accused persons.  
 The manner in which international law and comparative jurisdictions deal with 
gatherings may assist South African jurisprudence in providing better guidelines 
in order to regulate the various offences. 
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1.4 Research methodology 
This research will be qualitative in nature as well as a comparative study. Qualitative 
research is described as: 
...an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes counter-disciplinary field. It 
crosscuts the humanities and the social and physical sciences. Qualitative 
research is many things at the same time. It is multi-paradigmatic in focus. Its 
practitioners are sensitive to the value of the multimethod approach. They are 
committed to the naturalistic perspective and to the interpretive understanding of 
human experience. At the same time, the field is inherently political and shaped by 
multiple ethical and political positions.34 
By undertaking a qualitative study, it is implied that the qualities of the issues 
researched are emphasized. This involves a process of interpretive analysis where 
data (or legal texts as the object of analysis) is studied in order to “secure an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question”.35 Although qualitative research 
“crosscuts disciplines, fields, and subject matters”,36 this thesis will focus on the law, 
and mainly South African law, as well as all available legal material that will enhance 
the comprehension of the research. As such, the study is based on a desktop literature 
review of books, journal articles, legislation, case law, international guidelines, 
research reports and academic opinions. A critical analysis of the relevant South 
African legislation and case law will be undertaken, and compared with the relevant 
law of other countries.  
1.5 Literature review 
During the past century, there have been countless examples of civil disturbances 
around the world. The size and scope of these civil disorders vary from small 
gatherings of people merely protesting verbally, to full-blown riots resulting in property 
destruction, violence against others, and death.37 Some of the factors influencing 
public fracases worldwide are fluctuation of the global economy; competition for 
natural resources or basic human needs; and differing opinions on religion, politics, 
                                                          
34  Denzin and Lincoln The Sage handbook of qualitative research 10. 
35  Denzin and Lincoln The Sage handbook of qualitative research 7. 
36  Denzin and Lincoln The Sage handbook of qualitative research 3. 
37  US Department of the Army Civil disturbances vi. 
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and human rights.  
History has shown that people everywhere demand to be treated fairly, and want their 
grievances to be heard.38 In their efforts to be acknowledged, demonstrations are 
particularly the primary choice of protest by the numerous and, therefore, the most 
influential. So, for instance, the poorest, most frustrated and disappointed citizens of 
a new South Africa may well demonstrate in large, and, perhaps, disorderly numbers 
in an effort to speed up the pace of change.39 This was already anticipated by the 
Goldstone Commission who added that many of the special difficulties of 
demonstrations in South Africa will remain, although taking new forms.40 
Despite the prevalence of gatherings in South Africa, not much legal research has 
been completed on the topic. Only four research studies were located that focused on 
some element of the Gatherings Act. In 1998, Van der Walt examines section 5 of the 
Gatherings Act that creates a limitation on the constitutional right to freedom of 
assembly and expression. The author finds that this limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Bill of Rights, as it serves to protect a compelling 
state interest.41 Khumalo scrutinises the common-law offence of public violence as the 
major measure dealing with gatherings in South Africa. He finds that the apparent 
failure of the crime of public violence to adequately safeguard the rights of non-
protesters during violent protests means that the crime falls short of the objectives of 
section 39(2) of the Constitution, and thus requires to be developed in order to promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.42 Moses, again, investigates the 
primary reason for the promulgation of the Gatherings Act as a new legislative 
framework which was to repeal certain statutes that heavily restricted the ability of 
people to protest before and during apartheid. His principal inquiry relates to whether 
the definition of a gathering in the Gatherings Act extends to privately owned property. 
His conclusion is that the Gatherings Act encompasses gatherings held on privately 
owned property in certain circumstances. It is found that while the Gatherings Act may 
permit a deprivation of property, this dispossession may be justified, depending largely 
                                                          
38  US Department of the Army Civil disturbances 1-1. 
39  Heymann Towards peaceful protest in South Africa 4. 
40  Goldstone Fifth interim report 107. 
41  Van der Walt The effect of the 1996 Constitution on section 5 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
1-2. 
42  Khumalo Re-opening the debate on developing the crime of public violence iv. 
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on the content of the gathering itself.43 The last study encountered highlighted 
students’ right to demonstrate at South African universities. In his master’s study, 
Nantege examines the #FeesMustFall student protests that transpired at South African 
universities, as well as cases of private security guards and police using force to 
disperse persons assembled and gathered peacefully and unarmed. This is contrary 
to the Gatherings Act which states that gatherings should be disbanded forcefully only 
under the most extreme of conditions ‒ where there is no other way of guaranteeing 
public safety, and when the protestors have been warned to disperse. The writer 
furthermore examines the scope of the students’ right to demonstrate as per 
international law and the Constitution.44  
There have been quite a few articles written on the subject; however, not many are 
centred specifically on discussing the law itself. In one of the earliest articles on 
gatherings, Du Pisani, Broodryk and Coetzer45 examine peaceful procession as a 
substantive human right. This article is written against the background of a 
countrywide spate of anti-apartheid protest marches in 1989. These peaceful marches 
became the symbol of the so-called ‘new South Africa’. At that time, South Africa did 
not have a Constitution guaranteeing freedom of expression as a fundamental human 
right, which includes the right of assembly and procession. The authors consequently 
present a historical analysis of protest marches during the pre-apartheid period, the 
1950s, the 1960s and 70s, and the 1980s. The critical role-players in such protest 
marches as well as the political function thereof are examined. The authors predict 
that protest marches will form part of the South African political scene for a 
considerable time, which is indeed the case. 
Dlamini46 is one of the first researchers to direct attention to the regulation of mass 
protests by the Gatherings Act. His article reviews the South African court cases 
dealing with the constitutional right to protest, and whether the outcomes of these 
cases are in congruence with the provisions of the Act and the Constitution. It is 
established that the Gatherings Act bestows on police unrestricted powers to prohibit 
a protest without providing any reason for the prohibition. It is further found that these 
                                                          
43  Moses “Gathering” on privately owned property iii-iv. 
44  Nantege Students’ right to demonstrate at South African universities 8. 
45  Du Pisani, Broodryk and Coetzer 1990 The Journal of Modern African Studies 573-602. 
46  Dlamini 2009 African Journal of Rhetoric 86-107. 
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officers have little or no understanding of the content of the Act. The author contends 
that the Gatherings Act functions as a mechanism of the state whereby the right of the 
public to protest is violated. In an article examining whether the Gatherings Act 
regulates gatherings or restricts freedom of speech, Hjul47 critically reviews this South 
African legislation, and probes public violence and the consequences thereof. The 
value of public marches as contributing to the developing of democracy, and the 
function and role of the courts in promoting freedom of expression and association are 
determined. The writer’s conclusion is that the Gatherings Act should be amended to 
better protect freedom of expression and association. 
In her article, Chamberlain48 assesses the case of SATAWU and Another v Garvas 
and Others49 in order to show the striking similarities in the implementation of the 
enabling rights to protest and access to information in South Africa. In a follow-up 
article by Chamberlain and Snyman50 on the freedom of expression as an inherent 
quality of an open and democratic society (including freedom of assembly as provided 
for in the Bill of Rights), the cases of S v Mamabolo51 and the South African National 
Defence Union v Minister of Defence52 are evaluated. In especially the second 
judgment, the court stressed the fact that the right to assemble and protest must be 
valued as a guarantor of democracy. This right implicitly recognises and protects the 
moral agency of individuals in South African society, and facilitates the search for truth 
by individuals and society generally.53  
In an article involving procedural issues pertaining to the Gatherings Act, Omar54 
explains the process for a lawful protest, which primarily involves three components, 
as stated in the Gatherings Act. These are the provisions that ought to apply prior to 
a protest taking place; the conduct during gatherings and the powers of the police 
during a protest; and the post-protest phase, namely the liability for damages, and 
                                                          
47  Hjul 2013 De Jure 451. 
48  Chamberlain 2016 AHRLJ 365-384. 
49  South African Transport and Allied Workers Union/Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(SATAWU) and Jacqueline Garvas and Others, Case CCT 112/11 [2012] ZACC 13 (hereinafter 
SATAWU). 
50  Chamberlain and Snyman 2017 SA Crime Quarterly 7-20. 
51  S v Mamabolo (E TV Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) paras [2], [28].  
52  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence (CCT27/98) [1999] ZACC 7; 1999 (4) 
SA 469; 1999 (6) BCLR 615 para [8]. 
53  As per O’Regan J in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence (CCT27/98) 
[1999] ZACC 7; 1999 (4) SA 469; 1999 (6) BCLR 615 para [7]. 
54  Omar 2017 SA Crime Quarterly 21-31. 
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offences and penalties.  
One of the most recent articles, that of Barrie,55 is a critical case law discussion of 
Mlungwana,56 where the court declared section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act 
unconstitutional, and set aside the protesters’ convictions and sentences. Section 
12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act criminalises a failure to give notice for convening a 
gathering. The author examines whether this section is in conflict with section 17 of 
the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of assembly, as it limits that freedom. This 
study will also evaluate and deliberate on this section.  
Most of the research completed on gatherings consist of criminal justice or law-
enforcement perspectives on the topic. For example, Pearce57 investigates the 
policing of public violence after the new constitutional dispensation in two selected 
towns. The public in these towns were protesting against poor service delivery, and 
the writer finds that the SAPS’ handling of public violence was reminiscent of the 
military style of the former political oppressors. It is recommended that a preventative, 
inclusive community policing style should be introduced to address public violence. In 
an article on the similar topic of policing gatherings, Iwu and Iwu58 consider the policing 
of protests by the police in order to ensure the safety of lives and that the protests 
remain peaceful. Unfortunately, lives are lost in such protests, and the study probes 
the reason why this happens, as well as whether there are any interventions that need 
to be in place so as to curtail the high rate of casualties during protests. A serious 
requisite to review public order policing is suggested. 
Research in the above texts, as well as in reports, have furthermore revealed that 
perceptions of police crowd management and control are contradictory – the police 
see their actions as restrained and disciplined efforts to deal with ‘unruly and 
dangerous mobs’, whereas participants in political gatherings commonly view police 
action as ‘provocative and violent’.59 At present, the police force in South Africa enjoys 
little credibility and trust in the townships because of the politicised role the SAPS has 
                                                          
55  Barrie 2019 Journal of South African Law 405-418. 
56  Mlungwana paras [1]-[111]. See discussion in para 3.4 below. 
57  Pearce A preventative policing style for public violence 3-8. 
58  Iwu and Iwu 2015 The Scientific Journal for Theory and Practice of Socio-Economic Development 
541-552. 
59  Institute of Criminology Crowd management: Civilian and police conduct 1.  
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played historically. In their study, Rauch and Storey60 examine the policing of public 
gatherings and demonstrations from the year 1960 to 1994. In the early 1960s, a 
specialised police unit tasked with riot control to suppress any political protest 
associated with resistance to apartheid was created. Although the name of the unit 
changed in the next three decades, the function of this unit remained the same. The 
police thus played a prominent role in enforcing apartheid policies. 
In 1992, the Institute of Criminology conducted fieldwork in rural areas as regards the 
communities’ perception of the police. The results show that substantial numbers of 
township dwellers see the police as being biased, that is ‘super-effective’ when dealing 
with opponents of the state, but totally inactive when violence is perpetrated by rivals 
of the ANC. The poor record of arrest and successful prosecution of those involved in 
political violence further undermines these people’s confidence in the SAPS.61 A 
contradiction seems to exist in the way in which the police employ force in situations 
of public disorder: excessive force is frequently used in dealing with peaceful, illegal 
political gatherings, whereas the police commonly fail to intervene forcefully when 
civilian groups are engaged in conflict with one another. Three decades later, the 
situation has not changed much. 
Demonstrations, assemblies, pickets and petitions have been debated on at length in 
the literature of other jurisdictions. This research will consider the legislature of 
countries such as England and India, amongst others, in order to compare their 
operational plans as to gatherings with that of South Africa. Many jurisdictions follow 
international and regional guidelines in regulating assemblies. As such, this study will 
also incorporate these guidelines. 
1.6 Outline of research 
This study will not involve the history of assemblies in South Africa before 1990. The 
starting point will be the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission, the 
Constitution, and the Gatherings Act. The focus will be on the way forward.  
  
                                                          
60  Rauch and Storey The policing of public gatherings and demonstrations 1. 
61  Institute of Criminology Crowd management: Civilian and police conduct 3. 
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The introductory chapter, Chapter one, has set the background to the study, and has 
provided some background information to set the scene of the research. The problem 
statement, the research questions and hypotheses, the research methodology and 
limitations of the research are explained. A short literature review in order to 
comprehend the topic more competently is provided.  
In which manner the conduct of the government and participants of gatherings must 
be qualified, is demonstrated in Chapter two, with reference to the facts of cases and 
applicable guidelines of regional and international instruments. According to the 
Constitution, international law is applicable in South Africa.62 This chapter focus on the 
following instruments ‒ the International Bill of Human Rights which consists inter alia 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),63 the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter referred to as the African Charter)64 and the European 
Human Right System.65 The facts of relevant international and regional case law will  
be examined so as to illustrate how and when the right to gather can be limited. 
In Chapter three, the constitutional application with regard to the right to gather is 
investigated and the activities protected by the Constitution are discussed. The 
Constitution also provides that the right to gather can be limited to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.66 Clear and 
well-drafted legislation on gatherings will support the government in protecting this 
right for everyone to enjoy. Similar legislature in other countries will be considered to 
establish if South Africa has the best model to manage assemblies. 
  
                                                          
62  See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) paras 
[95]-[98], where the Constitutional Court explained the relevance of international law to the South 
African constitutional framework. The Constitution s 39 directs that when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court must consider international law ‒ and may consider foreign law.  
63  Roberts The contentious history of the International Bill of Human Rights ix. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights Act, 1948 (UDHR) was ratified by South Africa on 24 October 1945. 
The UDHR is a standard for individual human rights. The ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 
1976, and was ratified by South Africa on 10 December 1998.  
64  The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted on 27 June 1981, and 
entered into force on 21 October 1986. It was ratified by South Africa on 9 July 1996. 
65  Most of the case law and guidelines linked to these instruments are similar in many respects and 
can be deemed as universally acceptable. 
66  Section 36. 
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Chapters four to six deal with offences generally utilised by the prosecution of cases 
relating to dissent, mass-action or protest. Offences utilised as public order offences67 
include offences under the Gatherings Act,68 public violence,69 sedition, offences 
under the Trespassing Act 6 of 1959, offences under the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 
of 1956, offences under the National Road Traffic Regulations 2000,70 and offences 
under the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982. These offences constitute a piece meal of 
legislation and common-law offences. Some of these offences were never intended to 
be applicable to gatherings. Participants are, therefore, never certain, when arrested, 
to what charges they will need to answer.  
In Chapter four, the offences under the Gatherings Act are discussed. In South Africa, 
the Gathering Act regulates the holding of public gatherings and demonstrations. The 
provisions inform the public where to notify the authorities and the procedures to be 
followed. The Gatherings Act will be examined as to problems experienced with the 
implementation of the Act on a daily basis. The question is investigated if these 
offences are still relevant in the South African context, and whether it will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  
In Chapter five, the common-law offence of public violence is discussed. The offence 
is essentially the only offence to prosecute the violent and unlawful conduct of a group 
of people in South Africa. It is utilised by the state to curb gatherings that are not 
peaceful and unarmed. A wide range of conduct falls into the definition of public 
violence. It is argued that the offence of public violence is not clearly defined, and 
hence cannot legitimately be regarded as a criminal offence.  
Chapter six focuses on offences that relate to the right to gather. Depending on the 
circumstances, several other offences can be committed during a gathering, for 
example, assault, malicious damage to property, arson, murder, or even sexual 
assault. The offence of sedition is intended to suppress revolutionary calls for political 
and social reform,71 but governments can misuse this offence to oppress any criticism 
                                                          
67  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277 categorises public violence as an offence against the state, 
and trespassing as an offence relating to damages to property. Burchell and Milton Principles of 
Criminal law xi categorise public violence under offences against the community interest.  
68  See Chapter 4 below. 
69  See Chapter 5 below. 
70  Published in GG 20963 dated 17 March 2000, GN R225. 
71  Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal law 683.  
17 
against the government, leadership or political parties. The Trespass Act 6 of 1959 
prohibits the entry or presence upon land and buildings.72 Currently, the Act is utilised 
as an important tool to combat violent protest action, land invasion73 of state or private 
property, and to restore public order. The Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 is 
clouded in controversy, as it is seen as stemming from apartheid-era law, it is out-
dated and historically used to prosecute liberation fighters.74 Section 18 of the Act 
provides for attempt, conspiracy and inducing another person to commit an offence. 
This section is utilised in South Africa daily for many offences, not only for public-order 
offences. Offences under the National Road Traffic Regulations 2000 are applied by 
the government when gatherings take place on public roads.75 When gatherings are 
violent, it is difficult to prove that that all the participants act in concert and committed 
the offence of public violence. It is easier to hold individuals or smaller groups 
accountable for certain conduct, for example, hindering or obstructing traffic on public 
roads.76 In South Africa, intimidation is frequently part and parcel of conduct at a 
gathering.77 Although it is well known that intimidation is rife in South Africa, very few 
people seem to be prosecuted for the offences created in this Act.78 It is suggested 
that the government creates new offences for different situations with applicable 
sentences. 
In Chapter seven, the recommendations in Chapters two to six are summarised. It is 
proposed that the government revisits the mixture of current offences utilised by the 
prosecution during dissent, public violence or protest action, and that specific public 
order offences are created that provide for specific unlawful conduct with corroborating 
sentences. Although some countries have codified public order criminal law, South 
Africa did not follow the route. The government is urged to consider organising 
applicable public order offences in a single public order act. Existing guidelines from 
                                                          
72  See para 6.3 below. 
73  Definitions for land invasion and land grabbing in the South African context are not available. Both 
terms are used in the media and sometimes have the same meaning. ‘Land invasion’ includes 
“both state and privately-owned land unlawfully entered by people (who is destitute or do it purely 
for financial gain)”. ‘Land grab’ is seen as more sinister. It is a “very large-scale land acquisition by 
means of nationalisation; it could involve abuses, force or violence.” See South African 
Government https://www.gov.za/services/place-live/how-respond-land-invasion (Date of use:  22 
November 2020). 
74  See para 6.4 below. 
75  See para 6.5 below. 
76  Regulation 319. 
77  See para 6.6 below. 
78  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 455. 
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applicable international and regional instruments which direct and monitor executive 
conduct must be included since these guidelines qualify public order offences, and 
inform participants of gatherings what conduct is deemed unacceptable by the 
government, and the consequences of not adhering to it. The changing society and 
new modern technology also need to be considered in reforming public order offences.  
1.7 Summary 
This chapter focused on providing a general background to the predicament of 
regulating and policing gatherings in South Africa. Although gatherings are protected 
by section 17 of the Constitution, there are rights and responsibilities involved in 
exercising this right by the individual as well as the state. Assemblies should also be 
peaceful in order to claim this right. As seen from the background information provided 
above, many gatherings turn violent with a subsequent loss of life. Participants of such 
gatherings also run the risk of being arrested for committing certain offences. This 
study will examine the current legislation and common-law offences utilised to curb 
public disorder in South Africa. The main statute regulating the holding of public 
assemblies and gatherings is the Gatherings Act. This Act will be thoroughly 
investigated as it contains many vague and presumably unconstitutional provisions. 
Since South African courts need to take cognisance of applicable international law, it 
is important that the police, prosecutors and judiciary are well versed in its application 
with regard to the right to gather. An arrested, prosecuted or guilty individual may still 
refer his or her complaint to an international or regional instrument for conclusion. It is 
consequently beneficial to identify the instances where international or regional 
instruments recognise that governments violated the right to gather, and when it 
constitutes an unjustified limitation. It is, therefore, debatable whether correct 
decisions can be made by the state without adhering to these guidelines and 
principles.  
As such, a qualitative, comparative research methodology will be employed to 
compare South African offences as regards gatherings with the comparable offences 
from selected foreign jurisdictions, international and regional guidelines, and case law 
in other legal systems. The proper facilitation of gatherings can prevent violence, 
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ensure that fewer participants are arrested, and influence the judgments of courts. In 
the following chapter, the relevant guidelines pertaining to gatherings under 




INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE 
RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE 
2.1 Introduction 
When people gather, be it peacefully or violently, participants run the risk of being 
arrested for committing an offence. The way the government of the day reacts to 
gatherings has an influence on the policing, prosecution and adjudicating of offences 
stemming from the right to gather.1 Due to the constitutional spirit, the South African 
government has the duty to assist and enable its citizens to assemble peacefully and 
unarmed, while citizens again must utilise the right to assemble peacefully and in a 
responsible manner. The offences that stem from gatherings differ from other 
offences, since the right to gather is qualified by a host of guidelines and principles in 
both regional and international instruments, as well as in case law.  
South Africa is party to various international and regional instruments. The Constitution 
directs that international and foreign law is applicable in South Africa,2 and that courts, 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights, must consider international law, and may consider 
foreign law.3 Therefore, it is important to recognise instances when an international or 
regional instrument has already identified a situation in which the right to assemble 
was violated by a government.  
This chapter focus on the following instruments which South Africa has either ratified 
or signed: The International Bill of Human Rights which consists inter alia of the UDHR 
and the ICCPR.4 South Africa is also a party to the African Charter.5 This is a regional 
                                                          
1  For the purpose of this study, the right to gather includes assemblies, demonstrations, pickets, 
petitions, rallies, marches, and so on.   
2  See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347(CC) paras 
[95]-[98], where the Constitutional Court explained the relevance of international law. Regional law 
is assumed to be included in these concepts. See also Chapter 1 footnote 62. 
3  Section 39 as in para 2.2 below. See also Mubangizi 2004 TSAR 324; Rodger 2002 Journal of 
South African Law 1. 
4  Roberts The contentious history of the International Bill of Human Rights ix. See also Chapter 1 
footnotes 63-65. 
5  African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1982 
(21) ILM 58), adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986. It was ratified by South 
Africa on 9 July 1996. 
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instrument that most African states have signed. The UDHR and ICCPR confirm the 
right to peaceful assembly as a human right, and this right is also guaranteed by the 
South African Constitution. These instruments also adopted guidelines that assist 
states in complying with international legal norms and standards. Certain guidelines 
aid with the interpretation of legislation governing the right to gather. A signatory 
state’s willingness to play its part when ratifying an international or regional instrument 
plays a detrimental role in terms of an individual enjoying the rights guaranteed in the 
instrument.6  
Although South Africa is not a signatory to the European human rights system, it has 
an abundance of case law on the right of assembly. In particular, the Guidelines on 
freedom of peaceful assembly7 gives meaningful context to the application of the right 
to assemble or gather. South African courts may take cognisance of the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when adjudicating cases that stem from 
the right to gather, since the Constitution provides that, for the purpose of 
interpretation, international instruments are applicable; thus, the courts are not 
confined to only referring to instruments that are binding on South Africa.8 
Although international and regional instruments provide South African courts with case 
law and guidelines, this guiding material is generally not part of the training courses 
provided to police officials, prosecutors and magistrates, since most are unaware of 
the existence of these documents.9 Court decisions are made daily without relevant 
case law and guidelines being considered. Most of the case law and guidelines that 
are linked to the different instruments are similar in many respects, and can be deemed 
as universally acceptable; thus, it is debatable whether correct decisions can be made 
without adhering to these documents. Therefore, it is important to identify situations 
that constitute unjustified restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully. These 
principles established by international and regional instruments may also suggest a 
                                                          
6  See Meyersfeld 2013 Constitutional Court Review 399-416.  
7  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2019 13-14. These guidelines were compiled by the Venice Commission, the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR). 
8  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 147.  
9  As gathered from 30 years’ personal work experience in criminal prosecution by the researcher, 
a senior public prosecutor employed by the NPA. 
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positive normative10 framework that could assist when dealing with evidence of human 
rights’ violations. 
How the conduct of the South African executive and participants of gatherings should 
be qualified, is demonstrated in this chapter, with reference to the facts of cases and 
applicable guidelines of regional and international instruments. This is important, since 
proper facilitation of participation in peaceful assemblies can prevent violence, ensure 
that fewer participants are arrested, and influence the judgments of courts. The 
discussion on the right to assemble as established in both international and regional 
law will begin by locating these principles as found in the Constitution, and also 
indicating the importance of these laws for South African jurisprudence. Lastly, 
selected international and regional guidelines on gatherings will be deliberated on. 
2.2 Constitutional principles on the application of international, regional 
and foreign law in South Africa 
Sections 39, 231, 232 and 233 of the Constitution provide for the application of 
international and foreign law in South Africa. However, the Constitution also reflects 
the influence of a variety of international human-rights instruments.11 When provisions 
derived from international instruments are included in the Constitution, it can be seen 
as a powerful method of incorporating international human rights into national law.12 
For example, the court in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others13 confirmed that international law is applicable in South 
Africa since the Constitution “embodies internationally accepted principles”.14 In the 
preamble to the Constitution, provision is made for a “democratic South Africa able to 
take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations”.15 These statements 
                                                          
10  See Daci 2010 Academicus International Scientific Journal 109 where he states that “a norm or a 
legal principle is a prevailing standard or set of standards of behaviour or judgment assumed to be 
just standards of behaviour for a society or for humanity in its entirety”.  
11  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 32 75, which may also 
include international declarations, covenants and conventions.  
12  According to Venter Global features of Constitutional law 11: “constitutional law has changed in 
character from a relatively insular discipline bounded by the nation-state’s operation within its own 
territorial jurisdiction, to a field of law which has been opened up to influences of a multitude of 
other disciplines and which has grown into a vehicle for notions migrating into the constitutional 
domain of all states as well as into the world of inter-state relations and international governance.” 
13  2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC).  
14  Paras [62]-[63], [101]. 
15  Constitution Preamble. 
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confirm that it is essential that the interpretation of national law must concur with 
international law.  
Section 39 of the Constitution provides for the manner in which the Bill of Rights must 
be interpreted; in that international law16 must be considered; and that foreign law may 
be considered: 
(1)  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –  
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b)  must consider international law; and  
(c)  may consider foreign law.  
(2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
A court, therefore, must endorse the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society, which are based on human dignity, equality and freedom. When a court 
interprets any legislation that relates to offences that stems from the right to gather, 
the court must give preference to any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with 
international law. In Law Society of South Africa and Others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others,17 the court indicated that international law is central in 
shaping South Africa’s democracy.18 Therefore, interaction between international and 
national law happens regularly.19 International law has featured in a wide variety of 
cases during the first ten years of South Africa’s democracy,20 and especially in the 
first few years after the South African Constitution became operational.21 Former 
Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke22 indicated that: 
It is no exaggeration to observe that our decisions read like works of comparative 
constitutional law and, where appropriate, we have not avoided relying on foreign 
judicial dicta or academic legal writings in support of the reasoning we resort to or 
conclusions we reach. Even so, it is fair to say that our burgeoning jurisprudence 
owes much debt to judicial reasoning emanating from other democratic 
jurisdictions and, in particular, the Commonwealth, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the European Court of Justice and certain African jurisdictions… We are 
more likely to find credible and dependable guidance from the collective wisdom of 
                                                          
16  See Chapter 3 below, Dugard International law: A South African perspective 24-41. 
17  2019 (3) SA 30 (CC). 
18  2019 (3) SA 31. 
19  Section 39(2).  
20  Botha and Olivier 2004 SAYIL 42-77. 
21  Botha and Olivier 2004 SAYIL 42-77. See s 35 of the 1993 and s 39 of the 1996 Constitutions.  
22  Moseneke 2010 Advocate 63.  
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the family of nations than from the likely breaches of the rule of law within domestic, 
legal and constitutional arrangements.23 
Accordingly, international law is part of South African law, and with regard to criminal 
law, it is utilised specifically for the purpose of interpreting rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution. South African offences concerning the right to gather must, therefore, 
conform to international law. 
Section 231 of the Constitution details how and when international agreements are 
applicable:  
(1)  The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive.  
(2)  An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection  
(3)  An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, 
or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, 
entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval 
by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must 
be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.  
(4)  Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted 
into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an 
agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
(5)  The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on 
the Republic when this Constitution took effect.24 
The common core of human rights can be found in instruments such as the ICCPR, 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the American Convention on 
Human Rights, and the African Charter. These instruments are testimony to human 
rights being a legitimate concern and part of the international legal system.25 Although 
South Africa is a signatory to many international human rights agreements, South 
African courts are not confined to instruments that are binding on the jurisdiction when 
interpreting international human rights law.26 However, when courts compare law, 
                                                          
23  Moseneke 2010 Advocate 63-65. See also Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law 
of South 32 175; Rautenbach 2015 PELJ 1546-1550.  
24  Mavedzenge 2013 Cornell International Law Journal Online 99-102 states: “Apart from playing an 
interpretive role, the application of international law in South Africa can also be more direct. An 
international agreement that South Africa has ratified can apply as domestic law. However, under 
section 231(4), the agreement must either be self-executing or enacted into domestic legislation… 
For agreements that are not self-executing, there are two distinct stages: ratification and enactment 
as legislation.”  
25  Barry 2015 SAYIL 103.  
26  Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 147. 
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regard must be given to the South African legal system, its history and the language 
of the Constitution.27  
Section 232 of the Constitution provides that customary international law is law in the 
Republic, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. The 
Constitutional Court still needs to interpret the law to ensure that the resulting national 
law is consistent with the Constitution.28 When applying international law, section 233 
determines that a court must give preference to any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law, rather than to any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.29 This section is applicable in 
circumstances where there is available international law to be considered with regard 
to the question before the court.30 It constitutes an error in law when applicable 
international law is obtainable, but not observed.31 International law is, therefore, 
binding in the sense that due regard must be given to it.32 When South Africa ratifies 
a treaty, it is obligated by international law to respect the provisions of the treaty.33  
International law is a vibrant, developing force, and the latest developments must 
always be taken into consideration.34 International law is a clear feature in the South 
Africa’s legal system, and society has been enriched by the courts’ use of its principles 
and precepts.35 In the following paragraphs, the significance of international and 
regional law will be focused on in more detail. 
                                                          
27  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para [39]. 
28  Constitution s 232: “Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”. See also Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams Cases & 
materials on International law 103. 
29  Constitution s 233: “When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”. 
30  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 32 182. See S v Baloyi 
2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC), 2000 (2) SA 245 (CC) para [13]. 
31  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 32 183.  
32  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 32 176. See S v 
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); Azanian People Organisation (AZAPO) and 
Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC); Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Ex parte 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature, In re: Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC); S v Basson 2005 
(1) SA 171 (CC); Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC ); 
Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); Centre for Child Law 
v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC).  
33  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 30 10. 
34  Botha and Olivier 2004 SAYIL 75. 




2.3  The importance of international- and regional law in South Africa  
South Africa’s Constitution can be seen as an international law user-friendly 
constitution, finding guidance from international law, in order to determine the content 
of South African law.36 As indicated in paragraph 2.2, South African domestic 
legislation must not only conform to the Constitution, but also to international 
instruments ratified by the state. This legislation must balance the right to gather 
peacefully with the facilitation of the right. The government has a constitutional duty to 
ensure that all South African people enjoy their basic rights. In S v Makwanyane and 
Another,37 Chaskalson J stated that international and foreign authorities are valuable, 
since they analyse arguments for and against what is disputed, and show how other 
courts deal with issues.38 However, it must be remembered that courts must interpret 
the South African Constitution, and not the international instrument. To refuse any 
comparative review with foreign constitutions “would be to deprive the legal system of 
the benefits of the learning and wisdom to be found in other jurisdictions”.39 According 
to Ackermann, foreign law “creates room for creative imagination, and raises new 
questions, possibilities and solutions to old problems”.40 
Therefore, international or regional instruments influence the approach taken by South 
African courts when interpreting the common law or legislation pertaining to offences 
stemming from the right to gather. In Mlungwana, the Constitutional Court took 
cognisance of international law.41 The declaration made by the High Court that section 
12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act was unconstitutional, was confirmed to the extent that 
it is a criminal offence for any person convening a gathering to either fail to give notice 
or to give inadequate notice of the intended gathering.42 The decision was in 
consensus with the findings of influential international and regional instruments,43 for 
example, the decision made by the UNHCR in Kivenmaa44 demonstrated that such 
                                                          
36  Tladi 2018 SALJ 707-708.  
37  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
38  Para [34].  
39  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC), 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) paras [34]-
[35]. 
40  Ackermann 2006 SALJ 508. Comparative law has proved instructive and helpful in the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in many different areas, see the list on 510-513. 
41  See, e.g. para [48].  
42  See Chapter 4 below, as well as footnote 16 in Chapter 1.  
43  Mlungwana paras [48], [51]. 
44  Kivenmaa v Finland (Communication no 412/1990 CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990). 
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criminalisation limits the right in article 21 of the ICCPR.45 The court also referred to 
the right to freedom of assembly under the ECHR, where the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR held that the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right and one of 
the foundations of a democratic society; therefore, it must not be interpreted 
restrictively.46  
Although a host of informative guidelines and material from international and regional 
instruments are available in and applicable to South African court cases, it is generally 
not included in the training courses of the executive authorities, and does not form part 
of the criminal-law courses for law students. In addition, it can be time-consuming to 
search for guiding material. Available sources of guiding principles are therefore 
neglected. Specifically, the guidelines created from experience and gathered by 
international and regional instruments with regard to assemblies are valuable to qualify 
the conduct of the executive. Meaningful decisions and guidelines are available to 
guide participants and governments on the subject of the right to gather peacefully. 
These instances constitute guidelines that affect how the police, prosecutors and the 
judiciary exercise their discretion to arrest, prosecute or adjudicate assemblers. These 
directives may not be ignored, and gatherings in South Africa cannot be dealt with in 
isolation. Guidelines may assist the police to facilitate gatherings properly and to 
minimise violent conduct by participants. These principles lay a normative framework 
for the state’s executive powers to operate within, and thus act as a standard against 
which the conduct of the executive power can be tested. Although South Africa has a 
high number of protest action taking place almost on a daily basis, it does not have a 
wealth of decisions on this right, while international and foreign case law and 
constitutionally sound guidelines already exists. South Africa can look towards 
international law in developing their jurisprudence, and also in guiding the state on the 
subject of guaranteeing human rights and solving legal problems. The guidelines on 
international and regional law as regards gatherings consequently needs to be 
examined more closely, as in the following paragraphs.  
                                                          
45  Mlungwana paras [48]-[49]. 
46  Mlungwana para [51]. 
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2.4 International and regional guidelines on gatherings 
This section focuses on guidelines and principles derived from international and 
regional instruments; specifically, under the international Bill of Rights, the African 
Charter and the ECHR. These instruments take cognisance of each other, and show 
conformity with regard to guidelines and case law when facilitating gatherings, 
therefore, the principles can be deemed as being universally acceptable. These 
human-rights systems adopt and publish guidelines to inform member states and civil 
society of their responsibilities towards the right of freedom of assembly. For South 
African jurists, the facts of international and regional case law on gatherings are also 
important in establishing when and what restrictions may be placed on the right to 
gather peacefully (when the state decides to arrest and prosecute participants of 
gatherings). In the following paragraphs, under each guideline, the background will 
first be provided on the particular international or regional instrument, where after the 
guidelines and examples on peaceful assemblies will be specified and discussed. 
2.4.1  Guidelines under the Bill of Human Rights  
The International Bill of Human Rights includes the UDHR, which declares itself “a 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”47 By signing the UDHR, 
member states aim to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, in co-operation with the United Nations (UN).48 Although the UDHR is not a 
legally binding document, it provides that “everyone is entitled to all rights and 
freedoms, without distinction of any kind,”49 and that “everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”50 The UDHR is the basis for two 
binding treaties;51 the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These three documents form the foundation of the modern 
system of international human rights.52 For purposes of this chapter, the ICCPR is 
extremely important. Article 21 of the ICCPR provides that: 
                                                          
47  UDHR Preamble. 
48  Preamble of the UDHR. 
49  Article 2 of the UDHR. 
50  Article 20(1) of the UDHR, Preamble. See also Dugard International law: A South African 
perspective 325. 
51  Roberts The contentious history of the International Bill of Human Rights ix. 
52  Roberts The contentious history of the International Bill of Human Rights ix. 
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The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised. No restrictions may be placed 
on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security 
or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
States that are party to the Covenant are, therefore, obligated to promote human rights 
and freedoms, while individuals have a duty and responsibility to other individuals and 
to the community.53 In terms of article 21 of the ICCPR, the right to peaceful assembly 
can only be limited in conformity with the law of a state; or when necessary in a 
democratic society, and when it is in the interests of national security, public safety, 
public order, the protection of public health, the protection of morals, and the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. These restrictions are of a general nature. States 
can use their own discretion to interpret the restrictions to their benefit. However, any 
restriction on the right to peaceful assembly must be necessary and proportional.  
Any state party to the Covenant may issue a written communication to another state 
party if the state is not adhering to the provisions of the ICCPR.54 The ICCPR 
establishes a Human Rights Committee55 (HR Committee) to assist with these 
matters.56 The HR Committee deals with matters only if all the available domestic 
remedies have been exhausted.57 The Committee may, when the matter is not solved 
to the satisfaction of the state parties, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission after 
obtaining the prior consent of the state parties to investigate the matter.58 The HR 
Committee appointed its first working group in 1960 to examine human rights 
violations in South Africa, thereafter, special procedures were implemented to provide 
for individual complaints.59  
                                                          
53  See Art 2 of the ICCPR. South Africa signed the Covenant in 1994, and ratified it in 1998. The 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was ratified by South Africa in 2002. See UN 
https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (Date of use: 8 July 2020).  
54  Article 41(a) of the ICCPR. 
55  Article 28 of the ICCPR. 
56  Article 41(b) of the ICCPR. 
57  Article 41(c) of the ICCPR. This is not the rule where domestic remedies are unreasonably 
prolonged. In Khadija v Netherlands (Communication no 1438/2005 CCPR/C/88/D/1438/2005 15 
November 2006), Khadija claimed inter alia a violation of art 21, since he was denied the right of 
peaceful assembly. Netherlands challenged the admissibility of the communication, arguing that 
Khadija did not exhaust the domestic remedies. The communication was ruled inadmissible, see 
paras [2.1]-[2.7]. 
58  Article 42(1) of the ICCPR. 
59  Roberts The contentious history of the International Bill of Human Rights 556-559; Dugard 
International law: A South African perspective 329-330.  
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When a violation of a right under the Covenant is established, the HR Committee has 
the power to instruct a state to provide the complainants with a remedy which includes, 
amongst others, reimbursement of legal costs, payment of the value of the fine paid, 
compensation, steps to prevent similar violations, and to ensure that legislation 
conforms to the provisions of the Covenant.60 Therefore, it would appear that the HR 
Committee makes recommendations and hopes that the state party will act on these.  
Although the ICCPR provides that state parties and individuals may refer matters to 
the HR Committee, it stays a concern that the Committee does not have any real 
powers to compel states to conform to its suggestions. There is a possibility that the 
state parties may choose to ignore the suggestions.61 For example, in Turchenyak and 
Others v Belarus,62 Turchenyak and the other petitioners claimed that their right to 
peaceful assembly (guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant) was restricted. The 
government of Belarus argued that they did not consent to an extension of the HR 
Committee’s mandate that communications may be submitted by a third party (lawyers 
and other persons) on behalf of individuals who alleged a violation of their rights.63 On 
this basis, Belarus declined to react to the communications.64  
It appears that the procedure to be followed under the instrument can be time-
consuming, and that decisions are being made by the HR Committee long after the 
actual incident took place. In practice, a person could be sentenced to death (in 
countries where the death penalty is still applicable) before the Committee makes a 
finding.  
  
                                                          
60  Govsha v Belarus (Communication no 1790/2008 CCPR/C/105/D/1790/2008 14 September 2012) 
(hereinafter Govsha v Belarus); Poliakov v Belarus (Communication no 2030/2011 
CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011 25 August 2014) (hereinafter Poliakov v Belarus); Kovalenko v Belarus 
(Communication no CCPR/C/108/D/1808/2008 26 September 2013) (hereinafter Kovalenko v 
Belarus).  
61  In Tanganyika Law Society & Another v Tanzania (Application 009/2011 consolidated with Mtikila 
v Tanzania Application 011/2011). See Enabulele 2016 AHRLJ 2.  
62  Turchenyak and Others v Belarus (Communication no 1948/2010 24 July 2013) (hereinafter 
Turchenyak and Others v Belarus).   
63  Turchenyak and Others v Belarus para [1]. 
64  Turchenyak and Others v Belarus para [1]. 
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2.4.1.1  Guidelines on peaceful assemblies under the Bill of Human Rights 
To protect and promote human rights in the context of peaceful assemblies, the HR 
Committee developed a General Comment on article 21 of the ICCPR.65 The HR 
Committee gained valuable experience by reviewing the reports and communications 
on gatherings of several states. The aim of the General comment is to provide 
appropriate and authoritative guidance to state parties and other actors on the 
measures to be adopted to ensure compliance with the rights protected under article 
21. It is an interpretive document and standard against which domestic legislation and 
conduct of governments must be tested.  
The General comment states inter alia that assemblies are an important means of 
participatory democracy; therefore, governments must ensure that this right is 
available to everyone.66 It is further of importance that the right of peaceful assembly 
is an individual right that is exercised collectively.67 Peaceful assemblies are a vital 
tool to bring concerns under the attention of the government; failure to recognise this 
right to gather is a marker of repression.68 However, violent gatherings are not 
protected by article 21, but the other rights in the Covenant are still available to 
individual participants.69 The General comment delineates violence as including 
physical force that is likely to result in injury or death, or serious damage to property. 
The mere pushing and shoving, or disruption of movement or daily activities do not 
amount to violence.70 It is interesting to note that expressing oneself online is protected 
by article 21 of the Covenant.71 As such, peaceful assemblies can take place online 
or rely on digital services, and state parties must refrain from blocking internet 
connectivity. Any restriction on information dissemination systems must conform to 
article 21 of the ICCPR.72 
The document further provides that governments have constitutional duties in respect 
of peaceful assemblies; they must respect and facilitate peaceful assemblies, promote 
an enabling environment, protect participants’ safety, and ensure accountability and 
                                                          
65  ICCPR General Comment 1-18. 
66  ICCPR General Comment para [1]. 
67  ICCPR General Comment para [4]. 
68  ICCPR General Comment para [2]. 
69  ICCPR General Comment para [9]. 
70  ICCPR General Comment para [15]. 
71  ICCPR General Comment para [13]. 
72  ICCPR General Comment para [34]. 
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remedies to victims of human rights violations.73 States must further enact domestic 
legislation to regulate peaceful assemblies in order to comply with international human 
rights norms and standards, which creates a general framework for restrictions of the 
right.74 The criminal justice system, for example, police members, must be properly 
trained, as they need to understand group dynamics and the importance of 
communication with participants and organisers. The intention of police members must 
always be to enable the assembly to take place as planned.75 Lastly, the fact that 
peaceful assemblies may provoke violent reactions from the public is not a legitimate 
reason to prohibit a gathering.76 
These comments were created to ensure the protection of human rights when people 
embark on peaceful assemblies. The General comment is not only a useful tool to 
assist state parties to comply with international human rights, norms and standards, 
but also has an educational purpose with regard to members of the public. It is clear 
that the right to assemble may not be disregarded by a government. The right needs 
to be facilitated to enable anyone to enjoy the freedom to gather.  
In South Africa, protest action is the voice of the people, and sometimes the only 
opportunity to inform the government of problems experienced by the poor; therefore, 
assemblies must take place without unwarranted interference. Restrictions must not 
be implemented lightly, particularly in circumstances when legislation provides for the 
sanctioning of the failure to adhere to technical detail of arranging gatherings. The 
Gatherings Act, for example, provides that organisers may be prosecuted if they fail to 
attend a meeting called by the local authority after notification of a planned gathering.77 
When governments allow peaceful protests, they foster accountability, however, to 
only adhere to the recommendations of the General comment is not sufficient ‒ 
governments need to be seen to listen and act on causes brought under their attention 
by members of the public.  
2.4.1.2 Case law on violations of the right to peaceful assembly 
The following communications are examples indicating how the HR Committee deals 
                                                          
73  ICCPR General Comment paras [21]-[25] 
74  ICCPR General Comment paras [36]-[40]. 
75  ICCPR General Comment paras [74]-[80]. 
76  ICCPR General Comment para [27]. 
77  Section 12(1)(b). 
34 
with violations of the right to peacefully assembly. Cognizance of these examples is 
important when South African courts deal with offences in respect of the right to gather. 
Most of the communications refer to or stem from complaints received from individuals 
in Belarus, where a lack of political will on the part of the state authority is identified to 
improve human rights.78   
In Govsha v Belarus, Belarusian nationals claimed a violation of their right to peaceful 
assembly,79 after the state prohibited a meeting of their organisation.80 The meeting 
was banned due to the following reasons; (a) a meeting on a similar subject had 
already taken place; (b) contrary to the requirements of article 5 of the Law on Mass 
Events, the application was not accompanied by receipts confirming that services 
relating to the protection of public order and security, medical facilities and cleaning at 
the end of the meeting, had been paid;81 and (c) contrary to the requirements of article 
8 of the Law on Mass Events, an announcement about the meeting was published in 
the newspaper before the organisation obtained authorisation to organise the 
meeting.82 The HR Committee noted that the state ‒ by imposing procedures for 
organising a mass event ‒ effectively placed restrictions on the right to freedom of 
expression and assembly.83 Since the state failed to show why the restrictions were 
necessary,84 the state was required to reimburse the applicants’ legal costs, to pay 
compensation, and to take steps to prevent a similar violation.85 A similar situation 
occurred in Poliakov v Belarus.86 Poliakov applied to the Executive Committee of the 
City of Gomel to organise a demonstration in the form of a picket.87 His request was 
rejected since the manner in which the demonstration would be conducted was not 
specified, and the application did not comply with Decision no. 299 of 2 April 2008 of 
                                                          
78  UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus 1.  
79  Govsha v Belarus para [1.1]. 
80  Govsha v Belarus para [3.1]. 
81  E.g., they did not provide receipts confirming that services relating to the protection of public order 
and security, medical facilities and cleaning at the end of the meeting had been paid. Sections 5 
and 6 of the Law on Mass Events contain various requirements, such as measures for securing 
public order and safety at a mass event, measures connected with medical services and cleaning 
after an event, and so on.  
82  Govsha v Belarus para [6.1]. 
83  Govsha v Belarus para [9.3]. 
84  Govsha v Belarus para [9.4]. 
85  Govsha v Belarus paras [11-12]. The HR Committee gave the state party 180 days to provide 
information about these measures. 
86  Poliakov v Belarus (Communication no 2030/2011 CCPR/C/111/D/2030/2011 25 August 2014) 
(hereinafter Poliakov v Belarus). 
87  Poliakov v Belarus para [2.1]. 
35 
the Executive Committee of the City of Gomel, which states that: 
…public gatherings can only be organised if the organisers present a letter from 
the Department of Interior of the District Administration (to ensure public order 
during the demonstration), the Health Department (to ensure medical care during 
the demonstration) and the Utilities Department (to ensure cleaning of the area 
where the demonstration was to take place).88  
Poliakov argued that the decision created considerable obstacles for organisers of 
public events, since documents from three separate public service departments had 
to be obtained, and public gatherings are only allowed at one location on the outskirts 
of the city.89 The HR Committee observed that the restrictions imposed are 
burdensome,90 furthermore, that the state did not demonstrate how a denial of the 
request to picket “constituted a proportionate interference with the right of peaceful 
assembly, i.e. that it was the least intrusive measure and proportionate to the interests 
the state sought to protect”.91 The state also failed to explain why Poliakov was not 
given an opportunity to amend his request, and to add the details omitted.  
A government may, therefore, not prohibit a gathering because a similar meeting has 
taken place; or because an application to hold a gathering is not accompanied by 
receipts that confirm that services will be rendered; or because an announcement 
about the meeting is published before authorisation is obtained. These grounds 
constitute a violation of the rights of the participants if the state is not able to justify 
why the restriction is necessary. Additionally, the state must give organisers an 
opportunity to rectify a request before rejecting it due to technical details. In South 
Africa, the Gatherings Act regulates public gatherings and demonstrations at certain 
places, and provides that gatherings may be prohibited by the executive or that 
conditions may be imposed by them.92 The Regulations Relating to Emergency Care 
at Mass Gathering Events93 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) are applicable 
in South Africa when an organiser plans to hold a gathering involving the attendance 
of more than a 1000 participants,94 or when less than 1000 participants are expected, 
                                                          
88  Poliakov v Belarus para [3.1]. 
89  Poliakov v Belarus para [3.3]. 
90  Poliakov v Belarus para [8.3]. 
91  Poliakov v Belarus para [8.3]. 
92  See discussion of the Gatherings Act, Chapter 4 below. 
93  Enacted in terms of section 90 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, published in GG 40919 dated 
15 June 2017, GN 566.  
94  Regulation 2(1). 
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but it is considered a high-risk event.95 In these circumstances, the Regulations require 
the organiser to arrange a risk assessment, and to arrange for adequate health and 
medical services. The organiser is liable for the cost of the emergency medical 
services.96 The decisions of the HR Committee are therefore an important standard to 
weigh the conduct of the executive against.   
In Kovalenko v Belarus, Kovalenko and about thirty inhabitants of Vitebsk, who had 
relatives who died in the Stalinist camps, attended a memorial service.97 When the 
bus transporting the participants stopped in the parking lot, and the participants started 
taking out wreaths, flowers and a cross, police officers demanded that the memorial 
be stopped as it constituted an unauthorised mass event or picket.98 The participants 
were detained and later prosecuted. The participants argued that the memorial in 
question was never intended to constitute any political, social or economic action, 
therefore, they had not sought prior authorisation, and, after all, the memorial did not 
affect the rights of others nor result in the damage to property.99 The state argued that 
the event was conducted on a public road; that the participants used flags which do 
not constitute a state symbol;100 and that authorisation for the gathering was not 
obtained.101 The HR Committee was of the opinion that the state failed to show how 
the memorial violated the interests of the state,102 and, therefore, found that the rights 
of the participants were violated.  
The issue of prior authorisation for a demonstration form the focal point in Bazarov v 
Belarus.103 In this case, Bazarov was arrested after he participated in a street march, 
and moved along a pavement down Lenin Street while carrying a flag. He was found 
guilty of partaking in an unauthorised mass action and fined 70,000 Belarusian 
roubles. He submitted that the event could not be considered mass action since only 
three persons were part of the event.104 He explained that the event was spontaneous; 
                                                          
95  Regulation 2(2). 
96  See Chapter 4 below. 
97  Kovalenko v Belarus para [1-2.1]  
98  Kovalenko v Belarus para [2.2]. 
99  Kovalenko v Belarus para [3.2]. 
100  Kovalenko v Belarus para [4.2]. 
101  Kovalenko v Belarus para [4.3]. See section 2 of the Law on Mass Events. 
102  Kovalenko v Belarus para [8.8]. 
103  Bazarov v Belarus (Communication no 1934/2010; CCPR/C/111/D/1934/2010 29 August 2014) 
para [2.1] (hereinafter Bazarov v Belarus). 
104  Bazarov v Belarus para [2.4]. 
37 
therefore, there was no need to notify the authorities. He only participated for ten 
minutes before he was arrested by the police.105 The HR Committee was of the opinion 
that the state failed to explain why it was necessary to receive prior authorisation when 
only three persons intended to participate.106 Furthermore, the HR Committee found it 
difficult to understand how walking along a pavement with a flag could violate the rights 
and freedoms of others, or pose a threat to public safety or order. The Committee 
suggested that it is more constructive for the executive to allow peaceful gatherings to 
continue than to take a restrictive approach by arresting participants.107 Consequently, 
states must be careful to fully assess a situation before restricting the rights of anyone. 
When people gather peacefully, the state must be cautious to interfere, since any 
hindrance without being able to show that the gathering affected the rights of others 
or the interest of the state, will be seen as a violation of the right to freedom of 
assembly.108  
If a government refuses to authorise proposed gatherings, the refusal may constitute 
a restriction on the right of peaceful assembly. In Kirsanov v Belarus,109 Kirsanov 
applied for authorisation in order to hold a stationary demonstration to draw attention 
to the state’s attempt to dismantle the Belarus Communist Party. The state denied 
authorisation; the reason being that the demonstration was planned by a political party. 
The HR Committee concluded that the right to peaceful assembly also includes the 
preparation and participation of the organiser and the organisation. The refusal to 
allow an assembly on the basis of the political contents constitutes serious interference 
with the right to gather. As stated by the Committee, when a state: 
…imposes restrictions to balance an individual’s right and the general interest, it 
must facilitate the right, rather than introducing unnecessary or disproportionate 
limitations.110  
  
                                                          
105  Bazarov v Belarus para [2.6]. 
106  Bazarov v Belarus para [7.5]. 
107  Bazarov v Belarus para [7.5]. 
108  In South Africa, participants in peaceful gatherings run the risk of being arrested under the 
Trespassing Act 6 of 1959 if they gather on private or municipal property. See Chapter 6. 
109  Kirsanov v Belarus (Communication no 1864/2009 CCPR/C/110/D/1864/2009 12 May 2014). 
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In another application for authorisation to gather, that of Chebotareva v Russian 
Federation,111 Chebotareva requested permission to hold a picket at the town square. 
However, the city’s administration suggested an alternative location for the event. 
Chebotareva responded that the suggested location would not serve the purpose of 
the picket, and re-submitted a request to hold the picket in a different location. The city 
administration once again suggested another location. The HR Committee found that 
the state’s restriction was unnecessary, and their refusal was a mere pretext to reject 
the request, thus, the right guaranteed in article 21 was violated.  
Also, in Turchenyak and Others v Belarus, Turchenyak filed an application with the 
city executive requesting permission to hold a three-day picket.112 The picket details 
involved ten people to gather for two hours at a pedestrian zone. The application was 
denied, since Decision No. 1715 of the Brest City Executive Committee approved a 
sport stadium as the only location for mass public events. The HR Committee 
remarked that a state must justify why a right needs to be limited.113 A request may 
not be rejected on the sole reason that one location was previously approved for public 
events, since organisers may choose a location for a picket or gathering within sight 
and sound of a target audience. The state also failed to justify why authorisation was 
required to hold a meeting in a private place rented by a political party in Lozenko v 
Belarus.114 The meeting was interrupted by the police, who entered the room, detained 
28 people, and charged them with participating in an unauthorised public event.115  
  
                                                          
111  Chebotareva v Russian Federation (Communication no 1866/2009 CCPR/C/101/D/1866/2009 26 
March 2012) Summary 1. 
112  Turchenyak and Others v Belarus para [1]. 
113  Turchenyak and Others v Belarus para [1]. See Kuznetsov v Belarus (Communication no 
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114  Lozenko v Belarus (Communication no 1929/2010 CCPR/C/112/D/1987/2010 24 October 2014) 
Case Digest Summary (hereinafter Lozenko v Belarus). 
115  Lozenko v Belarus 3. 
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The above cases provide illustrations of what the HR Committee has recognised as 
amounting to unjustified restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly under article 21 
of the ICCPR. Therefore, states must be careful to restrict the rights of organisers or 
participants of peaceful gatherings in the following situations:   
 Banning the organisation of a peaceful assembly merely on the grounds that a 
meeting on a similar subject had already been organised.116  
 Rejecting the right to organise a gathering on the basis of its political content.117 
 Withholding approval if the announcement about the venue, timing, subject 
matter and organisers of a meeting is published in a newspaper before 
authorisation is obtained. 
 Arresting people who attend a memorial, when the event was never intended to 
constitute political, social or economic protest action.  
 Withholding authorisation for a demonstration when the aim is to attract public 
attention to the state’s policy against opposition political parties.118  
 Creating considerable obstacles for organisers of public events.119 
 Allowing public gatherings to be organised in only one specific location, far from 
the target audience.  
 Arresting a group of people merely for walking on a pavement while holding 
photographs and posters, in order to attract public attention regarding a specific 
topic.120 
 Withholding authorisation because the application is incomplete or not 
accompanied by receipts that provide confirmation of payment for services 
relating to the protection of public order and security, medical facilities and 
cleaning after the meeting. 
 Arresting people who attend a meeting held in a private space rented by a political 
party. 
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The approach of the HR Committee in safeguarding the right to peaceful assembly 
under article 21 of the ICCPR is important since the South African Constitution already 
guarantees a similar right in the Bill of Rights.121 These decisions are relevant when 
South African courts apply national legislation, and when the state utilises the 
discretion to arrest or prosecute participants for offences that stem from the right to 
gather. Just as the rights and freedoms set out in article 21 of the ICCPR are not 
absolute, and may be subject to restrictions in certain situations,122 the Constitution of 
South Africa also provides that the human rights protected in the Constitution may be 
restricted. When a state imposes any procedure for organising a gathering, it 
effectively establishes restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly, and the state 
needs to demonstrate why such restrictions are necessary.123 When a right is violated, 
the state is obliged to provide an effective remedy.  
The lessons learned from the HR Committee cases are applicable in the South African 
context. It is important that the right of peaceful assembly is not restricted 
unnecessarily by decisions of the executive authorities. Organisers and participants of 
gatherings must be allowed as far as possible to organise and participate in peaceful 
meetings, especially if it is not hampering any interest of the state. Police officials must 
be properly trained, and their intention must always be on the facilitation of a peaceful 
gathering, rather than to disperse it.  
2.4.2  Guidelines under the African Charter 
The African Charter is binding on African states that acknowledge the importance of 
human rights, and have ratified the Charter.124 The member states of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) must recognise the rights and duties protected in the Charter, 
and must adopt legislation to give effect thereto.125 The enforcement of the rights in 
the Charter is entrusted to the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights 
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(ACHPR). The Charter provides for human and peoples’ rights. Violation of any 
provision of the African Charter is considered a violation of article 1.126 Article 2 
provides that “everyone is entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms, without 
any distinction, for example to race, sex, language, religion or status.” The enjoyment 
of all the rights in the Charter must be exercised with regard to the rights of others, 
and for their security, morality and common interest.127  
The ACHPR must promote and protect human rights and interpret the Charter.128 A 
member state may, by written communication, draw the attention of a state to a matter, 
if there are good reasons to believe that another member state violated the provisions 
of the Charter.129 When a conclusion cannot be reached, the matter must be submitted 
to the ACHPR.130 Individuals may also bring a complaint to the ACHPR alleging that 
a state, who is party to the Charter, has violated his or her right.131 A complaint may 
be brought on behalf of others.132 The ACHPR may only consider a communication 
when the seven requirements in Article 56 are adhered to.133 The ACHPR, for 
example, will not deal with cases before all local remedies have been exhausted, 
unless it is obvious that these remedies would be unduly prolonged.134 To assist with 
the duties, the ACHPR must draw inspiration, inter alia, from international law on 
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and imprisoned; therefore, he could not have access to local remedies. 
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human rights, other African instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of 
the UN, and the UDHR.135  
Unfortunately, the resolution process is hindered by member states that fail to report 
back after receiving written communications, the slow process of examination of 
complaints, and the making of recommendations by the ACHPR.136 Furthermore, the 
legal status of the ACHPR’s findings and recommendations is unclear, since there is 
no clear mechanism to hold member states accountable.137 
The African Charter also established the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(AfCHPR) to safeguard the protection of human and peoples’ rights. The court’s 
mission is to complement and reinforce the purpose of the ACHPR.138 However, few 
African states recognise the competence of the court to receive cases, thereby 
seriously hampering the court in performing its mandate.139  
2.4.2.1  The right to assemble freely under the African Charter 
The African Charter protects the rights to assemble freely in article 11, and the right to 
free association in article 10. Both are fundamental rights that are inextricably 
interlinked with each other and with other rights.140 For the purpose of this chapter, 
article 11 is relevant. Article 11 of the Charter provides that:  
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise 
of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in 
particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics 
and rights and freedoms of others.141  
Anyone can freely gather with others. The right to assemble is not absolute, and can 
be restricted by member states if it is necessary in the interest of national security, the 
safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others. The African Charter has a 
general application; therefore, member states may decide how the right is facilitated. 
The African Charter takes due regard of the UN Charter and the UDHR. South Africa, 
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being a member state of the African Union, has a duty to bring national and domestic 
law in compliance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed in these instruments.  
2.4.2.2  Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in the African Charter 
Article 45 of the African Charter mandates the ACHPR to formulate principles and 
rules to solve legal problems relating to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental 
freedoms. These rules have been adopted by the ACHPR in the Guidelines on 
freedom of association and assembly in Africa. The aim of these guidelines is to assist 
member states and relevant role players in developing human-rights standards,142 and 
to strengthen the obligations as set forth in the African Charter.143 The Guidelines on 
freedom of association and assembly in Africa must, however, not be seen as static 
but evolving in the course of time as new challenges emerge.144 The Guidelines on 
freedom of association and assembly in Africa are intended to serve as a basis for 
drafting laws that are compatible with the human rights protected in the African 
Charter.145  
The guidelines provide, inter alia, that nobody may be compelled to participate in a 
gathering,146 and that the right to gather only applies to peaceful gatherings. A 
gathering is seen as peaceful if the organisers have peaceful intentions, and the 
conduct at the gathering is generally peaceful. Isolated acts of violent conduct do not 
disqualify gatherings from being seen as peaceful, and conduct that annoys or hinders 
is still included under the understanding of the concept of ‘peaceful’.147 It is required 
that all the role players involved in gatherings be properly trained, and be made aware 
that the primary task is to facilitate peaceful gatherings.148 
The guidelines affirm that it is a right to be able to gather; therefore, obtaining 
permission from the government is not a requirement. However, notification 
procedures may be put in place to facilitate the exercise of this right, and to protect the 
rights of others.149 Notification procedures must, however, not be burdensome, and 
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failure to adhere to notification procedures must not render gatherings automatically 
illegal.150 These notification periods must be as short as possible, only to allow the 
authorities time to prepare to facilitate the gathering. The notification process must be 
simple, involving the completion of a form, to be submitted online, free of charge.151 It 
is imperative that the notification procedures need to be clear, transparent and easily 
readable.152 
According to the Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa, 
everything possible needs to be done to facilitate different gatherings taking place 
simultaneously.153 Gatherings with a small number of participants or spontaneous 
gatherings do not require notification.154 One body must be responsible for receiving 
notifications, and for informing other relevant role players.155 An independent oversight 
body must be available.156 Gatherings must not be prohibited as part of a general ban 
but must be handled on a case-by-case basis.157 Restrictions may only be imposed in 
accordance with the principle of legality; therefore, gatherings may not be restricted 
on broad or vague grounds.158 The executive must attempt to facilitate gatherings at 
a place and within sight of its target audience,159 and they must also protect gatherings 
from interference from third parties.160 Conditions imposed by the government must 
be narrowly tailored and promote a substantial interest.161 The prohibition of 
gatherings may only be used as a measure of last resort.162 Any sanctions must apply 
in narrow and lawfully prescribed circumstances, and be proportional to the gravity of 
the conduct.163  
As regards the responsibilities of the organisers or participants, these persons are not 
liable for costs of security and safety measures.164 Organisers may not be held 
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responsible if they fail to notify the government of a planned gathering or the public 
costs of such a gathering. However, organisers may be subject to monetary sanction 
when they failed to notify the executive of a planned gathering, and there is harm that 
was reasonably foreseeable caused during the gathering, and they failed to take 
reasonable steps within their power to prevent the harm. 165 When the right to gather 
has been infringed, organisers and participants must have a right to a remedy, which 
include compensation for harm that occurred. Members of the state who implement 
disproportional sanctions, disperse, or harass assemblies, must be held liable for 
violating the right to gather. 166  
The Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa, the General 
comment issued by the HR Committee,167 and the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful 
assembly168 are all in conformity. The Guidelines on freedom of association and 
assembly in Africa establish a standard against which all member states must 
measure their legislation in order to ensure the protection and fulfilment of human 
rights. The guidelines also serve as a training document for the police, prosecutors 
and judiciary when utilising their discretion with regard to offences stemming from the 
right to gather. Since it is assumed that the recommendations from the ACHPR are 
not binding, and that there is no clear mechanism of enforcement,169 it is debatable 
whether the member states will adhere to these guidelines or choose selective 
implementation. For example, the guideline suggesting that organisers and 
participants can claim compensation for any harm that occurred when the state 
infringed the right to peaceful assembly will be met with cynicism by many states.170 
Also, the guideline that provides that the authorities must be held liable if they institute 
groundless or disproportionate sanctions or disperse or harass peaceful gatherings171 
will be difficult to implement when there is no independent oversight body. Organisers, 
again, will not want to be held responsible for a monetary sanction when they failed to 
notify the government of an intended gathering, and there was reasonably foreseeable 
harm caused by the gathering but they failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it.172 
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On the other hand, the guideline providing that sanctions may only be applied in 
narrow and lawfully prescribed circumstances, and that they must be proportionate,173 
is especially valuable with regard to how the right to gather must be facilitated by the 
South African government.  
On the whole, these guidelines are clear and easily understandable, and can assist to 
inform the general public what gathering conduct is deemed acceptable or not. South 
Africa, being a member state of the African Union, needs to recognise these rights, 
duties and freedoms as enshrined in the Charter, and needs to adopt legislation or 
give effect to the provisions of the Charter. The guidelines are an effective and 
instructive tool to revisit existing legislation, or to create new legislation in compliance 
with human-rights standards. It is therefore suggested that South Africa formally 
adopts the guidelines through legislation.   
2.4.2.3  Case law on violations of the right to peaceful assembly 
There are a number of cases dealing with the violation of the right to assemble freely 
with others in terms of article 11 of the African Charter.174 In most of these instances, 
the right to assemble was unnecessarily restricted. For example, in some African 
states, it is required from organisers to obtain a permit before a gathering may be held. 
In Inspector-General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party and Others,175 a request to 
issue police permits to hold rallies was refused. When a rally was held without a permit, 
it was violently disrupted by the police, since the Public Order Act176 prohibits the 
holding of rallies or processions without a police permit.177 Section 1(2) of the Act 
provides that the organiser must apply for a licence, 48 hours before the gathering.178 
The court considered whether a police permit is required for the holding of a rally,179 
and decided that the Public Order Act does not only impose restrictions on the right to 
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gather, it also leaves “an unregulated discretion on the whims of officials”.180 The court 
found that the requirement of a permit as a condition to hold meetings and rallies 
cannot be justified in a democratic society.181  
In the case of New Patriotic Party v Inspector-General of Police,182 the police granted 
a permit to hold a rally in Sekondi, Ghana. However, two days later, the permit was 
withdrawn and the rally prohibited. The complainant and other political parties 
embarked on a peaceful demonstration to protest against the retraction.183 The police 
disrupted the demonstration, arrested the participants, and charged them with 
demonstrating without a permit.184 The court held that when the Commissioner of 
Police prohibits a public meeting, he restricts the freedom to gather,  furthermore, that 
once a permit was granted, there was no lawful authority for the police to withdraw it. 
The fact that other persons might disturb the meeting or procession, and thereby 
cause a breach of the peace is not a sufficient reason to withdraw a permit.185 The 
court expressed concern that a senior police officer may, out of prejudice, bias or even 
political preference, refuse to issue a permit.186 This decision holds a warning for South 
Africa. The Gatherings Act provides that an official from the municipality may prohibit 
a gathering or allow it to continue on certain conditions. Ironically, protests and 
marches may be aimed against the non-service delivery of the same dysfunctional 
municipality to whom notice must be given of the intended gathering.  
In the case of Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland,187 the Lawyers for Human 
Rights argued that during 1973, King Sobhuza II issued a proclamation188 whereby he 
outlawed political parties, and, therefore, violated the Swazi people’s right to freedom 
of assembly. The violations started in 1973 following the Proclamation by the King, 
prior to the coming into force of the African Charter, continued after Swaziland ratified 
the Charter, and is still on-going.189 The question before the court was whether the 
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ACHPR has the competence to entertain violations which occurred before the African 
Charter entered into force.190 The ACHPR reached the decision that they may deal 
with the communication from the date the Charter was ratified by the state. The 
ACHPR established that Swaziland failed to take appropriate measures to bring their 
domestic laws in conformity with the African Charter, thus violating the rights protected 
in the Charter.191  
In Malawi, the president gave a directive at a rally that there will be no demonstrations 
for or against the envisaged constitutional amendment dealing with the presidential 
term limit.192 The directive was not reduced into writing. An application was brought to 
court arguing that the directive violates the rights to freedom of association, assembly 
and demonstration as guaranteed by the Constitution.193 The court found the directive 
made by the president was unconstitutional, and found the banning of all forms of 
demonstrations unreasonable since the ban is too wide and not capable of 
enforcement.194 The shouting of slogans and displaying of placards are part and parcel 
of rallies, and would be impossible to enforce. The directives would also nullify the 
rights enshrined in the Constitution.195 
The case of Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman/Sudan196 is an example where the 
government of Sudan prevented a person from attending a gathering. Ghazi Suleiman 
was threatened with arrest if he made a trip to deliver a lecture. The court concluded 
that the prevention of the complainant to attend the gathering with others in order to 
discuss human rights, and then to punish him for doing so, violated his human rights 
to freedom of association and assembly, which are protected by Article 10 and 11 of 
the African Charter.197 Also, in Gunme & Others v Cameroon,198 the state suppressed 
demonstrations by using force in order to arrest and detain participants. The state 
admitted that demonstrators were detained, and that excessive force was applied to 
enforce law and order, for example, to disperse the demonstrations, and that lives 
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were lost because of such aggressive conduct. The ACHPR concluded that the 
conduct of the state violated article 11 of the African Charter.199 Another violation 
occurred in Amnesty International and Others v Sudan.200 In this case, the ACHPR 
found that the Process and Transitional Powers Act of 1989,201 which prohibits any 
assembly for a political purpose in a public or private place when special permission 
was not obtained. Therefore, a general prohibition on the right to gather was seen as 
disproportionate to the measures required by the state to maintain public order, 
security and safety.202 
The above case law provides illustrations of what the ACHPR and courts have 
recognised as amounting to unjustified restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly 
under article 11 of the African Charter. From these cases in point, it is possible to 
deduce that governments must be guarded when they restrict the right to gather in 
circumstances when:  
 The discretion to allow a gathering is left to the unregulated discretion or whims 
of officials.  
 The only reason not to allow the gathering was based on speculation of a 
possibility of violence and breach of the peace, or that other persons may disturb 
the meeting. Speculation whether a breach of peace will occur is untenable, and 
will deprive a citizen of the enjoyment of his or her right.203  
 An official’s decision not to grant a permit to hold a meeting cannot be challenged 
in court.  
 An official ‒ after granting a permit for a gathering ‒ withdraws it, and prohibits 
the gathering in circumstances where there is no lawful authority to withdraw it.  
 There is a requirement that a permit must be obtained to hold a gathering. 
 Any gathering is prohibited for a political purpose in a public or private place. 
 The establishment of political parties is prohibited.  
 All forms of demonstrations are banned.  
                                                          
199  Gunme & Others v Cameroon (2009) AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009) para [136]. 
200  Gunme & Others v Cameroon (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999). 
201  Process and Transitional Powers Act of 1989 s 7. 
202  Gunme & Others v Cameroon (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999 para [82]. 
203  Inspector-General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party and Others (2007) AHRLR 179 (NgCA 
2007) para [23].  
50 
 A person is prevented from gathering with others. 
In the following section, the guidelines under the European human-rights system will 
be examined and evaluated against the guidelines under the African Charter and the 
Bill of Human Rights. The ultimate aim is to select the most functional guidelines for 
application in the South African criminal justice system. 
2.4.3  Guidelines under the European human rights system 
The ECHR was proclaimed by the governments of European countries aimed at 
protecting human rights and freedoms in Europe. Article 11 of the ECHR provides for 
the right to freedom of assembly and association and reads as follows:  
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests. 
2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, 
of the police or of the administration of the State.204 
To ensure that the European governments which are contracting parties to the ECHR 
observe the rights, duties and freedoms in the Convention, the ECtHR was 
established.205 The ECtHR can sit in a single-judge formation, in committees of three 
judges, in chambers of seven judges, or in a grand chamber of seventeen judges to 
consider cases.206 Any contracting party can refer a breach of the provisions of the 
ECHR by another contracting party to the court.207 The court may also receive 
applications from groups or individuals, claiming to be victims of a right violated by a 
contracting state.208 However, the contracting party against which the complaint has 
been lodged must declare that it recognises the competence of the court to receive 
such applications.209 The ECtHR may only deal with the matter after all domestic 
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remedies have been exhausted.210 Contracting parties are obliged to execute the final 
judgments of the court.211  
2.4.3.1  Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly in the ECHR 
As already stated in paragraph 2.1, the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
was established by the Venice Commission and the OSCE ODIHR.212 These 
guidelines are based on international and regional treaties, judgments of domestic 
courts, and on the general principles of law as recognised by the participating 
European countries.213 The guidelines set out a clear minimum standard, thereby 
establishing a threshold that must be met by the governments when regulating the 
right to assemble peacefully.214 The recommendations are valuable in assisting 
governments to facilitate gatherings, who must foremost recognise that the protection 
of the right to gather is crucial to create a “tolerant and pluralist society in which 
individuals and groups with different backgrounds and beliefs can interact peacefully 
with one another”.215 It is reiterated in the document that the state has a positive 
obligation to facilitate and protect peaceful gatherings.216 
The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly describes an assembly as “the 
intentional gathering of a number of individuals in a publicly accessible place for a 
common expressive purpose.”217 A public accessible place includes private spaces 
that are generally accessible to everyone.218 Assemblies include organised, 
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unplanned, spontaneous, static and moving gatherings.219 This collective further 
comprises online assemblies taking place on the internet that also warrant protection. 
Consequently, social media can be used as a tool to facilitate assemblies:220  
The European Convention on Human rights applies both offline and online. The 
role of the internet and social media in the mobilisation of assemblies is 
increasingly pivotal to the exercise of the right.221  
The positive obligation of states to facilitate assemblies includes increased access to 
the internet.222 Internet service providers have an obligation to respect, protect and 
host publicly available space for expression and assembly.223 Notification is not 
required for online assemblies.224 
The ECHR underscores the fact that all assemblies are protected if the organisers 
have peaceful intentions, and conduct at the assembly is non-violent.225 However, any 
conduct that annoys, gives offence, or hinders is still included in the concept of what 
is deemed peaceful.226 Therefore, only gatherings where there is convincing evidence 
that the organisers intend to use or incite imminent violence, are not protected.227 
Unlawful assemblies can be peaceful.228 A peaceful participant does not stop enjoying 
the right to gather due to sporadic violence or any further punishable acts committed 
by others during the gathering.229 The peaceful intentions of organisers are to be 
presumed, except when there is conclusive evidence that they intend to use or incite 
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imminent violence.230 
As to the regulation or the giving of prior notification of assemblies, the Guidelines on 
freedom of peaceful assembly accentuates that the right to gather must as far as 
possible be enjoyed without any regulation.231 Advance notification of an assembly is 
not a requirement under international human rights law, however, prior notification 
enables governments to ensure peaceful assemblies, and to facilitate the event.232 In 
this regard, the public must have easy and practical access to relating procedure, law, 
regulations and police procedure with regard to assemblies.233 Notification should not 
be required for assemblies in buildings.234 Blanket legal restrictions, for example, the 
banning of all assemblies during certain times, or at certain locations or public places 
constitute excessive restrictions violating the right to freedom of assembly.235 As 
regards penalties imposed for unlawful conduct committed in the context of gatherings, 
these must be: 
…necessary and proportionate, since unnecessary, or disproportionately harsh 
sanctions for behaviour during assemblies could inhibit the holding of such events 
and have a chilling effect that may prevent participants from attending. Such 
sanctions may constitute an indirect violation of the freedom of peaceful assembly. 
Offences such as the failure to provide advance notice of an assembly or the failure 
to comply with route, time and place restrictions imposed on an assembly should 
not be punishable with prison sentences, or heavy fines.236  
The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly comprises of practical experience 
that was gained by contacting parties of the ECHR dealing with assemblies over years. 
It is a living document that grows with changes in societies.237 The guidelines take 
cognizance of problems experienced by governments when facilitating human rights. 
It is a reliable standard against which the conduct of participants and the executive 
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must be measured. These guidelines can assist the South African government in 
facilitating the right to peaceful assembly, and to prevent violence. If the guidelines are 
introduced into the Gatherings Act,238 it will solve various concerns, for example, the 
fact that organisers may be prosecuted when they fail to attend a meeting called by 
an official of the local authority.239 The Gatherings Act provides for an intricate 
procedure of notification, and possible further conditions that can be imposed on 
proposed gatherings, or that the gatherings may be prohibited. The language of the 
Gatherings Act is also difficult to understand and unclear.240   
2.4.3.2  Case law on unjustified restrictions of the right to peaceful assembly 
Article 11 of the ECHR protects the right to assemble peacefully, but the right is not 
absolute. State authorities are given: 
…a margin of appreciation and may impose restrictions on the exercise of this 
right, provided that such limitations are prescribed by law; necessary in a 
democratic society; in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.241  
How the police react to a gathering may influence the decision to prosecute 
participants. In the case of Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania,242 farmers obtained 
permits to hold demonstrations at authorised locations. The farmers decided to move 
the demonstrations onto the highways without informing the authorities. The police 
allowed the demonstrations to continue, however, prosecution was subsequently 
instituted against the farmers. The farmers alleged that their conviction for rioting 
violated their rights to freedom of assembly and expression.243 The government in 
return argued that there had not been any interference with the farmers’ rights, since 
they had been given permission to organise peaceful meetings. Furthermore, the 
farmers had not been convicted for exercising their right to gather, but for a serious 
breach of public order by organising riots. The government submitted also that when 
the farmers moved onto the highways, parked tractors, and blocked three major roads, 
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they exceeded the scope of the permits.244  
In the court’s view, the serious disruption of the activities of others is not at the core of 
the freedom as protected by article 11 of the ECHR. The moving of the demonstrations 
was done without any prior notice to the authorities, and without asking them to amend 
the terms of the permits. Although the farmers contended that the roadblocks were 
their last resort to protect legitimate interests, the court was of the opinion that there 
was no reason to question the assessment of the domestic courts that the farmers had 
alternative and lawful means to protect their interests, such as bringing complaints 
before administrative courts. The court considered that even though the farmers had 
neither performed acts of violence nor incited others to engage in such acts, the almost 
complete obstruction of three major highways was done in blatant disregard of police 
orders and the rights of road users. The police showed a high level of tolerance, even 
when the farmers refused to obey their lawful orders, the police did not disperse the 
gatherings, but attempted to balance the interests of the farmers with that of the road 
users. Therefore, in the court’s view, the domestic authorities did not violate the rights 
of the farmers by holding them criminally liable for their conduct. The court concluded 
that the Lithuanian authorities struck a fair balance between the legitimate aims of the 
“prevention of disorder [and the] protection of the rights and freedoms of others”245 on 
the one hand, and the requirements of freedom of assembly on the other.  
The case of Frumkin v Russia246 is an illustration where the state’s over-reach in 
attempting to facilitate a gathering resulted in a violation of the participants’ rights. 
Notice of a public demonstration was submitted to the mayor of Moscow.247 The 
march, with an estimated 5000 participants, was to be followed by a meeting. The aim 
of the demonstration was to demand fair elections and respect for human rights. The 
organisers were warned that they cannot exceed the number of 5000 participants as 
originally declared.248 The police chief adopted a plan so as to safeguard public order; 
the plan provided for an 8094-strong crowd-control taskforce, comprising of the police 
and the military. The security plan set out the allocation and deployment of police 
vehicles, police buses, intercepting and monitoring vehicles, dog-handling teams, fire-
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fighting and rescue equipment, ambulances, and a helicopter. An 1815-strong reserve 
unit equipped with gas masks, grenades, grenade launchers, rifles, tubeless pistols, 
and two water-cannon vehicles were ordered to be on standby. The march began at 
Kaluzhskaya Square, and was peaceful without any disruptions. The official estimate 
was that there were 8000 participants. When the march approached Bolotnaya 
Square, the leaders found that the layout of the meeting and the placement of the 
police cordon make it impossible for them to access the park at Bolotnaya Square.249 
After about fifteen minutes of attempting to engage with the police, the leaders 
announced that they were going on a ‘sit-down strike’, and sat on the ground. The 
crowd around the sit-down protest increased, which caused congestion. This 
prompted the leaders to abandon the protest, and head towards the stage, followed 
by the crowd. Some of the participants broke the police cordon, and the police cordon 
began to push the crowd into the restricted area.250 In total, 656 people were detained 
in Moscow to prevent public disorder and unauthorised demonstrations.  
The applicant, Frumkin, was arrested during the dispersal. He was found guilty of the 
failure to obey lawful police orders, and was sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative 
detention. The applicant alleged a violation of his rights to peaceful assembly, freedom 
of expression and liberty. He argued that he had been prevented from taking part in 
an authorised public assembly because of the heavy-handed crowd-control measures 
used by the police. He pointed out that the restrictions as detailed in the police security 
plan were not aimed at ensuring the peaceful conduct of the assembly, but at limiting 
and suppressing it, and that the authorities had altered the original meeting layout 
without informing the organisers or the public. As tension surged, the authorities failed 
to communicate with the organisers, and failed to facilitate peaceful co-operation.251  
The question before the court was whether the authorities took all reasonable 
measures to ensure that the meeting was conducted peacefully. The court criticised 
the police for not providing a reliable channel of communication with the organisers 
before the gathering, and for failing to respond to the real-time developments in a 
constructive manner. No official took any interest in talking to the leaders who were 
showing signs of distress in front of the police cordon. The court found that the 
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authorities made insufficient efforts to communicate with the organisers to resolve 
tension caused by the confusion about the venue layout. The police neglected to take 
simple and obvious steps at the first signs of conflict. The court found that the 
applicant’s behaviour remained strictly peaceful. It followed that any measures taken 
against him had to comply with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, and must be 
necessary in a democratic society. In this context, the severity of the measures applied 
against the applicant was entirely devoid of any justification. The court held, therefore, 
that the measures taken against the appellant were grossly disproportionate to the aim 
pursued. There was no ‘pressing social need’ to arrest the applicant, and to escort him 
to the police station. Article 11 of the ECHR was breached by the applicant’s arrest, 
pre-trial detention and administrative penalty.252 This case is significant, since the 
facilitation process utilised by the police can guarantee peacefulness, or render the 
gathering violent. In South Africa, similar situations often arise. If the ECHR principles 
were introduced into this jurisdiction, people accused of public violence committed 
during a gathering in South Africa might successfully argue that the gathering was 
peaceful until the police interfered, or that the facilitation process utilised by the police 
was the cause of the violence. 
A further case in point where participants were arrested and detained by the police in 
the interest of public safety, and in order to prevent crime, is Schwabe and MG v 
Germany.253 In this case, the applicants wanted to participate in demonstrations 
against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm. When the police sought to check their 
identity, the first applicant physically resisted by allegedly hitting the arms of a 
policeman, and kicking another ‒ consequently, the applicants were arrested and 
detained for six days.254 The applicants argued that their detention disproportionately 
interfered with their rights as it made it not impossible for them to participate and 
express their views during the summit.255 The government alleged that the interference 
with the applicants’ freedoms had been justified.256  
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The court found that there was nothing to indicate that the organisers of the 
demonstrations had violent intentions. Neither could such a conclusion be drawn from 
the fact that one of the applicants resisted the police. The nature and severity of the 
sanction imposed are factors to be considered when assessing the proportionality of 
interference in relation to the aim pursued. The court must determine whether the 
reasons adduced by the authorities to justify the interference were relevant and 
sufficient. The court noted that the applicants were detained for almost six days in 
order to prevent them from inciting others. The court accepted that guaranteeing the 
security of the participants in the summit and maintaining public order in general was 
a considerable challenge for the domestic authorities. However, a fair balance needs 
to be struck between the aim of securing public safety and the applicants’ rights. The 
court was not convinced that there were not any more effective and less intrusive 
measures available.257  
Petropavlovskis v Latvia258 is a further case in point that the right to gather carries with 
it duties and responsibilities, which are subject to specified conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as prescribed by a state’s domestic laws. The applicant complained inter alia 
under articles 10259 and 11 of the ECHR that the refusal of Latvian citizenship through 
naturalisation was a punitive measure imposed on him because of his criticism of the 
government during gatherings.260 The court stated that “pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society”,261 therefore, a balance must 
be achieved between ensuring fair treatment of minorities. Nevertheless, the freedoms 
guaranteed by articles 10 and 11 cannot deprive the authorities of the right to protect 
its institutions. Hence, in order to guarantee the stability and effectiveness of a 
democratic system, the state may be required to take specific measures to protect it. 
The court agreed with the applicant that, in exercising his freedom of expression and 
assembly, he is free to disagree with government policies for as long as it takes place 
in accordance with the law, since the limits of permissible criticism are wider with 
regard to the government. However, the requirement of loyalty to the state cannot be 
considered as a punitive measure capable of interfering with the freedom of 
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assembly.262  
From the above-mentioned ECHR case law, it can be deduced that it is essential that 
governments be careful not to restrict the right to gather in situations when:  
 The executive does not provide a reliable channel of communication with the 
organisers before the gathering.  
 The authorities fail to respond to real-time developments in a constructive 
manner.  
 The authorities do not comply with their positive obligation to ensure the peaceful 
conduct of the gathering, to prevent disorder and to secure the safety of all the 
people involved.  
 There is no ‘pressing social need’ to arrest and detain a participant.  
As a result, it is crucial that police receive adequate training to be able to facilitate 
gatherings correctly. The government of the day must select the means and measures 
to guarantee the safety of the participants of gatherings, and the public in general. 
Communication with the organisers and participants, before, during, and after the 
gatherings is essential, since communication can diffuse potential violent situations. 
The executive must be careful not to instigate violence and confusion when attempting 
to facilitate gatherings. The police regularly arrest participants to diffuse a situation or 
to detain a risk, without considering that some or most of the participants’ behaviour 
remained peaceful.  
2.5  Conclusion 
Offences that stem from the right to gather, as well as that of freedom of speech, differ 
from other offences in South Africa due to the magnitude of applicable international, 
regional and foreign case law and guidelines. The Constitution provides that courts 
must consider international law and may consider foreign law. Guidelines created by 
human-rights instruments are valuable since these strategies provide a standard or 
general framework for governments on how the right to gather may be regulated in 
practice at local and national level. These guidelines are not static but evolving in order 
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to regulate novel ways of gathering, for example, online assemblies.  
Gatherings ‒ both peaceful and violent ‒ are a constant factor in South African life, yet 
the jurisdiction does not have a wealth of decisions on the right to assemble. Available 
international guidelines can assist in this regard. For example, the Guidelines on 
freedom of peaceful assembly has determined the meaning of the term ‘peaceful’ to 
include any conduct that hinders, impedes, or obstructs the activities of the general 
public, for example, by interfering with the flow of traffic. The extent of what peaceful 
conduct entails play a role in the decision-making of a police official, whether a 
gathering need to be dispersed or not. In this regard, it needs to be considered that 
some or most of the participants’ behaviour may remain peaceful. According to the 
international and regional guidelines, a peaceful gathering must ‒ as far as possible ‒ 
be enjoyed without regulation.  
The South African criminal justice system must keep track of new developments with 
regard to the right to gather, since international law is ever changing. The government 
needs to ensure that the public has access to reliable information about the 
procedures in order to arrange gatherings. Legislation with regard to the regulation of 
gatherings must also be easily assessable and understandable to a member of the 
public. It is submitted that information on gatherings, whether domestically or 
internationally, may be difficult to access by the public or even police officials. Some 
of the international standards may even be unfamiliar to the general South African 
community.  
Facilitating participation in peaceful gatherings may prevent violence, ensure that 
fewer participants are arrested, and influence the judgments of courts. It is, therefore, 
important to recognise the instances where international or regional instruments 
already identified circumstances where the right to assembly was restricted by a 
government. It is debatable whether proper court decisions can be made without 
adhering to these guidelines. When deciding to arrest, prosecute, defend or 
adjudicate, it is important that the police, prosecutor, legal adviser and presiding officer 
are well versed in their domestic laws, as well as in the application of international and 
regional instruments. As such, the following chapter will investigate the right to 
assemble, demonstrate, picket or petition as provided for in the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY, DEMONSTRATION, PICKET AND PETITION 
3.1 Introduction 
Congregating together occurs naturally during most human actions without any legal 
intrusion. This may happen physically in person or in an online gathering space. Most 
countries protect the right to assemble peacefully, to demonstrate, to picket or to 
present petitions in their constitutions.1 Several types of assembling activities are 
protected, including: 
…planned and organised assemblies, unplanned and spontaneous assemblies, 
static assemblies (such as public meetings, ‘flash mobs’, sit-ins and pickets) and 
moving assemblies (including parades, processions, and convoys).2  
For the purpose of this chapter, this right as provided in section 17 of the Constitution3 
is referred to as the right to gather. Assemblies, demonstrations, pickets and 
petitioning are included in the term ‘gathering’, if not specified otherwise. 
Although the meaning of the right to gather is basically similar in most constitutions 
(as well as in relevant international and regional instruments),4 it is the government of 
the day that decides how this right is utilised by citizens. Most constitutions not only 
provide for the right to assemble, but also indicate when this right may be limited. This 
chapter focuses on how the Constitution of South Africa guarantees the right to gather, 
                                                          
1  E.g., art 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides that “every person 
shall be entitled to assemble freely”. Nigeria is a federal republic based on the principles of 
democracy and social justice. Art 58 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 provides that “every 
person has the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right not to assemble or 
associate with others”. Art 59 provides that “every person has the right to demonstrate and to 
present petitions, but these rights must be exercised peacefully”. Zimbabwe is a unitary, 
democratic and sovereign republic. Art 21 of the Constitution of Japan, 1946 provides that “freedom 
of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are 
guaranteed”. According to Art 1 of the Constitution, the Emperor is the symbol of the state and of 
the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people. Art 67 of the Constitution 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1972 provides that “citizens are guaranteed 
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association”. According to Art 1, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an independent socialist state that represents the 
interests of all the Korean people. See also para 1.1 above. 
2  European Commission for Democracy through Law 2019 Guidelines on freedom of peaceful 
assembly para [44].  
3  See discussion in para 3.2 below. 
4  See discussion in Chapter 2 above.  
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but also permits for limitations in accordance with section 36.5 National laws and by-
laws promulgated by local governments likewise support the right to gather, but may 
also limit the right to the extent allowed by the Constitution. Legislation such as the 
Gatherings Act6 was enacted to aid the Constitution by regulating the holding of public 
gatherings and demonstrations, therefore assisting citizens to organise protest action. 
The right is however easily limited, for example, by arresting or prosecuting organisers 
or participants of gatherings.7  
How the courts deal with the question of whether or not the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society, is explored in this chapter by 
considering applicable case law. Reference is also made to the guidelines from 
international and regional instruments as discussed in chapter 2 above. It will be made 
evident in this chapter that clear and well-drafted legislation can support the right to 
gather, assist to inform the public on how to utilise their rights, and what the 
consequences of certain gathering conduct will be.8 The following paragraphs will 
examine firstly, the particular right as protected in the Constitution, new forms of 
assemblies and the regulation thereof, limitations on the right to assemble, and lastly, 
the positive obligation of the state to protect all forms of peaceful assemblies.  
3.2  The right to gather protected 
Section 17 of the Constitution guarantees “everyone the right, peacefully and 
unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions”.9 Anyone 
can bring a cause or problem under the attention of the government, but it must be 
done peacefully and unarmed. Everyone includes a natural or juristic person.10 Most 
constitutions guarantee the right of assembly to anyone in their jurisdiction.11 Some 
                                                          
5  See footnote 125 below. 
6  The offences under the Gatherings Act are discussed in Chapter 4 below, but provisions of this 
Act are referred to in this chapter since the Act is responsible for limiting the right to gather. 
7  See Sampson 2010 AHRLJ 433-434; Malherbe and Van Eck 2009 TSAR 209.  
8  See Calland and Masuku 2000 Law, Democracy & Development 121-135. 
9  Constitution s 17. 
10  Section 8 of the Constitution.  
11  According to the European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of 
peaceful assembly 2010 para [109], the right of peaceful assembly is also extended to stateless 
persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers, migrants and tourists.      
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constitutions, such as the Belgian Constitution, 1831 grants this right to citizens only;12 
however, other legislation can accord this protection to foreigners as well.13    
The South African Constitution calls for two requirements in order to receive protection 
for the right to gather: the assembly, demonstration, picket or presentation of the 
petitions must, firstly, be peaceful and secondly, the gathering must be unarmed. 
These requirements will consequently be discussed. 
3.2.1.  The gathering must be peaceful 
Assemblies, demonstrations, pickets and the presentation of petitions are excluded 
from protection by the Constitution if they are not peaceful. There is no clear indication 
in the Constitution of what exactly ‘peaceful’ entails. According to the ordinary 
meaning, the word ‘peaceful’ means: “free from disturbance, calm … not involving war 
or violence … inclined to avoid conflict”.14 Peaceful stands in contrast with violence, 
as violence entails the “use of physical force that is likely to result in injury or death or 
serious damage to property”.15 The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, 
applicable under the ECHR and to most European countries, provides that: 
Only peaceful assemblies fall within the scope of Article 11(1) ECHR and Article 
21 of the ICCPR. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the concept 
of a peaceful assembly does not cover gatherings where the organisers and 
participants have violent intentions or incite violence. The peaceful intentions of 
organisers and participants in an assembly are to be presumed, unless there is 
convincing evidence that they themselves intend to use or incite imminent 
violence.16 The term ‘peaceful’ should be interpreted to include conduct that may 
annoy or give offence to individuals or groups opposed to the ideas or claims that 
the assembly is seeking to promote. This may even include, for example, 
assemblies advocating for changes to a country’s territorial boundaries or to 
fundamental constitutional provisions so long as this is done in a non-violent 
manner.17 An assembly can be ‘peaceful’ even if it is ‘unlawful’ under domestic law. 
In this regard, it is especially important to emphasize that the concept of ‘peaceful’ 
may include conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities 
                                                          
12  Accordingly, art 26 of the Belgian Constitution provides that Belgians “have the right to assemble 
peacefully and without arms, in accordance with the laws that can regulate the exercise of the right, 
without submitting it to prior authorisation. This provision does not apply to open air meetings, 
which are subject to police regulations”.   
13  The Belgian Constitution art 191 directs that “all foreigners on Belgian soil should benefit from the 
protection provided to persons and property, except if limited by law”. 
14  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “peaceful”. 
15  ICCPR General Comment para [15]. 
16  ICCPR General Comment para [46]. The ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and 
assembly in Africa [para 71] confirms this position.  
17  ICCPR General Comment para [47]. 
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of third parties, for example by temporarily blocking traffic.18  
There are no reasons why South African courts cannot take cognisance of these 
guidelines. The decision whether a gathering is peaceful or not, cannot be interpreted 
in a restricted manner. Violent acts by a few participants do not automatically denote 
that an assembly is violent.19 Assemblies that involve purely passive resistance should 
be considered peaceful.20 A participant who remains peaceful does not cease to enjoy 
the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence committed by others.21 
Thus, conduct that constitutes ‘violence’ should be narrowly interpreted; however, this 
conduct can “extend beyond physical violence to include inhuman or degrading 
treatment or intimidation or harassment”:22      
In practice, a gathering will be considered non-peaceful if the public and private 
interests (the public order, persons and property) are violated or threatened by 
violent or riotous action to such an extent that the limitation of the right, by 
prohibiting that particular action, would in any case have been justified in terms of 
section 36.23   
The facts and circumstances of each case or situation are indicators of whether or not 
the gathering or handing over of a petition is considered to be peaceful. It is important 
that the police understand that a few bad apples do not render a gathering violent, and 
therefore unlawful. What the police considers to be ‘peaceful’ has a direct impact on 
how they facilitate gatherings.   
3.2.2  The gathering must be unarmed 
In South Africa, an assembly, demonstration, picket and presenting a petition are all 
excluded from protection of the Constitution when the participants are armed. It is 
debatable if a gathering of heavily armed men can be considered to be peaceful.  
In South Africa, the Gatherings Act qualifies this requirement in the Constitution by 
providing that:  
                                                          
18  ICCPR General Comment para [48]. 
19  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [50]. 
20  ICCPR General Comment para [86]. 
21  ICCPR General Comment para [50]. 
22  ICCPR General Comment para [51]. See also the European Commission for Democracy through 
Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 2010 para [27]; Currie and De Waal The Bill of 
Rights handbook 384. 
23  Omar 2017 SA Crime Quarterly 24. See also Rautenbach Bill of Rights compendium 1A-154.   
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No participant may have at the gathering or demonstration in his or her possession 
any airgun, firearm, imitation firearm or any muzzle loading firearm, or any object 
which resembles a firearm and that is likely to be mistaken for a firearm; or any 
dangerous weapon, as defined in the Dangerous Weapons Act.24   
The Dangerous Weapons Act 205 of 1993 defines a dangerous weapon as “any 
object, other than a firearm that is capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily 
harm, if it was used for an unlawful purpose”.25 Therefore, depending on the 
circumstances, bottles, sticks, pangas, stones, and any sharp objects can qualify as a 
dangerous weapon. Participants in possession of such objects may thus be 
considered to be armed. However, objects that are not normally considered to be 
weapons must be permitted, unless there is a clear indication that it will be used to 
commit violence.26 
3.2.3  Activities protected by section 17 of the Constitution 
The South African Constitution protects specifically the activities of assemblies, 
demonstrations, pickets and petitions. Most constitutions and international instruments 
provide only for the protection of assemblies which can be seen as a collective term 
for demonstrations, pickets and petitions, and any other activity when people come 
together. However, what is understood under these activities or terms differ from 
country to country. The distinction in South Africa between these activities are 
somewhat blurred. The differentiation between demonstrations and gatherings as 
detailed in the Gatherings Act contributes to this confusion since the understanding of 
what a demonstration entails falls into the definition of a gathering which again 
encompasses an assembly.27 However, all these activities are furnished with the same 
protection by the Constitution, but they must be peaceful and unarmed. An explanation 
of each activity follows below. 
3.2.3.1 Assemblies 
As stated above, the interpretation of the term ‘assembly’ differs from one country to 
another. Constitutions may protect the right to assemble, but what the act entails is 
                                                          
24  Gatherings Act s 8(4). 
25  Dangerous Weapons Act 205 of 1993 s 1. 
26  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [154].  
27  Gatherings Act s 1. 
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usually disclosed in other legislation sanctioning or limiting the conduct of participants 
at gatherings. For example, in Russia, the federal law28 provides that assemblies imply 
the coming together of citizens at a place for the purpose to collectively discuss some 
socially important issues, while a meeting implies a mass gathering of citizens to 
publicly express a public opinion.  
Following the Russian example above, it is expected that the South African 
Constitution’s application with regard to the term ‘assembly’ should include any static 
and moving conduct of coming-together. According to the ordinary meaning, an 
assembly is “a group of people gathered together in one place for a common purpose 
… a group having legislative or decision making powers”.29 The Gatherings Act defines 
a gathering as “any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or 
on any public road, as defined in the Road Traffic Act ... or any other public place or 
premises wholly or partly open to the air.”30 In re Munhumeso,31 the court mentioned 
that:  
…a procession, which is but an assembly in motion, is by its very nature a highly 
effective means of communication, and one not provided by other media. It 
stimulates public attention and discussion of the opinion expressed. The public is 
brought in direct contact with those expressing the opinion.32  
The above-mentioned explanations create some confusion with regard to the activities 
that can be classified as an assembly. An assembly is one of the activities falling into 
the definition of a gathering under the Gatherings Act, while a procession is seen as 
an assembly in motion (as in the excerpt above). 
International and regional guidelines give direction with regard to what assemblies 
entail. The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly specifies that ‘assembly’ 
constitutes a number of persons intentionally gathering together in order to jointly 
express themselves, in a space that is publicly accessible to all.33 This description 
does not indicate that a specific number of participants or a specific purpose is required 
‒ people only need to gather for a common, expressive purpose. The gatherings may 
                                                          
28  Federal Law No. 54-Fz of June 19, 2004 on Rallies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and 
Picketing, passed by the State Duma on 4 June 2004 as endorsed, amended and ratified. 
29  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “assembly”. 
30  National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 s 1. For the full definition, see footnote 25 in Chapter 4 below. 
31  Re Munhumeso 1995 (1) SA 551 (ZS) 1995 (1) SA 551 (ZS) 557. 
32  Re Munhumeso 1995 (1) SA 551 (ZS) 1995 (1) SA 551 (ZS) 557.  
33  See footnotes 216, 217 in Chapter 2; European Commission for Democracy through Law 
Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 2010 para [12]. 
66 
take place on public or privately-owned premises as long as the space is generally 
accessible to everyone.34 The Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in 
Africa further provides that an: 
Assembly refers to an act of intentionally gathering, in private or in public, for an 
expressive purpose and for an extended duration. The right to assembly may be 
exercised in a number of ways, including through demonstrations, protests, 
meetings, processions, rallies, sit-ins, and funerals, through the use of online 
platforms, or in any other way people choose.35 
Therefore, peaceful assemblies may include demonstrations, meetings, processions, 
strikes, rallies, sit-ins and flash-mobs, candlelit vigils, pickets and marches.36 It seems 
that the term ‘assembly’ includes all types of gatherings. The internet can be utilised 
for online assemblies, and social media can also assist to facilitate assemblies.37 It 
must be remembered that although an assembly requires more than one participant, 
an individual person who exercises this right must be afforded the same protection as 
participants who gather together.38 There is no reason why a person who is alone and 
protesting peacefully will not be able to utilise this right. The Constitution guarantees 
this right to everyone who wants to convey a message or cause to the attention of the 
government or someone else, in a peaceful and unarmed way.   
It is suggested that all activities in South Africa that include the intentional and 
temporary presence of individuals in a public or private place, that are generally 
accessible to the public and ensue for an expressive purpose, must be embraced 
under the term ‘assembly’. 
3.2.3.2 Demonstrations 
As stated above, the Constitution of South Africa protects peaceful and unarmed 
demonstrations. The ordinary meaning for the word ‘demonstrate’ includes; “when 
people take part in a march or a meeting to show their opposition to something or their 
support for it.”39 The Constitution guarantees the right to demonstrate in general, and 
                                                          
34  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [12].  
35  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [3]. 
36  ICCPR General Comment para [6]. 
37  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [20]; ICCPR General Comment para [34]. 
38  OSCE/ODIHR Handbook on monitoring freedom of peaceful assembly 11. 
39  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “demonstrate”. 
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it does not specify the number of participants required to be classified as a 
demonstration, or if a demonstration needs to be politically motivated, or take place in 
a public or private space. The Gatherings Act defines a demonstration as follows: 
…any demonstration by one or more persons, but not more than 15 persons, for 
or against any person, cause, action or failure to take action.40  
The Gatherings Act also differentiates between gatherings and demonstrations.41 In 
the instance of a demonstration, the organiser of a demonstration is not required to 
provide notification to the government if fifteen people or less will be demonstrating. 
When more than fifteen persons gather, the government needs to be notified of the 
proposed gathering, and the activity is seen as a gathering. The definitions can 
possibly be perceived as a mechanism included in the Gatherings Act to limit the 
number of participants, since a small number of demonstrators may more easily be 
controlled. There is no indication that when the Constitution was enacted, the intention 
was that the number of participants in a demonstration be limited to fifteen people as 
provided in the Gatherings Act. It seems to be an artificial provision without any 
indication in the Gatherings Act as to how the maximum number of participants was 
agreed upon.  
International and regional guidelines include demonstrations as an activity which falls 
under the meaning of an assembly.42 It is suggested that a demonstration must be 
seen as the intentional and temporary presence of one or a number of individuals in a 
public or private place, accessible to the general public, in order to show their 
opposition or support for something. This definition easily fits into the suggested 
definition of what an assembly entails, namely activities that include the intentional 
and temporary presence of individuals in a public or private place accessible to the 
general public for an expressive purpose.  
3.2.3.3 Pickets 
The ordinary meaning of the term ‘picket’ includes “a person or group of people 
standing outside a workplace trying to persuade others not to enter during a strike”.43 
                                                          
40  Gatherings Act s 1(v). 
41  See footnote 30 above for the definition of a gathering. 
42  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [3]; ICCPR General 
Comment para [6]; European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of 
peaceful assembly 2010 paras [18], [44]. 
43  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “picket”. 
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A picket is normally associated with labour issues, and can be a form of social protest 
directed by one private party against another.44 Section 23 of the Constitution provides 
for labour relations, and inter alia states that every worker has the right to join a trade 
union, engage in collective bargaining, and to strike.45 There is a link between the right 
to picket, freedom of association,46 and labour relation rights. Limitations on the right 
to freedom of association can impact negatively on the right to picket. In South Africa, 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) facilitates the Constitution in realising this 
right, and in regulating the holding of pickets in the workplace. The Constitution 
stipulates a general protection to the right to picket. Sections 69(1), (2), (3) of the LRA 
again specify that: 
(1)  a registered trade union may authorise a picket by its members for the 
purpose of peacefully demonstrating ‒ 
(a)  in support of any protected strike; or 
(b) or in opposition to any lock-out. 
(2) Despite any law regulating the right of assembly, a picket authorised terms 
of subsection (1), may be held ‒  
(a)  in any place to which the public has access but outside the premises 
of an employer; or 
(b)  with the permission of the employer, inside the employer's premises. 
(3)  The permission referred to in subsection (2)(b) may not be unreasonably 
withheld.47 
A picket in terms of the LRA implies that workers inform their employer beforehand 
that a picket is going to take place, since pickets usually transpire in a controlled 
environment, where the time, place and number of participants are known. A picket is 
thus a highly regulated form of protest in South Africa.48  
                                                          
44  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Chapter 43 25. See Chapter 
6 below with regard to intimidation. 
45  Section 23 of the Constitution: “1. Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 2. Every worker 
has the right - a. to form and join a trade union; b. to participate in the activities and programmes 
of a trade union; and c. to strike”. 
46  Section 18 of the Constitution: “Everyone has the right to freedom of association”. 
47  According to the Department of Employment and Labour’s strike monitoring report, workers in 
South Africa lost an estimated R266-million in wages in 2018 due to strike activities, 115 89 42 
working days were further lost due to industrial disputes. See Department of Employment and 
Labour http://www.labour.gov.za/strikes-in-2018-reaches-a-high-in-the-past-five-year-%E2%80 
%93-department-of-employment-and-labour#:~:text=The%20IAR%20says%20there%20were, 
times%20more%20than%20in%202014  (Date of use: 12 February 2020).  
48  During the Covid-19 pandemic, pickets could continue under level 3 of the Disaster Management 
Act 57 of 2002, since it is seen as part of the “work purposes” as in regulation 37 of the Disaster 
Management Regulations. However, strict guidelines as to how the picket must be conducted were 
prescribed, e.g., to adhere to social distancing, limiting the picketers, providing hand sanitizer, and 
to wear masks and covering the mouth and nose while faces remained visible. See Swan Plastics 
CC and the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (2020) 41 ILJ 2025 (CCMA). 
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The LRA outlines the right to picket by providing that it may be conducted in a place 
to which the public has access, although it usually occurs outside the premises of the 
employer. If the employer gives consent, the picket may be held (inside) the 
employer’s premises; therefore, picketing may also take place on private property 
(which is accessible to the general public).  
The South African government recently consented to regulations under the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act 10 of 2018,49 which provide that a union may not embark 
on a picket unless there is a collective agreement with regard to a picket, or picketing 
rules were determined by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA)50 in accordance with the default rules.51 Default rules are applicable when the 
employer and the union fail to arrive at a picketing agreement.52 If an agreement 
cannot be reached, the CCMA Commissioner, inter alia, may decide on the following: 
where the picket must be held ‒ inside or outside the premises,53 the date and duration 
of the picket,54 the suspension of the picket, the chant of slogans, sing and dance, or 
the carrying of placards.55 Only members of the union and employees of the employer 
may take part in the picket.56 The LRA provides that the picketing agreement must be 
brought under the attention of the responsible officer (local authority) and authorised 
member (police member) as regulated in the Gatherings Act.57 An organiser and 
marshals must be appointed, and properly informed about the rules. Interestingly, 
marshals need to wear armbands or vests to be identifiable,58 and must be available 
from the start to the end of the picket.59 Social media may be utilised to report changes 
in the identities of the marshals and organisers during the picket. Runciman60 argues 
that these rules eliminate the pressure placed on the employer (who is typically the 
reason for the picket), as employers will have ample opportunity “to stockpile 
necessities, hire alternative labour and undertake other action to undermine the 
                                                          
49  Labour Relations Amendment Act 10 of 2018, established in terms of s 112 of the LRA. 
50  Regulation 2 issued in terms of s 208 of the LRA.  
51  Regulation 3 issued in terms of s 208 of the LRA.  
52  Section 69(4) of the LRA. 
53  Default rule 4 of the default picketing rules established in terms of section 69(5) of the LRA. 
54  Default picketing rule 5. 
55  Default picketing rule 6. 
56  Default picketing rule 5.2.2.  
57  See Chapter 4 below. 
58  Default picketing rule 7.5.2. 
59  Default picketing rules 7.5.3, 7.7. 
60  Runciman https://theconversation.com/why-changes-to-picketing-rules-in-south-africa-pose-a-
threat-to-strikes-104598 (Date of use: 22 February 2020).  
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collective power of workers”.61 Thereby, changing the way unions embark on protected 
strike action. When workers are violent, threatening or committing acts of intimidation 
or damaging property, it may result in forfeiture of the right to picket or to protest as 
part of the strike action.62  
3.2.3.4 Petitions 
The ordinary meaning of the word ‘petition’ includes “a formal written request, typically 
one signed by many people, appealing to authority in respect of a cause”.63 Although 
the right to petition can be seen as old-fashioned, it is frequently utilised nowadays.64 
For many citizens, it is the only way to bring their concerns to the attention of the 
government, as they lack funds or other methods of communication. Petitions are 
cheap ‒ anybody can present one. It is a non-violent way of participating in protest 
action, and sometimes an effective way to highlight interests.65 The use of a petition 
by communities is especially common with regard to gatherings held near courts. 
Communities employ this right to bring their cause under the attention of prosecutors 
or magistrates, and these petitions generally relate to a bail application or the 
sentencing of an offender. People who participate in a petition believe that they played 
a role in bringing their concern forward, as it is written down, signed and seen to be 
handed over to the person who needs to act thereupon. 
Currently, there is no national legislation governing petitions. The National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) ‒ one of the two houses of Parliament 
‒ are mandated to ensure that provincial interests are considered by the government. 
The NCOP may receive a petition from any interested person or institution in terms of 
section 17 of the Constitution. Some provinces in South Africa have adopted 
                                                          
61  Runciman https://theconversation.com/why-changes-to-picketing-rules-in-south-africa-pose-a-
threat-to-strikes-104598 (Date of use: 22 February 2020).  
62  Runciman https://theconversation.com/why-changes-to-picketing-rules-in-south-africa-pose-a-
threat-to-strikes-104598 (Date of use: 22 February 2020). See Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 998 (LC) para [13]; DisChem 
Pharmacies Ltd v Malema & Others (2019) 40 ILJ 855 (LC).   
63  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “petition”.  
64  Corder and Du Plessis Understanding South Africa’s transitional Bill of Rights 160. 
65  Corder and Du Plessis Understanding South Africa’s transitional Bill of Rights 160. See also Davis 
South African Constitutional law 239-242 where petitions are identified as a distinctly South African 
way of political participation. 
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legislation that sanctions the right to petition.66 For example, the Gauteng Petitions Act 
5 of 2002 provides for the right to submit a petition to the legislature of the province of 
Gauteng.67 The Act describes a ‘petition’ as a “complaint or request or representation 
or submission that is addressed by a petitioner to the Committee,” and a ‘petitioner’ as 
“the person who submits a petition”.68 Any person can submit a petition,69 and it may 
be produced by a single person,70 association,71 collective,72 mass or group,73 and 
may concern the same, or substantially similar complaints or requests.74 A petition 
may address any matter under the legislative or executive authority of the province.75   
A petition can furthermore be developed with the aid of technology. In South Africa, 
provincial governments provide for a petition to be registered on their websites.76 A 
simple Google search will provide a head office address of government departments 
or businesses, and a petition can be forwarded directly to available addresses online. 
Technology consequently facilitates or supports cyber-protests77 or petitions. 
However, a petition does not have to be referred to the government, provincial 
authorities or businesses, it can also be handed over to a private entity, for example, 
                                                          
66  See the KwaZulu-Natal Petitions Act 4 of 2003 (date of commencement: 31 August 2007), the 
North West Petitions Act 2 of 2010 (date of commencement: 30 May 2011), and the Northern Cape 
Petitions Act 8 of 2009 (date of commencement: 12 February 2010). 
67  The Gauteng legislature convenes petition hearings to address concerns. The numbers of petitions 
have increased as a result of public education and awareness campaigns. This is a method used 
to attempt to decrease protests with regard to service delivery issues; see Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature Report 2013/2014 EPRE Vote 2 62. The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality Petitions 
By-Law, Council Resolution: A-Rc (12-2015) (date of commencement: 20 July 2016) addresses 
petitions to the municipality. Any person who is a resident of Ekurhuleni may submit a petition on 
any matter.  
68  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 1. 
69  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 2. 
70  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 4(1)(a): “a single petition, which is an individual submission from 
a single petitioner, concerning a particular complaint or request.” 
71  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 4(1)(b): “an association submission, which is an individual 
submission from an association or single petitioner who has been mandated by an association to 
submit that petition, concerning a particular complaint or request.” 
72  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 4(1)(c): “a collective petition, which is a collection of signatures 
from a number of petitioners, concerning a particular complaint or request.”  
73  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 4(1)(d): “a mass or group petition, which is made up of individual 
or group submissions from a number of petitioners, concerning the same or substantially similar 
complaints or requests.” 
74  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 4(1). 
75  Gauteng Petitions Act 5 of 2002 s 4(3).  
76  Gauteng provincial legislature http://gpl.gov.za/petitions-guide (Date of use: 20 February 2020); 
Gauteng provincial legislature https://www.pa.org.za/info/petitions (Date of use: 20 February 
2020). 
77  Mead The new law of peaceful protest rights and regulations in the Human Rights Act era 168; 
Bowers https://www.theguardian.com/money/2000/feb/10/workandcareers.uknews (Date of use: 
20 February 2020); Buckingham 2000 Stellenbosch LR 133.  
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a church.  
3.3  The evolution of gatherings 
New challenges are arising as a result of novel methods of communication; for 
example, flash mobs without any identifiable causes, or cyber protest as an immediate 
response to any event around the world.78 The digital age has brought advantages for 
the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly. Social media diminishes 
the cost and timeframe of arranging protest action, since everybody is digitally 
connected.79 Social media connects the poor, middle class, and the rich.80 The internet 
provides an alternative space to gather although it can be difficult to control unlawful 
conduct, such as hate speech.81 In South Africa, political activists rely heavily on social 
media when organising gatherings. The #FeesMustFall-movement is testimony to this 
‒ gatherings organised by students online began simultaneously at different education 
facilities throughout South Africa.82  
When the Constitution was enacted, online gatherings was an unknown concept.83 
South Africa currently does not have any legislation providing for online protest. 
Although the Gatherings Act regulates the holding of public gatherings and 
demonstrations at certain places; it does not provide specifically for online gatherings 
or notification, mainly since it was enacted in 1996, when smart phones were unheard 
of, and access to the internet still a novelty. There is, however, no reason why 
gatherings or notification cannot take place online. When participants of gatherings 
commit offences online, they may possibly be dealt with under the Gatherings Act,84 
or under the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 20 of 2000 which 
                                                          
78  Brever The role of social media in mobilizing political protest 1. See also Rukundo 2017 
Stellenbosch LR 508. 
79  Brever The role of social media in mobilizing political protest 1; Rukundo 2017 Stellenbosch LR 
508. See Reuters https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20181205/2818014000345 31 
(Date of use: 2 November 2020) where social media is blamed for protest action in France. 
Facebook was used to convey messages by leaders to assist with arrangements. 
80  Brever The role of social media in mobilizing political protest 1. 26. 
81  Brever The role of social media in mobilizing political protest 1. 16. 
82  See in this regard Karim and Kruyer 2017 SA Crime Quarterly 93, where the case of Rhodes 
University v Student Representative Council of Rhodes University is discussed. The authors argue 
that overly-broad interdicts obtained by universities to interdict the students’ lawful protest action 
violated the constitutional right to assembly, and have a chilling effect on protests. 
83  See para 3.2.3.1 above. 
84  See Chapter 4 below. 
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sanctions unauthorised access, interception or interference with data, rendering data 
ineffective or overcoming security measures designed to protect data.85 However, 
these Acts were enacted to address the character of the telecommunications 
environment or the digital problems experienced at a certain time period. 
Technological opportunities, the scope of these possibilities, and the utilisation of 
technology to one’s own advantage will differ when the environment evolves.86 
The government has published the Cybercrimes Act 19 of 202087 to provide for threats 
in cyber space; it forbids inter alia unlawful access, interception of data, interference 
with computer programmes, data storage, cyber forgery, and cyber extortion.88 The 
Act outlaws the disclosure of a data message by means of electronic communication 
services when it is done with the intention to incite a person or group to cause damage 
to property or violence against a person or group.89 Section 17 of the Act prohibits the 
attempt, conspiring, aiding, inducing, instructing, commanding or procuring of another 
person to commit offences. The Act also arranges inter alia that a court in the Republic 
has jurisdiction to try offences, when the accused is arrested in the territory of the 
Republic, or when the offence was committed outside the Republic against a citizen 
of the Republic.90 
There are two main means in which cyberspace supports the right to gather online or 
online protest action. Firstly, social media serves as a tool to arrange gatherings and 
mobilise participants. It must be remembered that traditionally organisers also utilised 
telephones, telegrams, faxes or letters to mobilise participants. When the internet and 
smart phones became generally available, the speed of mobilisation and access to 
potential participants increased, since most persons in South Africa now have access 
to cellular phones.  
                                                          
85  Section 86. The Bill also provides that a court in South Africa may trial the offence if the result of 
the offence had an effect in the Republic. Section 86 will be repealed when the Cybercrimes Act 
19 of 2020 come into operation. Other offences that may be applicable to prosecute online are the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act 70 of 2002, the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, and the Protection 
of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004.  
86  Amabhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Others 2020 (1) SA 90 (GP). 
87  The Act is not yet in operation; it is awaiting the President’s assent.   
88  Sections 2-10. 
89  Sections 13-15. ‘Violence’ means bodily harm. 
90  Section 24. 
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Secondly, the internet may be a vehicle or platform for gatherings, for example, online 
petitions to private or public entities, such as government departments or private 
businesses. People can gather online without being physically in the same country. 
The benefit of online protest or gatherings is that everyone gets the opportunity to 
state their views. Conduct during gatherings that may not be sanctioned include 
persons inciting violence or inciting others to commit offences, conduct rendering 
websites and services ineffective, or the flooding of e-mail accounts.91  
International and regional guidelines provide specifically for the right to gather online.92 
Governments are obligated to respect and protect the rights of all individuals to gather 
peacefully – online as well as offline.93 The government must utilise national legislation 
to support this right. Online gatherings and facilitation of gatherings increasingly rely 
on technology; therefore, governments must not unduly block or obstruct internet 
connectivity,94 and should not:  
…silence, surveil and harass dissidents, political opposition, human rights 
defenders, activists and protesters, and to manipulate public opinion. Governments 
are ordering Internet shutdowns more frequently, as well as blocking websites and 
platforms ahead of critical democratic moments such as elections and protests. A 
surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened 
the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protesters in many countries 
around the world. While the role that technology can play in promoting terrorism, 
inciting violence and manipulating elections is a genuine and serious global 
concern, such threats are often used as a pretext to push back against the new 
digital civil society.95   
Governments must discharge their positive obligation to realise the right of freedom of 
peaceful assembly, by increasing access to the internet.96 This responsibility includes 
providing free internet to all persons in public places and in remote areas.97 Organisers 
must be able to choose the online environment as a space to gather.98 Privately owned 
                                                          
91  Van Niekerk 2017 AJIC 126. See also Van Laer and Van Aelst Handbook of Internet Crime 240-
242.  
92  See para 2.4 above. 
93  UN Human Rights Council Resolution 21/16 (2012). 
94  ICCPR General Comment para [34]. 
95  UN General Assembly Human Rights Council Rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association (Human Rights Council 17 May 2019 A/HRC/41/41) para [3]. 
96  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [67]. 
97  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [67]. 
98  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [68]. 
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internet service providers, for example, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube need to host 
publicly available space for online gatherings, however, they can be held accountable 
when content that amounts to incitement to violence or hate speech are not removed.99 
The Guidelines on the freedom of peaceful assembly recommends that gatherings 
must as far as possible be allowed without any regulation, and this includes online 
protests or gatherings, as long as no offence is committed.100  
It is thus evident that in order to ensure that the right to gather is enjoyed by everyone, 
legislation must keep up with modern technological developments. Legislation 
supporting the right to gather as guaranteed in the Constitution must allow for online 
protest action, and indicate which online conduct is regarded as unlawful, and cannot 
be tolerated. However, it must be considered that online gatherings may easily be 
abused for economic, commercial or political gain, and may not be a true reflection of 
pressing concerns,101 for example, online trolls are compensated to disseminate 
propaganda, isolate or drown out critical views.102 
3.4  Limitations on the right to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to 
present a petition 
Section 36 of the Constitution allows for the limitation of rights.103 The rights outlined 
in the Bill of Rights may only “be limited in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society that is based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom”.104  
South African courts have already dealt with the question whether provisions in the 
national legislation limit the right to gather as guaranteed by section 17 of the 
Constitution, and is, therefore, unconstitutional and invalid. Constitutional challenges 
                                                          
99  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [69]. 
100  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 paras [21], [45]. 
101  See Dingeldey 2019 Law Democracy & Development 181-201. 
102  UN General Assembly Human Rights Council Rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association para [45]. 
103  See Popken https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/trolls-hire-russia-s-freelance-disinformation-
firms-offer-propaganda-professional-n1060781 (Date of use: 2 November 2020). 
104  See Meyerson 2004 Acta Juridica 138.   
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were consequently brought to the validity of certain sections of the Gatherings Act.105  
In the Mlungwana-case,106 an appeal that progressed from a criminal case, section 
12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act was challenged which provides that it constitutes an 
offence to convene a gathering in respect of which no notice was given.107 In this case, 
fifteen people travelled from Khayelitsha to the Cape Town’s Civic Centre, and chained 
themselves to the railings of the building.108 In terms of the Gatherings Act, no notice 
is needed if fifteen people or less want to demonstrate. The protest was peaceful; 
however, when more people joined, the police requested that they leave. When they 
refused, they were arrested.109 The applicants argued that the criminalisation of the 
failure to give notice or adequate notice is unconstitutional,110 additionally, it 
discourages people from exercising their right to assemble peacefully and unarmed.111 
The court concluded that the sanction in section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act 
constituted a limitation to the exercise of section 17 of the Constitution, since all the 
appellants obtained criminal convictions for failure to give notice of a gathering – an 
assembly where they were seeking a response on an on-going sanitation problem in 
Khayelitsha. In reality, the Act implicated that sixteen people are prohibited to convene 
a gathering in a public space, if the organiser did not notify the local authority.112 The 
court found that section 12(1)(a) had a chilling effect on the right guaranteed in section 
17, because of the well-known calamitous effects of a previous conviction.113  
                                                          
105  See discussion of Els 2006 TSAR 537.   
106  Mlungwana and Others v S and Another (A431/15) [2018] ZAWCHC 3 (24 January 2018) 
(hereinafter Mlungwana (WCC)). In Mlungwana, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
underlying reasoning in the judgment of the High Court was correct.  
107  The police may allow a gathering to proceed on conditions they deem fit where no notice was 
given. According to the Goldstone Commission, if the activities of the demonstrators violate general 
criminal laws or occasion civil liability, particular demonstrators or those urging them on can be 
sanctioned later through the normal processes of the law, or through the disciplinary mechanisms 
of the organisation holding the demonstration. See Institute of Criminology Crowd management: 
Civilian and police conduct v. A panel of experts from South Africa, the United States, Canada, 
Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed on the principles which framed the 
recommendations of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation. 
108  Mlungwana (WCC) para [11]; Mlungwana paras [29]-[30]. 
109  Mlungwana (WCC) para [11]; Mlungwana paras [29]-[30]. Also see Barrie 2019 TSAR 405.   
110  Mlungwana-case (WCC) para [15]; Mlungwana para [4].  
111  Mlungwana-case (WCC) para [16].  
112  Mlungwana para [54].  
113  Mlungwana-case (WCC) para [42]. 
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In S v Tsoaeli and Others,114 also a criminal case, the appellants appealed against 
their conviction of contravening section 12(1)(e) of the Gatherings Act. The appellants 
attended a gathering for which no prior notice had been given. They argued that since 
they had only attended the gathering and not organised it, they had no criminal 
liability.115 The council for the appellants argued that their conviction for the “mere 
attendance of a gathering violated the principle of legality as expressed in the maxim 
nullum crimen sine lege”116 was flawed, and must be set aside since it amounted to 
an infringement of the right to protest.117 The court found that a provision which allows 
for unarmed and peaceful participants of protest action to risk losing their liberty and 
to acquire a criminal record, undermines the spirit of the Constitution.118 The court was 
of the opinion that section 12(1)(e) of the Gatherings Act is not written in a language 
that clearly declares that a gathering for which no prior notice was given is 
automatically prohibited.119 
In SATAWU and Another v Garvas and Others120 ‒ the first post-constitutional 
pronouncement on the right to freedom of assembly as enshrined in section 17 of the 
Constitution ‒ the constitutionality of sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the Gatherings Act 
were challenged. These sections set out the liability for damage that arises from 
gatherings and demonstrations. Section 11 provides: 
(1)  If any riot damage occurs as a result of ‒ 
(a)  a gathering, every organization on behalf of or under the auspices of 
which that gathering was held, or, if not so held, the convener; 
(b)  a demonstration, every person participating in such demonstration, 
shall, subject to subsection (2), be jointly and severally liable for that 
riot damage as a joint wrongdoer contemplated in Chapter II of the 
Apportionment of Damages Act, 1956 (Act 34 of 1956), together with 
any other person who unlawfully caused or contributed to such riot 
damage and any other organization or person who is liable therefor in 
terms of this subsection. 
(2)  It shall be a defence to a claim against a person or organization contemplated 
in subsection (1) if such a person or organization proves ‒ 
(a)  that he or it did not permit or connive at the act or omission which 
caused the damage in question; and 
                                                          
114  S v Tsoaeli and Others 2018 (1) SACR 42 (FB) (hereinafter Tsoaeli). 
115  Tsoaeli 42. 
116  Tsoaeli para [8]. 
117  Tsoaeli para [8]. 
118  Tsoaeli para [41]. 
119  Tsoaeli para [35]. 
120  SATAWU para [1]. This case was a civil matter. 
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(b)  that the act or omission in question did not fall within the scope of the 
objectives of the gathering or demonstration in question and was not 
reasonably foreseeable; and 
(c)  that he or it took all reasonable steps within his or its power to prevent 
the act or omission in question: Provided that proof that he or it forbade 
an act of the kind in question shall not by itself be regarded as sufficient 
proof that he or it took all reasonable steps to prevent the act in 
question. 
In this case, the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) 
organised a gathering which resulted in a riot and damage to property. The 
respondents proceeded against SATAWU for their damages under section 11(1). 
SATAWU denied liability, and argued that section 11(2)(b) was an unjustifiable 
limitation of the right to freedom of assembly.121 The applicants firstly contended that 
the words “and was not reasonably foreseeable” in section 11(2) of the Act rendered 
the section irrational and inconsistent with the principle of legality, since it was 
impossible to prevent an unforeseeable act, and, secondly, that section 11(2) 
unjustifiably limited the right to freedom of assembly.122 The court held that sections 
11(1) and 11(2) deemed organisers of gatherings liable for riot damage on a wider 
basis than under the common law. Compliance with the requirements of section 11(2) 
significantly increased the costs of organising gatherings, therefore, it amounted to a 
limitation of the right protected in section 17 of the Constitution.123  
In the above-mentioned cases, the court found that sections 11(1), 11(2), 12(1)(a), 
and 12(1)(e) of the Gatherings Act limited the right guaranteed in section 17 of the 
Constitution. In all three judgments, the court went further and considered whether the 
limitations were constitutionally justifiable with regard to the relevant factors prescribed 
by section 36 of the Constitution,124 which include: 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.125  
                                                          
121  SATAWU para [84]. 
122  SATAWU para [26].  
123  SATAWU paras [56]-[59]. 
124  Kroeze 2001 Stellenbosch LR 265. 
125  Constitution s 36(1). According to s 36(2), except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. See 
Petersen 2014 SAJHR 405 regarding the balancing of competing interests as part of the 
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After examining the nature and importance of the right to assembly as a relevant factor 
imparted in section 36, the courts in the Mlungwana and SATAWU-cases found that 
assemblies are central to the constitutional democracy of South Africa, and give a 
voice to the powerless. It was held that all gathering acts provide an outlet for the 
frustrations of the vulnerable groups without political and economic power, and are, in 
certain circumstances, the only mechanism available to express legitimate concerns. 
As such, assembling is one of the primary means by which ordinary people can 
meaningfully contribute to the constitutional objective of advancing human rights and 
freedoms. The conduct has a foundational relevance to the exercise and achievement 
of all other rights,126 and is an important mode in which the excluded and marginalised 
expressed themselves against the apartheid system, and are part and parcel of the 
participatory democracy they fought for.127 The courts held that gatherings remain a 
vital tool to the country’s democracy,128 and may not be limited without good reason.129 
As regards the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the court in the Mlungwana-
case considered that section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act serves a legitimate 
administrative purpose, since it facilitates the right protected in section 17 of the 
Constitution, and meets the prescripts of public welfare and social value.130 The 
Gatherings Act only requires a notice for gatherings of sixteen and more participants, 
and provides for a defence with regard to spontaneous gatherings.131 The purpose of 
the notification requirement is to ensure that proper planning and suitable preparations 
take place, for example, that a sufficient number of police officers are deployed.132 If 
no notification is given, crucial issues such as the planning of routes and appointment 
of marshals cannot occur, and, therefore, the risk that the gathering is not peaceful 
increases.133 The importance of the limitation is to protect the rights of everyone,134 
and the notice serves a legitimate purpose as every right must be exercised with due 
                                                          
proportionality test, which is often criticised because of the supposed lack of rational standards of 
comparison.    
126  SATAWU-case para [61]; Mlungwana para [70]. 
127  Mlungwana (WCC) para [62]; Mlungwana para [61]. 
128  Mlungwana (WCC) para [47]; Mlungwana para [69]. 
129  SATAWU para [66]. 
130  Mlungwana (WCC) para [55]. 
131  See definition of a gathering in section 1 of the Gatherings Act. 
132  Mlungwana (WCC) para [51]. 
133  Mlungwana (WCC) para [51]. 
134  Mlungwana (WCC) para [51]. 
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regard to the rights of everyone.135  
In the SATAWU-case, the court deliberated that the purpose of the limitation is to 
protect everyone, especially “those who do not have the resources or capability to 
identify and pursue the perpetrators of the riot damage for which they seek 
compensation”.136 The organisation may cancel a gathering when reasonably damage 
is foreseeable, but the victims of riot damage do not have any option with regard to 
what happens to them or their belongings.137 The organisers must, therefore, reconcile 
themselves with the risk of a violation of the rights of innocent bystanders.138 The 
purpose of section 11 is that organisations must accept the consequences of their 
actions, and that they will be held responsible for harm triggered by their decision to 
organise a gathering.139  
Concerning the nature and extent of the limitation of the right, the Mlungwana court 
deemed that the effect of the sanction for the failure to give notice has a suppressing 
or chilling effect on the exercise of the right to gather.140 The criminal sanction was 
judged to stifle free speech. The effect of the limitation is not only to punish the 
organisers for failing to notify; it also deters people to exercise their right to gather.141 
It comes with the loss of liberty and a previous conviction that impacts negatively on 
future employment, travel, or study prospects.142 The definitions for a ‘gathering’ and 
the ‘organisers’ are broad, and expand the scope of criminal liability for contravening 
section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act, accordingly peaceful gatherings without notice 
will be an offence because of how broadly a gathering is defined.143 It can be seen as 
a legislative overreach, since no regard is given to the effect of the protest on the 
public order itself.144 Where an organiser is not appointed, anyone who “has taken any 
part in planning or organising or making preparations for that gathering,”145 however 
                                                          
135  Mlungwana (WCC) para [56]. 
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139  SATAWU para [54]. 
140  SATAWU para [87].  See Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice 
& Constitutional Development and Another 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) para [87]. 
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marginal, could be criminally liable. The limitation does not distinguish between adult 
and under-aged organisers; therefore, children can be liable if they fail to give notice 
before organising a gathering146 – although children may not be held criminally liable 
on the same basis as adults, given their vulnerability and lack of self-restraint.147  
The SATAWU-case confirmed that section 11 has a deterring effect on the right to 
gather, however, it was found that it merely subjects the exercise of the right to strict 
conditions, for example, the presumption of liability for riot damage, which can be 
traced to the decision of the organisation to proceed with a gathering when harm is 
foreseen.148  
The last requirement as prescribed in section 36 of the Constitution concerns the 
balance between the limitation, the purpose and less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. As to this prescription, the court in Mlungwana reflected that the purpose of 
the Gatherings Act is to ensure that all people “have the protection of the state”149 to 
exercise their right to protest – a right that cannot be restricted by a notice requirement. 
Therefore, the criminal sanction is disproportionate to the offence of merely failing to 
comply with the notice requirement, since a criminal conviction hampers almost every 
aspect of a person’s life, and endures for ten years before it may be expunged.150 
Additionally, it is the previously disadvantaged that will be sanctioned by section 
12(1)(a), and that less restrictive alternatives to section 12(1)(a) exists, inter alia, civil 
liability, administrative fines, or changing the definitions of a gathering and 
demonstration as delineated in the Gatherings Act.151 The limitation is consequently 
not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on the values 
of freedom, dignity and equality,152 as the nature of the limitation is too severe, and 
the nexus between the means adopted in section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act and 
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any legitimate purpose is too tenuous to render section 12(1)(a) constitutional.153 
With reference to section 36(e) of the Constitution, the SATAWU court took into 
consideration the purpose of section 11, which is to ensure that a gathering does not 
become violent and destructive, and result in loss to others leaving its victims without 
recourse. Section 11 protects the rights of individuals who may be affected by riot 
damage that takes place during the exercise of the right to gather.154 The purpose is 
to achieve a balance between the right to gather on the one hand, and the safety of 
people and property on the other.155  
In the Mlungwana-case, the court declared that section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act 
is unconstitutional.156 In the Tsoaeli-case, the court found that section 12(1)(e) of the 
Gatherings Act does not create an offence for the participants of a gathering where no 
prior notice was given to the authorities.157 The court concluded that it was not 
necessary to adjudicate on the appellants’ application in respect of the constitutionality 
of section 12(1)(e) of the Act.158 In the SATAWU-case, the court found that the 
limitation on the right to assemble is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.159  
It is clear from the courts’ reasoning in the above-mentioned cases that the Gatherings 
Act in some instances fails to achieve the standard required by the Constitution, in 
regulating the holding of gatherings. The limitations the Act creates are not always 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on the values of 
freedom, dignity and equality. A criminal conviction under the Gatherings Act has a 
disastrous impact, and is disproportional for merely utilising the right guaranteed under 
section 17 of the Constitution. The approach of the courts when dealing with cases 
where participants were prosecuted under the Gatherings Act raises a red flag with 
regard to the constitutionality of the other offences under the Act.160 For example, 
organisers of gatherings can still be prosecuted if they fail to attend a meeting called 
by the local authority, or did not adhere to all their duties or a condition imposed by 
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the local authority.161 These offences can deter people from exercising their right to 
gather. Although these and other provisions of the Gatherings Act were not thus far 
tested in court, it is foreseen that in most instances they will be declared 
unconstitutional. 
3.4.1 Circumstances in which the right to assembly may be limited  
Section 17 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to assemble, to 
demonstrate, to picket and to hand over a petition, is not an absolute right. First of all, 
the facts of each case and applicable legislation play a role in how this right may be 
limited. Secondly, in South Africa, any limitation must be justified in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution.162 In the following sub-paragraphs, circumstances in which the 
right to gather may be limited as in the Gatherings Act will be discussed. Since South 
African courts must prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
therewith,163 reference is therefore also made to permissible grounds of restriction of 
this right under international instruments. 
3.4.1.1  The interests of national security or public safety, public order, the 
protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others  
International and regional instruments pronounce under which circumstances the right 
to peaceful assembly may be restricted.164 Restrictions are only permissible in 
conformity with the law, and when necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or 
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Only restrictions that 
are permissible under international human rights law, for example, the ICCPR, ECHR 
and African Charter, are allowed.165 These instruments confirm that governments may 
violate the right of freedom of assembly in times of war or public emergency,166 but 
they may only do so if the crisis or emergency affects the whole population, and 
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constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community.167  
Gatherings will generally impact on the rights and freedoms of others; however, 
governments must balance the right to gather with the rights and freedoms of 
others.168 The right to gather can be restricted in the public interest, for example, to 
prevent imminent violent conduct that may seriously infringe the public order,169 or to 
prevent crime.170 Restrictions based on moral grounds are rare, and in most 
circumstances, inappropriate.171 Restrictions necessary in the interest of national 
security can only be imposed to protect a nation against violence,172 or to protect the 
nation’s “territorial integrity or political independence against a credible threat or use 
of force”.173 Restrictions based on public safety is more common; it is usually 
applicable when participants of gatherings create significant and imminent danger for 
others.174 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, the rights of the public were limited due to public health 
concerns, and to protect the health of the whole nation. The Disaster Management 
Regulations175 issued under the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, prohibit 
gatherings during levels 4 and 5. This prohibition was permissible under the 
Constitution which provides that a state of emergency may be declared in terms of an 
Act of parliament, when the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general 
insurrection, disorder, natural disaster, other public emergency, and when such a 
declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.176 However, this type of injunction 
                                                          
167  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [92]. 
168  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [143]. 
169  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [139]. 
170  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [140]. 
171  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [142]. 
172  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 paras [136]-[137]. 
173  ICCPR General Comment para [42]. 
174  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [138]. 
175  Published in GG 43107 dated 18 March 2020 as amended, GN 318, see regulation 1. 
176  Constitution s 37. See, e.g., Proclamation no. 24 of 1999, Emergency Regulations applicable to 
the Caprivi Region made in terms of art 26 of the Namibian Constitution, in which an existence of 
a state of emergency has been declared under Proclamation no. 23 of 2 August 1999 – GG 2157 
dated 3 August 1999.  
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will always infringe the rights of citizens.177  
3.4.1.2  The contents or purpose of the gathering 
The Constitution does not differentiate between cultural, social, political or religious 
assemblies, demonstrations, pickets or petitions, as such, the right is not only reserved 
for when the contents or purpose of the gathering is politically aimed. The Gatherings 
Act provides that “every person has the right to assemble with other persons and to 
express his views on any matter freely in public and enjoy the protection of the state 
while doing so”.178 The Act limits a demonstration to a maximum of fifteen persons 
who may protest for or against any individual, on any grounds, and for any act or 
omission to act.179 The definition of a gathering provides for any “principles, policy, 
actions of any government, political party or political organisation”,180 but throws the 
field wide open for activists, petitioners, or persons mobilising or demonstrating 
backing for or in opposition to any “views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of 
any person or body of persons or institution”.181  
If the aim of a gathering involves pressuring or protesting against the government or 
any individual, the provisions of the Gatherings Act limits the right in the Constitution 
by requiring notification to the government before the gathering takes place. The 
government may impose certain conditions or prohibit the gathering to take place at a 
certain time or place, or ban the gathering altogether. Woolman182 criticises the 
definition of a gathering as established in the Gatherings Act, and is of the opinion that 
the Act makes no attempt to distinguish between different kinds of gatherings (social, 
economic, spiritual or political), is subject to subjective or arbitrary interpretation, and 
accordingly impossible to read down to a constitutionally acceptable definition.183 In 
                                                          
177  See, e.g. the case of Ex Parte Van Heerden [2020] ZAMPMBHC 10 (27 March 2020) which was 
decided during the Level 5 lockdown period. In terms of the provisions of Regulation 11B(1)(a)(ii) 
of the final lockdown COVID-19 Regulations issued on 25 March 2020, Van Heerden was 
prohibited to travel from Mpumalanga to the Eastern Cape in order to bury his grandfather [para 
10]. Although Roelofse AJ expressed extreme sympathy for the applicant [para 16], his application 
was dismissed [para 17].  
178  Gatherings Act Preamble. 
179  Gatherings Act s 1(v); see para 3.2.3.2 above, and para 4.3 below. 
180  Gatherings Act s 1(vi)(a); see footnote 28 in Chapter 4. 
181  Gatherings Act s 1(vi)(b). 
182  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 43 23. 
183  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 43 23. See De Reuck v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2003 (3) SA 389 (W), Dawood & 
Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others, Shalabi & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & 
Others, Thomas & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
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contrast, the German184 and Hungarian185 Constitutions reserve the protection of the 
right of freedom of assembly to meetings aimed at political will,186 excluding social, 
cultural or ‘fun’ gatherings.187 The Russian Federation excludes election campaign 
meetings, religious rites and ceremonies from constitutional protection.188  
The Gatherings Act restricts the right in the Constitution by prohibiting gatherings 
where the content or purpose is to incite hatred on account of differences in culture, 
race, sex, language or religion; whether the participants do that by displaying banners, 
placards, singing or verbalising, or in any other conceivable manner.189 Persons 
present at or participating in a gathering or demonstration may also not perform any 
act or utter any words which are calculated to cause violence against any person or 
group of persons.190 These provisions are in accordance with the values of the 
Constitution,191 and the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly which provides 
that:  
In principle, therefore, any restrictions on assemblies should not be based on the 
content of the message(s) that they seek to communicate … This also applies to 
assemblies expressing views that may ‘offend, shock or disturb’ the State or any 
sector of the population … Similar considerations apply with regard to imparting 
information or ideas contesting the established order or advocating for a peaceful 
change of the Constitution or legislation by non-violent means”.192 “Display of 
symbols such as flags, insignia, and other expressive items is protected 
communication that is entitled to the same freedom of speech and assembly 
protections as other forms of communication. Even where the insignia, uniforms, 
costumes, emblems, music, flags, signs or banners played or displayed during an 
assembly conjure memories of a painful historical past, this in general should not 
of itself be a reason to interfere with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In 
cases where the respective insignia or symbols are prohibited from being displayed 
by law, law enforcement should first attempt to confiscate the prohibited items, 
while letting the assembly proceed (provided it continues to remain peaceful). On 
the other hand, where this leads to violence, or where such symbols are intrinsically 
and exclusively associated with acts of physical violence or expressions of racism 
or other forms of fundamentalism, the assembly might legitimately be restricted to 
prevent the occurrence or reoccurrence of such violence, unlawful intimidation or 
                                                          
184  Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, 1949. 
185  Constitution of Hungary, 2011. 
186  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly 129. 
187  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly 129. 
188  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly 129. 
189  Gatherings Act s 8(5). See also footnote 121 in Chapter 4 below. 
190  Gatherings Act s 12(6). 
191  Constitution s 1. 
192  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [149]. 
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other significant violations of valid criminal laws.193  
The Gatherings Act also prohibits the wearing of apparel that resembles uniforms worn 
by members of the security force.194 No person may at a gathering or demonstration 
wear any form of clothing that resembles any of the uniforms worn by members of the 
security forces, including the police and the South African Defence Force.195 Where 
uniforms carry a message associated with acts of physical violence or hatred, the 
gathering can be disallowed. 
The Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa determines that 
when matters of “public or political concern are addressed, which may include criticism 
of the state, the gathering must be given maximum protection by the state”.196 There 
have been instances where governments limit the right to freedom of assembly by 
imposing improper restrictions on the contents and purpose of gatherings, for 
example, in Algeria, the law bans all gatherings opposing the government.197 
Prohibition on the contents or purpose of the gathering must take place as a measure 
of last resort.  
3.4.1.3 The number of participants 
As previously stated, the Gatherings Act limits the constitutional right to gather by 
requiring notification to the government when more that fifteen persons want to 
assemble. In this regard, the Act distinguishes between demonstrations and 
gatherings, as no notice needs to be given for a demonstration.198 Demonstrations 
differ from gatherings in terms of the size of the group.  
Demonstration ← 15 persons 16 persons→ Gathering 
One of the possible reasons why the Act differentiates between gatherings and 
demonstrations is that smaller groups do not pose the same threat and impact on the 
rights and freedoms of others, as larger groups. Smaller groups also do not require as 
                                                          
193  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [154]. 
194  Gatherings Act s 8(7). 
195  Gatherings Act s 8(8). 
196  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa paras [77]-[79]. 
197  Article 9 of the Law 89-28 of 1989 on Public Meetings and Demonstrations. 
198  Section 1 of the Gatherings Act; also see para 3.2.3.2 and Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 
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much effort to monitor and control from the local authority and the police. On the other 
hand, a demonstration may start out small but may easily escalate into a massive 
gathering when onlookers join the demonstration in solidarity. An organiser can plan 
to hold a demonstration, but when people join in, the demonstration instantaneously 
becomes a gathering. This conduct may have an unsettling effect on an organiser 
attempting to arrange a demonstration. Although the notification procedure is still in 
operation, the court in the Mlungwana-case declared the sanctioning of the convening 
of a gathering where no prior notice was given, unconstitutional and invalid.199 
Although the definitions of a gathering and demonstration were not challenged by the 
appellants, it was alleged that the distinction between a gathering and demonstration 
is “arbitrary and irrational as it is unclear why 16 is an appropriate number to sanction 
gatherings”.200  
3.4.1.4  Private property 
Section 17 of the Constitution does not distinguish between private or public property 
when guaranteeing the right to gather. Therefore, the protection of the Constitution is 
applicable to people coming together in both private and public places. States must 
consequently ensure that all assemblies, whether public and private, are protected 
from interference, harassment or intimidation.201 However, owners of private property 
can prohibit the use of their property for people to assemble, demonstrate, picket or to 
present petitions.   
As mentioned above in paragraph 3.4.1.3, the Gatherings Act requires that when 
sixteen or more people want to gather in a public place, notification of the intended 
gathering must be given to the government. The definition of a gathering provides for 
“… in or on any public road … or any other public place or premises wholly or partly 
open to the air.” The Gatherings Act is thus not applicable to gatherings taking place 
on private property, and, therefore, no notification is needed. The LRA202 stipulates 
that picketing may be held in any place to which the public have access, but outside 
the premises of an employer. After permission has been obtained from the employer, 
it may be held inside the employer’s premises. A picket, therefore, can also take place 
                                                          
199  Mlungwana-case (WCC) para [101]; Mlungwana para [112]; see footnote 16 in Chapter 1 above. 
200  Mlungwana-case (WCC) para [94]. 
201  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [94]. 
202  LRA s 69. 
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in an employer’s premises which can be a private place depending on the 
circumstances. If the public generally have access to a premise, it is deemed to be a 
public place.  
According to the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly is applicable to assemblies on both private property and publicly 
accessible places.203 Prior notification is not required for meetings on private property. 
Similarly, the Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa provides 
that the right to freedom of assembly applies to meetings on private as well as public 
property.204  
The question with regard to gatherings on private property is becoming imperative to 
take into account in South Africa, especially in respect to land invasion and the 
redistribution of land. People may gather peacefully on private land to bring their 
causes under the attention of the government, however, the gathering usually take 
place without the permission of the owner. The owner, whose interest is violated, in 
turn, may open a case of trespassing at the police.   
3.4.1.5  Notice of gatherings 
International instruments do not require any notification to the government, or 
permission or authorisation from the government to hold a gathering, but recognise 
that there may be legitimate reasons for requiring advance notification.205 In most 
countries, the governments require notification for a gathering to occur. The minimum 
notification period differs from country to country. In England, it must be six clear days 
before the event;206 in Germany, the notification period is at least 48 hours before the 
event.207 In some countries, authorisation or consent is needed; in others, permission 
need to be obtained or a permit needs to be issued.208  
                                                          
203  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [63]. 
204  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of peaceful association and assembly in Africa para [69]. 
205  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [113]. 
206  Sections 11(4) and (5) Public Order Act 1986.     
207  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[161]. 
208  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[330]. 
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The Constitution of South Africa does not mention any notification, authorisation or 
permission for assemblies to take place. The Gatherings Act does, however, require 
notification to the authorities when more than fifteen persons are planning to convene 
a gathering, as explained above. In terms of section 3 of the Act, the organiser of a 
gathering must notify the local authority in writing. A time frame of at least seven days 
before the gathering is to be held, is prescribed.209 If it is not possible to give earlier 
notice; then it needs to be done at the earliest opportunity,210 but if notice is given less 
than 48 hours before the commencement of the gathering, the local authority may 
provide a notice to the organiser prohibiting the gathering. The Gatherings Act requires 
that local authorities convene a meeting with the organisers and other interested 
parties within 24 hours of receipt of the notification. Once the meeting takes place, the 
local authorities are given a significant degree of discretion in deciding whether or not 
to allow the gathering. If an agreement cannot be reached on the contents of the 
notice, the local authority can impose conditions with regard to the holding of the 
gathering.211 Spontaneous assemblies are generally regarded as one of the 
exceptions to notification.   
3.4.1.6  Procedure in prohibiting gatherings 
Section 5 of the Gatherings Act deposits the discretion to prohibit a gathering in the 
hands of the responsible officer (an official appointed by the local authority).212 When 
credible information under oath is brought to the attention of the official that there is a 
threat, and that the police and the traffic officers will not be able to contain this threat, 
                                                          
209  This notice period creates doctrinal problems and practical difficulties. See Woolman, Bishop and 
Brickhill Constitutional Law of South Africa 43-9; 43-10. E.g., the experiences of the Thembelihle 
Crisis Committee (TCC). The TCC has adopted the practice of filing a notice – on a Friday – ten 
days in advance of an assembly scheduled for two Mondays hence. On Monday, the local 
authorities set up a meeting for Tuesday. On Thursday, the TCC conveners receive notice that 
their assembly has been prohibited. On Friday, the TCC files an urgent application in a Magistrate’s 
Court to have the prohibition set aside. The Magistrate summarily dismisses the application, and 
rules as follows: (a) Rule 55(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules requires that an application shall 
be delivered on 10 days’ notice; (b) Rule 9 (14) states that this ten-day notice period may be 
reduced if an application shows ‘good cause’, and thereby satisfies the requirements for urgency; 
(c) since the applicants could not demonstrate the requisite risk to life or liberty, the application 
does meet the conditions for reduced notice; (d) no other remedy is contemplated in the rules; (e) 
the date of the proposed gathering possesses no particular significance; and(f) future applications 
must observe the Magistrates’ Court Rules with respect to proper notice periods. 
210  Gatherings Act s 3(2). 
211  The conditions can include arrangements with regard to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, rush hour 
traffic, distances between two rival gatherings, access to property and workplaces, and prevention 
of injury to persons and property. See Gatherings Act s 4(4)(b).  
212  See Chapter 4 below. 
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the official must consult with the organiser of the gathering, the police, and other role 
players.213 If the official is, after the consultation, convinced that the threat cannot be 
contained, the proposed gathering may be prohibited.214 Credible information will be 
based on available operational information (taking into account the level of the risk, 
discussions and arrangements with the organiser, history of peaceful or violent 
protests, past experience with the parties, and the suitability and vicinity of the venue, 
etc.).215  
The right to gather will always be limited if a gathering is prohibited. In South Africa, it 
is in the power of only one person, employed by the local authority, to prohibit a 
gathering. His or her political perception may play a role in the decision-making. On 
the other hand, in England, when the chief officer of police reasonably believes that 
the powers under section 12 of the Public Order Act will not be sufficient to prevent a 
public processions resulting in serious public disorder, he or she must apply to the 
council of the district for an order prohibiting the public procession for a period not 
exceeding three months.216 On reception of such an application, the council may, with 
the consent of the Secretary of State, make such an order.217  
3.4.1.7 Organising the event 
According to the Guidelines on the freedom of peaceful assembly, pre-event planning 
with the executive is important, especially with regard to large or controversial 
gatherings.218 It is recommended that the organiser beforehand seeks the assistance 
of the police and relevant role players. Although the Gatherings Act does not provide 
that the organiser may request the assistance of the police, it is possible to do so. 
These discussions may comprise the deployment of police officials, marshals, venues, 
and specific concerns. The Regulations relating to Emergency Care at Mass Gathering 
Events219 are applicable in South Africa if an organiser plans to hold a gathering 
                                                          
213  Gatherings Act s 5(5)(1). 
214  Gatherings Act s 5(3). 
215  See South African Police National Instructions 4 of 2014 para 9(2). 
216  Public Order Act s 13(1).     
217  Public Order Act s 13(2). 
218  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [124]. 
219  Regulations relating to Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events, enacted in terms of s 90 of the 
National Health Act 61 of 2003, published in GG 40919 dated 15 June 2017, GN 566 of 2017 
(hereinafter Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events).  
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involving the attendance of more than 1000 participants,220 or when less than 1000 
participants are expected, but the incident is considered a high-risk event.221 In these 
circumstances, the regulations require from the organiser to arrange a risk 
assessment, and adequate health and medical services. The organiser must take the 
responsibility for the cost of providing health and medical services for the gathering.222 
Most organisations or communities do not have the finances, the know-how or 
administrative support to adhere to these regulations.   
3.4.1.8  Time, place and sound restrictions 
Legislation providing for time, place and sound restrictions seriously undermines the 
purpose of gatherings, and can be regarded as violations of the right protected in the 
Constitution. Time, place and sound restrictions are usually found in by-laws. For 
example, in Serbia, the freedom of assembly is guaranteed in locations designated by 
municipal or city regulations.223 Ukraine, Serbia, the Russian Federation and Turkey 
place general time limits on the exercise of freedom of assembly, amounting to a night-
time ban on gatherings.224 The reason for the ban seems to be to prevent squatting 
on public property. In South Africa, by-laws in municipal areas, for example, the Parks 
and Open Spaces By-Law225 provide that no person may deliver, utter or read aloud 
any public speech or address of any kind, or sing any song, or hold or take part in any 
public meeting or assemblage, except with the prior written consent of the 
Municipality.226 Effectively the by-laws require written permission from the 
municipality. According to the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, everybody 
has an equal right to use public parks, squares, streets, roads, avenues, sidewalks, 
pavements and footpaths, therefore, the state should always seek to facilitate 
                                                          
220  Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events Regulation 2(1). 
221  Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events Regulation 2(2). 
222  Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events Regulation 3(4). 
223  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[501].  
224  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[506]. 
225  Parks and Open Spaces By-Law, Provincial Gazette Extraordinary 2385 dated 11 November 2014, 
Local Authority Notice 2294.This by-law was created by the Council of Govan Mbeki Municipality 
in terms of s 156 of the Constitution read in conjunction with ss 11 and 98 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 as amended. 
226  Parks and Open Spaces By-Law s 4. 
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gatherings in these locations.227  
3.4.1.9  Anonymity of participants 
In South Africa, the Gatherings Act provides that the notice to the local authority must 
at least contain the names, telephone and facsimile numbers of the organiser and his 
or her deputy, as well as the name of the organisation or branch on whose behalf the 
gathering is convened. It will consequently be problematic to notify the local authority 
about an intended gathering if the organiser chooses to stay anonymous. Similarly, it 
is not allowed for participants of gatherings to disguise themselves in order to remain 
unidentified. In terms of section 12(7) of the Gatherings Act, persons may not ‒ at any 
gathering or demonstration ‒ wear a disguise or mask, or any other apparel or item 
which obscures their facial features and prevent their identification. However, during 
the Covid-19 pandemic, the wearing of masks was compulsory in most countries, even 
during demonstration or gatherings. According to the Guidelines on freedom of 
peaceful assembly, the wearing of a mask for expressive purposes at a peaceful 
gathering must not be prohibited,228 so long as it does not create a danger of imminent 
violence.229 Conversely, some governments go to the extent of keeping databases of 
participants in gatherings, such as in England.230 In Turkey, identification rights extend 
to the right to take fingerprints and photographs.231 In South Africa, the police are not 
prohibited from taking photos or life coverage of gatherings and demonstrations. It will 
be difficult for participants of a gathering to raise an objection on the grounds of 
privacy, or that they want to stay anonymous. 
3.4.1.10  Restricted zones or places 
In South Africa, legislation prohibits gatherings or demonstrations at restricted places. 
These restrictions make serious inroads into the right guaranteed in section 17 of the 
Constitution. Section 7 of the Gatherings Act prohibits demonstrations and gatherings 
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in vicinity of courts, buildings of Parliament, and the Union Buildings. All 
demonstrations and gatherings in a court building or within a radius of 100 metres from 
such building, and an area specified in the City of Cape Town232 and Pretoria233 are 
prohibited. If a magistrate of the district, the Chief Magistrate of Cape Town, or the 
Director-General of the Office of the State President grant permission in writing, the 
gathering or demonstration may continue.234 
The Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act 53 of 1985 provides for 
the safeguarding of certain public premises and vehicles, and for the protection of 
people. Section 2 specifies that the owner of any public premises,235 or any public 
vehicle may take steps that he or she considers necessary to safeguard and protect 
such a premise. Therefore, nobody may enter any public premises or vehicles without 
obtaining permission. Another such prescriptive example is the National Key Points 
Act 102 of 1980, which makes provision for safety at national key points. If it appears 
to the Minister that damage to, disruption or immobilisation of a place may prejudice 
the Republic, he or she may declare that place or area a national key point.236 Access 
to national key points are restricted. 
3.4.1.11  Discretion of the police to restrict or disperse groups 
The police may restrict or disperse gatherings, and, in so doing, they effectively limit 
the right protected in section 17 of the Constitution. Section 9 of the Gatherings Act 
stipulates that police members may, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that 
the police will not be able to provide protection for the participants of a gathering or 
demonstration, prevent the group from proceeding to a different place, deviating from 
the route, or from disobeying any condition specified. A police member may, if the local 
authority did not receive a notice more than 48 hours before the gathering, restrict the 
gathering to a place, or guide the participants along a route to ensure, for example, 
                                                          
232  Gatherings Act Schedule 1. See also Chapter 4 below. 
233  Gatherings Act Schedule 2. 
234  Gatherings Act s 7(2). 
235  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act 53 of 1985 s 1 ‒ ‘Public premises’ are “any 
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that traffic is least impeded, or that there is an appropriate distance between rival 
gatherings. Police members may also specify an area considered by them to be 
necessary for the movement and operation of emergency personnel and vehicles, 
traffic, or for the safe passage of the group. The public may also be excluded from the 
area.   
If a member of the police, above the rank of warrant officer, has reasonable grounds 
to believe that any potential danger to persons and property cannot be averted by the 
steps referred to above, he or she must order participants to disperse and to depart 
from the place within a reasonable time, using a loud voice or an amplified sound 
system. If the participants do not leave, members of the police may disperse the 
participants and may use force, excluding the use of weapons likely to cause serious 
bodily injury or death. The police must ensure the safety of not only the participants, 
but also of the general public in the vicinity. The police may use force if their own lives 
are threatened. Hence, participants of gatherings or demonstrations always run the 
risk that police may interfere or use force against them.   
3.4.1.12  Possibility to be prosecuted 
Participants who gather, utilising their right to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and 
to present petitions, run the risk of being arrested, especially if the gathering or 
demonstration becomes violent or conditions imposed are not met. The common law 
and legislation in South Africa provide for numerous offences under which organisers 
and participants of gatherings and demonstrations can be prosecuted.237 Organisers 
can be held liable for technical requirements in the Gatherings Act, for example, not 
informing the responsible officer that the gathering will not proceed.238 In the cases of 
Mlungwana239 and Tsoaeli,240 the effect of sanctioning certain conduct before and 
during a gathering were considered as having a chilling effect on the exercise of the 
right protected in section 17 of the Constitution. Criminalisation may come with the 
loss of liberty, and a previous conviction can be seen as impacting negatively on 
present and future employment. The stigma of a criminal conviction further deters 
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people from exercising their right to gather.241  
3.4.1.13 Liability for damage 
Depending on the circumstances, it is not only the organiser or participants that may 
be held liable for riot damages occurring as a result of a gathering. The state potentially 
may also be held accountable for the failure to protect an individual’s right to physical 
safety, or failure to assist when a gathering moves onto private property and 
participants damage structures.   
In South Africa, the Gatherings Act requires that if riot damage242 occurs as a result of 
a gathering or a demonstration, every organisation (any part of it), or the organiser, or 
a person participating in the demonstration, can be held jointly and separately liable.243 
The court in SATAWU v Garvas244 found that organisers of gatherings are liable for 
riot damage on a wider basis than under the common law.245 The court held that the 
purpose of the limitation of section 17 of the Constitution is to protect the general 
public, who are usually unable to identify the wrongdoers, and powerless to institute 
civil action due to the costs it entails.246 Organisers always run the risk that they may 
be held liable for damages suffered by third parties during protest action. Liability for 
riot damage has a dispiriting effect on the exercise of the right to gather. However, in 
practice, many gatherings, particularly service delivery protests, take place without a 
transparent leader, organiser or an organisation supporting the protest. Such protest 
action regularly involves serious damage to state and private property. 
3.5  Positive obligation of the state to protect assemblies 
The state has a positive duty to protect peaceful and unarmed assemblies, 
demonstrations, pickets or the handing over of petitions. This duty comprises these 
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242  Gatherings Act s 1(xv) ‒ ‘Riot damage’ constitutes “any loss suffered as a result of any injury to or 
the death of any person, or any damage to or destruction of any property, caused directly or 
indirectly by, and immediately before, during or after, the holding of a gathering”.     
243  Gatherings Act s 11. 
244  SATAWU para [32]. Also see footnote 120 above. 
245  SATAWU para [32]. 
246  SATAWU para [67]. 
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activities at the time when they take place, or when they are facilitated online.247 The 
positive obligation requires from the government to enable and assist participants to 
gather, and to protect the participants from any person or group who attempt to disrupt 
a gathering.248  
The court held in S v Basson249 that there is a constitutional obligation upon the state 
to prosecute offences which threaten or infringe the rights of citizens. Therefore, where 
gatherings or demonstrations pose an imminent and direct threat to public security; 
the government is in its right to prohibit them,250 or to arrest participants who commit 
offences whilst the gathering is in procession. The state needs to weigh up the relevant 
factors and circumstances of each case, to decide how the rights and interests of the 
participants and the general public must be protected.251 There are accordingly also 
negative obligations that include not prohibiting, dispersing or disrupting peaceful 
gatherings without justification or legitimate cause.252 
To realise the state’s positive duty, the police need to be appropriately trained to 
protect the human rights of everyone present; participants as well as non-participants. 
Section 9 of the Gatherings Act obliges a member of the police to act positively if he 
or she has any reasonable grounds to believe that there is a danger to persons and 
property as a result of the gathering or demonstration. The police may be held liable if 
they failed to intervene where it was reasonable to do so. Section 205(3) of the 
Constitution provides as follow: 
…objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to 
maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic, and 
their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.  
To achieve the above, the police may employ force, if and when necessary. However, 
if more force is used than required in the circumstances, the police may face 
disciplinary action as well as civil and/or criminal liability.  
                                                          
247  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [45].   
248  ICCPR General Comment para [24].  
249  S v Basson 2004 (1) SACR 285 (CC) para [32]. 
250  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 43 28. 
251  Bekink 2005 AHRLJ 408. See also Tenza 2015 Law, Democracy & Development 211-231; De Vos 
2009 Without Prejudice 4-5.   
252  ICCPR General Comment para [23]. 
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3.6  Conclusion 
The Constitution not only provides for the right to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket 
and to present petitions but also indicates when it may be limited. In South Africa, the 
Constitution permits for limitations in accordance with section 36. Accordingly, 
legislation that governs gatherings and the conduct of the executive when facilitating 
gatherings must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The right to gather is limited by, inter 
alia, the provisions of the Gatherings Act and decisions taken by the government when 
facilitating gatherings. Although the Constitution protects peaceful gatherings, it 
depends on the circumstances of each gathering as to what is deemed peaceful. 
Proper police training is essential since inappropriate police conduct at a peaceful 
gathering may trigger violence.  
This chapter has also examined provisions of the Gatherings Act which already have 
been the subject of constitutional challenges. In the Mlungwana-case, the court found 
that the criminal sanctions in section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act constitute a 
limitation to the exercise of section 17 Constitution, since all the appellants acquired 
criminal convictions for the failure to give notice of a gathering; a gathering wherein 
the appellants were seeking a response from the local authority as regards an on-
going sanitation problem. In the Tsoaeli-case, the court concluded that a provision 
which allows for unarmed and peaceful participants of gatherings to run the risk of 
losing their liberty for up to a period of one year for merely participating in peaceful 
protest action undermines the spirit of the Constitution. In the SATAWU-case, the court 
maintained that sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the Gatherings Act hold organisers of 
gatherings liable for riot damage on a wider basis than under the common law, and 
that compliance with section 11(2) of the Gatherings Act significantly increased the 
costs of organising gatherings; therefore, it amounts to a limitation of the right to 
gather. It is foreseen that the constitutionality of other offences under the Gatherings 
Act, the common law and other legislation providing for offences that arise from the 
right to gather, will be the subject of future constitutional challenges. It is accordingly 
submitted that the government is required to enact national legislation to support and 
give meaning to section 17 of the Constitution. 
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Organisers and participants of gatherings always run the risk of being arrested and 
prosecuted for contravening numerous offences under the provisions of the 
Gatherings Act, common law or other statutory offences. As such, in the following 
chapter, offences created under the Gatherings Act will be focused on in more detail.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OFFENCES UNDER THE REGULATION OF THE GATHERINGS ACT 
4.1 Introduction 
In South Africa, the Gatherings Act which regulates public gatherings and 
demonstrations asserts that “everyone has the right to peacefully assemble with other 
persons, and to express views on any matter freely in public”.1 Any such peaceful and 
unarmed assembly is afforded the protection of the state. The Act can accordingly be 
utilised as an instrument to ensure the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket or to 
petition as guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution.2 The Gatherings Act 
criminalises certain unlawful conduct in the planning phase of gatherings, and while 
the gatherings or demonstrations are in progress. When a gathering turns violent, the 
common law offence of public violence is usually applicable.3 The Gatherings Act 
provides for the steps to be taken by persons who want to arrange a gathering. The 
aim is to balance the right to gather against not unjustifiably infringing on the rights of 
others.  
The Gatherings Act was born after the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry regarding the 
Prevention of Political Violence and Intimidation was established in terms of the 
Political Violence and Intimidation Act 139 of 1991.4 The Commission recommended 
the processes to be followed in order to arrange or organise gatherings, practices 
during gatherings, the role and duty of the police before and during such gatherings, 
and the norms and behaviour of participants.5 
In this chapter, the relevance of the Gatherings Act is considered since gatherings 
regularly take place without the organisers and participants adhering to the 
                                                          
1  Gatherings Act Preamble. 
2  Constitution s 17. See Chapter 3 above.  
3  See Chapter 5 below. 
4  See footnote 11 in Chapter 1 above. 
5  See Shaw Recommending peace 1; as well as the following reports from Goldstone: Report on the 
regulation of gatherings and marches; Second interim report; Fifth interim report; Report by the 
Committee appointed to inquire into the organisation and conduct off mass demonstrations; Report 
on incidents of violence at Mossel Bay during July 1993 and Final report. See also Jacobs 1995 
Die Landdros 3-6. 
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requirements of the Act.6 The police usually arrive on the scene when the gatherings 
are already in progress. It is, therefore, debatable whether the provisions of the Act 
are still adequate in the South African context. 
Although this chapter focuses on the offences created under the Gatherings Act, it is 
also necessary to discuss some of the procedures or arrangements under the Act in 
order to understand how and when these offences can be committed. The Act 
prescribes the process to notify the government of intended gatherings. It raises the 
question whether the Gatherings Act is understandable and accessible to the general 
public. It must be remembered that the Act is the first and sometimes the only 
reference to the poor, who cannot afford legal advisers.  
In South Africa, an organisation needs to appoint a person ‒ called a convener7 ‒ who 
is responsible for the arrangements and notification of a proposed gathering to the 
local authority. The local authority again must appoint a responsible officer8 who 
receive the notifications. The responsible officer in turn notifies the authorised 
member9 (a member of the police) of the intention to hold the gathering. Time periods 
are applicable, and possible meetings may be held, conditions may be imposed, or 
gatherings can be prohibited.  
In chapter 3, the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Gatherings Act were 
discussed, for example, in Mlungwana,10 section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act was 
declared unconstitutional. In this chapter, the constitutionality of other provisions in the 
Act are also considered. There is no doubt that several provisions of the Gatherings 
Act constitute limitations to the right as guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution.11 
However, whether the limitation is constitutionally justifiable is another question. 
Furthermore, the offences under the Gatherings Act also need to conform to 
                                                          
6  Some organisations are pro-active in training the community not to be unlawfully involved in protest 
action. See Delaney The right to protest - A handbook for protesters and the police and FXI Manual: 
Regulation of Gatherings Act, 205 of 1993.  
7  The word ‘organiser’ is preferred to the term ‘convener’ that is used in the Gatherings Act. See 
definition of ‘convener’ below in footnote 46. 
8  According to the Gatherings Act s 1(xiv), a ‘responsible officer’ means: “a person appointed in 
terms of section 20 2(4)(a) as responsible officer or deputy responsible officer, and includes any 
person deemed in terms of section 2(4)(b) to be a responsible officer”.  
9  Gatherings Act s 1(i) states that an ‘authorised member’ is “a member of the Police authorized in 
terms 5 of section 2(2) to represent the Police as contemplated in the said section”. 
10  Mlungwana-case (WCC) para [94]; Mlungwana para [112]. See also Omar 2017 SA Crime 
Quarterly 24.   
11  See Chapter 3 above. 
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international human-rights norms and standards.12 As such, in this chapter’s analysis 
of offences and sentences created under the Gatherings Act, ample reference is made 
to the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly,13 the Guidelines on freedom of 
association and assembly in Africa14 and the General comment no. 37.15 A general 
background to protest action in South Africa is provided for a local perspective on the 
subject matter, which will firstly be dealt with below. 
4.2  Incidence of protest action in South Africa 
Protest action is rife in South Africa.16 The country regularly experiences protest action 
that involves substantial levels of violence.17 The Incident Reporting Information 
System (IRIS), a database maintained by the South Africa Police Service (SAPS), is 
utilised to record peaceful and violent gatherings.18 In the years 2012-2013, 1882 
peaceful gatherings and 12 399 unrest gatherings were recorded.19 During the period 
1 April 2017 to 31 December 2017, the police reported 10 711 crowd-related incidents, 
                                                          
12  As illustrated in Chapter 2 above. 
13  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2019. 
14  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa 2017. 
15  ICCPR General Comment 1-18.  
16  Eggington and Hosken https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2015-09-22-vigilante-rage-
born-of-peoples-despair/ (Date of use: 10 October 2020); Mailovich 
https://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Misdaad/Tenk-gebrand-oor-wurms-in-water-20150205 (Date of 
use: 10 October 2020); Germishuys https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20150205/ 
textview (Date of use: 10 October 2020); Germishuys https://www.netwerk24.com/ 
Nuus/Misdaad/Betogers-wil-in-die-donker-baklei-20150206 (Date of use: 10 October 2020); 
Keppler https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20150205/2816768433290 43 (Date of 
use: 10 October 2020); Mailovich https://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Hoe-se-seun-vertel-hoe-huis-
aangeval-is-20150205 (Date of use: 10 October 2020); Louw-Carstens https://www.netwerk24. 
com/Nuus/Politiek/Ministers-se-besoek-kal meer-niemand-20150205 (Date of use: 10 October 
2020); Louw-Carstens https://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/Al-meer-protes-kom-2015 0206 
(Date of use: 10 October 2020); Msomi 2016-06-19 Sunday Times 17. See also the violence 
involved in the #FeesMustFall campaign in footnote 82 (Chapter 3) above. 
17  Marks 2014 SACJ 346-376. 
18  The IRIS is, however, criticised because of the manner in which data is collected, depending mainly 
on the police officer responsible for the input of the data, and the responsible officer providing the 
information. See Marks 2014 SACJ 352.  
19  Marks 2014 SACJ 351. See also Auerbach 2003 AHRLJ 275-313, Shearing and Foster 2007 Acta 
Juridica 156-170; Dixon 2000 SACJ 69-82, Barron https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-
times/opinion-and-analysis/2017-02-12-so-many-questions-on-anc-top-brass-implicated-in-state-
of-capture-report/ (Date of use: 10 October 2020); Alexander, Runciman and Maruping SAPS data 
on crowd incidents 19-24; Mbazira 2013 SAJHR 251-275.  
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which include 8133 peaceful incidents and 2578 violent incidents.20  
According to the statistical information on violent protest and industrial action kept by 
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA),21 185 convictions and 59 acquittals were 
reported in criminal court cases arising from service delivery protests and industrial 
action during the period April 2015 to November 2017, and during the period April 
2018 to June 2019, 633 convictions and 48 acquittals were recorded. 
Although there are a high number of violent gatherings taking place, a relatively small 
number of prosecutions are instituted, and a low number of suspects are arrested for 
cases relating to violent gatherings. When cases are referred to the courts, the 
prosecution generally proceeds under the common law offences of public violence, 
malicious injury to property, assault, or trespassing under the Trespass Act 6 of 1959. 
Case law on these types of offences are numerous, however, prosecution and case 
law with regarded to the offences under the Gatherings Act are very limited. 
Unfortunately, data with regard to the amount of notifications of gatherings that were 
received by local authorities is not available to be included in this study.  
4.3  Gatherings and demonstrations in the Gatherings Act 
International instruments protect the different activities when people gather under the 
term ‘assembly’.22 The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly proclaims an 
assembly to mean several people jointly and intentionally gathering together in a public 
accessible place in order to collectively express themselves on a certain matter.23 An 
assembly can include a concourse, demonstration, meeting or procession. Every 
country has its own understanding what an assembly, demonstration, rally, march, 
meeting, gathering, and so forth, entails or what the purpose of it must be. For 
example, in Turkey, meetings and demonstrations may be arranged on specific issues 
to enlighten people and to create public opinion.24 The French law distinguishes 
                                                          
20  South African Government https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-bheki-cele-south-african-police-
and-independant-police-investigative-directorate (Date of use: 23 January 2020). See also 
Chamberlain 2016 AHRLJ 365-384.  
21  Information collected and centralised by the NPA, received from prosecutors on a monthly basis.  
22  See Chapter 2 above. 
23  See footnotes 216, 217 in Chapter 2; European Commission for Democracy through Law 
Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 2010 paras [41], [44].  
24  OSCE/ODIHR Handbook on monitoring freedom of peaceful assembly 60. 
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between public meetings and demonstrations; no notification is needed for public 
meetings but demonstrations, which include marches and rallies on public roads, are 
subject to prior notification.25  
In South Africa, section 17 comprising the right to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket 
and to petition does not contain the word ‘gathering’. However, the moniker ‘gathering’ 
is utilised in the Gatherings Act, as such, the meaning of ‘gathering’ must be read into 
the activities protected in section 17. The definition of a gathering under the Gatherings 
Act include any assembly, concourse or procession.26 The Gatherings Act 
distinguishes between gatherings and demonstrations. The difference is important 
since different duties are ascribed to organisers of gatherings and to organisers of 
demonstrations. Notification and some of the offences under the Act are only 
applicable to gatherings. 
According to section 1 of the Act, a demonstration is defined as consisting of no more 
that fifteen persons protesting in favour of or in opposition to any individual or 
individuals, any cause, or any conduct or lack of conduct.27 The definition for a 
gathering again includes: 
…any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any 
public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989), or any other 
public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air-  
(a)  at which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, 
political party or political organization, whether or not that party or 
organization is registered in terms of any applicable law, are discussed, 
attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated; or 
(b)  held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to 
mobilize or demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, 
policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or institution, 
including any government, administration or governmental institution.28 
It is clear from the above-mentioned two definitions that a gathering regards 
assemblies, concourses, processions, petitions and pickets if more than fifteen 
persons gather, while if less than fifteen persons come together, the activity is seen 
as a demonstration. For a demonstration, notice to the authorities is not required. 
                                                          
25  OSCE/ODIHR Handbook on monitoring freedom of peaceful assembly 25-26. 
26  Gatherings Act s 1(vi). 
27  Gatherings Act s 1(v); see footnote 40 in Chapter 3 above. 
28  Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989. 
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However, when more than fifteen persons are planning to gather, the authorities need 
to be notified. For example, in Rudolph and Others v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Another,29 four adults and four children gathered near Capital Park. Upon arrival, 
the police informed them that their assembly was an unlawful gathering as they did 
not have the requisite permission.30 The group was given time to disperse, and after 
an hour31 arrested for, inter alia, not notifying the authorities of the intended 
gathering.32 Since the appellant and his group were only eight in number while the 
Gatherings Act requires notification if more than fifteen persons gather in a public 
place, the court found that the small group did not constitute a gathering within the 
meaning of the Act.33 Therefore, there was no evidence of a gathering, and no offence 
had been committed in the presence of the police.34   
Although the failure to notify the authorities of an intended gathering is no longer an 
offence in South Africa, the notification procedure is still applicable and must be 
adhered to when more than fifteen persons intend to gather. It becomes problematic 
when a demonstration is held and other people join in solidarity, and suddenly more 
than fifteen persons are participating. The Gatherings Act is silent on what steps an 
organiser must take in such circumstances, or how to rectify such situation. In 
Mlungwana,35 the court considered the appellants’ argument that the distinction 
between a gathering and a demonstration is arbitrary and irrational as it is unclear why 
sixteen participants is an appropriate number to require notification. The explanation 
offered by the police for the number of sixteen participants was simply that there had 
to be a cut-off number.36 One of the possible reasons why the Act distinguishes 
between gatherings and demonstrations is that smaller groups do not pose the same 
threat as larger groups, and, therefore, does not need any regulation from authorities. 
                                                          
29  Rudolph and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2009 (2) SACR 271 (SCA) 
(hereinafter Rudolph and Others). 
30  Rudolph and Others para [10]. 
31  Rudolph and Others para [11]. 
32  Rudolph and Others para [12]. 
33  Rudolph and Others para [14].  
34  Rudolph and Others para [18]. 
35  Mlungwana para [47]. 
36  See Mlungwana para [93] where Petse AJ states: “There appears to be no intrinsic magic in the 
number 15…”.  The SAPS Amendment Bill 2020 was published in GG 1 October 2020, to invite 
public comments to address the concerns raised by the Mlungwana-judgment. It provides inter alia 
that when more than 50 persons gather in any other public place or premises wholly or partly open 
to the air, notice is needed (see section 3(1)(b)) and that the convener must not later than four 
days before the gathering is to be held, give notice to the responsible officer (see section 3(2)).  
However, the proposed amendments do not address the inherent problems of the Act. 
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Smaller groups also do not require the same effort from the local authority and police.  
A gathering must take place in or on a public road,37 or public space or premises wholly 
or partly open to the air. The space must be accessible to the general public. 
Therefore, an enclosed, indoor, public place does not fall under the definition. A 
‘premise’ is not defined in the Gatherings Act, however, according to the general 
meaning “the premises of a business or an institution are all the buildings and land 
that it occupies on one site.”38 ‘Premises’ can be seen as referring to a site occupied 
by a business or institution, and, therefore, implies that the public have access thereto. 
A gathering in a private space, although the intention is to attack the actions of the 
government, will not fall into the ambit of the Act.39 The requirement that a gathering 
must take place in a public space does not form part of the definition of demonstration. 
A demonstration can take place in a private or public space, indoors or outdoors.  
The Constitution does not distinguish between public and private places, as the 
intention is to protect any place in the Republic. However, it must be kept in mind that 
the owner of private property still needs to give permission for a demonstration or 
gathering on his or her property, and that other legislation may be applicable. Although 
the definition of a gathering includes assemblies as well as pickets and petitioning in 
public spaces; in practice, picketing40 or petitioning can take place on an employer’s 
premises which can be a private place depending on the circumstances. If the public 
has access to premises, it could be deemed to be a public place. According to the 
Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, gatherings can take place on privately 
owned places, for example, privatised public spaces such as streets, squares and 
                                                          
37  As defined in s 1 of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996. The Act replaced the previous Act 
29 of 1989 (The Road Traffic Act). ‘Public road’ means “any road, street or thoroughfare or any 
other place (whether a thoroughfare or not) which is commonly used by the public or any section 
thereof or to which the public or any section thereof has a right of access, and includes - (a) the 
verge of any such road, street or thoroughfare; (b) any bridge, ferry or drift traversed by any such 
road, street or thoroughfare; and (c) any other work or object forming part of or connected with or 
belonging to such road, street or thoroughfare”. 
38  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “premises”. 
39  This does not mean that assemblies held inside buildings or on private property are not subject to 
protection - see Cisse v France (Application no 51346/99 9 April 2002); Acik and Others v Turkey, 
2009). Rather, they are usually subject to different regulations, and there is a greater presumed 
right to use open public spaces for all forms of public assembly. See OSCE/ODIHR Handbook on 
monitoring freedom of peaceful assembly 11. 
40  LRA s 69. See Chapter 3 above.   
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shopping centres to which the general public has access.41 
A demonstration and gathering have the same intention ‒ the coming together of 
persons for an expressive purpose. Both gatherings and demonstrations can have a 
person, group or government as a target. The definitions in the Gatherings Act 
providing for gatherings and demonstrations include any coming together of persons 
– from a burial ceremony to a sporting event, as long as it is for an expressive purpose. 
The intention of the participants can be social, spiritual or political.42 The same apply 
for the definition of a demonstration – it is applicable to any type of event. However, 
most gatherings in South Africa, for example, sporting events at schools, funerals and 
church events, which may or may not be politically motivated, take place without any 
reference to the Gatherings Act or any interference of the authority. The Gatherings 
Act does not attempt to exclude certain activities, for example, social or spiritual 
events. In some countries, for example, in Germany, legislation excludes events of 
crowd entertainment or mass partying.43 In England, notification is not applicable 
where the procession is customarily held in a place, or is a funeral procession 
organised by a funeral director in the normal course of his or her business.44 
4.4  Offences created by section 12 of the Gatherings Act 
The Gatherings Act provides for offences that can be committed before the actual 
gatherings take place, and while demonstrations and gatherings are in progress. The 
Act attempts to compel organisers to notify the authorities of an intended gathering, 
and to ensure that organisers attend meetings deemed important by the authorities. 
Organisers, participants and marshals must attend to certain duties and adhere to 
police instructions. In the following paragraphs, certain offences created by the 
Gatherings Act will be discussed separately. In each discussion, the definition of the 
particular offence will be provided, and where applicable, the manner in which the 
offence was applied in case law will be considered. 
                                                          
41  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [83]. See also ICCPR General Comment para [10]. 
42  See Woolman’s criticism of the definition of a gathering above in para 3.4.1.2.  
43  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly 52.  
44  Section 11(2) of the Public Order Act.  
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4.4.1  Failure to give notice or adequate notice of an intended gathering 
A person who unlawfully and intentionally convenes a gathering, without giving notice 
or adequate notice to the responsible officer from the local authority is guilty of an 
offence.45  
In terms of section 3 of the Gatherings Act, the organiser46 of a gathering must give 
notice in writing to the responsible officer.47 When an organiser has not been 
appointed, the person who has “taken part in the planning, organising or preparations 
for the gathering or invited the public to attend,”48 will be deemed to have organised 
the gathering. A responsible officer must be suitable for the position, and is appointed 
by the local authority. It is the prerogative of the local authority to decide who is 
suitable. If a responsible officer is not appointed, the notice must be submitted to the 
chief executive officer of the municipality, or in his or her absence, to his or her 
immediate junior.49 If a local authority does not function in the area, notice must be 
given to the magistrate, who then needs to fulfil the functions of the responsible 
officer.50 It is evident that it may be a time-consuming and confusing exercise for a 
member of the public to identify the place where notification must take place.  
The organiser must give notice at least seven days before the gathering is to be held. 
The seven-day notice period grants or allows the government leverage to decide if 
and how to take action against the notification.51 When it is not reasonable possible to 
give notice as prescribed above – then it needs to be done at the earliest opportunity.52 
                                                          
45  Section 12(1)(a) of the Public Order Act. 
46  The Gatherings Act provides that “an organisation or any branch of an organisation intending to 
hold a gathering shall appoint a person to be responsible for the arrangements for that gathering 
and to be present thereat, to give notice in terms of section 3 and to act on its behalf at any 
consultations or negotiations contemplated in section 4, or in connection with any other procedure 
contemplated in the Act at which his presence is requires; and a deputy to such a person must be 
appointed”. Section 1(iv) of the Act declares that such a person will be the convener. A convenor 
also includes any person who, of his own accord, convenes a gathering – following that no structure 
or entity needs to exist when notice of an intended gathering is given.  
47  According to the European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of 
peaceful assembly 2010 para [25], the notification process should not be onerous or bureaucratic, 
since it may discourage those who wish to hold an assembly. 
48  Gatherings Act s 13(3). 
49  Gatherings Act s 2(4)(b). 
50  Gatherings Act s 3(4). 
51  According to the European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of 
peaceful assembly 2010 para [120], the period of notice should not be unnecessarily lengthy but 
allow adequate time for the relevant state authorities to plan and prepare.  
52  Gatherings Act s 3(2). 
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However, when notice is given less than 48 hours before the commencement of the 
gathering, the responsible officer may prohibit the gathering.53 It seems that the 
responsible officer has the discretion to decide what constitutes ‘reasonable possible’, 
and ‘at the earliest opportunity’. The decision to proceed with the gathering, or to 
impose conditions may rely on the decision or whims of only one person, the 
responsible officer – setting this section at odds with most international instruments.54  
As regards the notice itself, it must contain the following information: 
 the name, address and telephone and facsimile numbers, of the organiser 
and his deputy, 
 the name of the organisation or branch on whose behalf the gathering is 
convened,  
 the purpose of the gathering,  
 the time, duration and date of the gathering, 
 the place where the gathering is to be held, 
 the anticipated number of participants, 
 the number of marshals, where possible, the names of the marshals who will 
be appointed by the organiser, and how the marshals will be distinguished 
from the other participants in the gathering.55  
In the case of a gathering in the form of a procession, the notice must comprise of the 
following details:  
 the exact and complete route of the procession,  
 the time when and the place at which participants in the procession are to 
gather, and  
 the time when and the place from which the procession is to commence,  
 the time when and the place where the procession is to end and the 
participants are to disperse, 
 the manner in which the participants will be transported to the place of 
assembly and from the point of dispersal, 
 the number and types of vehicles, which are to form part of the procession.  
 If notice is given later than seven days before the date on which the gathering 
is to be held, the reason why it was not given timeously.56 
The Act does not specifically prescribe the requirements for a petition,57 except that 
the place and the person to whom it is to be handed over must be mentioned in the 
notice. Since specific and detailed information are required in the above notifications, 
                                                          
53  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 43 9. 
54  See Chapter 2 above. 
55  Gatherings Act s 3(3). 
56  Section 3(3). 
57  See Chapter 3 above regarding acts in South Africa providing for petitioning. 
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it is foreseen that the time of commencing and ending of the gatherings may be 
guesswork on the part of the organisers. It is also very difficult to anticipate the number 
of participants, or number or type of vehicles, or the number of marshals necessary to 
control the participants. The Gatherings Act does not provide any requirements for 
how marshals must be distinguished from the rest of the participants, although the 
LRAA58 makes available picketing rules which require that marshals need to wear 
armbands or vests to be identifiable.59 Funds, in most instances, are not available for 
special clothing. The Gatherings Act also does not specify whether marshals must be 
adults, or that they need to attend from the beginning till the end of the gathering. 
According to the Guidelines on the freedom of peaceful assembly, prior notification 
must only be required when a government needs to put in place necessary 
arrangements to facilitate the right to gather, and to protect the public order and safety 
as well as the rights of others.60 The Guidelines on freedom of association and 
assembly in Africa, in conformity, states that:  
Participating in and organising assemblies is a right and not a privilege, and thus 
its exercise does not require the authorisation of the state. A system of prior 
notification may be put in place to allow states to facilitate the exercise of this right 
and to take the necessary measures to protect public safety and rights of other 
citizens… A notification regime requires that the presumption is always in favour 
of holding assemblies, and that assemblies not be automatically penalised, through 
dispersal or sanction, due to failure to notify.61 
Therefore, the notification procedure can be rebuked if the object of the state is to 
facilitate the right and to protect the rights of others. However, the process must not 
amount to authorisation or permission from the authorities to proceed with a gathering. 
Different notification standards are required by different countries, for example, in 
England, an advance notice of six days before the proposed date of the event must 
be delivered or posted to the police station, or the notice must be delivered by hand 
as soon as reasonably practicable.62 In Belgium, authorisation requests must be made 
                                                          
58  Published in the GG 42121 dated 19 December 2018.   
59  Default rule 7.5.2. 
60  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [25]. See ICCPR General Comment para [41]. 
61  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [71]. 
62  Section 11(4)-(6) of the Public Order Act. 
111 
to the mayor of the Belgian municipality at least ten days before the gathering.63 
Notification must be made not less than eight days before the gathering in Algeria; five 
days in Egypt and Ghana; four days in Mozambique and Zimbabwe; three days in 
Cameroon and Kenya, and two days in Ethiopia.64 The international standard for 
notification is two days, and this allows for sufficient time for the organisers and 
authorities to discuss differences, and to appeal decisions.65 The notice period of 
seven days in South Africa, therefore, seems excessive, and has a restrictive effect 
on the right of peaceful assembly. In some jurisdictions, for example, in Russia, the 
Russian Federal Law requires even more detailed information in the notice:  
1.  A notice of holding the public event (except for an assembly and picketing 
held by a single participant) shall be sent by its organiser in writing to the 
executive authority of the Subject of the Russian Federation or … local self-
government … In the event of a picket by a group of persons, notice of a 
public event may be submitted no later than three days prior to the holding 
of that event …  
3.  The notice of holding the public event shall indicate: 
1)  the purpose of the public event; 
2)  the form of the public event; 
3)  the place (places) of holding the public event, routes of passage of 
participants, and, in the event of a public event to be held with the use 
of means of transport, information on the use of means of transport; 
4)  date, time of commencement and termination of the public event; 
5)  expected number of participants in the public event; 
6)  forms and methods to be used by the organiser of the public event to 
ensure public order, the organisation of medical aid, intention to use 
sound-amplifying technical devices when holding the public event; 
7)  family name, first name, patronymic or denomination of the organiser 
of the public event, data on his residential address or location and 
telephone number; 
8)  family name, first name and patronymic of persons authorised by the 
organiser of the public event to perform managerial functions 
associated with the organisation and holding of the public event; 
9)  date of submission of the notice on holding the public event.66 
Detailed personal information with regard to the organiser and persons assisting are 
required. The requirement in the excerpt at 6) which regards the “forms and methods 
                                                          
63  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[46]. 
64  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[61]. 
65  Peters and Ley Comparative study on national legislation on freedom of peaceful assembly para 
[61]. 
66  European Commission for Democracy through Law Federal law on assemblies, meetings, 
demonstrations, marches and pickets No 54-Fz of 19 June 2004 of the Russian Federation art 7.  
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to be used by the organiser to ensure public order” can have a chilling effect on the 
right to gather.  
In England, written notice needs to be given of any proposal to hold a public 
procession,67 unless it is not reasonably practicable.68 The information required in the 
notice is straight-forward and easy to provide. The notice in England must specify: 
 the date when it is intended to hold the procession, 
 the time when it is intended to start,  
 the proposed route, and 
 the name and address of the person (or of one of the persons) proposing to 
organise it.69  
In accordance with the Guidelines of freedom of association and assembly in Africa: 
Notification procedures shall be non-burdensome… An appropriately simple 
procedure would involve the filling in of a clear and concise form, available and 
submittable online and elsewhere, requesting information as to the date, time, 
location and/or itinerary of the assembly, and the name, address and contact 
details of principle organiser(s)... Procedures shall be flexible in instances of late 
notification or submission of incomplete information, with a view to facilitating the 
conduct of assemblies.70 
The information required for notification in England seems to be sufficient to notify the 
police of the gathering. If further details are required, it can always be requested. It is 
submitted that in comparison to other countries’ notification requirements, the 
information called for by the Gatherings Act in the notice is excessive. It will be difficult 
for a member of the public, specifically the poor, to obtain all the information as 
mandated in the notice without assistance. However, the Act does call for the 
responsible officer to assist the organiser to reduce the notice in writing, upon 
request.71 In Mlungwana, the court found that the notice involves a considerable effort 
on the part of the organiser; first to be familiar with the provisions of the Act, and then 
to satisfy the requirements.72 It is suggested that the government revisit the information 
necessitated in the notice, the time-period of notification, as well as how the notice 
                                                          
67  Section 11 of the Public Order Act. ‘Public procession’ means “a procession in a public place”. 
According to s 16 of the Public Order Act, a ‘public place’ constitutes “(a) any highway ... (b) any 
place to which at the material time the public or any section of the public has access, on payment 
or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission”.  
68  Public Order Act s 11(6).  
69  Public Order Act s 11(3). 
70  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 paras [72], [119]. 
71  Gatherings Act s 3(1). 
72  Mlungwana para [91]. 
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needs to be submitted.  
Although the failure to notify the authorities of an intended gathering does not any 
longer constitute an offence,73 the notice procedure as provided by the Act is still 
applicable. Organisers74 still need to notify the local authority of a planned gathering, 
however, there are no consequence if they do not comply. The notice procedure was 
regrettably not considered by the Constitutional Court in Mlungwana. It is foreseen 
that in future, notification will be problematic and will only proceed in circumstances of 
planned mass action, or where the assistance of the police is necessary. In practice, 
many of the provisions of the Gatherings Act are rendered ineffective since section 
12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act was declared unconstitutional. Organisers are aware 
that if no notice was given, there is no risk that they can be prosecuted for some of the 
other offences under the Gatherings Act, for example, for not attending a meeting 
called by the responsible officer (local authority).75  
Lastly, the use of social media or online methods to facilitate gatherings and protest 
action is a common practice by organisers and participants in South Africa. However, 
the Gatherings Act does not expressively provide for online notification of gatherings, 
which can positively enhance the notification and facilitation procedures. A simple 
online notification, 24 hours before the event, to the nearest police station where the 
gathering will take place, can be adequate to alert the authorities. The LRAA76 already 
provides that online methods may be utilised to assist during pickets, for example, to 
report changes in the identities of the marshals and organisers. It is suggested that 
the Gatherings Act follow suit. 
  
                                                          
73  Section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act was declared unconstitutional in Mlungwana-case (WCC) 
para [101]; Mlungwana para [112]. The Constitutional Court concluded in para [101] that this 
section is not ‘appropriately tailored’ to facilitate peaceful gatherings, and that the nature of the 
limitation is too severe to render this provision constitutional since there are less restrictive means 
available to achieve the same result. This offence was not applicable to demonstrations or 
gatherings as an immediate response to an event or spontaneous gathering.  
74  Gatherings Act s 1(xi): ‘Organisation’ means “any association, group or body of persons, whether 
or not such association, group or body has been incorporated, established or registered in 
accordance with any law”.  
75  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(b). 
76  Published in the GG 42121 dated 19 December 2018.  
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4.4.2  Failure to attend a meeting called by the responsible officer after the 
organiser gave notice of a proposed gathering 
If the organiser of a gathering, or any person after giving notice to the local authority 
of the intention to hold a gathering, unlawfully and intentionally fails to attend a meeting 
to discuss the contents of the notice, amendments thereof, additions thereto, or any 
conditions to be imposed on the gathering as directed by the responsible officer of the 
local authority, he or she is guilty of an offence.77  
This offence is relevant when the responsible officer (local authority),78 after receiving 
notice of a proposed gathering from an organiser, is of opinion that negotiations are 
necessary, and calls a meeting with the organiser and other relevant role players in 
order to discuss amendments of the contents of the notice and conditions.79 Proof will 
be required that the message (regarding the time and place of the meeting) was 
conveyed to the organiser. Therefore, the responsible officer needs to keep proper 
track of dates, timeframes, reasons, notifications received, and other relevant 
information. This information is required to properly investigate a case of contravention 
of section 12(1)(b) of the Act.  
The section is applicable to gatherings where there is an intention to inform relevant 
stake holders. The section is not applicable to demonstrations or when the gathering 
is an immediate response to an event or spontaneous,80 or where no notice was given. 
However, as the convening of a gathering without giving notice or adequate notice to 
the responsible officer no longer constitutes an offence, a void in the proper planning 
and execution of gatherings arises. It is ironic that an organiser cannot be prosecuted 
if he or she fails to notify the responsible officer, however, when he or she did notify 
the responsible officer, and fails to attend a meeting, prosecution can be instituted. 
                                                          
77  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(b). 
78  Gatherings Act s 1(xiv): ‘Responsible officer’ means “a person appointed in terms of section 2(4)(a) 
… it is a suitable person appointed by the local authority or the chief executive officer or his 
immediate junior, or the magistrate if a local authority does not exist or is not functioning.” 
79  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(b). 
80  The gatherings occur when a group of people gather at a particular location but without any prior 
arrangements or planning in response to some incident. See European Commission for 
Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 2010 para [79]. In South-
Africa, spontaneous gatherings take place frequently. In some instances, community members, 
who are divided into street committees, gather when an offence is committed, e.g., to apprehend 
the perpetrator of an offence, or to assist with searching for a missing child. The offence or incident 
triggers the gathering. These gatherings regularly turn violent, since participants take the law into 
their own hands, with grave consequences for the alleged suspect.  
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The nature of this limitation is severe, and there are less restrictive means available 
to facilitate gatherings.  
Apart from the requisite notice, the Gatherings Act obliges local authorities to set up a 
meeting with the organiser and other interested parties within 24 hours after receiving 
notification.81 In terms of section 4 of the Act, the responsible officer and the authorised 
member must consult regarding the necessity for discussions.82 If the responsible 
officer is of the opinion after the consultation that discussions are not necessary, and 
that the gathering can take place as specified in the notice, he or she must notify the 
organiser accordingly.83 If the organiser has not been called to a meeting within 24 
hours after notification, the gathering may take place in accordance with the contents 
of the notice. Circumstances where the notice of the responsible officer does not reach 
the organiser can be challenging. The organiser may wish not to be reached. If the 
organiser gives notification on a Friday or before a public holiday, the 24 hours’ period 
can already lapse before attention to the notice could be given, or before the notice of 
the responsible officer could be received. If the identity or whereabouts of the 
organiser is unknown, the responsible officer can publish the conditions and the 
reasons in a notice, newspaper, on radio or television, or affix it at the address of the 
organiser as specified in the notice.84  
If the responsible officer is of opinion that discussions are necessary, a meeting must 
be called with the relevant persons or bodies85 to discuss the contents of the notice, 
amendments thereof, additions thereto, and any conditions to be met.86 The 
responsible officer must ensure that the discussions take place in good faith.87 
Regrettably, the responsible officer’s perception of what ‘good faith’ entails, may play 
a decisive role. Once the meeting takes place, the responsible officer is “given a 
significant degree of discretion in deciding whether or not to prohibit the gathering”.88 
If an agreement cannot be reached on the contents of the notice, the responsible 
                                                          
81  Gatherings Act s 4(3). 
82  Gatherings Act s 4(1). 
83  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(a). 
84  Gatherings Act s 4(5)(a).  
85  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(b). 
86  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(c). 
87  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(d). 
88  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 43 11.  
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officer can impose conditions with regard to the holding of the gathering.89 The 
responsible officer must give written reasons for the conditions imposed.90 However, 
the conditions imposed can render the reason for the gathering ineffective.  
As soon as the organiser becomes unable to perform or continue with his or her 
functions, the organisation may appoint another person. However, after another 
person was appointed, no further appointments can be made without the approval of 
the responsible officer.91 If the responsible officer withholds approval, the organisation 
will be unable to adhere to the provisions of the Act, or will need to approach the courts 
for assistance. Section 2(2)(b) of the Act also provides that after a new member of the 
police was designated as authorised member, no further designation can be made 
except with the approval of the responsible officer. Again, if the responsible officer 
withholds approval that a new member of the police may be designated, the 
organisation will be unable to continue with the proposed gathering. These provisions 
can be seen as strange, since the local authority may restrict the police to perform 
their duties by withholding approval. It is also ironic that protest action can be aimed 
at the service delivery of dysfunctional municipalities to whom notice must be given of 
the intended gathering. It is debatable whether an independent and fair decision can 
be made if there is awareness that the protest action is directed against the local 
authority.92  
Section 2(3) of the Gatherings Act states that when the organiser or police member is 
not available, the consultation or meeting can continue in their absence – however, 
the police or organisation will be bound by the decisions. Effectively, it means that the 
local authority (consisting of the responsible officer – a single person) will decide how 
and where the gathering will proceed without the relevant parties at the table. The 
subjective beliefs and political affiliation or views of the responsible officer may play a 
part in his or her decision-making. It is, therefore, difficult to understand that if the 
meeting can proceed without the organiser, that the failure of the organiser to attend 
                                                          
89  The conditions can ensure proper arrangements regarding vehicular or pedestrian traffic, rush hour 
traffic, distances between two rival gatherings, access to property and workplaces, and prevention 
of injury to persons and property. See Gatherings Act s 4(4)(b).  
90  Gatherings Act s 4(4)(c). 
91  Gatherings Act s 2(c). 
92  Chamberlain 2016 AHRLJ 375-376 mentions the difficulties a group of women encountered when 
they wanted to arrange a march after 44 mine workers were killed during a strike near Marikana. 
The women’s notices to the relevant municipalities were rejected, denying the women their right to 
protest.  
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the meeting constitutes an offence. The purpose for the consultation and negotiation 
is unclear when the organiser is not present at the meeting. Prosecution will also be 
problematic if the organiser did not attend the meeting, and is arrested for failing to 
adhere to the conditions imposed by the responsible officer,93 especially if the decision 
of the responsible officer was irrational, or based on inexperienced or incorrect facts.  
This notification procedure is extensive, and cannot be seen as a simple, user-friendly 
process. Chamberlain is of opinion that these provisions in: 
…the Gatherings Act are misunderstood – or deliberately improperly applied by 
municipal officials, since they routinely operate on the basis that the organisers of 
a protest are required by the Gatherings Act to ask for permission to proceed.94  
The fact that the gathering can be prohibited or allowed to continue pending certain 
conditions to be met, creates the impression that ‘permission’ needs to be obtained 
from the responsible officer before the gathering may proceed. When permission is 
required to proceed with a gathering, the right protected in section 17 of the 
Constitution is restricted. 
4.4.3  Failure to comply with the duties of the organiser, marshal or participants at 
a gathering or demonstration 
Any person, who unlawfully and intentionally, contravenes or fails to comply with any 
provision of section 8 in regard to the conduct at a gathering, or when applicable at a 
demonstration is guilty of an offence.95 Section 8 determines the duties of the 
organiser and marshals, and prohibits certain conduct of participants and other 
persons present at the gathering or demonstration. It also criminalises the compelling 
of any person in any manner whatsoever to join a gathering or demonstration. Section 
8 provides for gatherings where notification was given by the organiser to the 
responsible officer, since many of the duties are linked to the contents of the notice.96 
However, since the failure to notify the local authority of an intended gathering is no 
longer an offence, the relevance of failure to adhere to several of the duties in section 
8 are debatable.  
                                                          
93  See Gatherings Act s 12(1)(c). 
94  Chamberlain 2016 AHRLJ 377. 
95  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(c). 
96  Mlungwana para [20]. The notice process is discussed above at para 4.4.1. 
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The duties under section 8 of the Gatherings Act were designed to ensure that 
gatherings are peaceful, orderly, and properly managed. When organisers and 
participants do not have access to administrative and financial support, it can be 
problematic to adhere to these duties. Once masses gather and bystanders join in 
solidarity, it may be impossible to attend to these duties. Therefore, organisers may 
decide not to notify the authorities, and not to run the risk of being prosecuted for 
certain offences under the Act.  
The duties of the organiser before, during and after the gathering entail the following: 
 the appointment of the number of marshals mentioned in the notice,  
 the taking of necessary steps to ensure that the gathering at all times proceeds 
peacefully, 
 that the notice and conditions specified are complied with,97 
 that all the marshals are clearly distinguishable,98 
 that all reasonable steps are taken to ensure that the marshals and participants, are 
timeously and properly informed of the conditions.99 The organiser and the authorised 
member (police member) must, respectively, ensure that every marshal and every 
member of the police present at the gathering are informed of the contents of the notice, 
including any amendment or condition,100  
 that the gathering proceeds and take place at the location or on the route and in the 
manner and during the times specified in the notice.101 
 the taking of all reasonable steps to ensure that no persons have in his or her possession 
any airgun, firearm, imitation firearm or any muzzle loading firearm, as defined in section 
1 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 or any object which resembles a firearm and 
that is likely to be mistaken for a firearm or any dangerous weapon, as defined in the 
Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2005.102 
 to take all reasonable steps to ensure that no person, before or during a gathering or 
demonstration, compel or attempt to compel any person to participate in the gathering 
or demonstration.103 
Although the police and local authority can assist organisers with guidance and 
manpower to adhere to these duties, it is evident that it is difficult to attend to all the 
duties of an organiser under section 8 of the Act. The Act is silent on how the organiser 
must appoint the marshals. There is also no requirement in the Act that the marshals 
                                                          
97  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(d) is also applicable. 
98  Gatherings Act s 8(1). 
99  Gatherings Act s 8(2). 
100  Gatherings Act s 4(5)(b). 
101  Gatherings Act s 8(3). 
102  Gatherings Act s 8(4). 
103  Gatherings Act s 8(6). 
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appointed must be present from the beginning until the end of the gathering. The 
marshals appointed may moreover leave during the gathering or be completely 
absent. The Act further does not indicate how marshals must be distinguishable from 
the rest of the crowd.  
Under the Act, it is expected from the organiser and marshals to control the gathering. 
It will be an extremely difficult task at larger gatherings, if not impossible, to establish 
if the organiser distributed to each and every marshal the required information with 
regard to how the gathering must proceed. Persons who join while the gathering is 
underway may not receive the necessary information as well. The larger the gathering, 
the more difficult it is to adhere to the notice and conditions. When the organiser does 
not have financial or administrative support, it is debatable if he or she will be able to 
take the necessary steps to ensure that the gathering proceeds peacefully. Training 
for organisers is furthermore not a prerequisite, as such, a person with no experience 
in crowd control is required to identify steps to ensure a peaceful gathering. 
It is unclear from the Act what reasonable steps the organiser needs to take to ensure 
that nobody has a firearm or a dangerous weapon in their possession. This may indeed 
be impossible to ascertain since the Act does not allow for each participant to be 
searched. It is lastly also vague what reasonable steps the organiser needs to take to 
ensure that nobody is compelled to participate in the gathering or demonstration. 
When masses gather, the organiser will not be able to personally monitor the 
behaviour of each participant. 
If the organiser is prosecuted, it will be the duty of the court – after listening to all the 
facts – to decide what reasonable steps the organiser could have taken. The 
Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly provides that organisers of gatherings 
must not be held liable for failure to perform their responsibilities when they have made 
reasonable efforts to do so.104 The organisers also must not be held liable for the 
actions of individual participants, or for the conduct of bystanders.105  
  
                                                          
104  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [224]. 
105  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [224].  
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In certain countries, the duties of organisers are excessive. According to the Russian 
Federal Law,106 an organiser is obligated during a public event to see to the following 
duties: 
3)  to ensure compliance with the conditions for holding the public event 
specified in the notice … 
4)  to require that the participants in the public event comply with the public law 
and order and also with the rules of procedure for holding the public event. 
Persons who fail to comply with the lawful requirements of the organiser of 
the public event may be sent away from the place of holding the public event; 
5)  to ensure, within their respective competence, public order and security of 
citizens when holding the public event and… to perform that obligation jointly 
with the authorised representative of the executive authority… complying in 
so doing with all their lawful requirements; 
6)  to suspend or terminate the public event in case of perpetration by its 
participants of any illegal actions; 
7)  to ensure compliance with the norm of the maximum holding capacity… at 
the place of holding the public event; 
8)  to provide for the safety of plantations, premises, buildings, structures, 
installations, equipment, furniture, implements and of other property at the 
place of holding the public event; 
9)  to bring to the notice of participants in the public event the requirements of 
the authorised representative of the executive authority… regarding 
suspension or termination of the public event; 
10)  to bear a distinctive sign of the organiser of the public event. An authorised 
representative shall also carry a distinctive sign. 
In Russia, it is also expected from the organiser to terminate the event when 
participants commit unlawful acts. In South Africa, it is debatable if the organiser of a 
gathering will be able to stop a violent gathering. Shortage of funds will hamper the 
duty to provide for the safety of buildings, structures or installations. These duties have 
a restricting effect on the freedom of peaceful assembly. According to the General 
Comment, organisers or participants do not need to arrange for, or to contribute 
towards the costs of policing or security, medical assistance or cleaning.107 However, 
it can be helpful in the South African context if the organiser and the senior police 
member assigned with the facilitation of the gathering, wear distinctive clothing. They 
                                                          
106  European Commission for Democracy through Law Federal law on assemblies, meetings, 
demonstrations, marches and pickets No 54-Fz of 19 June of the Russian Federation 4-5. 
107  ICCPR General Comment para [64]. See European Commission for Democracy through Law 
Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 2010 paras [89], [155]; ACHPR Guidelines on 
freedom of association and assembly in Africa paras [96], [102].   
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will be easily identifiable to assist with problematic issues. 
Marshals may be appointed to manage the participants of a gathering.108 According to 
the Gatherings Act, the duties of the marshals during the gathering entail the following: 
 to take all reasonable steps to ensure that entrances to building or premises 
are not barred so that reasonable access is denied to any person,  
 that no entrance to a hospital, fire or ambulance station or any other 
emergency services, is barred by the participants,109  
 to take all reasonable steps to ensure that no persons have in his or her 
possession any airgun, firearm, imitation firearm or any muzzle loading 
firearm, as defined in section 1 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 or any 
object which resembles a firearm and that is likely to be mistaken for a 
firearm, or any dangerous weapon, as defined in the Dangerous Weapons 
Act 15 of 2013. 
 to take all reasonable steps to ensure that no person, either before or during 
a gathering or demonstration, is compelled to join or participate in the 
gathering or demonstration.110 
The Act does, however, not provide for any crowd-control training for these appointed 
marshals. Marshals are generally not independent persons, but form part of, or are 
appointed from the heart of the organisation (persons sharing the same beliefs or 
having the same political aims). To proceed peacefully may not be beneficial for the 
organisation to highlight their concerns. Marshals are also not subsumed under law 
enforcement since law enforcement remains the responsibility of the police.111 The 
appointment of marshals is furthermore not a legal requirement.112 
The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly suggests that marshals113 must 
receive appropriate training, thorough briefing before the assembly takes place, and 
should be familiar with the area in which the assembly is being held.114 The Act does 
not stipulate any such training, nor is there any available instruction with regard to a 
suitable age or age limit for marshals, therefore, grade 8 schoolchildren may be utilised 
as marshals. The organiser in charge of the assembly must inform the marshals what 
                                                          
108  Gatherings Act s 8(1) – can be read into the duties. 
109  Gatherings Act s 8(9). 
110  Gatherings Act s 8(6). 
111  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [156]. 
112  ICCPR General Comment para [65]. 
113  Stewards do not have the powers of law enforcement officials, and should not use force but must 
aim to obtain the cooperation of the assembly participants. 
114  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [193].  
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is expected from them during the protest. Yet, it is difficult to establish if incorrect 
information is distributed to them. Lastly, the Act does not describe how the marshals 
must be identified from the other participants. The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful 
assembly suggests that it is desirable that they wear special bibs, jackets, badges or 
armbands.115  
The appointment of marshals is no guarantee that a gathering is controllable, or that 
the participants will adhere to their instructions. In the SATAWU-case, the union 
organised a gathering of thousands of people.116 SATAWU gave notice of the 
gathering to the local authority, and appointed about 500 marshals to manage the 
crowd.117 It advised its members to refrain from any unlawful and violent behaviour, 
and requested the local authority to clear the roads of vehicles and erect barricades 
along the route.118 However, the gathering still resulted in riot damage estimated at 
R1.5 million.119 Several people died, and many participants were injured or arrested.  
Participants of assemblies have particular charges as required by section 8 of the 
Gatherings Act. These include not having in their possession any airgun, firearm, 
imitation firearm, or any muzzle-loading firearm, as defined in section 1 of the Firearms 
Control Act 60 of 2000, or any object which resembles a firearm and that is likely to be 
mistaken for a firearm, or any dangerous weapon, as defined in the Dangerous 
Weapons Act 15 of 2013.120 
Any persons present at a gathering – not only participants – are prohibited from inciting 
hatred on account of differences in culture, race, sex, language or religion by way of 
a banner, placard, speech, singing, or in any other manner,121 or performing any act 
or uttering any words which are calculated or likely to cause or encourage violence 
against any person or group of persons.122 These persons present may also not wear 
a disguise or a mask or any other apparel or item which obscures their facial features 
and prevents identification,123 or wear any form of attire that resembles any of the 
                                                          
115  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [194]. 
116  SATAWU para [10]. 
117  SATAWU para [11]. 
118  SATAWU para [11]. 
119  SATAWU para [11]. 
120  See footnote 24 in Chapter 3 for the full definition. 
121  Gatherings Act s 8(5). See also footnote 189 in Chapter 3 above. 
122  Gatherings Act s 8(6). 
123  Gatherings Act s 8(7). 
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uniforms worn by members of the security forces, including the police and the South 
African Defence Force,124 Such persons may also not compel or attempt to compel 
any person to attend, join or participate in the gathering or demonstration.125  
It is usually not problematic to hold an individual participant liable who was found in 
possession of a firearm, or to identify a participant with a mask or clothing resembling 
the uniforms of the security forces. A person inciting hatred,126 encouraging violence 
or compelling any person to join a gathering or demonstration may also be identified 
and arrested127 while the gathering or demonstration continues. However, due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic, members of the public are obliged to wear masks. According to 
the General Comment, the wearing of masks, or the taking of steps to participate 
anonymously is not in itself a sign of violent intent, and must be allowed.128 Flags, 
uniforms, signs and banners are regarded as legitimate forms of expression, even if 
such symbols are reminders of a painful past.129 Although above-mentioned are only 
guidelines, police members assigned to facilitate gatherings must be adequately 
trained to take proper decisions. 
The police are regularly criticised by the general public as being passive while 
watching violence taking place. Although a specialised public order police unit is 
trained to manage and control crowds with a view to restore public order,130 it is usually 
the local police members who are first on the scene, and who assist with facilitating 
gatherings.131 These police members did, in general, not receive any formal crowd-
management training, they were not part of the negotiation process, and are not in 
possession of the necessary equipment (specifically video apparatus and cameras) to 
assist with evidence in court. To properly support the right to assemble, demonstrate, 
picket or to hand over petitions, local police members must be properly trained, and 
                                                          
124  Gatherings Act s 8(8). 
125  Gatherings Act s 8(10). 
126  Gatherings Act s 8(5). 
127  Gatherings Act s 8(10).  
128  ICCPR General Comment para [60]. 
129  ICCPR General Comment para [51]. 
130  See National Instruction 4 of 2014 s 20(t). According to the standard operating procedure, first 
responders at station level in terms of protest action, attacks of foreign nationals, land invasions 
and evictions (Letter of Lieutenant General E Mawela dated 3/3/2017 at 3 (Responsibilities) ‒ 
members at the local police station are not required to have any formal crowd management training 
– only some knowledge and experience of crowd management. 
131  See Barron https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2017-02-12-so-many-
questions-on-anc-top-brass-implicated-in-state-of-capture-report/ (Date of use: 10 October 2020). 
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assigned to assist with gatherings. 
Participants of violent gatherings are sometimes arrested to minimise the danger to 
persons and property, without a clear indication how they contributed to an offence. 
Obtaining evidence to proceed with prosecution is challenging when the police have 
no knowledge of the duties and requirements of section 8 of the Act. The police officials 
who were part of the negotiation process are usually not part of the actual supervising 
of the gathering or the investigation process. When dockets are forwarded to the 
prosecution, most of the information regarding the planning phase of the gatherings is 
not available, or unknown. Most of the information pertaining to the duties of the 
organiser would consist of the knowledge of the organiser him- or herself – the person 
accused of not adhering to the duties. In practice, it is almost impossible to establish 
if all reasonable steps have been taken to inform the marshals timeously and properly 
of the conditions of a gathering. A central body which manage information from the 
planning of a proposed gathering until the completion thereof, and the investigation of 
offences committed, can contribute to the peaceful facilitation of gatherings.  
It is difficult to prove that participants were not intimidated, thus participating against 
their will, or being compelled to attend132 ‒ a popular defence in protest action cases. 
Persons compelled or intimidated to attend gatherings or demonstrations will not open 
cases due to the fact that they are fearful. The police furthermore struggle to 
differentiate between onlookers who mingle with the crowd and actual participants. 
The only available witnesses are usually community members residing in the same 
community as the participants. They are, therefore, not willing to testify in court.  
                                                          
132  Joubert https://www.netwerk24.com/nuus/onderwys/leerlinge-glo-gedwing-om-te-betoog-20170 
307?mobile=true (Date of use: 10 October 2020) reports of school principals who reported that 
learners were forced out of classroom to join the protest action in the Barberton-area. This is also 
the view of the researcher, a senior public prosecutor employed by the NPA, with 30 years’ 
experience in criminal prosecution. Many of the examples refer to are gained from dealing 
personally with cases that arise from the right to gather. 
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When riot damage133 occurs as a result of a gathering (every organisation on behalf 
of or under the auspices of which that gathering was held, or the convener) or a 
demonstration (every person participating in such demonstration), they may be jointly 
and severally liable for the riot damage as joint wrongdoers,134 together with any other 
person who unlawfully caused or contributed to the damage.135 It is a defence to a 
claim against a person or organisation, when the act or omission which caused the 
damage in question was not permitted or planned, that it did not fall within the scope 
of the objectives of the gathering or demonstration; it was not reasonably foreseeable, 
and all reasonable steps were taken to prevent the act or omission.136  
4.4.4 Failure to comply with the notice of a gathering or a condition to which the 
holding of a gathering or demonstration is subject 
Any person (including the organiser and participants) who knowingly and intentionally 
contravenes or fails to comply with the contents of a notice or a condition, to which the 
gathering or demonstration is subject, is guilty of an offence.137 If an organiser has not, 
within 24 hours after giving notice, been called to a meeting by the responsible officer 
(local authority), the gathering may take place in accordance with the contents of the 
notice as given by the organiser.138 When a meeting was held between the organiser 
and the local authority, and an agreement was reached, the gathering may take place 
in accordance with the contents of the notice, including amendments, as agreed.139 
The organiser and participants of a gathering must adhere to the contents of the notice 
                                                          
133  Gatherings Act s 1 states that ‘riot damage’ means “any loss suffered as a result of any injury to 
or the death of any person, or any damage to or destruction of any property, caused directly or 
indirectly by, and immediately before, during or after, the holding of a gathering”. The Gatherings 
Act does not provide that the police can be held liable for riot damages occurred which could have 
been prevented if the police acted timeously. In Yarl's Wood Immigration Ltd & Ors v Bedfordshire 
Police Authority [2008] EWHC 2207 (Comm), [2009] 1 All ER 886, the issue before the court was 
whether the authority responsible for an immigration detention centre can claim under the Riot 
(Damages) Act 1886 against the relevant police authority in respect of damage to, or destruction 
of property in the centre caused by those detained in it during a riot. In Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance 
Co (Europe) Ltd & Anor v The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Offence: [2013] WLR(D) 356, [2013] 
EWHC 2734 (Comm), the Sony Warehouse was destroyed by fire, and looting took place during 
widespread civil disorder and rioting. The claimants were the insurers of Sony, seeking 
compensation from the defendant, which is the statutory body responsible for the oversight of the 
Metropolitan Police, under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886 in respect of losses.  
134  As contemplated in Chapter II of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
135  Gatherings Act s 11(1). 
136  Gatherings Act s 11(2). 
137  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(d). 
138  See para 4.4.1 above. 
139  Gatherings Act s 4(4)(a). 
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and any agreement reached. 
This offence excludes circumstances where the responsible officer imposes conditions 
on the gathering, or prohibits the gathering from proceeding. This offence excludes 
conditions imposed in terms of section 4(4)(b),140 6(1),141 or 6(5)142 of the Act ‒ these 
provisions are included under the offence created by section 12(1)(f) of the Act.143  
When the organiser has not, within 24 hours after giving notice, been called to a 
meeting, the gathering may take place in accordance with the contents of the notice 
(as planned and suggested by the organiser).144 The Act requires from local authorities 
to set up a meeting with the organiser and other relevant parties, within 24 hours of 
receipt of the notification, when amendment of the notice contents is necessary. In 
terms of section 4, the local authority (responsible officer) and the police (authorised 
member) must consult regarding the necessity for negotiations.145 However, the 
Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly holds that any participation in the pre-
                                                          
140  Gatherings Act s 4(4)(b) – “If at a meeting contemplated in subsection (2)(b) agreement is not 
reached on the contents of the notice or the conditions regarding the conduct of the gathering, the 
responsible officer may, if there are reasonable grounds therefore, of his own accord or at the 
request of an authorised member impose conditions with regard to the holding of the gathering to 
ensure - (i) that vehicular or pedestrian traffic, especially during traffic rush hours, is least impeded; 
or (ii) an appropriate distance between participants in the gathering and rival gatherings; or (iii) 
access to property and workplaces; or (iv) the prevention of injury to persons or damage to 
property”. 
141  Gatherings Act s 6(1)(a) – “Whenever a condition is imposed in regard to a gathering in terms of 
section 4(4)(b) or when a gathering is prohibited in terms of section 5(2), the convener of such 
gathering may apply to an appropriate magistrate for the setting aside of such prohibition or the 
setting aside or amendment of such condition, and the magistrate may refuse or grant the 
application. (b) Whenever an authorised member in terms of section 4(4)(b) requests that a 
particular condition be imposed and the request is refused, or whenever information contemplated 
in section 5(1) is brought to the attention of a responsible officer and the gathering in question is 
not prohibited, an authorised member may, if instructed thereto by the Commissioner or the district 
commissioner of the South African Police for the area where the gathering is to be held, apply to 
an appropriate magistrate to set aside such refusal or to prohibit such gathering, as the case may 
be, and the magistrate may refuse or grant the application”. 
142  Gatherings Act s 6(5) – “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1), (2) and (4), the 
convener, authorised member or any person whose rights may be affected by the holding of a 
gathering or by its prohibition or by any term in a notice or any condition imposed or failure to 
impose any condition in relation to a gathering may by means of an urgent application in 
accordance with the Uniform Rules of the several Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa, apply to an appropriate court for the striking out or amendment of any such 
term or condition or the imposition of any other condition or for permission to hold, or for a 
prohibition of, the gathering, and the court may strike out or amend any such term or condition or 
impose any other condition or grant such permission or prohibit the gathering, as it deems fit”.  
143  See para 4.4.5 below. 
144  Gatherings Act s 4(3). 
145  Gatherings Act s 4(1). 
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event planning with the authorities must be voluntary.146 
The organiser and participants are bound to the information they have supplied in the 
notice, conditions or amendments agreed to during the meeting with the responsible 
officer. When anybody fails to comply with the information or a condition in the notice, 
an offence is committed. The information regarding notices, meetings, amendments 
and conditions must be meticulously kept by the responsible officer. Prosecution 
without this evidence will be problematic. Usually, information with regard to the 
notification process is not available in police dockets.  
4.4.5  Convening a gathering in contravention of the provisions of the Act, or to 
convene and attend a gathering or demonstration that is prohibited 
Any person (including the organiser and participants) who unlawfully and intentionally 
convenes a gathering or convenes or attends a gathering or demonstration prohibited 
in terms of the Act is guilty of an offence.147 To arrange a gathering in contravention 
of the Act, or to arrange or attend a gathering or demonstration knowing it is prohibited 
in the vicinity of courts, the Parliament and Union buildings,148 constitutes an offence.  
The first part of section 12(1)(e) of the Gatherings Act is not applicable to 
demonstrations (i.e. when less than fifteen persons gather). The second part is 
applicable to demonstrations and gatherings (when more than fifteen persons gather). 
If notice of a gathering was not given less than 48 hours before the commencement 
of the gathering, the responsible officer may by notice to the organiser, prohibit the 
gathering.149 The gathering can therefore be prohibited before any meeting was held. 
Reasons seem to be that due to the shortage of time, the meeting and the negotiations 
necessary between the relevant parties cannot take place, or that the responsible 
officer is convinced that the gathering is a risk to the safety of the community.  
After a meeting was conducted between the responsible officer and the organiser, 
section 5 holds that the responsible officer can prohibit the gathering, if convinced on 
reasonable grounds that no amendment or condition will prevent a threat to the rights 
                                                          
146  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [124]. 
147  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(e). 
148  See discussion on restricted zones or places in para 3.4.1.10 above. 
149  Gatherings Act s 3(2). 
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of others. When a gathering is prohibited by the responsible officer, the Minister of 
Safety and Security,150 or a court; the police must bar access to the place, and give 
notice that it is closed to the public, for such time as may be necessary to prevent the 
gathering from taking place.151 The police may take reasonable and appropriate steps 
in this regard.152 The place must be kept closed or inaccessible to the public in order 
to prevent the gathering from taking place.153  
Section 5 leaves the discretion to prevent or to prohibit a gathering in the hands of the 
responsible officer. When credible information under oath is brought to the attention 
of the responsible officer that there is a threat154 which will result in serious disruption 
of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, injury to participants or other persons, extensive 
damage to property, and the police and the traffic officers will not be able to contain 
this threat, he or she must meet with the organiser, the police and any other relevant 
stakeholder.155 When the responsible officer is after the meeting convinced that no 
amendment or condition of the notice would prevent the occurrence of any 
circumstances contemplated, he or she can prohibit the proposed gathering, and must 
give reasons for his or her decision.156 Credible information will be based on available 
operational information: 
…taking into account the level of the risk, discussions and arrangements with the 
convenor, history of peaceful or violent protests by the parties involved, past 
experience with the parties, suitability, vicinity or venue in terms of alleviating or 
aggravating risk, and so forth.157  
The prohibition of a gathering will therefore depend on the existing circumstances 
surrounding the intended gathering. According to the Guidelines on freedom of 
                                                          
150  See para 4.6.2 below. Regulations published in terms van the Disaster Management Act 57 of 
2002, prohibited gatherings during the period of lockdown (Covid-19 pandemic) in South Africa. 
151  Gatherings Act s 6(6). 
152  Gatherings Act s 6(6)(c). During the #FeesMustFall-movement in South Africa, universities 
obtained court orders prohibiting gatherings on campuses. Students felt that the police presence 
is in excess of what can be seen as reasonable or appropriate. See University of Cape Town v 
Rhodes Must Fall and Others (20182/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 151 (19 October 2015), eNCA 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/violence-of-feesmustfall-protests-has-damaged-cause-2016-
matric-class (Date of use: 27 December 2020); Gasa and Dougan https://www.groundup.org.za/ 
article/fees-must-fall-2016-where-here/ (Date of use: 28 December 2020); Genever 
https://www.sabreakingnews.co.za/tag/fees-must-fall (Date of use: 28 December 2020).  
153  Gatherings Act s 6(6)(a).  
154  The National Instruction 4 of 2014 9-10 provides a threat assessment and the categorising thereof 
into levels 1-3.  
155  Gatherings Act s 5(5)(1). 
156  Gatherings Act s 5(3). 
157  National Instructions 4 of 2014 s 9(2). 
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association and assembly in Africa, less intrusive responses must be considered, and 
prohibition must be the only and last resort.158 All gatherings must be presumed to be 
peaceful in the absence of convincing evidence that the organiser or the participants 
intend to use violence or incite imminent violence.159 The Gatherings Act does not 
require a level of experience or training with regard to the responsible officer. The 
responsible officer’s own political perception can, therefore, play a role in the decision-
making.  
In England, when the chief officer of police reasonably believes that, because of 
particular circumstances existing in a district, the powers under section 12160 will not 
be sufficient to prevent a public procession resulting in serious public disorder, he or 
she must apply to the council of the district for an order prohibiting the public 
procession for a period not exceeding 3 months.161 On receiving such an application, 
a council may, with the consent of the Secretary of State, make such an order.162 The 
same applies to the Commissioner of Police for the City of London or the 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.163 In contrast, in South Africa, one person 
employed by the local authority can prohibit gatherings. The Gatherings Act also does 
not specify that a gathering may be prohibited for a period of time. However, it is a 
more constitutionally sound principle that when a gathering is prohibited due to inciting 
circumstances, it can continue after a certain time period. In England, a constable in 
uniform who reasonably believes that a person is on his or her way to an assembly 
which is prohibited, can stop that person, and direct him or her not to proceed in the 
                                                          
158  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [92]. 
159  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [86]. 
160  Public Order Act s 12: “If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and 
the circumstances in which any public procession is being held or is intended to be held and to its 
route or proposed route, reasonably believes that — (a) it may result in serious public disorder, 
serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or (b) the purpose of 
the persons organising it is the intimidation of others with a view to compelling them not to do an 
act they have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do, he may give directions 
imposing on the persons organising or taking part in the procession such conditions as appear to 
him necessary to prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, including conditions 
as to the route of the procession or prohibiting it from entering any public place specified in the 
directions.” 
161  Public Order Act s 13(1).   
162  Public Order Act s 13(2). 
163  Public Order Act s 13(4). Section 13(5) states: “An order made under this section may be revoked 
or varied by a subsequent order made in the same way”.  
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direction of the assembly.164 It could be beneficial to adopt a similar approach in South 
Africa since such legislation may assist to deflect busses full of potential participants 
away from violent scenes or prohibited gatherings. 
To attend a prohibited gathering is an offence in terms of the Act. In the Tsoaeli-case, 
the question before the court was whether a gathering where no notice was given by 
the organiser became automatically prohibited. The appellants in the Tsoaeli-case 
appealed their conviction of contravening section 12(1)(e) of the Gatherings Act. The 
appellants were part of the staff establishment of the Free State Department of Health 
who were dismissed. The dismissed employees decided to hold a night vigil outside 
the headquarters of the Department of Health. When the first group of protestors 
gathered outside the premises, the police demanded to see documentary proof that 
notice was given to the local authority. When none was provided, the crowd were 
notified that the gathering was illegal, and ordered to disperse. On non-compliance, 
they were arrested.165 After sunrise, a second group of protestors gathered, and the 
same happened to them.166 Both groups of protestors were not armed or violent.167 
The court found that section 12(1)(e) of the Act is not couched in a language that 
unequivocally proclaims that a gathering for which no prior notice was given is 
automatically prohibited.168 The court mentioned that the Gatherings Act only requires 
prior notice, and not that consent is granted.169 The court was of the opinion that the 
participants in the first group had believed that prior notice was given, and with regard 
to the second group, the court found that the gathering was spontaneous.170 The court 
did not adjudicate on the appellants’ application in respect of the constitutionality of 
section 12(1)(e) of the Act.  
In Mlungwana, the court referred to the Tsoaeli-case and distinguished between a 
prohibited gathering and a gathering for which no notice was given:  
Importantly, all parties agreed that it does not constitute an offence to attend a 
gathering for which no notice has been given. But it is an offence to attend a 
prohibited gathering. However, it must be emphasised that an unnotified gathering 
                                                          
164  Public Order Act s 14C(1). See United Kingdom Government Department of Constitutional Affairs 
A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 24.  
165  Tsoaeli para [3]. 
166  Tsoaeli para [4]. 
167  Tsoaeli para [5]. 
168  Tsoaeli para [35]. 
169  Tsoaeli para [43]. 
170  Tsoaeli para [43]. 
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is not necessarily a prohibited gathering. A gathering can be prohibited if notice is 
given less than 48 hours before the gathering is meant to commence, or if it is 
prohibited under section 5 … On ‘reasonable grounds’ that no amendment to the 
notice given as contemplated in section 4(2)(b) or no unilateral imposition of 
conditions as contemplated in section 4(4)(b) would prevent a threat to the rights 
of others from the proposed gathering, may the responsible officer prohibit the 
gathering. Nowhere does the Act expressly provide that the mere failure to give 
notice is a ground to prohibit the gathering and render participation in it an offence 
under section 12(1)(e).171  
In practice, when the local authority is not notified of a gathering, there is no risk that 
a gathering can be prohibited by the responsible officer, or that participants can be 
prosecuted for attending a prohibited gathering. Failure to notify the local authority of 
a proposed gathering is no longer an offence. To attend a meeting of which no 
notification was given is also not an offence. This position questions whether sections 
4(2)(b) and 5 of the Gatherings Act are still relevant. The position is further complicated 
since people join gatherings or demonstrations during different times and stages, not 
knowing it is prohibited. The police can allow a peaceful prohibited gathering to 
continue, thereby creating the expectation that they will allow peaceful prohibited 
gatherings also in the future to continue. 
As discussed in paragraph 3.4.1.10 above, section 7 prohibits demonstrations and 
gatherings in the vicinity of courts,172 buildings of Parliament, the Union Buildings, and 
                                                          
171  Mlungwana paras [17]-[19]. 
172  Gatherings Act s 7(1)(a) determines that all demonstrations and gatherings in any building in which 
a courtroom is situated, or at any place in the open air within a radius of 100 metres from such 
building, on every day of the week, except weekends and public holidays are prohibited, except 
when permission was granted in writing by a magistrate.  
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in certain specified areas173 as contained in Schedule 1174 and 2175 of the Act. Written 
permission for demonstrations and gatherings in these areas need to be obtained from 
the Chief Magistrate of Cape Town or the Director-General: Office of the State 
President.176 In contrast, according to the General comment, the designation of places 
such as courts and parliament as areas where gatherings may not take place, must 
be avoided since it is public spaces.177  
However, on a daily basis, gatherings and demonstrations take place within a radius 
of 100 meters from court buildings without obtaining the written permission of the 
magistrate. Due to the fact that no notices of such gatherings are given, the police are 
caught unaware;178 not having the manpower to assist timeously at the scenes. 
Although the police monitor the gathering or demonstration, they do not interfere if it 
stays peaceful, and does not threaten the safety of the public or damage to property. 
Therefore, the police are creating the expectation that a peaceful gathering in a 
prohibited area without obtaining the permission of the magistrate will be allowed to 
                                                          
173  Gatherings Act s 7(1)(b). See Schedule 1 and 2 of the Act. These areas include some streets in 
the City of Cape Town and in Pretoria. 
174  Gatherings Act Schedule 1 – “The area bounded by the following streets in the City of Cape Town, 
namely Queen Victoria Street from the point where Queen Victoria Street and Museum Avenue 
meet, up to the point where Queen Victoria Street and Wale Street meet, up to the point where 
Wale Street and St. George's Street meet, up to the point where St. George's Street and 
Longmarket Street meet, up to the point where Longmarket Street and Corporation Street meet, 
up to the point where Corporation Street and Barrack Street meet, up to the point where Barrack 
Street and Coffee Lane meet, up to the point where Coffee Lane and Commercial Street meet, up 
to the point where Commercial Street and Nieuwmeester Street meet, up to the point where 
Nieuwmeester Street and Hope Street meet, up to the point where Hope Street and Tuinplein 
Street meet, up to the point where Tuinplein Street and Vrede Street meet, up to the point where 
Vrede Street and St. John's Street meet, up to the point where St. John's Street and Gallery 
Avenue meet, up to the point where Gallery Avenue and Government Avenue meet, up to the point 
where Government Avenue and Museum Avenue meet, up to the point where Museum Avenue 
and Queen Victoria Street meet, including the surface of the said streets and the pavement on 
either side thereof”. 
175  Gatherings Act Schedule 2 – “The area in Pretoria bounded by the following: (a) To the south, the 
continuing line 100 metres south of the south side of the tarred road which is situated to the south 
of the Union buildings and which connects Edmond Street and Government Avenue with one 
another. (b) To the west, from the junction of Edmond Street and the tarred road referred to in 
paragraph (a), the line extending due north up to the crest of Meintjieskop and the line extending 
due south from the said junction up to where it intersects the line referred to in paragraph (a). (c) 
To the east, from the junction of Government Avenue and the tarred road referred to in paragraph 
(a), the line extending due north up to the crest of Meintjieskop and the line extending due south 
from the said junction up to where it intersects the line referred to in paragraph (a). (d) To the north, 
the line along the crest of Meintjieskop extending between the northern points of the first-mentioned 
lines referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c)”. 
176  Gatherings Act s 7(2). 
177  ICCPR General Comment para [56]. 
178  Spontaneously public protests catch the SAPS off-guard, and make it very difficult for them to plan 
for proper contingency measures. It is, however, arguable if public protests are spontaneous, or if 
the police are caught off-guard due to a lack of intelligence. 
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continue. This situation strengthens the assumption that it is not necessary to adhere 
to the provisions of the Act. 
4.4.6  Failing to comply with a condition imposed on the gathering 
Any person (including the participants and organiser) who knowingly and intentionally 
contravenes or fails to comply with a condition imposed by the responsible officer (who 
may impose conditions to the holding of a gathering), or who fails to comply with 
conditions or a refusal ordered by a magistrate or judge, (when the organiser applies 
to a court to set aside the prohibition or conditions of a gathering), is guilty of an 
offence.179 The responsible officer may, when there are reasonable grounds, on his or 
her own accord, or on request of a police member impose conditions to ensure that 
vehicular or pedestrian traffic, especially during traffic rush hours, is least impeded; an 
appropriate distance between participants in the gathering and rival gatherings are 
kept; access to property and workplaces are not impeded; and injury to persons or 
damage to property are prevented.180  
The responsible officer may impose conditions on a gathering not due to any other 
reasons. When the responsible officer imposes conditions or refuses a request of the 
police, he or she must give written reasons for his or her decision.181 The written 
reasons must as soon as possible be handed to all the parties who attended the 
meeting (called by the responsible officer after receiving notice of a proposed 
gathering). If the organiser is not satisfied with the decision of the responsible officer, 
he or she may within 24 hours after the responsible officer has given notice of the 
imposition of conditions or refusal to allow the gathering to continue, apply to a 
magistrate to challenge the decision.182 The notice of the responsible officer remains 
in force until set aside by the court.183 Section 6(3)(c) of the Act bars magistrates from 
awarding costs when an organiser seeks to have an order prohibiting a gathering set 
aside, although the High Court may still award costs. Though the High Courts may be 
better suited to assess competing expressive and public order interests, the Act 
                                                          
179  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(f). 
180  Gatherings Act s 4(4)(b). 
181  Gatherings Act s 4(4)(c). 
182  Gatherings Act s 6(1). 
183  Gatherings Act s 6(4). 
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channels the impecunious conveners toward the Magistrates’ Court.184 The 
magistrate, very often unfamiliar with the Act, and taking the Magistrates’ Court Rules 
on ‘urgent’ applications at their word, turns down the convener's application to have 
the prohibition set aside. All the parties – from the convener, to the local authority, to 
the magistrate – have complied with the required procedures, and yet no gathering, 
and no meaningful assessment of the grounds for prohibition, take place.185 Even 
worse, local authorities often take more than a week to reply to a properly filed notice, 
violating section 4(3) of the Act. The police or any person whose rights may be affected 
by the holding of a gathering or by its prohibition or by any condition or lack thereof, 
may also bring an urgent application to an appropriate court.186  
4.4.7  Failure to comply with an order given by the police or interfering with any 
steps taken by the police 
Any person who unlawfully and intentionally fails to comply with an order issued, or 
interferes with any steps taken by the police during a gathering or demonstration, is 
guilty of an offence.187 Amongst the unlawful conduct proscribed is proceeding to a 
different place or deviate from the route specified; disobeying any condition; not 
adhering to an instruction to restrict the gathering to a place or a route;188 interfering 
or attempting to interfere with a gathering or demonstration; not ceasing with certain 
conduct; not remaining at a distance, or not dispersing and departing when called upon 
to do so. 
Section 9 provides for the powers bestowed on the police during gatherings and 
demonstrations. The section is applicable whether the organisers or participants 
adhere to the provisions of the Act or not, but the provisions of the section will not be 
applicable when police arrive at a scene where violent conduct is already in progress, 
for example, when a group of people attack a community. In application of their duty 
in this section, police members may, when they have reasonable grounds to believe 
that the police will not be able to provide adequate protection for the people 
                                                          
184  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill Constitutional Law of South Africa 43-11. 
185  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill Constitutional Law of South Africa 43-14. 
186  Gatherings Act s 6(5). 
187  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(g). 
188  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(c). 
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participating in the gathering or demonstration, notify the organiser and participants.189 
They may also prevent participants in the gathering from proceeding to a different 
place, or to deviate from the route specified, or from disobeying any condition.190 
Furthermore, when the responsible officer did not receive notice more than 48 hours 
before the gathering, the police member may restrict the gathering to a certain place, 
or guide the participants along a particular route to ensure that traffic is least impeded. 
The police member should likewise ascertain that there is an appropriate distance 
between rival gatherings; that there is access to property or workplaces; and take such 
steps, including negotiations, to protect persons and prevent damage to property.191 
When an incident, whether or not it results from the gathering or demonstration, 
causes persons to gather at any public place, the police may specify an area 
considered necessary for the movement and operation of emergency personnel and 
vehicles, or the passage of a gathering or demonstration or the movement of traffic or 
the exclusion of the public from the vicinity or the protection of property.192 The police 
official may order any person or group to stop interfering with a gathering or 
demonstration, or to cease certain conduct or to remain at a distance.193 
When a gathering is prohibited,194 or if a member of the police with the rank of warrant 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that danger exists to persons and property, 
and that it cannot be averted by the steps referred to above – he or she195 can call 
upon the participants to disperse, by obtaining their attention by suitable lawful means, 
and then,196 in a loud voice order them in a language understood by the majority of 
the persons present, to disperse and to depart within a reasonable time.197 
                                                          
189  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(a). 
190  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(b). This conduct is not applicable to demonstrations. 
191  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(c), (f). 
192  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(e). 
193  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(d). 
194  See Gatherings Act s 6(6). 
195  National Instruction 4 of 2020 s 14: “The use of force and dispersal of crowds must only be 
conducted by those members of Public Order Police (POP) trained in crowd management and 
equipped with the relevant crowd management equipment. The situation must be contained by 
members of Visible Policing at station level and Metro Police until POP members can take over 
the situation. If it is not possible to contain the situation or wait for POP to arrive, only members of 
Visible Policing at station level and Metro Police members trained in crowd management with the 
relevant equipment, may use the necessary force”.   
196  Gatherings Act s 9(2)(a)(i). 
197  Gatherings Act s 9(2)(a)(ii). According to the National Instructions 4 of 2014 s 16 – “The warning 
must be audible and must include the action that will be taken against them, and is applicable 
should defensive measures fail. The warning should, if the circumstances permit, include an 
explanation of the steps that are going to be taken to disperse the crowd and should give the 
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When the participants have not left the area or made no preparations to leave, the 
officer may order the members of the police to disperse the persons, and may order 
the use of force, excluding the use of weapons likely to cause serious bodily injury or 
death.198 The degree of force must not be greater than is necessary for dispersing the 
persons, and must be proportionate to the situation and the object to be attained.199 If 
any participants or any person who hinders or interferes with the participants kills or 
seriously injures, or attempts, or shows an intention of killing or seriously injuring any 
person, or destroys or serious damage or attempts or shows an intention of destroying 
or to do serious damage, to valuable immovable or movable property, he or she may 
order the law enforcement members to take the necessary steps to prevent the illegal 
conduct, including the use of firearms and other weapons.200 
According to the National Instructions,201 force may only be used upon the command 
of the operational commander,202 except when the police member acts in private 
defence:203  
If the use of force is unavoidable, – (a) the purpose of offensive actions must be to 
de-escalate conflict with the minimum force to accomplish the goal and therefore 
the success of the actions will be measured by the results of the operation in terms 
of loss of life, injuries to people, damage to property and cost; (b) the degree of 
force must be proportional to the seriousness of the situation and the threat posed 
in terms of situational appropriateness; (c) it must be reasonable in the 
circumstances; (d) the minimum force must be used to accomplish the goal; and 
                                                          
participants enough time to disperse peacefully; yet, the time should not be so long that it gives 
the participants the impression that the police are not serious. In cases of violence immediate 
action may be required. A second warning must be given in at least two official languages and if 
possible also in the language that is most commonly spoken in that area before the 
commencement of the offensive measures, giving innocent bystanders the opportunity to leave the 
area. In cases where violence has already started the time frame should be shortened 
immediately”. This is similar to the situation in Canada where the Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 
s 67 provides that a justice, mayor, sheriff, or warden must, after receiving information that twelve 
or more persons are unlawfully and riotously assembled, and that a riot is in progress, approach 
and command silence, and in a loud voice instruct the participants to disperse to their homes or 
businesses. Anyone who opposes or hinders the justice or other delegated person, or does not 
depart within thirty minutes after the order was given, is guilty of an indictable offence, and liable 
to imprisonment for life. See Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 s 68. 
198  Gatherings Act s 9(2)(b).  
199  Gatherings Act s 9(2)(c). See OHCHR Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement iii; 
the guidelines are designed to assist governments to supply law enforcement officials with the 
means to determine whether force is necessary in a particular situation and how to react to it. 
200  Gatherings Act s 9(2)(d). 
201  National Instructions 4 of 2014 s 14(9). 
202  ‘Operational commander’ means “an operational officer or member who is responsible for the 
operational execution and coordination of an operation, and who has been designated in writing”. 
See National Instructions 4 of 2014 s 2(q). 
203  See Tait and Marks 2011 SA Crime Quarterly 15-22. This article offers recommendations for a 
model of public order policing in South Africa that is more effective and respectful of human rights.  
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(e) the use of force must be discontinued immediately once the objective has been 
achieved; (f) if the participants are going to be dispersed, make sure that they have 
enough escape routes in order to try and avoid serious injuries or possible deaths 
as a result of a stampede; (g) If dispersion is unavoidable, an attempt must be 
made to disperse the participants in the direction of a positive attraction point (an 
area where participants would most likely be willing to move to); and (h) always 
implement gradual police response.204 
Woolman205 argues that after the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Ex Parte Minister 
of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters & Another206 and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Govender v Minister of Safety and Security,207 section 
9(2)(d) of the Gatherings Act, authorising the use of firearms “where there is merely 
an intention to ‘destroy ... or damage property’ must be viewed as constitutionally 
suspect”.208  
According to the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, negotiation and 
mediation are important tools to be used by the police during gatherings to de-escalate 
conflict.209 The Gatherings Act also proposes negotiation to protect persons and 
                                                          
204  National Instruction 4 of 2014 s 13(1), according to ss 13(5)-(8), the following items are prohibited 
during crowd management operations: “(a) Pepper spray (or capsicum) is prohibited, unless the 
relevant commander has issued a specific instruction to do so (pepper spray may not be used in 
confined spaces or a stadium where it could lead to a stampede); (b) firearms and sharp 
ammunition including, birdshot (fine lead pellets) and buckshot (small lead pellets) are prohibited; 
and (c) teargas (CS) may be used only by POP members on command of the operational 
commander in situations that allow for its use, but never in stadia or confined spaces that could 
lead to a stampede. Approved rubber rounds may only be used as offensive measures to disperse 
a crowd in extreme circumstances, if less forceful methods have proven ineffective. Approved 40 
mm rounds may only be used on command. All other measures (such as water cannons, crowd 
management trained equestrian units, etc.) may only be utilised upon the command of the 
operational commander”.  
205  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Chapter 43 16. 
206  Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters & Another 2002 (2) SACR 
105 (CC). This case concerns the constitutionality of statutory provisions that permit force to be 
used when carrying out an arrest. 
207  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (2) SACR 197 (SCA). Section 49(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was applicable in the Govender-case where the plaintiff’s minor 
son was shot while he was pursued on foot by a policeman who stopped the stolen motor car 
driven by the son. The court concluded in para 2 that “in reading section 49(1) consistently with 
the Constitution, the proportionality of the force to be permitted in arresting a fugitive must be 
determined not only by the seriousness of the relevant offence but also by the threat or danger 
posed by the fugitive to the arrester, to others or to society at large”. The court was of opinion that 
it is “a rational and equitable way of balancing the interests of the state, society, the police officers 
involved, and of the fugitive and a proper mechanism for balancing collective against individual 
interests”. See paras [9]-[24].  
208  Woolman, Bishop and Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Chapter 43 16. See 
Rutinwa Article 19: Freedom of association and assembly 65. 
209  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [169]. See OHCHR Guidance on less-lethal weapons in law enforcement iii – the 
guidelines are designed to assist governments to supply law enforcement officials with the means 
to determine whether force is necessary in a particular situation, and how to react to it. 
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property.210 The fact that the Gatherings Act provides for police powers does not mean 
that the police must utilise it. Non-intervention may be the best way to ensure 
peacefulness. The dispersing of gatherings for the reason that the organisers did not 
comply with conditions, or deviated from the terms in the notice ‒ without any unlawful 
conduct by the participants ‒ is not permitted.211 Prosecution becomes problematic 
when police actions and instructions escalated violent conduct during gatherings, or 
the police force’s decision-making was irrational, or based on inexperience. Training 
and proper management by the police of protest action is essential to guarantee the 
right to gather, however, educating the public to exercise their rights responsibly and 
to understand what conduct is deemed unacceptable, is the antithesis.212  
4.4.8  Failing to notify the responsible officer that the gathering will not proceed 
If the organiser or any person, unlawfully and intentionally, fails to notify the 
responsible officer that the gathering is postponed, delayed, cancelled or called off, he 
or she is guilty of an offence. 213 Consequently, the organiser has a duty to notify the 
responsible officer if the gathering is postponed, delayed, cancelled or called off. The 
intention to punish the failure to inform the responsible officer is possibly linked to the 
expenditure and manpower which accompany the policing of gatherings and 
demonstrations. The Gatherings Act does not provide that wasteful expenditures can 
be claimed from the organiser or organisation who did not proceed with a gathering 
as indicated in a notice to the local authority. When the gathering is cancelled, the 
notice given in terms of section 3 will in effect be deemed cancelled. When the 
responsible officer is notified that the gathering will be delayed or postponed, he or 
she can call a meeting to discuss the postponement or delay.  
Prosecution under this section will be challenging, since the Act does not provide for 
any timeframes. The organiser can inform the responsible officer minutes before the 
gathering is due to start that it is cancelled, and accordingly escape prosecution. The 
state must also prove that the organiser intentionally failed to inform the responsible 
                                                          
210  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(f). 
211  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [176]. Dispersal is only allowed if there is an imminent threat of violence, offences are 
committed, or the gathering seriously violates the rights of others. 
212  Sampson 2010 AHRLJ 455.  
213  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(h). 
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officer ‒ a misunderstanding or forgetfulness will not be sufficient for criminal liability. 
The failure to notify the authorities of an intended gathering is no longer criminalised, 
however, if the organiser notifies the authorities of a proposed gathering, and then fails 
to inform the local authority that the gathering is cancelled, a punishment of one-year 
imprisonment can be applicable. It is ironic that when the local authority was not 
informed of the intention to hold a gathering, there is no risk to be prosecuted for failure 
to inform the responsible officer that the gathering is not proceeding. The nature of the 
limitation in this provision is severe. It is suggested that the provision is 
unconstitutional since there are less restrictive means available to achieve the same 
purpose.  
4.4.9  Supplying false information for the purposes of the Act 
Any person, who unlawfully and intentionally supplies or furnishes false information 
for the purposes of this Act, is guilty of an offence. 214 Any person may include the 
organiser, marshals, participants, members of the public, police, bystanders, 
representatives of relevant bodies, local authorities and police community forums. 
False information can be supplied with regard to facts or circumstances before or 
during the gathering or demonstration. It may also consist, for example, of information 
supplied in the notice, information supplied to the responsible officer during the 
meeting, or information supplied to the authorised member or to the police on the 
scene.  
4.4.10  Hindering or obstructing a member of the police, the responsible officer, the 
organiser, a marshal or another person in the exercise of his or her powers 
or duties 
Any person who intentionally and unlawfully, hinders, interferes with, obstructs, or 
resists a member of the police, responsible officer, organiser, marshal or other person 
in the exercise of his powers or the performance of his duties, is guilty of an offence.215 
Not adhering to an instruction of the responsible officer (an employee of the local 
authority), or the organiser and marshal can be seen as hindering, interfering, 
obstructing or resisting. Conduct may, for example, include hindering the organiser to 
                                                          
214  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(i). 
215  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(j). 
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notify the responsible officer of a planned gathering,216 stopping the organiser from 
giving notice seven days before the gathering is to be held,217 hampering the 
responsible officer to establish the identity of the organiser of a gathering,218 
preventing the responsible officer to call a meeting,219 thwarting the discussions at the 
meeting to proceed,220 obstructing the gathering to take place in accordance with the 
contents of the notice,221 or by preventing the authorised member to give notice that 
that place or area is closed or inaccessible to members of the public.222 
This offence is broader than the offence under the SAPS Act which provides that a 
member of the service must not be hindered or obstructed.223 Practically, it will be 
possible to prosecute a member of the police, responsible officer, organiser, marshal 
or any other person if they hinder, interfere with, obstruct or resist each other in the 
exercise of their powers or the performance of their duties under the Gatherings Act.  
4.4.11  Being in possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon during a gathering or 
demonstration 
No participant at a gathering or demonstration may have in his or her possession any 
airgun, firearm, or a simulated firearm, or any dangerous weapon.224 The organiser 
and marshals have the duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that this section is 
complied with. If not, they may risk prosecution under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. The 
Act does not provide for the organiser and marshals to search participants before and 
during gatherings. It must be highlighted that the Act also does not provide for the 
training of organisers or marshals with regard to firearms.  
  
                                                          
216  Gatherings Act s 2(2)(b). 
217  Gatherings Act s 3(2). 
218  Gatherings Act s 3(2)(c). 
219  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(b). 
220  Gatherings Act s 4(2)(c). 
221  Gatherings Act s 4(4)(a). 
222  Gatherings Act s 6(6)(b). 
223  SAPS Act s 67 arranges that “any person who resists or wilfully hinders or obstructs a member in 
the exercise of his power or duties or wilfully interferes with such member’s uniform or equipment 
is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
12 months”. 
224  Firearms Control Act s 12(1)(k). See footnote 24 Chapter 3 for the full definition. Firearms Control 
Act s 1 states that a ‘dangerous weapon’ means “any object, other than a firearm, capable of 
causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm, if it were used for an unlawful purpose”. 
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Since the offences under the Firearm Control Act and Dangerous Weapons Act are 
also applicable,225 the prosecution can decide under which Acts to institute 
prosecution. The prescribed sentences for carrying any object referred to in section 
12(1)(k) of the Act is a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years. It 
must be taken into consideration that a firearm may be properly licenced and belong 
to the participant. The Firearm Control Act provides for a period of imprisonment not 
exceeding 15 years when the firearm is unlicensed. Section 3 of the Dangerous 
Weapons Act again provides for a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
three years.  
4.5  Sentences under the Gatherings Act 
When convicted of contravening section 12(1)(a)-(j) of the Gatherings Act,226 the 
prescribed penalty is a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or 
both such fine and such imprisonment. As mentioned in paragraph 4.4.11 above, 
section 12(1)(k) of the Act stipulates that anyone who is found in possession of any 
proscribed or dangerous weapon227 during a gathering or demonstration, is liable to a 
fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.  
The provisions of the Gatherings Act228 must not be interpreted as to detract from the 
provisions of the Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act 53 of 1985, 
the Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013, the Firearm Control Act 60 of 2000, the 
Trespass Act 6 of 1959 or the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The prosecution 
select under which Act prosecution is to be instituted. The prescribed penalties are 
more substantial under most of the aforementioned Acts.  
Section 1 of the Trespass Act avers that any person who, without the permission of 
the lawful occupier or owner in charge of land or building, enters or is upon such land 
or building, is guilty of an offence, and on conviction liable to a fine not exceeding       
R2 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or to both such fine 
                                                          
225  Firearms Control Act s 3 provides that no person may possess a firearm unless he or she holds a 
license, permit or authorisation issued in terms of the Act. 
226  See paras 4.4.1 - 4.4.10 above. 
227  See para 4.11 above. 
228  Gatherings Act s 13. 
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and such imprisonment.  
Under the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982, certain forms of intimidation are prohibited, and 
when a person is convicted, he or she is liable to a fine not exceeding R40 000, or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment.229 In cases of intimidation of the general public, a particular section of 
population, or inhabitants of particular area,230 a person will be liable to a fine which 
the court may in its discretion deem fit, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
25 years, or to both such fine and such imprisonment.  
The Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act provides for the 
safeguarding of certain public premises, vehicles, and for the protection of people. 
Section 2(2) provides that no person may without the permission of an authorised 
officer enter upon any public premises or any public vehicle.231 Any person who 
contravenes the provisions is guilty of an offence, and liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding R2 000, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or to both 
that fine and that imprisonment.232 In terms of section 66(1) of the SAPS Act, it is an 
offence to wear any uniform or distinctive badge or anything materially resembling a 
uniform of the SAPS.233 Any person who contravenes the provisions is guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
six months.  
In contrast, the Guidelines on freedom for peaceful assembly recommends that any 
penalties for offences committed during a gathering must be necessary and 
proportionate:  
Unnecessary or disproportionately harsh sanctions for behaviour during 
assemblies could, if known in advance, inhibit the holding of such events and have 
a chilling effect that may prevent participants from attending. Such sanctions could 
thus constitute an indirect violation of the freedom of peaceful assembly. Penalties 
for minor offences that do not threaten to cause or result in significant harm to 
public order or to the rights and freedoms of others should accordingly be low and 
                                                          
229  Intimidation Act ss 1(1), 1A(1). 
230  Intimidation Act s 1A. 
231  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 1. 
232  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 4.  
233  It is also an offence under s 104(5) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 as amended, to “possess or 
wear a prescribed uniform, distinctive marks or crests, or perform any prohibited act while wearing 
such uniform or distinctive marks or crests”.  
143 
the same as minor offences unrelated to assemblies.234  
The punishment for contravening the provisions created in the Gatherings Act is 
significant. A person can, for example, acquire a criminal conviction for the failure to 
inform the local authority that a gathering was cancelled.235 By attempting to arrange 
a gathering, the organiser can already acquire a heavy sentence, while the calamitous 
effects of a previous conviction recorded against an individual are well-known.  
4.6  Other legislation influencing aspects of gatherings 
Other legislation may also be utilised to prosecute certain necessary aspects when 
people come together, for example, emergency care, or safety precautions at 
gatherings. Sometimes legislation co-exist with the Gatherings Act, and on occasion 
it is not applicable. The Regulations relating to Emergency Care at Mass Gathering 
Events236 are applicable to mass events involving more than 1000 participants. The 
Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 focuses on the safety of 
persons and property at events. However, the Safety at Sports and Recreational 
Events Act explicitly exclude gatherings arranged in terms of the Gatherings Act from 
its application.237 Times of emergency or disaster can also allow governments to ban 
gatherings for extensive periods. 
4.6.1  Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events 
The Regulations relating to Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events are applicable 
to mass gatherings, which are defined as “an event where the expected attendance is 
more than 1,000 participants simultaneously present at any given time”,238 or when 
less than 1000 participants are expected, but the gathering is considered a high-risk239 
                                                          
234  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [22]. 
235  Gatherings Act s 12(1)(h). 
236  Enacted in terms of section 90 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, published in GG 40919 dated 
15 June 2017, GN 566.  
237  See Chapter 5 below. 
238  Regulation 1 and 2(1) of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. See also para 3.4.1.7 
above, footnote 220. 
239  According to the Regulations relating to Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events s 1, a ‘risk’ is 
seen as the “probability of harmful consequences or losses (deaths, injuries, damage to property, 
disrupted economic activity or environmental damages) resulting from interactions between 
hazards and vulnerable conditions that is quantified”. 
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event.240 An ‘event’ includes: 
…an entertainment event (including live acts), a recreational, educational, cultural, 
religious event, a political rally, a business event (including marketing, public 
relations and promotional), a charitable, exhibitional, conferential, organisational 
event and similar activities hosted at a stadium or a venue or along a route or its 
precinct.241 
The regulations specifically focus on emergency medical care at gatherings. The 
Regulations must be read together with the Gatherings Act. In the Regulations, 
Annexure B, Table 1 provides for the allocation of a score based on the nature of the 
event, and gatherings and demonstrations are specifically mentioned as an event.  
The regulations place substantial duties on the organiser to arrange for emergency 
care at events, and give the Emergency Medical Service Manager the power to 
prohibit the event when concerns are not met.242 The organiser needs to, inter alia, 
conduct a risk assessment,243 to consult with the event medical service provider, and 
to prepare plans to show the layout of the venue, entries and exit points, emergency 
routes, medical facilities and triage areas, positioning of toilets, merchandising stalls, 
and parking.244 The organiser must also take responsibility for the cost of providing all 
health and medical services for the event.245 The assessments must also be submitted 
to the Emergency Medical Service Manager at least six weeks prior to the event taking 
place.246  
It is understandable that mass gatherings must be planned well in advance due to the 
number of persons attending. However, the applicable time period of six weeks can 
seriously hamper the expressive nature of protest action or marches. The period is 
extensive, and can derail the reason for holding the event. The regulations also 
provide that the organiser is responsibility for the costs of providing health and medical 
services for the event. The Regulations is in disagreement with the Guidelines on 
freedom of peaceful assembly which provides that the government should not levy 
                                                          
240  Regulation 2(2) of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. See para 3.4.1.7 above, 
footnote 221. 
241  Regulations relating to Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events s 1. 
242  Regulations 10 and 12 of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. 
243  Regulation 3(1) of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. 
244  Regulation 3(2) of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. 
245  Regulation 3(4) of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. 
246  Regulation 6(1) of the Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events. 
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charges on organisers to provide for policing, medical services or health and safety.247 
For example, in Govsha v Belarus,248 the application to hold a gathering was not 
accompanied by receipts indicating that services relating to the protection of public 
order and security, medical facilities, and cleaning at the end of the meeting had been 
paid, therefore, the application was denied.249 In Poliakov v Belarus,250 the request to 
hold a gathering was rejected since the organisers could not present a letter to prove 
that medical care will be available during the demonstration.251 In both these cases, it 
was held that the rights of the applicants were violated.   
Without assistance to complete the mandatory application, the necessary knowledge 
to adhere to the requirements of the Regulations, and the requisite funds to pay for 
expensive medical services, it will be impossible to arrange mass events, specifically 
when it involves protest action. The imposition of compulsory risk assessments can 
create unnecessary bureaucratic requirements which can discourage groups and 
individuals from enjoying their freedom of peaceful assembly.252 Regulation 14 of the 
Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events Regulations provides that a person who 
contravenes any of the regulations is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding five years, or both a fine and such imprisonment. The 
substantial sentence can discourage organisers and participants to arrange and 
proceed with mass gatherings. 
4.6.2  Disaster Management Act 
Section 6(6)(a) of the Gatherings Act provides that when the responsible officer, the 
Minister for Safety and Security, or a court on application in terms of the common law, 
has prohibited a gathering, or if a magistrate or court has upheld the prohibition of a 
gathering, the authorised member (police member) must prevent the gathering from 
taking place. However, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Minister of Cooperative 
                                                          
247  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 paras [89], [155]. 
248  Govsha v Belarus para 1.1. See Chapter 2 above. 
249  E.g., they did not provide receipts confirming that services relating to the protection of public order 
and security, medical facilities and cleaning at the end of the meeting had been paid. Sections 5 
and 6 of the Law on Mass Events contain various requirements, such as measures for securing 
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250  Poliakov v Belarus para [2.1]. 
251  Poliakov v Belarus para [3.1]. 
252  Poliakov v Belarus para [119]. See also Chapter 2 above. 
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Governance and Traditional Affairs, designated under the Disaster Management Act 
57 of 2002, declared a national state of disaster.253 The Disaster Management 
Regulations254 provides for serious inroads into the right to gather as protected by 
section 17 of the Constitution. A ‘gathering’ in the Disaster Management Regulations 
means:  
…any assembly, concourse or procession in or on ‒  
(a)  any public road, as defined in the National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (Act No. 
93 of 1996); or  
(b)  any other building, place or premises, including wholly or partly in the open 
air, and including, but not limited to, any premises or place used for any 
sporting, entertainment, funeral, recreational, religious, or cultural 
purposes.255 
The Disaster Management Regulations prohibit any kind of gathering with the 
exception of a funeral or cremation, which is limited to 50 persons including the 
employees of the funeral parlour.256 The police must order persons who are gathering 
to disperse immediately, and, on refusal, they may arrest and detain these 
participants.257 A person who convenes a gathering,258 or hinders, interferes with, or 
obstructs the police in the exercise their powers and duties in terms of these 
Regulations, is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six 
months, or to both such fine and imprisonment.259  
  
                                                          
253  Regulation 1 of the Disaster Management Act ‒ a “national state of disaster” means “the national 
state of disaster declared by GN R. 313 of 15 March 2020”. 
254  Consolidated regulations published in GN 318 dated 18 March 2020, as amended by GN R. 398 
dated 25 March 2020, R. 419 dated 26 March 2020, R. 446 dated 2 April 2020 and R. 465 dated 
16 April 2020.  
255  Regulation 1 of the Disaster Management Act. The Disaster Management Regulations provides 
for different levels of restriction during the pandemic.  
256  Regulation 3(1) of the Disaster Management Act read with regulation 11B(8). Even though funerals 
are allowed under level 3 Covid-19 lockdown regulations, many such gatherings contravene the 
50-person maximum. See, e.g. Bhengu L “Police fire rubber bullets, stun grenades to disperse 
250-strong church service in Sebokeng” https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/ 
police-fire-rubber-bullets-stun-grenades-to-disperse-250-strong-church-service-in-sebokeng-
20210110 (Date of use: 11 January 2021); Pheto B “Cop assaulted after breaking up illegal ‘after 
tears’ party in Joburg” https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-01-14-cop-assaulted-
after-breaking-up-illegal-after-tears-party-in-joburg/ (Date of use: 16 January 2021). 
257  Regulation 3(2) of the Disaster Management Act.  
258  Regulation 11(1)(a) of the Disaster Management Act. 
259  Regulation 11(1)(c) of the Disaster Management Act. 
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4.7  Conclusion 
As discussed in this chapter, the purpose of the Gatherings Act is to regulate the 
holding of peaceful public gatherings and demonstrations. The Act also provides for 
offences when the provisions of the Act are not adhered to. Although the Act 
commenced in 1996 and is approximately 25 years in operation, very few prosecutions 
have been instituted under the provisions of the Act. Any indication of court records 
for several of the offences under the Act, for example, failure by an organiser or 
marshal to adhere to their duties, or failure to inform the responsible officer that a 
gathering is cancelled, could not be found.   
Protest action is the only way the poor and unrepresented can bring their causes under 
the attention of the authorities, and the Gatherings Act must assist everyone to do so. 
The first point of reference when a member of the public considers to organise a 
gathering, is the Act itself. The Act prescribes the steps an organiser needs to take to 
arrange gatherings and demonstrations. However, the language used in the 
Gatherings Act can be seen as difficult to understand, confusing and not user-friendly. 
The use of words, for example, ‘responsible officer’ and ‘authorised member’ create 
confusion. To identify the place of notification may require substantial effort. To 
establish what the offences in the Act entail can be difficult without the assistance of 
a legal representative. Although the Act provides for notification, the procedure can 
easily be mistaken for permission required to be obtained from the local authority, and 
this confusion may, therefore, be abused by local authorities.  
The provisions providing for the failure to notify the local authority of an intended 
gathering was declared unconstitutional although the notification procedure is still in 
place. It is also not an offence to participate in a gathering where no notification was 
given to the local authority. These decision renders an already limping Act mainly 
ineffective to provide in its purpose. Quite a few of the offences are linked to the notice 
procedure. If the organiser fails to notify the responsible officer (local authority) of an 
intended gathering, there is no risk that conditions can be imposed on the gathering, 
or that the gathering can be prohibited.  
It is evident that the provisions of the Gatherings Act must be reconsidered since they 
seem to be not functional or relevant in today’s context. To protest is inherent to the 
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people of South Africa, and the Act regulating the gathering of persons must be 
supportive, easily readable and understandable. Most of the Gatherings Act will 
possibly not withstand constitutional muster. It is foreseen that the contents of the 
notice, time-frame prescriptions, the difference between demonstrations and 
gatherings, and the involvement of the local government, may be contended in court 
as limiting the right to gather as guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution. 
In the following chapter, the common-law offence of public violence will be investigated 





The common-law offence of public violence is essentially utilised by the state in cases 
of violent gatherings, dissent, mass-action, protest, or faction fighting. The application 
of this offence is extensive. A wide range of acts, depending on the circumstances, 
resort under the definition, for example, the offence is applicable to the landless poor 
trespassing, gangs clashing, communities burning property, employees picketing, a 
private party turning violent, or soccer hooligans fighting. The offence does not 
differentiate between violence involved in land invasion, violence at sport events, 
violence against the state, or domestic quarrels, as long as the conduct “assume 
serious dimensions and is intended forcibly to disturb public peace and tranquillity or 
to invade the rights of others”.1 The offence of public violence is primarily the only 
crime to prosecute the violent conduct of a group of people in South Africa.  
Be that as it may, not all violent conduct qualifies as crimes of public violence. In this 
regard, guidelines created by international and regional instruments aid governments 
to comply with international legal norms and standards as regards regulating violent 
gatherings.2 These guidelines assist with the interpretation of legislation governing the 
right to gather and the use of violence. The ECtHR states that only gatherings where 
the organisers and participants intend to use violence qualify for prosecution.3 
Furthermore, the range of conduct that constitutes violence should be narrowly 
interpreted but “may extend beyond physical violence to include inhuman or degrading 
treatment or intentional intimidation or harassment.”4 According to the Guidelines on 
freedom of association and assembly in Africa, isolated acts of violence do not render 
                                                          
1  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. 
2  See Chapter 2 above. Although it is guidelines, its basis is in case law. 
3  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [46]; Cisse v France (Application no 51346/99 9 April 2002) para [37]. South African 
courts may take cognisance of the decisions of the ECtHR when adjudicating cases that stem from 
the right to gather, since the Constitution provides that, for the purpose of interpretation, 
international instruments are applicable. 
4  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [55]. 
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a gathering as a whole unpeaceful.5 Any peaceful gathering, however, has the 
potential to become violent. Service delivery protest is especially marred by violence 
which includes, amongst other misdeeds, serious damage to infrastructure. Police 
action during gatherings may also escalate violent conduct by participants, raising the 
question if the police are properly trained to decide when conduct renders a gathering 
violent. 
This chapter focuses on the difficulty experienced by the general public to predict when 
the offence of public violence is committed, since the answer seemingly depends on 
the decision of the presiding officer after considering the facts of each case. It is 
important that the public are informed in advance as to what conduct is unacceptable 
and criminally sanctioned. It is argued that it is uncertain when conduct will be deemed 
serious enough to result in a guilty-finding. Furthermore, the forum and the discretion 
of the presiding officer play a role with regard to the punishment imposed.  
Reference is made to legislation in other countries; i.e. England, and India, who have 
deviated from the one-offence-fits-all-conduct-approach, and enacted specific public 
order legislation to cater for particular problems with reasonable sentences. These 
countries enacted various offences ranging from serious to less serious conduct with 
applicable sentences. The question is investigated whether South Africa should also 
follow this approach as regard violent gatherings. 
5.2  The definition and elements of public violence 
In order to examine the manner in which the offence of public violence has developed 
in selected foreign countries as specified above, it becomes necessary to explore the 
definition and elements of the crime as located in South African criminal law. This will 
be effected in the following paragraphs. 
5.2.1  The definition of public violence 
According to Snyman: 
Public violence consists of the unlawful and intentional commission, together with 
a number of people, of an act or acts which assume serious dimensions and which 
                                                          
5  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [70]. 
151 
are intended forcibly to disturb public peace and tranquillity or to invade the rights 
of others.6  
The elements of the offence are an act (on private or public property), by a number of 
people (the number will depend on the circumstances), which assumes serious 
proportions (contingent on different factors), is unlawful and intentional, disturbing the 
public peace and order by violent means, or infringing the rights of others.7 The 
elements of this offence are interlinked, however, the evidence on some of the 
elements must be considered to prove another. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
elements of culpability and unlawfulness are not discussed.8   
The offence does not describe specific acts ‒ any conduct which takes on serious 
proportions, and where the intent is to disrupt the public’s peace and quiet by force, or 
where another person’s rights are violated are criminalised. These elements will 
consequently be discussed. 
5.2.2  The elements of public violence 
In the following paragraphs, four elements of public violence will be analysed by 
making use of applicable case law, legislation, and international and regional 
guidelines. 
5.2.2.1 A number of people acting in concert 
Public violence must be committed by a number of persons acting in concert. The 
number is not prescribed, and will depend upon the circumstances of each case.9 A 
single person, however, cannot commit public violence. 
To establish the exact number of people deemed sufficient to commit the offence is 
problematic. In the past, different courts made dissimilar rulings on the number of 
persons required to constitute public violence. For example, in R v Nxumalo and 
                                                          
6  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. In Milton South African Law and Procedure 74, public violence 
is defined as consisting in the unlawful and intentional commission, by a number of people acting 
in concert, of acts of sufficiently serious dimensions which are intended violently to disturb the 
peace or security or to invade the rights of others. See S v Le Roux and Others 2010 (2) SACR 11 
(SCA). 
7  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. See also ER v Cele and Others 1958 (1) SA 144 (N); R v 
Claassens and Another 1959 (3) SA 292 (T); Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal law 610.    
8  See Snyman Snyman’s criminal law Chapters IV and V for a discussion. 
9  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 278. 
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Others,10 five appellants had been convicted of public violence in relation to a quarrel 
in which only they and five others had been involved, and which lasted two minutes.11 
The court of appeal was doubtful whether it could be said that ten persons constituted 
a considerable number of persons.12 The court found that although the actions of the 
five accused were forceful, the incident did not last long, and, thus, the offence of 
public violence was not proven.13 In R v Salie,14 the court held that in faction-fight 
cases the following need to be considered: the extent of the quarrel, the number of 
persons engaged, the locality, the duration of the fight, the way in which the fight was 
ended, the cause of the quarrel, and the status of the persons engaged in it.15 Eight 
persons fighting were not considered sufficient to constitute public violence. In Mcunu 
v R,16 the conduct of six persons was not sufficient to commit the offence of public 
violence, whereas in R v Terblanche,17 five persons were considered adequate. 
Where, in R v Nxumalo,18 five to ten persons armed with sticks and irons assaulted 
passengers on a train, the court nonetheless believed that the offence of public 
violence was not committed.  
The examples of case law mentioned above indicates that the police and prosecution 
sometimes misread the elements required to prove the offence of public violence.19 It 
is submitted that a member of the public will struggle to establish when the number of 
persons will be deemed sufficient to commit this offence. It seems that in order to 
ascertain whether the offence was actually committed depends on the discretion of 
the presiding officer, after consideration of all the facts.  
The definition does not require that the exact number of persons be known ‒ the state 
only needs to corroborate that a group of people was present. It will depend on the 
circumstances of each case whether the group of persons is deemed sufficient to 
commit the offence, therefore, it is possible that two or three persons are sufficient to 
                                                          
10  R v Nxumalo and Others 1960 (2) SA 442 (T) (hereinafter Nxumalo). 
11  Nxumalo 442. 
12  Nxumalo 442-443. The court took into consideration the dimensions of the quarrel, the number of 
persons involved, the locality, the duration of the fight, and the cause of the quarrel.    
13  Nxumalo 444. 
14  R v Salie 1938 TPD 1362. 
15  R v Salie 1938 TPD 1362. 
16  Mcunu v R 1938 NPD 226. 
17  R v Terblanche 1938 EDL 112. 
18  R v Nxumalo 1960 (2) SA 442 (T). 
19  By misinterpreting the number of persons needed to commit the offence or if the conduct assumes 
serious proportions. 
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commit the offence.  
It is essential that the state also shows evidence that the group acted in concert. If 
only one person acts violently in a group of a hundred, it is debatable whether the 
offence is committed. For example, in S v Mei,20 between fifteen and thirty people 
assembled at a place where the road had been blocked by stones. The appellant threw 
a stone at a police vehicle, and was arrested.21 The court found that the mere placing 
of stones in the road did not amount to public violence, but throwing stones at vehicles 
may satisfy the requirement of violence.22 The court concluded that it is difficult to 
associate the appellant’s behaviour with the group unless it is found that the group of 
people present at the scene had as their objective the throwing of stones at vehicles. 
In this case, the element of the offence which requires that a number of people must 
act in concert to commit public violence was absent.23  
On the other hand, in S v Safatsa,24 the court stated that it was not necessary to 
establish that the accused themselves threw stones, since the evidence corroborated 
clearly that the accused were in the forefront of the stone-throwing mob, thus actively 
associating themselves with the common purpose to commit riotous and violent 
disturbance of the public peace. In S v Mgedezi,25 groups of men armed with home-
made weaponry entered parts of a compound, chanting songs of the imminent 
execution of the team leaders. They then attacked the room shared by six team 
leaders, hacked the door down, and set it alight. During the attack, four team leaders 
died.26 None of the state witnesses saw the accused physically hurting the team 
leaders. In this case, the court found that it had a duty to consider the evidence against 
each accused separately and individually, in determining whether there was a 
sufficient basis for holding each of the participants liable.27  
To establish whether the number of people acted in concert may be challenging. 
Unorganised, seemingly leaderless, violent gatherings sometimes give the police no 
other option than to arrest participants to eliminate injury to persons and damage to 
                                                          
20  S v Mei 1982 (1) SA 299 (O) (hereinafter Mei). 
21  Mei 299. 
22  Mei 302. 
23  Mei 302. 
24  S v Safatsa 1988(1) SA 868 (A) 903E. 
25  S v Mgedezi 1989 (1) SA 687 (A) (hereinafter Mgedezi). 
26  Mgedezi 688. 
27  Mgedezi 689. 
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property. When the police get involved, participants may scatter in all directions. To 
identify individuals, and be able to testify what part they played in the gathering, is 
problematic. Popular defences are, for example, that the accused were only passing 
by, watching (as spectators), on their way home, compelled, intimidated, or assaulted 
to attend the gathering. Community members and schoolchildren often allege that they 
were taken out of their houses or schools, threatened and bullied into joining protest 
action. In ER v Samuel and Others,28 the defence of the accused was that he had 
been forced by the gang to join the gathering. However, the court held that when the 
police arrived on the scene, the duress ceased, and, therefore, any justification for 
adherence to the gang.29 The state needs to prove that the accused actively 
associated with the conduct of the crowd,30 and acted in concert, that is, in common 
purpose with the group.31   
Due to the number of accused in public violence cases, the finalisation of cases are 
slow. Cases can repeatedly be postponed for all the accused and their legal 
representatives to attend court. Court attendances of a high number of accused in 
public violence matters are regularly accompanied by further protest action outside 
courts, and the handing over of petitions by community leaders. All these factors may 
impede the progress of a public violence case. 
5.2.2.2 An act must assume serious proportions 
To decide whether conduct assumes serious proportions, courts need to consider the 
facts of each case individually, taking into account relevant factors, which can include: 
the number of persons, the time, the place, the reason, status of persons involved, 
damage to property, injuries, loss of life, weapons involved, planning, intimidation, 
common-purpose, how the participants responded to police action, the nature of the 
violence, the impact on the public, and how the violence ended.32 In the past, courts 
made various rulings with regard to when conduct assumes serious proportions. In S 
v Mlotshwa and Others,33 an employee of a company drove her car to the company’s 
                                                          
28  ER v Samuel and Others 1960 (4) SA 702 (SR).  
29  ER v Samuel and Others 1960 (4) SA 702 (SR). 
30  See Dlamini 2002 SACJ 1-22.   
31  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 278. 
32  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 279. 
33  S v Mlotshwa and Others 1989 (4) SA 787 (W) (hereinafter Mlotshwa). 
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warehouse, and found the main gates closed.34 When she stopped in front of the gate, 
a group of approximately twelve to twenty persons stormed her vehicle. Some 
members of the group hit the vehicle, screamed, and attempted to open the doors. 
The vehicle was completely surrounded, and her door opened. The gates opened, and 
she drove into the premises. The incident lasted approximately six seconds, and no 
damage was done to the vehicle. The court decided that the confrontation did not 
contain all the elements of public violence.35 The incident lasted a mere six to seven 
seconds; the participants were unarmed, and the violence was restricted to a threat of 
violence, accordingly, no harm was done. The court found that it would be an 
unwarranted extension of the offence of public violence since the acts were not of 
sufficiently serious dimensions ‒ the episode was of an extremely short duration. The 
court also considered that the accused were on a lawful strike.36  
A similar conclusion was reached in R v Ngubane and Others.37 In this case, sixteen 
persons attended a wedding celebration at a kraal, armed with shields, sticks and knob 
sticks. When a constable attempted to arrest one of them, he was assaulted by the 
group. The court found that due to the restricted nature of the quarrel, the private 
nature of the locality, the limited duration of the occurrence, and the limited number of 
persons concerned, that the incident did not amount to an act of public violence.38 
However, in S v Usayi and Others,39 a group of about twelve of the Usayi family 
entered the Masango’s land. A number of them were armed with axes, spears and 
sticks. Fences were demolished, and fire set to fencing material and grass. One 
person was assaulted.40 The court held that:  
…it involved a family dispute and the trouble was confined to private property, that 
the families were large - more like clans - and the violence occurred very much in 
the open and on some scale; it was likely and must have been known to be likely 
to cause retaliation from the other clan, with quite possibly serious consequences, 
even though it might not have disturbed other members of the public; the action 
was premeditated, the appellants were armed, and they openly and publicly 
invaded the property and rights of others.41 
                                                          
34  Mlotshwa 794. 
35  Mlotshwa 795. 
36  Mlotshwa 795. 
37  R v Ngubane and Others 1947 (3) SA 217 (N) (hereinafter Ngubane). 
38  Ngubane 217. 
39  S v Usayi and Others 1981 (2) SA 630 (ZA) (hereinafter Usayi). 
40  Usayi 631. 
41  Usayi 631. 
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The court found that their conduct constituted public violence. Similarly, in R v Xybele 
and Others,42 rival groups marched in gangs for six days, bearing weapons and battle 
headdress, to exhibit a show of strength. The court decided that any reasonable 
person would be of opinion that these acts would likely cause fights, assaults, fear and 
disturbances among the citizens, therefore constituting public violence.43 In S v Le 
Roux and Others,44 seven appellants were convicted of public violence.45 The 
convictions arose from an incident at a restaurant in which the appellants were found 
to have assaulted customers, and damaged property. The incident was rowdy and 
confrontational in which windows, goods and furniture had been broken.46 The 
appellants argued that the incident had not been of such a magnitude as to amount to 
public violence, and that the state failed to adduce evidence linking them to any act 
committed on the day in question. The court stated that the prominent features of the 
offence of public violence were that a group of persons, acting in concert, had 
committed an act of sufficiently serious dimensions which invaded the rights of others 
and disturbed public peace.47 The court found that it was necessary to consider all the 
evidence in order to determine the involvement of the appellants48 and referred to 
Mgedezi49 where the court dealt with a situation where there was no prior plan to 
commit the offence of public violence.50 The court concluded that: 
…a general and all-embracing approach regarding all those charged is not 
permissible, and that the conduct of the individual accused should be individually 
considered, with a view to determining whether there is a sufficient basis for holding 
that a particular accused person is liable, on the ground of active participation in 
the achievement of a common purpose that developed at the scene.51  
In S v Thonga,52 the accused, who lived in a rural area where people still believe in 
witchcraft, was convicted of public violence on the basis of his participation in a 
rampage by an unruly mob of mostly young people aimed at attacking people accused 
of being witches and wizards. The acts continued for a period of approximately two 
                                                          
42  R v Xybele and Others 1958 (1) SA 157 (T). 
43  R v Xybele and Others 1958 (1) SA 157 (T) 157. 
44  S v Le Roux and Others 2010 (2) SACR 11 (SCA) (hereinafter Le Roux). 
45  Le Roux para [12]. 
46  Le Roux para [17]. 
47  Le Roux paras [16]-[18]. 
48  Le Roux para [13]. 
49  Le Roux para [17] referring to Mgedezi paras [703B], [703I].  
50  Le Roux para [19]. 
51  Le Roux para [19]. 
52  S v Thonga 1993 (1) SACR 365 (V) (hereinafter Thonga). 
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months. The accused, together with others, visited a number of kraals where they 
assaulted persons suspected of being involved in witchcraft, one person was killed 
and others injured.53 It is, therefore, difficult to predict beforehand whether certain 
conduct assumes serious proportions, since it depends on how the presiding officer 
will interpret the particular facts. As a result, it is challenging for an ordinary member 
of the public to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences of certain conduct.  
In South Africa, depending on the seriousness of the conduct and factors including 
time, locality, duration, damage, or violence, the forum where the case can be heard 
varies – the case may be heard in the district, regional or high court. According to the 
Policy Directives issued by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP),54 all 
cases must be tried in the regional court where personal injuries were inflicted. It 
follows that where no injuries were inflicted, cases can be heard in the district court. 
According to the Policy Directives issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP): 
Mpumalanga,55 all cases must be tried in the regional court, except where the senior 
prosecutor is of the view that the public violence committed was not of a severe nature. 
The question can conversely be posed ‒ if it is deemed that the conduct was not of a 
severe nature ‒ does this conduct constitute public violence as it does not assume 
serious proportions?  
As regards punishment, the district court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for 
a maximum of three years. Section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 
1997 provides for discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious offences. 
Public violence falls under Part IV of Schedule 2, which determines that an offender 
must be sentenced if he or she had with him or her a firearm intended to be used in 
the commission of the public violence; to a minimum sentence in the case of a first 
offender to imprisonment for a period not less than five years; a second offender to 
imprisonment for a period not less than seven years; and a third or subsequent 
offender to imprisonment for a period not less than ten years. It is, therefore, important 
                                                          
53  Thonga 366. 
54  Part 11: Matters justiciable in regional court. Prosecution Policy Directives. Policy Directives issued 
by the NDPP as revised on 1 May 2019, read with the Policy directives issued by the DPP for the 
province Mpumalanga dated 1 November 2019. 
55  Part 11: Matters justiciable in regional court. Prosecution Policy Directives. Policy Directives issued 
by the NDPP as revised on 1 May 2019, read with the Policy directives issued by the DPP for the 
province Mpumalanga dated 1 November 2019. 
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that the senior prosecutor must properly consider the facts in each case. Specific 
guidelines are currently not available to assist senior prosecutors with the meaning of 
‘not of a severe nature’, therefore, the decision may differ from prosecutor to 
prosecutor. Due to the variance in possible sentences in the high, regional and district 
courts, the decision on the applicable forum will be of most importance to the accused.   
5.2.2.3 Forcibly disturbing peace and tranquillity 
The interest that the state attempts to protect with the offence of public violence is 
public peace and tranquillity, which is generally violated during protest action or when 
groups of people attack others. According to the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful 
assembly: 
The term ‘peaceful’ includes conduct that may annoy or give offence to individuals 
or groups opposed to the ideas or claims that the assembly is seeking to promote. 
It also includes conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities 
of third parties ... As such, an assembly can be entirely ‘peaceful’ even if it is 
‘unlawful’ under domestic law.56  
The General comment published by the UN Human Rights Committee provides that: 
Isolated instances of such conduct will not suffice to taint an entire assembly as 
non-peaceful, but where this is manifestly widespread within the assembly, 
participation in the gathering as such is no longer protected under article 21.57 
It therefore implies that the facts of each case will indicate whether the peace and 
tranquillity were affected. There must furthermore be a common purpose amongst the 
participants to forcefully disturb the public peace and tranquillity.58 The offence can be 
committed even if there is no actual disturbance of public peace and security, so long 
as the conduct is intended to disturb the peace or invade rights of others.59 
Consequently, it is not sufficient if only one of the participants has the required 
intention.  
According to Snyman, public violence must be accompanied by violence or threats of 
violence.60 It seems, therefore, that the reference in the definition to disturb the public 
peace and tranquillity by force, or to offend the rights of others implies that the conduct 
                                                          
56  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [19]. 
57  ICCPR General Comment para [19]. 
58  R v Kashion 1963 (1) SA 732 (SR) 727. 
59  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 279. 
60  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 279. 
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must take place by means of violence or threats of violence. The definition provided 
by Milton also stipulates that “conduct must be intended violently to disturb the peace 
or security”.61 Khumalo is of opinion that reference must be made to the offence of 
assault, since it sets out how the concepts of force and violence can be interpreted for 
purposes of all offences of violence, inter alia, public violence:  
Under assault jurisprudence, the violence required to constitute an assault exists 
where there is a direct or indirect unlawful application of force (in whatever degree) 
against the body of another. A threat of violence exists where the victim 
apprehends the immediate application of force against his/her body. Therefore, it 
is clear that for the offence of assault, force is a feature of violence and that there 
is no distinction between these concepts. Furthermore, any degree of force (be it 
slight or extreme) is sufficient to constitute violence… the force needed to 
constitute the violence required for public violence, regardless of whether such 
force is slight or extreme, still has to satisfy the element of ‘serious dimensions’ 
before such force could be deemed to amount to public violence.62  
Khumalo thus interprets force as part of violence. Violence usually includes forceful 
conduct, especially when participants of public violence want to bring their cause to 
the attention of the government, or want to achieve a specific objective. It is submitted 
that members of the public may find it challenging to understand the concept of ‘forcibly 
disturbing public peace’, and the extent of force required to commit the offence.  
When monitoring gatherings, the police must be vigilant not to induce violence when 
facilitating a peaceful assembly, or not to arrest all the participants when only some of 
the participants display violent behaviour. The conduct of the participants in retaliation 
against police conduct at a gathering frequently are forceful and of sufficient serious 
dimensions to amount to public violence. Therefore, the police must be properly 
trained to identify violent conduct and to facilitate gatherings. The Guidelines on 
freedom of peaceful assembly also alert governments to the following:  
It is vital to note, however, that the presence of certain socio-economic or political 
factors does not of itself make violence at public assemblies inevitable. Indeed, 
violence can often be averted by the skilful intervention of law enforcement officials, 
municipal authorities and other stakeholders such as monitors and stewards. 
Measures taken to implement freedom of assembly legislation should therefore 
neither unduly impinge on the rights and freedoms of participants or other third 
parties, nor further aggravate already tense situations by being unnecessarily 
                                                          
61  Milton South African Criminal law and procedure: Common law crimes 74. 
62  Khumalo 2016 SACJ 44-52. 
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confrontational.63 Law enforcement officials should differentiate between peaceful 
and non-peaceful participants: Neither isolated incidents of sporadic violence, nor 
the violent acts of some participants in the course of a demonstration, are 
themselves sufficient grounds to impose sweeping restrictions on peaceful 
participants in an assembly… Law enforcement officials should not therefore treat 
a crowd as homogenous if detaining participants or (as a last resort) forcefully 
dispersing an assembly.64 
A decision to institute prosecution can consequently only be taken after careful 
consideration of the conduct of all the participants on the scene.   
5.2.2.4  Private or public place 
It does not matter whether the conduct by a number of people was committed in a 
public or private place, in a building, or in the open air when prosecution is instituted 
under the common law offence of public violence. Although public violence can take 
place in a private place, it still needs to disturb the public peace and tranquillity. 
5.3  The South African public violence offence and international 
guidelines 
A member of the public may struggle, without legal advice, to establish when the 
common-law offence of public violence is committed. Many of the elements of the 
offence of public violence are open for interpretation, and can easily be misunderstood 
by participants and police members.65 As stated above, to ascertain if the offence was 
committed is only clarified at the end of a trial, depending on the discretion of the 
presiding officer, after consideration of all the facts. According to the Guidelines on the 
freedom of peaceful assembly, an offence must be: 
…accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficiently precision 
to enable them to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.66   
                                                          
63  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [142]. See European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom 
of peaceful assembly 2019 para [176]. 
64  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [159]. 
65  See paras 5.2.2.1-5.2.2.4 above; Khumalo 2017 SACJ 23.   
66  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [98]. 
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These guidelines are based in case law. Furthermore, the rule of law demands legal 
stability and predictability.67 Clear definitions are vital to ensure that an offence is 
understandable. The South African government must for that reason clearly outline 
the responsibilities and duties of all the role-players, and ensure public awareness with 
regard to applicable law.68  
The Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania-case69 is an ECtHR example where the 
applicants, after being convicted of rioting, appealed to an international human rights 
instrument. Their complaint was that the elements of the offence riot was not clearly 
defined, and could, therefore, not be legitimately regarded. The arguments in this case 
are also applicable to the offence of public violence, since it is argued that the offence 
is not clearly defined. The facts of this case entail that a group of farmers blocked and 
demonstrated on three major highways for approximately 48 hours.70 Criminal 
proceedings against the farmers (applicants) were instituted under Article 283 section 
1 of the Criminal Code which establishes criminal liability for rioting ‒ a public order 
offence ‒ which provides as follows: 
A person who organises or provokes a gathering of people to commit public acts 
of violence, damage property or otherwise seriously breach public order, or a 
person who, during a riot, commits acts of violence, damages property or otherwise 
seriously breaches public order, is liable to be sentenced to a short-term custodial 
sentence (baudžiamasis areštas) or to imprisonment for up to five years.71  
The farmers inter alia raised the arguments that the notion of ‘serious breach of public 
order’ was not clearly defined, and thus could not legitimately be regarded as a feature 
characterising the criminal offence.72 The farmers submitted that the provisions were 
not clearly formulated, not properly interpreted by the domestic courts, and, therefore, 
the conviction was of an excessive measure.73 The farmers further argued that the 
government’s deliberate delay and refusal to assist with the farmers’ problems created 
a critical situation. The farmers contended that the government’s indecision had 
significantly impoverished rural areas; therefore, the conduct for which they had been 
                                                          
67  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [96]. 
68  ICCPR General Comment para [28]. 
69  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [1]. For a more detailed case discussion, see para 2.4.3.2 
above. 
70  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [20]. 
71  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [81]. 
72  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [103]. 
73  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [103]. 
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convicted was deprived of the “objective and subjective elements of criminal liability”.74 
The decision to stage roadblocks had been a last resort in order to defend their 
interests.75 Their intention was not to breach public order, but to peacefully 
demonstrate for social justice.76 The applicants claimed that the criminal proceedings 
against them had been disproportionate, and an unnecessary measure.77 
Notwithstanding the farmer’s arguments, it is submitted that Article 283 section 1 of 
the Criminal Code which establishes criminal liability for rioting is more clearly outlined 
than the South African common-law offence of public violence.78  
Many of the elements of the definition of the common-law offence of public violence in 
South Africa are open for interpretation, since it is not clearly defined and formulated.79 
It is argued that conduct criminalised by this offence can include any conduct,80 for 
example, tribal fights,81 student protests,82 service delivery protests, strikers violently 
intimidating others,83 disturbing meetings,84 throwing of stones, trespassing on 
property, gang-related fights, private quarrels, organised crime, destroying 
infrastructure,85 or sport-related violence.86 The number of persons needed to commit 
the offence varies from case to case,87 sometimes three people are sufficient, while 
ten or more people can be inadequate. The meaning of ‘intended forcibly’ is unclear ‒ 
raising questions with regard to passive resistance, and when the force or violence will 
be sufficient to constitute the offence.88  
                                                          
74  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [119]. 
75  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [120]. 
76  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [122]. 
77  Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania para [124]. At the end, the court found that the Lithuanian 
authorities struck a fair balance between the legitimate aims of the “prevention of disorder [and of 
the] protection of the rights and freedoms of others” on the one hand, and the requirements of 
freedom of assembly on the other, see para [182].  
78  It provides that a person who organises or provokes people to commit public acts of violence or 
damage property or seriously breach public order, or a person who, during a riot, commits such 
acts is guilty of an offence.   
79  Burchell 2019 Acta Juridica 206 warns that it is not a simple issue to develop law in order to meet 
changing circumstances and attitudes.   
80  See para 5.1 above. 
81  Ngubane 217, R v Xybele 1958 (1) SA 157 (T). 
82  E.g., the #FeesMustFall movement. See footnote 82 in Chapter 3 above. 
83  Cele 1958 (1) SA 144 (N). 
84  Claassens 1959 (3) SA 292 (T). 
85  The Criminal Matters Amendment Act 18 of 2015 provides for substantial sentences when 
essential infrastructure is damaged or destroyed.  
86  See Chapter 3 above; Oloka-Onyango When courts do politics: Public interest law and litigation in 
East Africa 76-111. 
87  See para 5.2.2.1 above. 
88  See para 5.2.2.3 above. 
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The average citizen will have much difficulty in figuring out when conduct assumes 
serious proportions,89 when exactly the public peace and order is disturbed, or when 
the rights of others are infringed. It is, therefore, uncertain which behaviour is 
criminalised and when precisely it becomes unlawful. The extent of the sentence that 
can be imposed by the courts is furthermore difficult to foresee.90  
Most service delivery protests in South Africa take place against the government’s 
refusal or inaction to assist communities in impoverished areas. In these participants’ 
opinion, the violence (protest and burning of buildings and infrastructure) are their last 
resort in order to draw the attention of the government to their plight. Marks91 
summarises the situation in South Africa as follows:  
Police responsible for public order policing find themselves in the middle of 
complex situations which they are unable to resolve, and it would appear that 
government at all levels is not taking adequate responsibility for the conditions that 
have led to this current climate…92 Local government, and other key components 
of government have turned into instruments for the enrichment of the politically 
connected rather than prioritising the interests of the people as a whole. 
Government institutions that are being used as an instrument for enrichment and 
operate around patronage networks are not capable of responding to the demands 
of protestors. Peaceful protest did not present too much of a problem to local or 
other political elites and were largely ignored. But ignoring peaceful protests 
inevitably translated into an escalation of more violent protest, essentially a 
symptom of systems of local power that functioned in an exclusionary manner.93 
Therefore, a conviction of public violence in these circumstances may be seen as 
deprived of the objective and subjective elements of criminal liability, or 
disproportionate and an unnecessary measure. However, an application on this 
ground will not succeed if the participants had at their disposal alternative and lawful 
means to bring their complaints to the attention of the government.94  
  
                                                          
89  See para 5.2.2.2 above. 
90  See para 5.2.2.2 above. 
91  Marks 2014 SACJ 346.  
92  Marks 2014 SACJ 373.  
93  Marks 2014 SACJ 371-372. 
94  Marks 2014 SACJ 371-372. 
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5.4  Other South African legislation criminalising serious violent conduct 
by a number of people 
In addition to the common-law offence of public violence providing that conduct must 
‘assume serious proportions’, other legislation also provides for situations where 
serious violent conduct is deemed unlawful. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
121 of 1998 and the Criminal Matters Amendment Act 18 of 2015 may also be 
applicable when violent gatherings take place. The Safety at Sports and Recreational 
Events Act 2 of 2010 regulates safety at events where spectators usually pay an 
entrance fee. Charges under these Acts can be added to the charge of public violence.  
For the purpose of this chapter, reference is made to abovementioned Acts. It must, 
however, be kept in mind that depending on the circumstances, several other offences 
may be committed during public violence, for example, assault, malicious damage to 
property, arson, murder, or even sexual assault. Public violence is also a competent 
verdict on a charge of murder, attempted murder,95 and culpable homicide.96 A precise 
separation of offences is not always possible.97 If the acts of a number of people 
challenge the authority of the state, sedition is committed, and if the act is 
accompanied by hostile intent, then high treason may be committed.98  
5.4.1  Gang-related offences 
Gang-related offences are deemed to be serious, and include violent conduct by a 
number of people. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act provides for offences 
committed by gangs. When a gang commits public violence, the offences under the 
Prevention of Organised Crimes Act apply. However, the gang needs to meet the 
specific requirements in the definition of a criminal gang. The requirements include:  
…any formal or informal on-going organisation, association or group of three or 
more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of one or more 
criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol and 
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern 
                                                          
95  Section 258 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In S v Whitehead and Others 2008 (1) 
SACR 431 (SCA), the court found that a conviction on charges of public violence and culpable 
homicide did not constitute a duplication of convictions.  
96  CPA s 259. 
97  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 278. 
98  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 278. 
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of criminal gang activity.99   
A court can, in considering whether a person is a member of a criminal gang, take 
certain factors in consideration. For example, that the person admits to criminal gang 
membership; is identified as a member of a criminal gang by a parent or guardian; 
resides in a particular criminal gang’s area; adopts a style of dress, uses hand signs, 
language, or has tattoos associated with a gang.100 The Act is applicable to more 
structured gangs having a name, dress code, and its roots in criminal activity. Due to 
the requirements of the Act, it is difficult to prove these offences except in areas of 
notorious gang activities. In many cases, boys of school-going age, staying in a 
specific area, are part of informal gangs with a specific name but no identifiable activity. 
They gather at night, drinking and partying – and attack other groups or individuals 
foreign to the area as a loose-knitted group. In these instances, the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act is difficult to apply, and the prosecution usually proceeds on a 
charge of public violence.    
5.4.2  Essential infrastructure offences 
Service delivery protests regularly include the destruction of infrastructure since it is 
seen to be the only way to attract the attention of the government. The damaging of 
municipal buildings, hospitals, trains, buses, trucks, and roads are part and parcel of 
the offence of public violence.101 The Criminal Matters Amendment Act creates 
offences relating to essential infrastructure102 which are necessary to deter the high 
occurrence of damage to these properties. Any interference with essential 
infrastructure poses a risk to public safety, electricity supply, communications and 
                                                          
99  Prevention of Organised Crime Act s 1 ‒ A ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ means “any person 
who actively participates or is a member of a criminal gang and wilfully aids any criminal activity 
committed for the benefit of the gang or threatens to commit any act of violence or any criminal 
activity by a criminal gang or threatens any person with retaliation in response to any act or alleged 
act of violence, is guilty of an offence. Any person who performs any act which is aimed at causing 
or promoting towards a pattern of criminal gang activity; or encourages any other person to commit 
or participate in a pattern of criminal gang activity; or to join a criminal gang is guilty of any offence.” 
100  Prevention of Organised Crime Act s 11. 
101  See Chapter 6 below. 
102  Criminal Matters Amendment Act s 1. ‘Essential infrastructure’ includes: “any public or privately-
owned installation, structure, facility or system, when lost, damage or tampering with, may interfere 
with the provision or distribution of a basic service to the public”. According to Criminal Matters 
Amendment Act s 1, ‘basic service to the public’ comprises: “Any service relating to energy, 
transport, water, sanitation and communication, when interfered with, which may prejudice the 
livelihood, wellbeing, daily operations or economic activity of the public is seen as a basic service”.  
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transportation.103 The prosecution may combine charges under this Act for a charge 
of public violence.  
Section 3(1) of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act provides that a person who 
tampers with, damages, or destroys essential infrastructure, or colludes with, or 
assists others in the commission of such an activity, knowing that it is essential 
infrastructure,104 is guilty of an offence, and liable on conviction to a period of 
imprisonment not exceeding 30 years.105 The prescribed sentence under the Act is 
substantial. The Act does not provide that a number of persons must act together to 
commit the offence, as such, only one person can commit the offence.  
In S v Alpheus Mohlabane and Another,106 the court confirmed that the offence in 
section 3(1) is applicable to service delivery protest action. The accused were former 
employees of a bus company, and dismissed because of an illegal strike. They set a 
bus alight, which was used for public transport. Inside the bus, a person was killed, 
and another seriously injured. They were sentenced, inter alia, for damaging essential 
infrastructure to ten years’ imprisonment, and for public violence to five years’ 
imprisonment. The presiding officer was satisfied that the bus was used for public 
transport, and that it was tampered with, and intentionally damaged and destroyed. 
The court concluded that although some of the elements of the offence overlap with 
the offence of public violence, these are still two separate offences.107 Therefore, when 
a number of persons damage public transport in a public place, it also constitutes the 
offence of public violence.  
5.4.3  Offences with regard to safety at sport and recreational events 
The Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 provides for measures to 
safeguard the physical wellbeing and safety of persons and property at events held at 
stadiums, venues, or along a route. The venue or stadium must have a seating or 
                                                          
103  Criminal Matters Amendment Act Preamble. 
104  Criminal Matters Amendment Act s 3(2) ‒ “A person ought reasonably to have known or suspected 
a fact if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would have been 
reached by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both (a) the general knowledge, skill, 
training and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in his or her position and (b) 
the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact has.”  
105  A corporate body can also be prosecuted and sentenced to a fine. 
106  S v Alpheus Mohlabane and Another CC133/2017, date of judgement 8/3/2018, High Court of 
South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria (unreported). 
107  S v Alpheus Mohlabane and Another CC133/2017. 
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standing spectator capacity of 2000 or more persons.108 The event can include 
“sporting, entertainment, recreational, religious, cultural, exhibitional, organisational or 
similar activities”.109 The Act is not applicable to gatherings arranged in terms of the 
Gatherings Act.110 However, nothing prohibits the prosecution to proceed with the 
offence of public violence when spectators become violent. The offences under the 
Act may be added as main or alternative charges. The Act provides for offences 
designed to criminalise unacceptable behaviour, such as serious injury to persons or 
damage to property. The Act prohibits, inter alia, the conduct of failing to comply with 
a lawful request or a directive given by a police official, or hindering a police official, a 
private security service provider, member of the safety and security planning 
committee, an access control officer, a peace officer, a member of the essential 
services or a member of a local authority.111 The Act also applies to instances where 
an authorised member is obstructed in the carrying out of his or her duties.112 Other 
prohibited conduct includes the throwing, kicking, knocking or hitting of any object 
within a stadium, venue or along a route;113 the damaging or destroying of any movable 
or immovable property inside a stadium or venue or along a route,114 and engaging in 
delinquent and antisocial behaviour, including racist, vulgar, inflammatory, 
intimidating, or obscene language or behaviour.115 The prescribed sentences for these 
offences are substantial. In certain instances, a fine or imprisonment for a period of 20 
years is applicable.116  
5.5  Public order laws in England and India 
Other countries, which include the jurisdictions of England and India, have deviated 
from the common-law offence approach, and have enacted legislature to specifically 
cater for particular problems experienced with public order. They list offences ranging 
                                                          
108  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 1. 
109  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 1. 
110  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 2(2)(b). 
111  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 44(1)(n). 
112  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 44(1)(o). 
113  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 44(1)(p). 
114  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 44(1)(q). 
115  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 s 44(1)(r). 
116  On conviction, a person may be liable in the case of contravening of s 44(1)(n) to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years, or both, in the case of ss 44(1)(o) to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or both and in any other case, to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both.  
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from less serious to more serious conduct with corroborating sentences. This method 
enables governments to more clearly define specific unlawful conduct. In the following 
paragraphs, England and India will be closer examined as to their specific public order 
legislation. 
5.5.1  England 
In England, public order offences are clustered together by the lawmaker for easy 
accessibility. The criminal law in respect of public order offences criminalises the use 
of violence, or intimidation by individuals or groups. The public order offences are 
contained in Part I of the Public Order Act 1986,117 and include riot,118 violent 
disorder,119 affray,120 using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour 
causing fear of or provoking violence,121 using threatening, abusive or insulting words 
or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour intending to and causing harassment, alarm or 
distress,122 using threatening, abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour 
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.123 The Act abolishes the common-law 
offences of riot, rout, unlawful assembly, and affray.124  
Provision is also made for specific kinds of conduct, for example, the Football 
(Disorder) Act 2000 which provides for the prevention of violence or disorder at football 
matches.125 The Act allows a court to make a banning order, when satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a banning order would help to prevent violence 
or disorder at a football match.126  
It seems that in England, the lawmakers attempt to curb conduct which causes specific 
problems by creating offences and implementing sentences which correspond to the 
conduct. These specific sentences range from the more serious offence of riot to less 
                                                          
117  The Public Order Act 1986 c 64 Part II, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64 (Date of use: 
27 March 2017). See Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams Cases & materials on International law 
107. 
118  Public Order Act s 1.  
119  Public Order Act s 2. 
120  Public Order Act s 3. 
121  Public Order Act s 4. 
122  Public Order Act s 4A. 
123  Public Order Act s 5. See Glazebrook Blackstone’s statutes on Criminal law 135-137.   
124  Public Order Act s 9(1). 
125  The Football (Disorder) Act 2000 amended the Football Spectators Act 1989, and reinforced the 
football banning orders (FBOs) which may ban a person from any United Kingdom football grounds 
for two to ten years.  
126  Football Spectators Act s 14A(2). 
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serious conduct such as using threatening, abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly 
behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.127  
The offence of riot requires that twelve or more persons must use or threaten unlawful 
violence128 for a common purpose, and the conduct must cause a person of 
reasonable firmness to fear for his personal safety.129 Riot can be committed in private 
or public places.130 A person is guilty of riot only if he or she intends to use violence or 
is aware that his or her conduct is violent.131  
The English concept of riot overlaps with the South African common-law offence of 
public violence. Both offences entail a group of people threatening or using unlawful 
violence in order to disturb the public peace and tranquillity. For riot to be perpetrated 
in England, more than eleven persons are requisite. It is assumed that if more than 
eleven persons participate using or threatening unlawful violence, serious dimensions 
are encompassed. A person guilty of riot is liable on conviction on indictment to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine or both.132 In the case of riot 
connected to football hooliganism, the offender may be banned from football grounds 
for a period of time, and may be required to surrender his or her passport to the 
police.133 The offence of riot is considered as serious since no prosecution for an 
offence of riot or incitement to riot may be instituted without the consent of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions.134  
Another serious crime listed in the Public Order Act is violent disorder. When three or 
more persons use or threaten unlawful violence, and their conduct would cause a 
                                                          
127  Public Order Act s 5. 
128  Public Order Act s 8: ‘Violence’ means “any violent conduct, so that ‒ (a) except in the context of 
affray, it includes violent conduct towards property as well as violent conduct towards persons, and 
(b) it is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to cause injury or damage but includes any 
other violent conduct (for example, throwing at or towards a person a missile of a kind capable of 
causing injury which does not hit or falls short).” 
129  Public Order Act s 1(1). A riot is seen in the Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 s 64 as 
“an unlawful assembly that had begun to disturb the peace tumultuously”. A person who conceals 
his or her identity while taking part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence, and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. See Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 s 65(2). 
130  Public Order Act s 1(5). 
131  Public Order Act s 6(1). 
132  Public Order Act s 1(6). See R v McKeown & Ors [2013] NICA 63 (12 November 2013); R v Najeeb 
and Others [2003] EWCA Crim 194. 
133  Football (Disorder) Act 2000. Also see footnote 125 above.   
134  Public Order Act s 7(1) ‒ No prosecution for an offence of riot or incitement to riot may be instituted 
without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. In South Africa, no prior permission 
from the DPP is needed to institute prosecution for the offence of public violence. 
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person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal 
safety, each of the persons is guilty of violent disorder.135 The offence may be 
committed in a public or private place.136 Violent disorder is essentially similar to the 
offence of riot, but provides for fewer participants ‒ three to eleven persons. A person 
guilty of violent disorder is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding five years or a fine or both, or on summary conviction137 to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum or both.138 It seems that smaller groups or less serious conduct warrants a 
lesser sentence than riot where imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or 
a fine or both is prescribed.  
In order to be held accountable for the offence of affray, a person must: 
…use or threaten unlawful violence towards another and his or her conduct is such 
that it will cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for 
his personal safety.139  
There must be conduct beyond the use of words, which is threatening and directed 
towards a person or persons.140 Where two or more persons use or threaten unlawful 
violence, their conduct together must be considered.141 Affray may be committed in 
private as well as in public places.142 A person is guilty of affray only if he intends to 
use or threaten violence or is aware that his conduct is violent.143 To commit affray, 
just one person is needed to threaten unlawful violence. A person found guilty of affray 
is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three 
years or a fine or both, or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.144   
                                                          
135  Public Order Act s 2(1). 
136  Public Order Act s 2(4). 
137  Summary offences are normally dealt with in the magistrate’s court and governed by Part 37 of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2010. In such proceedings there is no jury, the appointed judge decides 
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Each summary offence is specified by statute which 
describes the (usually minor) offence. see Criminal Procedure Rules 2010, Summary offences and 
the Crown Court.  
138  Public Order Act s 2(5). 
139  Public Order Act s 3(1). 
140  Public Order Act s 3(3). 
141  Public Order Act s 3(2). 
142  Public Order Act s 3(5). 
143  Public Order Act s 6(2). 
144  Public Order Act s 3(7).  
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The common law offence of assault145 in South Africa covers most of the elements in 
the offence of affray. However, affray is a public order offence created for 
circumstances of disorder. South Africa does not have any specific public order 
offences, and the common-law offence of assault is utilised in private and public 
disorder situations.  
A third specific public order offence is provocation of violence. A person may be held 
liable for this crime if he or she:  
(a) uses towards another person threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour, or (b) distributes or displays to another person any writing, sign or other 
visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, with intent to cause 
that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used against him or 
another, or to provoke the immediate use of unlawful violence by that person or 
another, or the believe that such violence will be used or is likely to be provoked.146  
An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except 
that no offence is committed while both persons are inside dwellings.147 It seems that 
domestic violence in a dwelling is not intended to fall under this offence. A person 
guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 (£5,000) on the 
standard scale or both.148 The common-law offence of assault in South Africa is wide 
enough to include threatening conduct committed in a dwelling and in domestic-
violence situations. 
A person may also be found guilty of the offence of intentional harassment, alarm or 
distress, with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, if he or she: 
(a) uses threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly 
behaviour, or (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing a person harassment, alarm or 
distress.149   
                                                          
145  According to Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 395, assault constitutes “any unlawful and intentional 
act or omission which results in another person’s bodily integrity being directly or indirectly 
impaired, or inspires a belief in another person that such impairment of her bodily integrity is 
immediately to take place”. As a common-law offence, the discretion for the sentencing of assault 
is left in the hands of the presiding officer. Generally, an assault case will proceed in the district 
court, where imprisonment of three years can be implemented.    
146  Public Order Act s 4(1). 
147  Public Order Act s 4(2). 
148  Public Order Act s 4(4). 
149  Public Order Act s 4A(1). 
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An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, however 
no offence is committed if the persons are present in dwellings.150 A person guilty of 
an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5151 on the standard scale 
or both.152 In South Africa, in similar circumstances to this crime, a victim would be 
entitled to apply for a harassment order.153 When such an order is granted by a 
magistrate and not adhered to, it constitutes an offence.154 However, the main focus 
of the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 is not public order or offences 
against the state.   
The last offence under the Public Order Act is that of harassment, alarm or distress. A 
person is guilty of an offence if he or she: 
(a) uses threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) 
displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or 
abusive, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, 
alarm or distress thereby.155   
An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except 
that no offence is committed if the parties are inside dwellings.156 A person is guilty of 
this offence only if he or she intends his or her words or behaviour, to be threatening 
or abusive, or is aware that it may be threatening or disorderly.157 A person guilty of 
an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
level 3 on the standard scale.158 Seemingly, this offence attempts to discourage 
                                                          
150  Public Order Act s 4A(2). 
151  Not exceeding £5000.    
152  Public Order Act s 4A(5). 
153  Under the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011. The Protection from Harassment Act s 1 
declares that a person is guilty of the offence if he or she is “directly or indirectly engaging in 
conduct that causes harm or inspires the reasonable belief that harm may be caused to the 
complainant by unreasonably - following, watching, pursuing or accosting of the complainant or 
loitering outside of or near the building or place where the complainant happens to be; engaging 
in verbal, electronic or any other communication aimed at the complainant; or sending, delivering 
or causing the delivery of letters, telegrams, packages, facsimiles, electronic mail or other objects 
to the complainant; or amounts to sexual harassment of the complainant”. Harm means any 
mental, psychological, physical or economic harm. There is also no requirement that persons must 
be outside a dwelling for this crime to occur. 
154  Under the Protection against Harassment Act in South Africa s 18, any person who contravenes 
any prohibition, condition, obligation or order is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a 
fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. 
155  Public Order Act s 5(1). 
156  Public Order Act s 5(2).   
157  Public Order Act s 6(4). 
158  Public Order Act s 5(6). 
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unwanted conduct by a person or group before it escalates into more serious 
behaviour.   
5.5.2  India 
In India, the criminal law is mainly contained in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code.159 Chapter VIII provides for offences against the public tranquillity.160 
These include unlawful assembly, rioting, affray, assaulting or obstructing a public 
servant when suppressing riot, provocation with the intent to cause riot, promoting 
enmity between different groups on ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, 
language, et cetera, and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony, being an 
owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held, hiring persons to join 
unlawful assemblies, and harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly. Each of 
these offences will consequently be discussed below in more detail. 
The offence of an unlawful assembly prohibits unlawful assemblies by listing the 
numerous ways it can be committed:   
An unlawful assembly consists of five or more persons, with the common object of 
the participants to overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the central 
or any state government or parliament or the legislature of any state, or any public 
servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or to resist the 
execution of any law, or of any legal process; or to commit any mischief or criminal 
trespass, or other offence; or by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, 
to any person to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person 
of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right 
of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed 
right; or by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person 
to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled 
to do.161  
More than four participants are needed to commit the offence. The criminalised 
conduct ranges from using force against the government, utilising force when 
trespassing, issues with water, or the right of way. It is an offence being a member of 
                                                          
159  Ratanlal and Dhirajlal The Indian Penal Code iii. 
160  Gour Sir Hari Singh Gour’s commentaries on the Indian Penal Code 467.  
161  Indian Penal Code s 141. See also the Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 s 63(1) where 
an unlawful assembly is defined as consisting of “three or more persons who, with common 
purpose, assemble in such a manner or conduct themselves so as to cause persons in the 
neighbourhood to fear, that they will disturb the peace tumultuously or will provoke other persons 
to disturb the peace”. Any member of such unlawful assembly is punishable on summary 
conviction. See Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 s 66(1). 
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an unlawful assembly,162 and it is punishable with imprisonment of six months, or with 
a fine, or with both.163 A lawful gathering can become unlawful. Joining or continuing 
with an unlawful gathering, knowing that the participants had been ordered to disperse, 
constitutes an offence, and is punishable with imprisonment of two years or with a fine, 
or with both.164 When a participant of an unlawful assembly fails to disperse after being 
commanded to do so, it is a punishable offence with imprisonment of six months or 
with a fine or with both.165 When a participant joins an unlawful gathering armed with 
a weapon which is likely to cause death, he or she may be punished with imprisonment 
of two years or with a fine, or with both.166 The common-law offence of public violence 
in South Africa overlaps with this offence, however, the public violence definition does 
not provide for specific conduct or circumstances.167  
In India, rioting is committed when force or violence is used during an unlawful 
assembly, or by any participant in furthering the common objects of the assembly. 
Every participant is guilty of the offence of rioting,168 and it is punishable with 
imprisonment of two years or with a fine, or with both.169 Rioting armed with a deadly 
weapon carries a punishment of imprisonment of three years or with fine, or both.170 
This offence does not provide for the interference with public peace or tranquillity, 
though the use of force or violence would usually disturb the peace of persons in the 
vicinity.  
Affray is committed when two or more persons, fighting in a public place, disturb the 
public peace.171 If found guilty, the punishment consists of imprisonment of one month, 
or with a fine of one hundred rupees, or both.172 This offence overlaps with the 
                                                          
162  Indian Penal Code s 142. Indian Penal Code 445 ‒ “Whoever, being aware of facts which render 
any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to 
be a member of an unlawful assembly.” 
163  Indian Penal Code s 143. 
164  Indian Penal Code s 143. 
165  Indian Penal Code s 151. 
166  Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code. In South Africa, the Gatherings Act s 8(4) prohibits a person 
in a gathering to have in his or her possession any type of gun or any object resembling a gun and 
is likely to be mistaken for a gun. See also s 1 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 and s 1 of 
the Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. See also footnote 25 in Chapter 3, and the discussion in 
4.4.11. 
167  Gatherings Act s 9. See para 4.4.7 above. 
168  Indian Penal Code ss 447-449. 
169  Indian Penal Code ss 447-449. 
170  Indian Penal Code ss 447-449. 
171  Indian Penal Code s 159. 
172  Indian Penal Code s 160. 
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common law offence of assault in South Africa,173 however, the Indian offence is 
specifically designed for the public order category.  
In India, the conduct when a person assaults, obstructs or threatens to assault a public 
servant while busy dispersing an unlawful gathering, or suppressing a riot or affray; or 
uses, or threatens criminal force against the public servant, is specifically criminalised. 
Contravening such offence makes one liable to be punished with imprisonment for a 
term of three years or a fine, or with both.174 In South Africa, prosecution will usually 
be instituted for similar conduct under section 67 of the SAPS Act which provides that 
nobody may interfere with a member of the police when exercising his or her duties.175 
Section 12(1)(j) of the Gatherings Act also provides for an offence if the police are 
hindered in their duties when dispersing unlawful gatherings.176  
It is furthermore illegal for any person to do anything unlawfully, malignantly or 
wantonly to provoke any person, knowing that rioting will be committed. If the rioting 
does take place, the punishment prescribed is for a term of imprisonment of one year 
or with a fine, or with both; if the offence of rioting is not committed, the prescribed 
sentence is imprisonment for a term of six months or with fine, or with both.177 A less 
severe sentence is applicable when riot was not committed. In South Africa, it is an 
offence to compel or attempt to compel any person to attend, join or participate in a 
gathering or demonstration.178   
A very specific offence in India prohibits acts which promote enmity, or disturb the 
harmony or public tranquillity, or cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity. This 
offence is defined as: 
Anyone who by words, signs, visible representations or otherwise, promotes or 
attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, 
                                                          
173  Offences created in municipal by-laws in South Africa may also cover instances where two or more 
persons disturb the peace, e.g., the Nuisance By-Law promulgated by the Govan Mbeki 
Municipality in the Provincial Gazette Extraordinary no. 2385 dated 11 November 2014 states: “No 
person shall disturb the public peace in any public place by making unseemly noises or by 
shouting, roaring, wrangling or quarrelling, or by collecting a crowd, or by fighting or challenging to 
fight, or by striking with or banishing or using in a threatening manner any stick or other weapon, 
or by any other riotous, violent or unseemly behaviour, at any time of the day or night”.  A person 
found guilty is liable to a fine of five thousand rand or imprisonment of six months. 
174  Indian Penal Code s 153. 
175  A person is liable with a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months. 
176  See discussion in para 4.4.10 above. 
177  Indian Penal Code s 153. 
178  Section 8(10) of the Gatherings Act. 
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language, caste or community or any other ground, disharmony or feelings of 
enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional 
groups or castes or communities, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the 
maintenance of harmony between groups or castes or communities, and which 
disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity - or organises any exercise, 
movement, drill or similar activity intending that the participants shall use or be 
trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the 
participants will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any 
religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such is 
likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such 
entity, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or 
with a fine, or with both. When the offence is committed in place of worship, 
imprisonment which may extend to five years and a fine will be applicable.179  
This offence is so broad that it includes the organising of training or training of 
participants of groups in criminal force or violence. In South Africa, a participant of a 
gathering or demonstration may not make use of a poster, notice board, discourse or 
singing, et cetera to incite hatred because of cultural, racial, sexual, language or 
religious differences.180  
Additionally, the owner or occupier of land where an unlawful gathering or riot takes 
place can be held accountable if he or she does not notify the police, and did not use 
all lawful means in his or her power to prevent, disperse or suppress it.181 A sentence 
of a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees is applicable.182 This offence does not 
exist in the South African context. The owner or occupier of land can obtain a court 
order prohibiting persons to trespass or gather on the property. It is furthermore the 
duty of the police to disperse participants who unlawfully gather on private land. The 
Indian offence may assist in aiding and bringing information more speedily under the 
attention of the police to assist sooner rather than later. However, to criminalise this 
failure of the owner may be met with constitutional challenges in South Africa.   
In India, it is an offence to hire persons to join an unlawful gathering.183 The hired 
person can also be prosecuted, and is liable on conviction with imprisonment for a 
                                                          
179  Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code. 
180  Section 8(5) of the Gatherings Act. Similarly, Gatherings Act s 8(6) criminalises the performance 
of any act or utterance of any words which are calculated or likely to cause or inspires violence 
against any person or group of persons. 
181  Section 156 of the Indian Penal Code. 
182  Section 156 of the Indian Penal Code. 
183  Indian Penal Code s 150.   
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period of six months or with a fine, or with both.184 This offence does not exist in the 
South African law although it is well known that people are recruited and paid to gather 
for purposes of protest action, organised crime or political or financial gain. It is alleged 
that organised groups commit offences under the pretence that they are participating 
in lawful gatherings, while their only intent are to loot shops, burglar houses, rob 
community members or dissemble money and jobs from businesses. In South Africa, 
it is possible to prosecute a person who hired others to commit public violence on 
charges of conspiracy or incitement to commit public violence.185 However, it is difficult 
to prove that a person was hired to commit public violence.186 It is also debatable if a 
person, hired to protest for some gain, can invoke the protection given to the right to 
gather under the South African Constitution.187 
The last Indian public order offence to be discussed is the harbouring, on a premises 
under his or her control, of any persons knowing that they have been hired to join an 
unlawful gathering. This offence is punishable with imprisonment of six months or with 
a fine, or with both.188 It is, therefore, an offence to support a person who is hired to 
participate in a gathering with a place to stay. This offence does not exist in South 
Africa with regard to unlawful gatherings. However, in South Africa, anybody who 
harbours or conceals a person who is about to commit or committed an offence under 
the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982, or permits such persons to meet or gather 
on a premises under his or her control, is guilty of an offence.189   
  
                                                          
184  Section 158 of the Indian Penal Code.   
185  Section 18 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. 
186  See, e.g. Umraw https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20170802/281569470808835 
(Date of use: 1 December 2020). In this article, it is reported that Lord Bell, previous head of the 
Bell Pottinger Company, was requested by the Guptas to organise protest marches in South Africa, 
and to search for and recruit persons to participate in protest action. It is however uncertain how 
the participants were recruited and paid for their duties. 
187  See Chapter 3 above. 
188  Indian Penal Code s 157.   
189  The Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 prohibits certain acts in relation to “prohibited places, 
obtaining and disclosure of certain information, acts prejudicial to security or interests of Republic 
and the obstruction of persons on guard at prohibited places.” Section 7 of the Protection of 
Information Act 84 of 1982 determines that on conviction of this offence, a person is liable to a fine 
of R1 000 or to imprisonment for 12 months or to both such fine and such imprisonment. According 
to s 12, the written authority of the DPP is needed to continue with prosecution.   
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5.6  Conclusion 
In South Africa, the offence of public violence is applicable when violence or weapons 
are part of the conduct of a gathered group. Accordingly, the right to gather peacefully 
and unarmed, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is jeopardised. It must, however, be 
taken into consideration that international and regional instruments allow for some 
measure of harassment; isolated acts of violence; annoying conduct; deeds that give 
offence or temporarily hinders, impedes, or obstructs the daily activities of members 
of the public, while still deeming the gathering peaceful. Therefore, the above-
mentioned conduct will not render a gathering as a whole not peaceful. Still, this type 
of conduct holds implications for how a police member views the happenings at a 
gathering. 
As deliberated on in paragraph 5.3, it is evident that some of the elements of the 
common-law offence of public violence lack clearness, and are accordingly open to 
having several possible interpretations. One such element requires that conduct must 
constitute ‘serious dimensions’, which implies that participants will not be arrested or 
prosecuted for minor forms of violence. However, if the conduct is not serious, the 
prosecution can proceed on other offences, for example, malicious damage to 
property or contravention of the National Road Traffic Regulations 2000. It is difficult 
to determine beforehand what conduct will actually constitute ‘serious dimensions’. 
The opinions of the police member, the member of the public, the organiser, or 
participants on the scene may differ.  
The number of persons necessary to commit this offence varies from case to case, 
and cannot be predicted in advance, since it is closely linked with the requirement that 
conduct must reach ‘serious dimensions’. The definition of public violence is 
furthermore very broad since conduct may include, for example: tribal fights, student 
protests, service delivery protests, trespassing on property, gang-related fights, 
private quarrels, destroying infrastructure, looting, organised crime, and sport-related 
violence. The ordinary layperson may struggle to establish exactly what public 
violence conduct is criminalised, or when such conduct becomes unlawful. It is further 
challenging to determine when precisely the public peace and order is disturbed, or 
the rights of others infringed, since most gatherings will annoy or hamper other citizens 
in their daily goings-on. The unrepresented participant needs to ascertain when 
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conduct will be seen as forceful, violent, or in excess by the police members on the 
scene.  
Depending on the seriousness of the conduct, factors including time, locality, duration, 
damage, injuries, or violence, the case can be heard in the district, regional or high 
court, which also implies different sentences from each type of court. The discretion 
with regard to the forum is that of the prosecution. The accused in public violence 
matters may find it difficult to access the prescribed sentence, and to foresee the 
effects. The reality is that only at the end of a trial, when the presiding officer has heard 
and considered all the evidence, it is clear whether all the requirements of the definition 
were met. The offence of public violence is, therefore, not clearly defined, and can 
possibly not legitimately be regarded as a criminal offence.  
The public violence offence is the primary offence to prosecute the violent conduct of 
a number of people in South Africa. In reality, public violence cases in court generally 
consist of a combination of charges of public violence, and other common law and 
statutory offences. Not all of these offences were created with public order in mind, 
therefore, a person accused of public violence may be caught unaware. The public 
violence offence in South Africa also does not provide for a scale of serious to less 
serious conduct with applicable sentences. It seems that it is a matter of convenience 
for the state to prosecute any violent group conduct under the public violence umbrella.    
In certain countries, such as England and India, specific offences were created to cater 
for specific problems experienced with public order. These countries have departed 
from the one-offence-fits-all-conduct-approach, and enacted specific legislation to 
cater for particular problems with reasonable sentences. In this manner, these 
countries have clustered public order offences together. The offences are clearly 
defined, and more understandable in contrast to an endeavour to prosecute all violent 
conduct under a one basket-offence. The laws are more accessible to members of the 
public, and clarify what conduct will be deemed unlawful and unacceptable. Grouping 
all offences relating to public order together has an educational purpose, and is 
important since people often utilise their right to gather.  
Public order offences must prohibit the use of violence or intimidation by individuals or 
groups, and control and curb violent gatherings. The offences, therefore, must target 
specific behaviour with correlating sentences. It may be useful for the South African 
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legislature to create offences criminalising less serious conduct which is generally part 
of unwanted behaviour at gatherings, without continuing with the common-law offence 
of public violence which is deemed serious. To prohibit specific conduct may assist 
the police to remove persons displaying threatening or disorderly behaviour from 
gatherings before it escalates in more serious conduct. A distinction between serious 
and less serious conduct, and what it entails, can assist to finalise prosecution more 
speedily, especially if alternative resolution options, for example, mediation or 
diversion, are applicable.  
It is evident that even though the common-law public violence offence may be a 
convenient tactic to prosecute a number of persons in a violent gathering, it may not 
be the most effective approach to do so. Accordingly, in the following chapter, other 




OTHER OFFENCES APPLICABLE TO THE RIGHT TO GATHER 
6.1 Introduction 
South Africa uses a blend of common law and statutory offences to curb occurrences 
of public order misbehaviour. Most of these offences were not specifically enacted to 
restrain unlawful conduct during gatherings, and have a more general application. The 
offences of sedition, offences under the Trespassing Act 6 of 1959, incitement under 
the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956, offences under the National Road Traffic 
Regulations 2000,1 and offences under the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 can be utilised 
by the prosecutor in cases relating to dissent, mass-action or protest. In the correct 
circumstances, they may also be described as public order offences.2  
It is important to establish whether these offences are still adequate to deal with violent 
conduct at gatherings. The reasons for protest action, and how the acts take place are 
ever-changing, therefore, provision must be made for new trends and developments. 
A further question required to be investigated is whether the current offences conform 
to the Constitution of South Africa. Legislation prohibiting conduct before and during 
gatherings must be reader-friendly, easily understandable, and accessible to the 
general man on the street.  
For the purpose of this chapter, reference to a gathering includes protests, strikes, 
assemblies, pickets and demonstrations. The term gathering is therefore used in a 
general context.3 Each of the above-mentioned public order offences will accordingly 
be successively investigated. 
  
                                                          
1  Published in GG 20963 dated 17 March 2000, GN R225.  
2  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law viii categorises public violence as an offence against the state and 
trespassing as an offence relating to damages to property, intimidation is categorised under 
offences against bodily integrity. Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal law xi categorise public 
violence under offences against the community interest. 
3  Under the definition of a gathering in the Gatherings Act, a gathering includes more than fifteen 
persons. 
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6.2  Sedition 
After 1990, it seems that no prosecution was instituted under the common-law offence 
of sedition in South Africa. The prosecution preferred to proceed with the common-law 
offences of public violence,4 terrorist- and related activity offences,5 or incitement to 
commit offences.6 However, in the neighbouring countries of Namibia and Lesotho, 
which previously formed part of South Africa, prosecution for sedition continued.7 
Since the offence of sedition is not presently utilised by the state in situations where 
participants gather with the intention to challenge, defy or resist the authority of the 
state, reference is made in this chapter to case law of Namibia and Lesotho.  
The crime of sedition often involves a disturbance of public peace, order and 
tranquillity, and an offender may be charged with either sedition or public violence. Yet 
sedition differs from public violence in that it is aimed at the authority of the state, 
whereas public violence is aimed at public peace and tranquillity.8 Similar to the 
offence of public violence, sedition can be committed only if a number of people (more 
than two)9 gather together, or there is a concourse of persons. Analogous to the crime 
of public violence, the gathering of the people must be accompanied by violence or 
threats of violence.10 However, the mere fact that a number of people gather together 
with the intention of committing a crime, or to break the law is not yet sufficient to 
constitute sedition – for the crime to be committed, there must be mutual conduct by 
                                                          
4  See Chapter 5 above. 
5  The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 
was enacted due to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all member 
states of the UN. The Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the 
OAU, requires member states to become party to instruments, dealing with terrorist and related 
activities. See preamble. 
6  See para 6.4 below. 
7  In S v Monyau [2005] 3 ALL SA 90 (LESCA), the appellant appealed to the Lesotho Court of Appeal 
against his conviction of sedition. The appellant attended meetings with the intention to subvert the 
state. In Mahupelo v The Minister of Safety and Security (56/2014) [2017] NAHCMD 25 (2 February 
2017), the accused were arrested by the Namibian Police based on information that they planned 
and influenced people to take up arms to secede Caprivi from Namibia; the accused were 
prosecuted on 278 charges, inter alia, sedition. See Chunga v Minister of Safety and Security 2018 
JDR 0108 (Nm).   
8  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 275; S v Twala and Others 1979 (3) SA 864 (T) 868 (hereinafter 
Twala). 
9  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 275-276. In the Twala case (para 869F), the view was expressed 
that two persons are sufficient.  
10  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 276. 
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a group of persons whereby the authority of the state is challenged.11 
Although the definition of sedition seems unclear, and its application is extensive, the 
constitutionality thereof will never properly be tested since the offence of sedition is 
currently in disuse. South Africa is not the only country where prosecution for sedition 
ceased ‒ in the United States of America, no prosecution is instituted with regard to 
the offence of seditious conspiracy.12   
The offence of sedition is intended to suppress revolutionary calls for political and 
social reform or when it is detrimental to keep the authority of the state intact,13 but 
governments can exploit this offence to silence any criticism against the government, 
leadership or political parties.  
6.2.1  Definition 
Snyman describes sedition as: 
…the unlawfully and intentionally taking part in a concourse of people, violently or 
by treats of violence challenging, defying or resisting the authority of the state of 
the Republic of South Africa, or causing a concourse.14  
Sedition is aimed against the authority of the state. Not only those who take part in the 
gathering but also those who incite, instigate or arrange the gathering, provided that it 
does take place, are guilty of the offence.15 Sedition cannot be committed by only one 
person; more than one person is required to qualify as a perpetration of the offence.16 
The state needs to prove that an unlawful meeting took place attended by different 
people challenging, defying, or resisting the authority of the state. It is irrelevant where 
it takes place online or offline, in private or in a public place. However, when a 
                                                          
11  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 276; see also S v Zwane and Others 1989 (3) SA 253 (W) para 
261E (hereinafter Zwane and Others).  
12  Seditious Conspiracy 18 US Code s 2384 states: “If two or more persons in any state or territory, 
or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or 
to destroy by force the government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose 
by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of 
the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary 
to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty 
years, or both”.   
13  Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal law 683.  
14  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 274. 
15  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. 
16  The general meaning of ‘concourse’ includes “a crowd or assembly of people”, i.e. a gathering of 
people. See Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “concourse”. 
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gathering takes place online, procuring evidence may hamper the prosecution thereof 
since the police are not always equip to obtain and link the evidence with the 
participants.17  
Certain concerns may be raised with regard to the breadth of the sedition definition, 
for example, the definition does not explain when participating is deemed unlawful.18 
The intent to defy or subvert the authority of the state can also be widely interpreted 
to include expressions of grievances and protest against the government.19 In India, 
for example, anyone who shows hatred, contempt or disaffection20 towards the 
government, commits the offence of sedition.21 However, comments expressing 
dissatisfaction with the measures, administration, or actions of the government with a 
view to obtain change by lawful means are excluded under this offence.22 This 
provision guarantees the right of a person to disapprove or protest against an 
ineffectual government.23 In South Africa, the offence of sedition lacks this integral 
reassurance that one may disapprove of the government.24 It is furthermore uncertain 
how many persons are required to constitute an unlawful gathering, since it depends 
on the circumstances and the discretion of the presiding officer after all the evidence 
is admitted.25 The question is still debated whether an unlawful gathering needs to 
include violence, threats of violence, or forcible conduct.26 As a result, the average 
man on the street will find it difficult to understand when conduct constitutes the 
offence of sedition since it is open to different interpretations.  
6.2.1.1  Violence or no violence? 
In South African law, there is disagreement whether violence is an element of sedition. 
This question was raised before the Namibian High Court in S v Malumo.27 The 
                                                          
17  The Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act 70 of 2002 and Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 are 
applicable. 
18  See para 6.2.2.2 below. 
19  Hoctor 2005 SACJ 341. 
20  Disaffection includes “disloyalty and all feelings of enmity”.   
21  Section 124A, Indian Penal Code 396-401. 
22  Indian Penal Code 400. 
23  Indian Penal Code 400. 
24  Hoctor 2005 SACJ 341. 
25  See para 6.2.2.3 below. 
26  See para 6.2.2.1 below. 
27  S v Malumo 2013 JDR 0231 (Nm) (hereinafter Malumo).  
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accused was prosecuted on charges of high treason and sedition,28 after he held 
various meetings where plans were made to overthrow the state.29 The court stated 
that contrary to Snyman’s view that violence is a necessary element of the crime of 
sedition,30 it was not required by courts as an element of the offence during the last 
years.31 The court referred to the South African court decision of S v Twala and 
Others,32 where the following elements were found to constitute sedition: 
…a gathering which is unlawful, with intent (not necessarily hostile) to defy or 
subvert the authority (majestas) of the state. As far as the element of ‘unlawfulness’ 
is concerned, the usual principles apply, namely that the performance or non-
performance of an act is unlawful if it is contrary to some legal prohibition and is 
proved by proof of the act complained of, unless, objectively seen, some 
justification or another exists. Proof of this element is usually compounded with the 
mens rea of the accused to defy or subvert or assail the authority of the 
government. As far as the element of a gathering is concerned, a gathering is the 
congregation or the coming together of a number of people and when it occurs, 
with the intent to defy, subvert or assail the authority of the government, the crime 
of sedition has been committed. To constitute a ‘gathering’ it is sufficient if an 
unspecified number of people come together with the necessary intent, and even 
two would be sufficient. Such a gathering can take place anywhere, whether in a 
public place or in a private place. What is paramount is the presence of the 
intention to defy the authority of the state. The gathering need not be accompanied 
by violent and forcible conduct and violence is certainly not an essential part of the 
seditious gathering. What is essential is that the gathering occurs with the 
necessary intent. If regard is had to the quality of the intention required, namely to 
defy or subvert or assail the authority of the state or its officials, there is no logical 
reason why violence must be regarded as a natural concomitant, or an essential 
element of a seditious gathering.33  
The court also referred to examples of nonviolent seditious gatherings which included 
the burning of pass books in the early 1950s, and workers’ strikes against labour 
legislation.34 It is, however, debatable whether these examples do not constitute a 
degree of violence or force. 
                                                          
28  Although charged with high treason and sedition, the distinction between these two crimes is 
arbitrary, especially if one considers that challenging the state’s authority can in all probability not 
be divorced from acts by which the government is coerced into a certain line of action or which 
threatens its safety – then there is no difference in this respect between the two crimes. See 
Snyman Criminal law 319. 
29  Malumo para [6]. 
30  See footnote 10 above. 
31  Malumo para [84]. 
32  Twala 864. 
33  Twala para 896H.    
34  Malumo paras [34]-[35], Twala 870-871. 
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In R v Monyau,35 the Court of Appeal in Lesotho considered whether a gathering had 
to have some element of ‘unruliness or restiveness’ to give rise to the offence of 
sedition. The appellant, a priest at the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Maseru, was 
convicted of sedition and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.36 The conviction 
stemmed from serious civil disturbances that took place in Lesotho. The appellant 
played an important role in securing the presence of army attendees, provided cell 
phones to them, and assisted with hiding men and funds.37 The court firstly referred to 
Molapo v R,38 applying the definition of sedition advanced by Milton,39 namely that 
sedition consists in the unlawful gathering of a number of people, with the intention of 
impairing the majestas of the state by defying or subverting the authority of its 
government, but without the intention of overthrowing or coercing the government. The 
court mentioned that Milton does not contend that the gathering in question must itself 
necessarily be violent, but argued for the presence of some element of violence (in the 
form of a threat or to incite violence) before persons should be punished for exercising 
their constitutional right of coming together to protest.40 The court then referred to S v 
Zwane, where it was decided that:  
Although sedition may take the form of an armed uprising or violent resistance of 
a tumultuous mob in defiance of established authority, I am of the view that a 
seditious gathering need not necessarily involve an uprising or not, or be coupled 
with clamour, uproar, violence or threats of violence. It seems to me that the weight 
of authority only requires a gathering in defiance of the authorities and for an 
unlawful purpose to constitute the crime of sedition.41 
The Zwane-decision was previously criticised by Snyman, Burchell and Milton.42 The 
court further referred to R v Endemann,43 where the court found that “to constitute the 
crime of sedition, it is not necessary that acts of violence should have been actually 
committed”.44 The Monyau court decided that the argument of the appellant that 
violence is a requirement for sedition disregards the nature of present-day society and 
                                                          
35  R v Monyau (C of A (CRI) 11/04 CRI/T/111/2002) (CRI/T/111/2002) [2005] LSHC 88 (20 April 
2005) 865-866 (hereinafter Monyau). 
36  Monyau para [1]. 
37  Monyau paras [5]-[7]. 
38  Molapo v R [1999-2000] LLR-LLB 316 320 (hereinafter Molapo). 
39  Milton South African Criminal law and procedure: Common law crimes 42. 
40  Molapo para [16]. 
41  S v Zwane 1987 (4) SA 369 (W) 374 (hereinafter Zwane). 
42  Monyau para [14]. 
43  R v Endemann 1915 TPD 142. 
44  Monyau para [15]. 
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the functioning of the state. A state may be brought to its knees by schemes which 
involve no violence or no threats of violence, for example, hacking into computer 
systems, or interference with telecommunications.45 The court deliberated that it may 
be necessary in the future to review the definition of sedition since the common law 
must comply with the Constitution of Lesotho. Certain dicta and academic writings in 
South Africa may have to be reconsidered in Lesotho to the extent that they suggest 
that “acts falling short of subversion and defiance, and which amount only to a 
challenge to authority or protest against its exercise”46 constitute sedition.   
Usually some degree of violence, or the threat of violence or force materialises as part 
of the facts of a sedition case, ruling this question irrelevant.47 Snyman is of the opinion 
that when two or three persons gather and challenge the authority of the state, but 
they stay passive and disperse peacefully, they cannot be found guilty of sedition.48 
Incitement or conspiracy to commit sedition will be a more appropriate approach. On 
the other hand, when persons gather peacefully with the intention to defy the authority 
of the state by hacking the government’s online services, the act may seem non-violent 
but it will disturb service delivery and the lives of the general public. It can be argued 
that if violence or threats of violence is not a requirement, participants of state 
capture,49 diverting massive amounts of state money and disrupting the proper 
functioning of the state by defying the state, can also be charged with sedition.  
Seditious conduct usually requires some planning, and takes place over a period of 
time. The gathering or meeting becomes unlawful when these plans are made and 
decisions are taken with the intent of impairing the majestas of the state by defying or 
subverting the authority of its government. Accordingly, the happenings or plans 
prepared at the meeting or gathering is the focus of this offence. In most instances, 
the actual conduct of impairing the majestas of the state by defying or subverting the 
authority of the state is conducted in a forceful way.   
                                                          
45  Monyau para [17]. 
46  Monyau para [19]. 
47  Force is seen as a part of violence. See para 5.2.2.3 footnote 62 above. 
48  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 276. 
49  State capture implies, inter alia, that government procedures are manipulated by parties or 
individuals to influence state policies, or the reassignment of state money to promote private 
interests to the detriment of the people of a state. 
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6.2.1.2  Defying or assailing the authority of the state 
A gathering is seditious if it intentionally defies or assails the authority of the state.50 
Sedition differs from high treason in that treason requires a hostile intent, while for 
sedition intent to resist or challenge the authority of the state is needed.51 Examples 
of sedition include, amongst others, holding people’s courts,52 attacking police 
stations, or seizing essential infrastructure belonging to the state. The participants in 
the same gathering may have the intent to defy public peace and tranquillity, and also 
to defy or assail the authority of the state. Although it is expected that the authority of 
the state should be openly resisted, challenged, or disobeyed; a person can defy the 
authority of the state in committing a seditious act by holding a seditious gathering in 
private.53 Each individual member of the gathering must know that the other 
participants or a substantial number of them have the same aim, therefore, that they 
act in concert.54 A gathering with the intention of committing an offence is not sufficient 
to constitute a seditious gathering.55  
The dividing line between levelling criticism at the government and impairing the 
authority of the government can almost be non-existent, as seen in Rudolph and 
Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Another.56 In this case, eight persons 
gathered at a bridge when the police informed them that their assembly was an 
unlawful gathering since they did not have the requisite permission. The appellants 
were given fifteen minutes to disperse, and later arrested on a charge of sedition.57 
The court decided that the appellants were involved in a peaceful protest, and there 
was nothing seditious about their conduct or utterances. It was more probable that the 
police were annoyed by their conduct or the tone of the appellants’ placards. The court 
found that in a democratic society, people need to be tolerant ‒ even of views which 
may seem unpalatable.58 The offence of sedition can, therefore, inhibit legitimate 
political action and the right to gather. Disapproval or opposing remarks of political 
                                                          
50  Zwane and Others 253. 
51  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. See also Snyman 1980 SALJ 14-24. 
52  Instead of the state’s official courts, and resulting is so-called township justice. 
53  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 276. See also Snyman 1980 SALJ 14-24. 
54  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. 
55  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 277. 
56  Rudolph and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2009 (5) SA 94 (SCA) 
(hereinafter Rudolph and Others). 
57  Rudolph and Others paras [7]-[11]. 
58  Rudolph and Others para [24]. 
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parties or groups may be seen as resistance or challenges to the authority of the state, 
and peaceful protest may be regarded as seditious.59 It is a different situation in 
Canada, for example, where everyone is presumed to have seditious intention who 
advocates, publishes, or circulates any writing supporting the use of force as a means 
of achieving governmental change.60 However, seditious intention is excluded if a 
person, in good faith, shows that Her Majesty has been misled or mistaken in her 
measures, or to point out errors or defects in the government or constitution.61 Such 
provision safeguards political dissent and protest action against the government.  
On the other hand, the question can be asked whether people participating in a 
seditious gathering may resort to violence or any other means to free themselves from 
the oppression of a government. May one resort to conduct going beyond dissent and 
protest action to lawfully defy or assail the authority of the state? This implies that 
accused will be able, when prosecuted for sedition, to claim that they were forced to 
use unlawful conduct to resist domestic oppression. Article 20 of the African Charter 
‒ which South Africa is a party of and consequently legally bound to its provisions ‒ 
postulates for a right to free oneself from or to resist oppression:  
2.  Colonised or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from 
the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognised by the 
international community. 
Article 20(2) specifies a defence when an accused on a charge of sedition is acting 
within internationally recognised lawful means. The article provides for an exceptional 
human right, i.e. to commit unlawful acts as a means to resist unlawful use or abuse 
of power.62 It is seen as a ‘self-help’ remedy, and includes a broad spectrum of illegal 
conduct (from peaceful to violent).63 It is unclear whether this right also applies in 
resisting unconstitutional, corrupt, or unresponsive governments.64  
In order to establish whether an accused may rely on this right, it must be taken into 
consideration whether the accused were denied their right to political, economic and 
democratic change, and excluded from democratic political participation; if conditions 
constituting oppression or domination can be established, when the law is oppressive, 
                                                          
59  Hoctor 2005 SACJ 341. 
60  Criminal Code RSC C-34 s 59(4). 
61  Criminal Code RSC C-34 s 60. 
62  Murphy 2011 AHRLJ 465-466. 
63  Murphy 2011 AHRLJ 469. 
64  Murphy 2011 AHRLJ 470. 
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unconstitutional, or corrupt; and whether the community have no prospect of any other 
available, effective and sufficient remedy.65 When the answer to all of above is in the 
affirmative, the accused have a justified right to resist under article 20(2) of the African 
Charter.66 The right to resist has already found its way into South African legislation. 
Section 1(4) of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and 
Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 provides that any act committed during a struggle 
waged by people, including any action during an armed struggle, in the exercise of a 
legitimate right to national liberation, self-determination and independence against 
colonialism, occupation, aggression or domination by alien or foreign forces, cannot 
be a terrorist activity.67 
6.2.1.3  Number of persons 
High treason can be committed by only one person, while sedition and public violence 
need to be committed by a number of people acting together.68 With the offence of 
sedition and public violence,69 it is uncertain what number of participants will be 
sufficient to constitute the offence. Snyman is of the opinion that more than two people 
are required since “something more sinister, menacing or threatening is needed”.70 In 
the case of Twala,71 the court found that two persons can constitute a seditious 
gathering.72 However, the mere attendance of two or more persons coming together 
or holding a meeting is not prohibited. A gathering is only seditious when it intentionally 
defies or assails the authority of the state.73 It will depend on the circumstances and 
facts of each case and the discretion of the presiding officer what number of 
participants will suffice to constitute this offence.   
  
                                                          
65  Murphy 2011 AHRLJ 470. 
66  See Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995); Jawara v The 
Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000); Gunme & Others v Cameroon (2009) AHRLR 9 
(ACHPR 2009).    
67  See discussion at para 6.2.2 below. 
68  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 275. 
69  See para 5.2.2.1 above. 
70  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 275-276. 
71  Twala 869. 
72  Twala 869. 
73  Zwane and Others 253. 
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6.2.2  The offence of sedition versus offences under the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 
The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities 
Act (Terrorist and Related Activities Act) prohibits terrorist and related activities which 
are intended to achieve political and other aims in a violent or unconstitutional manner, 
and thereby undermine democratic rights and values and the Constitution.74 The 
advantage of the offences listed under the Act is that they do not require more than 
one person acting in concert to commit the offence, as necessitated in the definition 
of sedition. One person can be held liable. The Act also provides that offences can be 
committed outside South-Africa in contrast with the common-law offence of sedition.75 
Section 2 of the Terrorist and Related Activities Act states that any person who 
intentionally and unlawfully engages in “a terrorist activity”76 is guilty of the offence of 
                                                          
74  Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act Preamble.   
75  See s 15 of the Act. 
76  See s 1 of the Act: ‘Terrorist activity’ means – “(a) any act committed in or outside the Republic, 
which - (i) involves the systematic, repeated or arbitrary use of violence by any means or method; 
(ii) involves the systematic, repeated or arbitrary release into the environment or any part of it or 
distributing or exposing the public or any part of it to - (aa) any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive 
or harmful substance or organism;  (bb) any toxic chemical; or (cc) any microbial or other biological 
agent or toxin; (iii) endangers the life, or violates the physical integrity or physical freedom of, or 
causes serious bodily injury to or the death of, any person, or any number of persons; (iv) causes 
serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public; (v) causes the 
destruction of or substantial damage to any property, natural resource, or the environmental or 
cultural heritage, whether public or private; (vi) is designed or calculated to cause serious 
interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, or the delivery of 
any such service, facility or system, whether public or private, including, but not limited to - (aa) a 
system used for, or by, an electronic system, including an information system; (bb) a 
telecommunication service or system;  (cc) a banking or financial service or financial system; (dd) 
a system used for the delivery of essential government services; (ee) a system used for, or by, an 
essential public utility or transport provider; (ff) an essential infrastructure facility; or (gg) any 
essential emergency services, such as police, medical or civil defence services;  (vii) causes any 
major economic loss or extensive destabilisation of an economic system or substantial devastation 
of the national economy of a country; or (viii) creates a serious public emergency situation or a 
general insurrection in the Republic, whether the harm contemplated in paragraphs (a) (i) to (vii) 
is or may be suffered in or outside the Republic, and whether the activity referred to in 
subparagraphs (ii) to (viii) was committed by way of any means or method; and (b) which is 
intended, or by its nature and context, can reasonably be regarded as being intended, in whole or 
in part, directly or indirectly, to - (i) threaten the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic;  (ii) 
intimidate, or to induce or cause feelings of insecurity within, the public, or a segment of the public, 
with regard to its security, including its economic security, or to induce, cause or spread feelings 
of terror, fear or panic in a civilian population; or (iii) unduly compel, intimidate, force, coerce, 
induce or cause a person, a government, the general public or a segment of the public, or a 
domestic or an international organisation or body or intergovernmental organisation or body, to do 
or to abstain or refrain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act 
in accordance with certain principles, whether the public or the person, government, body, or 
organisation or institution referred to in subparagraphs (ii) or (iii), as the case may be, is inside or 
outside the Republic; and (c) which is committed, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the 
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terrorism. The definition of what a ‘terrorist activity’ entails is extensive, since the 
lawmaker attempted to include a wide range of unlawful conduct. Section 3 of the Act 
establishes offences associated or connected with terrorist activities, while section 4 
regulates offences associated or connected with the financing of specified offences. 
Section 14 provides that any person, who threatens, attempts, conspires with any 
other person, or aids, abets, induces, incites another person to commit an offence, is 
guilty of an offence. This section is similar to section 18 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 
17 of 1956 which provides for the attempt, conspiracy and inducing another person to 
commit an offence. Conspiracy or incitement to commit sedition can be prosecuted 
under section 18 of the Riotous Assemblies Act. 
Violent gatherings, damaging infrastructure, and defying or resisting the authority of 
the state may accordingly fall into both the definitions of a terrorist activity and that of 
sedition. Terrorist activities can also be read into the definitions of high treason and 
public violence depending on the circumstances and facts of the case. The conduct 
punishable in high treason, sedition, public violence, and the Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act may overlap, and it may be difficult to distinguish between these acts. 
Although the conduct of participants during violent gatherings may meet the 
requirements for prosecution under this Act and the offence of sedition, prosecution 
usually continues under the common-law offence of public violence,77 or under section 
18 of the Riotous Assemblies Act, as stated above. The conduct under the above-
mentioned offences easily intertwines. For example, when the Sebokeng-community 
violently seized a sewer-plant in Gauteng, no worker was able to enter the plant for 
months since the community was protesting against the unavailability of jobs in the 
area.78 As a result, thousands of litres of waste streamed into the Vaal River, and the 
whole river system was polluted.79 The government needed billions to rectify the 
situation.80 The elements of the above-mentioned offences can be read into these 
                                                          
purpose of the advancement of an individual or collective political, religious, ideological or 
philosophical motive, objective, cause or undertaking.  
77  See Chapter 5 above. 
78  Tempelhoff https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20180927/28155229178 6492 (Date 
of use: 2 November 2020); Tempelhoff https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/2018 
0928/28148786727 9344 (Date of use: 2 November 2020). 
79  Tempelhoff https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20180927/28155229178 6492 (Date 
of use: 2 November 2020); Tempelhoff https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/2018 
0928/28148786727 9344 (Date of use: 2 November 2020). 
80  The South African Defence Force was deployed to guard the sewer-plant. The possibility exists 
that sewer-plants will be declared as national key points in terms of the National Key Point Act 102 
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facts.  
Section 1(3) was included into the Terrorist and Related Activities Act in order to 
provide for the purposes of paragraph (a)(vi) and (vii) of the definition of terrorist 
activity, which states that:  
…any act which is committed in pursuance of any advocacy, protest, dissent or 
industrial action and which does not intend the harm contemplated in paragraph 
(a) (i) to (v) of that definition, shall not be regarded as a terrorist activity within the 
meaning of that definition.81 
Section 1(4) of the Terrorist and Related Activities Act again stipulates:  
Notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law, any act committed 
during a struggle waged by peoples, including any action during an armed struggle, 
in the exercise or furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, self-
determination and independence against colonialism, or occupation or aggression 
or domination by alien or foreign forces, … shall not … be considered as a terrorist 
activity.82 
It is clear that the government attempted to exclude all types of protest action or any 
disapproving or opposing conduct of political parties or groups from being criminalised 
as a terrorist activity by including section 1(3) and 1(4) in the Act.83 However, service 
delivery protest action can be aimed to damage property and infrastructure, causing 
the destruction of natural resources or serious interference with essential services, 
while challenging the authority of the state. Harm is intended by the participants since 
it is their only means of assuring that the government pays attention to their 
grievances.84 Section 1(3) and 1(4) are therefore not very helpful, and participants are 
still at risk of being prosecuted under the Act. Cachalia85 criticises the vague and over-
broad definition of what terrorist activities constitutes, and the government’s attempt 
to exclude the acts of ‘freedom fighters’ from the ambit of the offence of terrorism.86 
The author is of the opinion that violence is not a requirement for a guilty-finding under 
the Act, since serious interference with essential services or causing major economic 
                                                          
of 1980. See Tempelhoff https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20181214/2815 
30817115056 (Date of use: 2 November 2020). 
81  Terrorist and Related Activities Act s 1(3)(a)(vi), (vii). 
82  Terrorist and Related Activities Act s 1(4). 
83  In S v Okah 2018 SACR 492 (CC) paras [46]-[47], the court held that an evidentiary basis for 
reliance on the exemption must be placed before the court.  
84  See para 5.4.2 above. 
85  Cachalia 2010 SAJHR 511.   
86  Cachalia 2010 SAJHR 511. See Lumina 2007 AHRLJ 35.   
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losses may not involve violent acts.87 It is similar to the existing view that violence or 
threats of violence is not a requirement for a conviction on a charge of sedition in South 
Africa.88  
With regard to the sentences prescribed for these offences, sedition seems not to be 
deemed as serious as the terrorist- and related activities offences. Section 51 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 105 of 1997 (as amended) provides for discretionary minimum 
sentences for certain serious offences as contained in Schedule 2, Part I. When a 
person is convicted of any of the offences listed therein, he or she must be sentenced 
to life imprisonment. Part I does not provide for high treason or sedition, but does refer 
to offences in the Terrorist and Related Activities Act, in circumstances when it is 
proved that the offence has endangered the life, or caused serious bodily injury or the 
death of any person or group of persons, or caused serious risk to the health or safety 
of the public, or created a serious public emergency situation. In other circumstances, 
a first offender must be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not less than fifteen 
years; a second offender to imprisonment for a period of not less than 20 years, and 
a third or subsequent offender to imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years.89 
High treason and sedition falls under Part IV of Schedule 2, and provides for a 
sentence in the case of a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than five 
years, a second offender to imprisonment for a period not less than seven years, and 
a third or subsequent offender to imprisonment for a period not less than ten years.90  
Although certain sections of the Terrorist and Related Activities Act, which overlap with 
the offence of sedition, safeguard acts which are committed in pursuance of protest, 
dissent or industrial action,91 some seditious conduct during protest action still qualifies 
for prosecution under the Act.  
  
                                                          
87  Cachalia 2010 SAJHR 512. 
88  See para 6.2.2.1 above. 
89  Criminal Procedure Act s 51(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii). 
90  Criminal Procedure Act s 51(2)(c)(i), (ii), (iii). 
91  Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act ss 1(3), 1(4). 
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6.3  Trespassing 
In South Africa, there are different acts which govern eviction and occupation.92 The 
Trespass Act 6 of 1959 prohibits unlawful entry or presence upon land and buildings. 
The Trespass Act covers trespassing in general on occupied and unoccupied land, or 
in buildings or parts of buildings. This Act focuses on trespassers who gather on land 
or in buildings before they are deemed to be unlawful occupiers. Currently, the Act is 
utilised as an important tool to combat violent protest action, land invasion93 of state 
or private property, and to restore public order. Occupiers moving back into buildings 
after an eviction order was granted, illegal mining by Zama-Zama’s,94 and when 
perpetrators enter land or buildings to commit offences, are further examples of cases 
under the Trespass Act.  
The Act does not differentiate between the motives why persons are trespassing. 
Communities or landless people often venture onto land belonging to municipalities, 
demanding space to build houses, to start building structures, or to show 
dissatisfaction with service delivery. Trespassing on land by communities can be 
politically motivated. From time to time, ruthless fraudsters instigate an invasion of 
land when they take advantage of the poor by selling stands on state property for small 
sums of money.  
The English and Indian governments have created specific offences for the diverse 
problems experienced with trespassing. The aim of the legislation is to disperse 
crowds effectively; however, it must still be coupled with proper police training to make 
correct decisions. The question is therefore investigated whether it will be fruitful to 
create similar offences in the South African context. Although the police in South Africa 
                                                          
92  See the Extension of Security Tenure Act 62 of 1997; the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 
1996; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 and 
the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999.  
93  Definitions for land invasion and land grabbing in the South African context are not available. Both 
terms are used in the media and sometimes have the same meaning. ‘Land invasion’ includes 
“both state and privately-owned land unlawfully entered by people (who is destitute or do it purely 
for financial gain)”. ‘Land grab’ is seen as more sinister. It is a “very large-scale land acquisition by 
means of nationalisation; it could involve abuses, force or violence.” See South African 
Government https://www.gov.za/services/place-live/how-respond-land-invasion (Date of use:  22 
November 2020). 
94  This is a term referring to illegal miners on mine property where mining has been discontinued. 
Zama-Zama’s are usually illegal in South Africa, and originate from Lesotho, Mozambique or 
Zimbabwe. When illegal miners need to be removed from mine property, the mine environment 
causes a serious security risk to mine personnel and the police. 
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receive some guidance from the Gatherings Act (which does not clearly state that it is 
applicable to trespassing scenarios) and the Police National Instructions, it is argued 
that incorporating police powers in the Trespass Act will assist the police to diffuse 
situations expediently.  
6.3.1  Definition 
Section 1 of the Trespass Act prohibits the entry or presence upon land or buildings in 
certain circumstances: 
(1) Any person who without the permission - (a) of the lawful occupier of any land 
or any building or part of a building; or (b) of the owner95 or person in charge of any 
land or any building or part of a building that is not lawfully occupied by any person, 
enters or is upon such land or enters or is in such building or part of a building, 
shall be guilty of an offence unless he has lawful reason to enter or be upon such 
land or enter or be in such building or part of a building.96 
A person needs to be personally present on land or in a building or part of a building.97 
A person can be lawfully present in certain parts of a building but may have been 
denied access to other parts of the same building. Possible defences for trespassing 
on property include consent, a lawful reason, or necessity.98 
The Trespass Act distinguishes between occupied and unoccupied land. Unoccupied 
land is, for example, land belonging to mines or companies. Section 1 determines that 
the permission of the lawful occupier, the owner, or the person in charge of land or a 
building or part of the building needs to be obtained. The lawful occupier’s permission 
is required when land or a building or part thereof is occupied while the owner or 
person in charge of land or a building or part of a building that is unoccupied, must be 
obtained. The Trespass Act does not define a trespasser or occupier, but the Act is 
applicable to any persons present on land or in buildings without permission. Although 
the entering and being on land or in a building may take place with consent, when the 
permission is withdrawn, and the person fails to leave, he or she is deemed to be a 
trespasser. The Trespass Act is only applicable to trespassers who are not lawful or 
unlawful occupiers. It is, therefore, vital to establish if the trespasser is an occupier 
                                                          
95  In terms of s 1(2) of the Trespass Act, a ‘lawful occupier’ in relation to a building or part of a building 
does not include a servant of the lawful occupier of the land on which that building is situated. 
96  Trespass Act s 1. 
97  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 488. 
98  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 488-489. 
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before the Trespass Act can be applied. Different Acts in South Africa govern the 
position of trespassers, lawful occupiers or unlawful occupiers, which will subsequently 
be elaborated on.  
6.3.1.1  The trespasser, lawful occupier and unlawful occupier  
A lawful occupier, who is entitled to be on land in terms of the Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act 62 of 1997, has a lawful reason to enter, and be upon such land. The 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act’s main function is to protect occupiers against 
unfair eviction. To ‘evict’ in this context means to: 
…deprive a person against his or her will of residence on land, the use of land and 
access to water which is linked to the right of residence.99  
An ‘occupier’ is described as a person:  
…residing on land which belongs to another person and who has on 4 February 
1997 or thereafter consent or another right in law to do so, but it excludes labour 
tenants or a person who use the land for industrial, mining, commercial purposes, 
or who earns more than R5000-00 on a monthly basis.100  
The permission to be present on land can be expressed or implied. A lawful occupier, 
when his or her occupation is terminated, cannot be prosecuted under the Trespass 
Act. The rights of an unlawful occupier are protected by the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (Illegal Eviction Act). 
This Act regulates the eviction of unlawful occupiers from land in a fair manner, while 
recognising the right of owners to apply for an eviction order at a court.101 As such, in 
terms of the Illegal Eviction Act, an unlawful occupier who is already staying or 
occupying land in a building or structure102 may only be removed with a court order. It 
constitutes an offence to evict an unlawful occupier without a court order.103 Therefore, 
the police may not arrest an unlawful occupier under the Trespass Act.  
                                                          
99  Extension of Security of Tenure Act Preamble, s 1. See also the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (Illegal Eviction Act) s 1 which defines the verb 
‘evict’ as: “to deprive a person of occupation of a building or structure, or the land on which such 
building or structure is erected, against his or her will”. 
100  Extension of Security of Tenure Act s 1. See the Illegal Eviction Act s 1 which delineates an 
‘unlawful occupier’ as “a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the 
owner or person in charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land, excluding a person 
who is an occupier in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act”. 
101  Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act Preamble. 
102  The Illegal Eviction Act s 1 states that a ‘building or structure’ includes “any hut, shack, tent or 
similar structure or any other form of temporary or permanent dwelling or shelter”. 
103  The Illegal Eviction Act s 8. On conviction, a person is liable to a fine, or to imprisonment not 
exceeding two years, or to both such fine and such imprisonment.  
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Under the Trespass Act, a trespasser can be seen as somebody who is not a lawful 
or unlawful occupier of land or the building he or she is found on. The Trespass Act is 
not applicable if persons lawfully or unlawfully occupy land or buildings. Trespassing 
implies something temporary, before any structures are erected. The trespasser must 
know or foresee that he or she is entering the property of somebody else, and that he 
or she does not have permission to be there. The Trespass Act differs from other Acts 
in that a court that convicts a person under the Trespass Act, may “order the summary 
ejectment of that person from the building or land”.104 
This difference between a trespasser, occupier and unlawful occupier was discussed 
in Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others.105 Prosecution against the applicant was instituted on three 
charges of incitement to trespass in contravention of section 1(1) of the Trespass Act. 
The applicant argued that when land is occupied by landless people, it falls outside 
the mandate of the Trespass Act,106 since it must be read “subject to post Constitution 
eviction laws, including the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act and Extension of Security of Tenure Act”.107 The court was of the opinion 
that the relief sought by the applicant was a declaration that the Trespass Act is 
inconsistent with the Illegal Eviction Act and Extension of Security of Tenure Act when 
read in light of the section 39(2) of the Constitution.108 In short, the applicant argued 
that the Trespass Act is unconstitutional or not applicable to land invasion, therefore, 
no offence was committed by the appellant. However, the court found that the Acts 
can exist together and complement each other.109 In Economic Freedom Fighters and 
                                                          
104  Trespass Act s 2(2). 
105  Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others 2019 (2) SACR 297 (GP) (hereinafter Economic Freedom Fighters 2019). 
106  Economic Freedom Fighters 2019 para [62]. 
107  Economic Freedom Fighters 2019 para [63]. 
108  Constitution s 39(2): “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights.” See para 2.2. above. 
109  Economic Freedom Fighters paras [74]-[75]. See para [77]: “In the Zwane-case (Zwane v S and 
Another GP A 635/2016 (unreported judgment)), the appellant was convicted under section 1(1) 
of the Trespass Act after unlawfully entering a property that she had been lawfully evicted from 
under PIE. It would entirely defeat the purpose of Trespass Act and Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act if, following a lawful eviction, the appellant was allowed 
to re-enter the property and remain in unlawful occupation in perpetuity. Section 1(1) of the 
Trespass clearly applied as the appellant had re-entered and re-occupied the property without the 
permission of the complainant in order to thwart the eviction order.”   
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Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another,110 the applicants 
contended that a proper interpretation of the Trespass Act in conjunction with the 
Illegal Eviction Act yield a meaning that effectively renders it impermissible to institute 
criminal charges, and a possible conviction flowing from an alleged violation of section 
1(1) of the Trespass Act.111 Nonetheless, the prayer for an order declaring that the 
Trespass Act does not apply to unlawful occupiers under the Illegal Evictions Act was 
refused.112  
It would assist future cases in similar contexts as the afore-mentioned greatly if the 
difference between a trespasser, lawful occupier and unlawful occupier, and the 
purpose and reasons why different Acts are considered necessary to govern these 
situations, would be simplified. These terms create confusion, are difficult to 
understand and interpret ‒ not only to the unrepresented accused, owner, lawful 
occupier and members of the public ‒ but also to the police members who need to 
assist on the scenes.  
6.3.2.2  Permission to enter in the Trespass and supplementary Acts 
Section 1(1) of the Trespass Act indicates that a person requires permission to enter 
on land, or in a building, or in part of a building. The owner, the lawful occupier, or the 
person in charge may permit somebody to enter land, a building or part of a building; 
however, the permission may be revoked. The Trespass Act provides that a lawful 
occupier’s servant cannot permit anybody to enter or be on land or in the building or 
part of a building.113 Therefore, a servant cannot revoke permission previously given 
by the lawful occupier. It is suggested that the reference to ‘servant’ in this Act is 
outdated, and must be replace with the term ‘employee’. It is important to identify the 
owner, lawful occupier or person in charge, since this person’s statement is required 
before any prosecution can be instituted.114  
There are other Acts also prohibiting access to certain places that may supplement 
the Trespass Act. Access to gather can be denied to groups and participants at these 
                                                          
110  Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and 
Another [2020] ZACC 25 (hereinafter Economic Freedom Fighters 2020). 
111  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [73]. 
112  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 2. 
113  Trespass Act s 1(2). 
114  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 488. 
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specific places. The Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act 53 of 1985 
provides for the safeguarding of certain public premises, vehicles and people. It is 
applicable to certain airports in South Africa.115 The owner116 of any public premises117 
or public vehicle118 may take steps considered necessary for the safeguarding of the 
premises or vehicle, and for the protection of people. He or she can direct that the 
premises or the vehicle may only be entered with the permission of an authorised 
officer.119 For the purpose of granting permission, an authorised officer may require 
the person to furnish his or her name, address, and any other relevant information.120 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Trespass Act, an authorised officer may 
remove any person from any public premises or public vehicle if that person enters 
without permission or fails to observe a condition.121 The sentence prescribed is similar 
to that under the Trespass Act.122  
The National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 regulates security at national key points. If it 
appears to the Minister, in terms of the National Key Points Act, that a place or area 
is important, and that its “loss, damage, disruption or immobilisation may prejudice the 
Republic or is necessary or expedient for the safety of the Republic or in the public 
interest,”123 he or she may declare that place or area a national key point.124 The Act 
places a duty on the owner of the national key point to take steps to safeguard the 
area to the satisfaction of the Minister,125which includes that permission needs to be 
obtained before accessing the place or area. A person who obstructs the owner in 
taking any steps required to effectively securing the key point, is on conviction liable 
to a fine not exceeding R10 000, or to imprisonment for three years, or to both such 
fine and imprisonment.126 Trespassers found on the key point will be prosecuted under 
                                                          
115  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 2. 
116  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 1 defines an ‘owner of any public premises 
or any public vehicle’ to mean “the head of the department of State, division, office or other body 
which occupies or uses those premises or that vehicle or is in charge thereof, as the case may be”. 
117  See Chapter 3 footnote 235 for the definition of ‘public premises’. 
118  See Chapter 3 footnote 235 for the definition of ‘public vehicle’.  
119  According to the Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 1, an ‘authorised officer’ 
constitutes “any person authorised by the owner of any public premises or any public vehicle to 
act in terms of the provisions of section 2”.   
120  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 2(2)(a). 
121  Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act s 2(3)(b). 
122  The Trespass Act s 4 states that a person is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R2000, or 
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or to both the fine and imprisonment. 
123  National Key Points Act s 2. 
124  National Key Points Act s 2. 
125  National Key Points Act s 3. 
126  National Key Points Act s 10. 
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the National Key Point Act. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 8 of 2019 was 
ascended to with the aim to repeal the National Key Points Act.127 The new Act was 
regarded as necessary to provide for measures to be put in place for the protection, 
preservation and durability of critical infrastructure. This Act may play a role in 
protecting buildings, installations, pipelines, premises, systems, transport networks or 
networks for the delivery of electricity or water,128 from being damaged or destroyed 
during protest action. 
The Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act 2 of 2010 focuses on the welfare of 
persons and property at public events. These events may include, amongst others, 
sporting, entertainment, recreational, religious, cultural or similar activities hosted at a 
stadium, venue or along a route, for which spectators are paying.129 Section 44(1)(s) 
of the Act prohibits the entry into:  
…a designated area or traffic free zone inside a stadium, venue or route or its 
respective precincts, without the prior written authorisation of a controlling body, 
event organiser or stadium or venue owner.  
Upon convicted of contravening this Act, a person is liable to a fine or imprisonment 
for five years, or to both a fine and imprisonment.130  
6.3.2  Facilitation of trespassers 
The Trespass Act in South Africa provides for one general offence to prosecute 
persons trespassing. The Act does not include the duties or the powers of the police. 
Yet, problems are experienced with trespassing occur daily in South Africa, as 
mirrored by the facts in Ego Gardens Pty Ltd and Others v Minister of Police and 
Others.131 In this case, the applicants (companies or close corporations) sought to 
protect unfenced property on undeveloped land. A large crowd of more than 1000 
persons gathered on the property and registered for spaces to build, while a small 
                                                          
127  Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 8 of 2019, assented to 20 November 2019, date of 
commencement needs to be proclaimed. 
128  Critical Infrastructure Protection Act s 1. Basically, the government will be able to declare sewer-
plants as critical infrastructure. 
129  See Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act s 1. 
130  Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act s 44(2). 
131  Ego Gardens Pty Ltd and Others v Minister of Police and Others Case no 19186/2018, Gauteng 
Division High Court, Pretoria (unreported) (hereinafter Ego Gardens). Also see Otto 
https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20180405/281629600835467 (Date of use: 2 
November 2020). 
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group of persons were demarcating stand size portions.132 The applicants were 
informed that the land was being expropriated without compensation and distributed 
to individuals.133 The applicants approached the local police station for assistance to 
remove the trespassers. The police were unresponsive, and refused to attend to the 
complaint and to stop the trespassers, or to open a docket. The reason for this refusal 
was that the names of the trespassers were not provided to them.134 The applicants 
were of opinion that the police failed to act in accordance with the National Police 
Instruction 7 of 2017. Part of the relief the applicants sought were the names and 
contact numbers of designated police officers at the public order policing unit or local 
police station to be contacted in situations of public violence or trespassing. The police 
submitted that the public order policing unit was not locally available, that no local 
member was tasked with these matters, and that any assistance to the public will 
depend on the available resources of the local police.135 The police’s supposition was 
that since the applicants could not identify the trespassers, they could not be assisted 
or the participants arrested.  
The National Police Instruction 7 of 2017 provides for directives on unlawful 
occupation136 of land and evictions. The instruction places a duty on land owners and 
occupiers to report incidents of land invasions and illegal evictions to their nearest 
police stations.137 When laying a complaint, the complainants must submit an affidavit 
with the following information: (i) whether the complainant is the owner, lawful occupier 
or person in charge of the property; (ii) particulars of the suspect(s) who entered the 
property; (iii) whether the owner, lawful occupier or person in charge gave permission 
to the suspect(s) to enter the property; and (iv) whether the suspect(s) have any lawful 
reason for entering the property.138 When a building or structure has been erected on 
land and it is inhabited, the person is considered to reside on such land.139 It is a 
factual question how long the person was residing or staying on the terrain. If the 
suspects have been residing on the property, the owner must be advised that the 
                                                          
132  Ego Gardens para [3]. 
133  Ego Gardens para [4]. 
134  Ego Gardens para [4]. 
135  Ego Gardens para [8]. 
136  According to the National Police Instruction 4, an ‘unlawful occupier’ is “a person who occupies 
and resides on land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge”. 
137  Ego Gardens para [2]. 
138  National Police Instruction 7. 
139  National Police Instruction 7. 
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trespassers should be evicted by means of a court order.140 However, a person who 
is still in the process of erecting a building or structure and not inhabiting the building 
or structure is not residing, and is still seen as a trespasser.141 Trespassers must be 
arrested as soon as possible after a complaint of trespassing was lodged, and must 
be brought before a court.142 If persons are found on the land or premises that are in 
the process of erecting buildings or structures for habitation or threatening to erect 
such buildings or structures, the police member at the scene must inform them that 
they are trespassing, and that they will be arrested if they do not leave the land or 
premises immediately.143 If the trespassers refuse to leave the land or premises, they 
must be arrested in order to stop them from continuing to commit the offence of 
trespassing.144 If information exists under oath that persons are conspiring to invade 
land, the persons can be arrested in terms of section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous 
Assemblies Act.145     
Although the National Police Instruction 7 of 2017 guides police members as to 
possible unlawful occupation, owners or lawful occupiers encounter problems in that 
most instances of trespassing constitutes a danger of unlawful occupation. Owners 
are particularly powerless when crowds trespass on their property. They cannot 
remove these masses with force, and need the police to assist them. The availability 
of resources at local police station hampers the arrest or removal of these participants. 
Owners are furthermore usually caught off guard by trespassers; therefore, in most 
instances, they will not know the identities of the trespassers. Additionally, it will be 
impossible to identify each participant if hordes of people move onto land. Owners or 
lawful occupiers will not be able to submit the identities of the suspects in an affidavit 
to the local police station.  
Frequently, the boundaries between land belonging to the state, municipalities, 
businesses or private owners are blurred, preventing the police to react. The police 
must hence receive the necessary support to be able to establish ownership of land. 
A further dilemma exists when the trespassers cannot be served with civil court 
                                                          
140  National Police Instruction 7. 
141  National Police Instruction 5. 
142  National Police Instruction 7. 
143  National Police Instruction 11. 
144  National Police Instruction 11. 
145  National Police Instruction 10-11. 
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documents because the participants are not discernible. Participants of such 
gatherings may vary from day to day, or from hour to hour. The owner may obtain an 
interdict to prevent identified persons or groups from trespassing on land, yet, the 
following day or a few hours later, other persons could be trespassing. It is problematic 
to prove that there is a connection between the persons mentioned in the court order 
and the new trespassers, or that the new trespassers were informed of the existence 
of the court order.  
When trespassers commence to occupy land, a slow and costly court process is 
necessary for eviction. It is, therefore, important that the police are able and well-
informed to act properly in all circumstances. It seems that the police on local level do 
not possess the knowledge or resources to facilitate trespassers. When the public 
order policing unit arrives much later, trespassers may already be deemed occupiers. 
In practice, the police will not remove unlawful occupants, and eviction must first 
proceed in terms of the Illegal Eviction Act. A sheriff must carry out an order for 
eviction, demolition or removal.  
Unlawful occupiers may furthermore move back into the building or land after being 
evicted, but the police may lack the knowledge that these persons are now deemed to 
be trespassers, and can be arrest for trespassing.146 When gatherings on another’s 
land are peaceful, the police usually allow the gatherings to continue, however, 
depending on the circumstances, they may also be dispersed.147 However, 
trespassers and owners may be uncertain what is to be expected from the police. 
Section 9 of the Gatherings Act provides, inter alia, that a member of the police may 
call upon the persons participating in the gathering to disperse, by obtaining their 
attention and in a loud voice order the participants to disperse within a time 
specified.148 If they do not adhere to the order, the police may arrest them. Typical 
                                                          
146  In Zwane v S and Others the court dealt with a constitutional challenge to s 2(2) of the Trespass 
Act. The argument was that it allowed for “eviction by the back door”. The court found that there is 
no merit in this submission. The section merely confers discretion to a court that it may make an 
order for summary ejectment. See Economic Freedom Fighters 2019 paras 78-79. 
147  See Chapter 5 above. 
148  Gatherings Act s 9(1)(f). According to the National Instructions 4 of 2014 para 14 – “the warning 
must be audible and must include the action that will be taken against them, and is applicable 
should defensive measures fail. The warning should, if the circumstances permit, include an 
explanation of the steps that are going to be taken to disperse the crowd and should give the 
participants enough time to disperse peacefully; yet, the time should not be so long that it gives 
the participants the impression that the police are not serious. In cases of violence immediate 
action may be required. A second warning must be given in at least two official languages and if 
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defences of trespassers are that they did not realise it was private or municipal land; 
that the land was not fenced; there were no warning signs erected; the land was used 
by the community as a walk-through or playground for children; they were just walking 
past; intimidated to participate; or that the stands were sold to them.  
The facilitation of trespassers by the police represents a major problem in South Africa, 
as evidenced by the criticism evoked from Legodi JP for the unsatisfactory manner in 
which the Mpumalanga police handled trespassers, which is against their 
constitutional obligation: 
…to prevent, combat, investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure 
the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, uphold and enforce the law.149  
The High Courts have received numerous applications for orders restricting groups 
and participants to commit acts of protest, trespassing or public disorder. In Impangele 
Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Another v All Truck Drivers’ Foundation (ATDF) and Others150 
and Mbali (Pty) Ltd v Ntuthuko Buthelezi and Others,151 relief was granted against the 
respondents from unlawfully damaging, obstructing, interfering or trespassing in and 
on the businesses of the applicants.152 The court mentioned that: 
…it is not the responsibility of the courts to prevent, combat or investigate crimes. 
Neither is it the function of the courts to maintain public order.153  
The court was concerned with the question whether the training offered to the police 
is sufficient, or if the police are merely neglecting their duties. The court held that there 
is no justification to let people take the law into their own hands simply because there 
are deficient police resources.154  
It therefore seems that the Trespass Act is not adequate to deal with the current 
circumstances surrounding trespassing. A member of the public will find it challenging 
to access the Gatherings Act or the National Police Instructions in order to establish 
                                                          
possible also in the language that is most commonly spoken in that area before the 
commencement of the offensive measures, giving innocent bystanders the opportunity to leave the 
area. In cases where violence has already started the time frame should be shortened 
immediately”.   
149  See s 205(3) of the Constitution. 
150  Impangele Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Another v All Truck Drivers’ Foundation (ATDF) and Others 
(3647/2019) [2019] ZAMPMHC 11; 2020 (1) SACR 536 (hereinafter Impangele Logistics). 
151  Mbali (Pty) Ltd v Ntuthuko Buthelezi and Others Case no 3564/2019, Mpumalanga High Court 
Division. 
152  Impangele Logistics paras [9]-[10]. 
153  Impangele Logistics para [17]. 
154  Impangele Logistics para [29]. 
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what the duties or powers of the police entail. In England, for example, offences were 
created for different unique problems, and legislation provides for the duties or powers 
of the police in different situations. The police play a leading role to diffuse situations 
of public disturbance and trespassing. Similar legislation in South Africa can equip the 
police to take correct and firm steps to solve and diffuse, specifically, land invasion 
matters.  
6.3.4  Trespassing in England and in India 
As afore-mentioned in paragraph 6.3 above, the jurisdictions of England and India may 
assist South Africa in improving their legislation on trespassing. These foreign laws 
will subsequently be discussed. 
6.3.4.1  England 
In England, legislation provides for offences covering different scenarios which cause 
problems in their own context, while in South Africa, the Trespass Act has to deal with 
all forms of trespassing conduct.155 The English legislation centres on the police to 
firstly diffuse volatile situations, and then if the participants do not adhere to the police’s 
instructions, to proceed with arrest. Provision is made for the steps to be taken by the 
police, and in most instances it is required that a senior police official takes the 
decisions.  
6.3.4.1.1  Power to remove trespassers on land 
If a senior police officer reasonably believes that two or more persons are 
trespassing156 on land with the common purpose of residing on the land, and that 
reasonable steps have been taken by the occupier157 to request them to leave, and 
the trespassers caused damage to the land, or used threatening or insulting words or 
behaviour towards the occupier or have six or more vehicles between them, he can 
                                                          
155  See Glazebrook Blackstone’s statutes on Criminal law 211-214.   
156  In terms of s 61(7)(a) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, references to trespassing 
or trespassers were “references to acts and persons doing acts which constitute either a trespass 
as against the occupier or an infringement of the commoners’ rights”. 
157  In terms of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 61(7)(b), references to the occupier included 
“the commoners or any of them or, in the case of common land to which the public has access, 
the local authority as well as any commoner”.  
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order them to leave the land and to remove any vehicles158 or property.159 It constitutes 
an offence if a person, knowing that the police gave this order, fails to leave the land 
as soon as reasonable. Trespassers are given an opportunity to rectify their conduct 
before criminal steps are applicable. When a trespasser adheres to the order but after 
having left, again enters the land as a trespasser within the period of three months, he 
or she also commits the offence. A person is liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding (£2,500) on the 
standard scale, or both.160  
It is interesting to note that the occupier needs to take reasonable steps to ask 
trespassers to leave. This section also provides for a period of three months during 
which the trespasser may not enter the specific land again. A similar provision can be 
fruitfully applied in land invasion or illegal mining situations in South Africa. However, 
it will necessitate that the police keep proper record of persons who entered land, and 
were ordered to vacate the land. Trespassers should also be given an opportunity to 
rectify their conduct before criminal steps are applicable. 
6.3.4.1.2  Powers to remove persons attending or preparing for a rave 
The case of R v Carling161 is an example of the security risk and damage that can be 
caused by a rave.162 In this case, numbers of participants gathered in the woods, 
abandoned their vehicles, and blocked driveways. The crowd attacked the police and 
the site was left in a state of mess with broken glass, litter and human excrement, 
costing £4,000 to clean up. The police operation lasted three days.  
                                                          
158  ‘Vehicle’ includes – “(a) any vehicle, whether or not it is in a fit state for use on roads, and includes 
any chassis or body, with or without wheels, appearing to have formed part of such a vehicle, and 
any load carried by, and anything attached to, such a vehicle; and (b) a caravan as defined in 
section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960”. See Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act s 61(9).  
159  Section 61(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Part V Public Order: Collective 
Trespass or Nuisance on land, Powers to remove trespassers on land. 
160  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 61(4). Section 61(6) determines that “it is a defence for the 
accused to show that he was not trespassing on the land, or that he had a reasonable excuse for 
failing to leave the land as soon as reasonably practicable or, as the case may be, for again 
entering the land as a trespasser”.  
161  R v Carling [2016] EWCA Crim B1.   
162  According to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 63(1), a ‘rave’ constitutes “a gathering on 
land in the open air of 100 or more persons (whether or not trespassers) at which amplified music 
is played during the night (with or without intermissions) and is such as, by reason of its loudness 
and duration and the time at which it is played, is likely to cause serious distress to the inhabitants 
of the locality”. 
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The police’s powers under the Act not only include removing persons attending a rave 
but also persons preparing for a rave. A police officer of the rank of superintendent, 
who reasonably believes that two or more persons are preparing to hold a rave, or ten 
or more persons are waiting for the rave to start, or when ten or more persons are 
attending the rave, can order the participants to leave the land, and remove their 
vehicles and property.163 A person knowing that an order has been given, and who 
fails to leave the land as soon as reasonable, or having left, and trespass on the land 
again within seven days, commits an offence, and is liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding (£2,500) on the 
standard scale, or both.164 It is also an offence, if a person knowing that such an order 
was given, prepares or attends such a gathering within 24 hours after the order was 
given.165 A constable can enter the land if the participants failed to adhere to the order, 
to seize and remove vehicles or sound equipment.166 A constable, can if he or she 
reasonably believes that a person is on his or her way to a rave in relation to which an 
order is applicable, stop the person, and direct him or her not to proceed in the 
direction of the gathering.167 This power may only be applied within five miles of the 
location of the rave. If a person does not adhere to this instruction, he or she commits 
an offence, and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding (£1,000) on 
the standard scale.168  
A similar offence providing for raves do not exist in South Africa. However, comparable 
legislation can contribute especially in situations where persons invade land belonging 
to local authorities or private owners. Gathering’ participants are frequently transported 
with minibuses and buses, the costs funded by councillors or influential businessmen, 
who gain politically or financially. Legislation in South Africa providing that the police 
may direct or stop potential trespassers not to proceed further can contribute to 
minimising the impact of facilitating and moving large crowds. To attach an ambit from 
the location of the gathering not to proceed further, can assist to manage risks. A time 
frame when a trespasser may not go back to the land, can also be effective in cases 
of illegal mining or land invasion. Implementation of similar legislation in South Africa, 
                                                          
163  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 63. 
164  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 63(6). 
165  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 63(7A-B). 
166  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 64. 
167  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 65. 
168  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 65(4). 
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in the current climate of promises of land exploration, may be met with distrust. 
However, it is necessary to clearly map out the powers of the police and the 
consequences if participants of land invasion do not adhere to their orders. Land 
invasion counters the orderly awarding of stands and services rendered by 
municipalities. Therefore, similar legislation in the South African context will be 
essential to fulfil the promise of land. Police powers and proper training in these 
matters will be vital since the police need to play an active role in the stability of the 
communities they serve. 
6.3.4.1.3  Aggravated trespass 
A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass, when he or she trespasses in 
the open air on land169 to intimidate persons who are engaging in a lawful activity.170 
On conviction, a person is liable for a period not exceeding three months or a fine not 
exceeding (£2,500) on the standard scale, or both.171 A senior police officer, who 
reasonably believes that a person is committing, or intending to commit the offence, 
or that two or more persons are trespassing with the common purpose of intimidating 
persons to discourage them from engaging in a lawful activity, may order them to leave 
the land.172 When a person knowing that such an order is in place, fails to leave the 
land as soon as practicable, or having left, again enters the land within three months, 
he or she commits an offence.173  
These provisions were created to cater for problems experienced in England. Similar 
legislation in South Africa may assist with problems presently experienced with groups 
intimidating businesses. Their unlawful conduct harms businesses, and has a serious 
economic implication. Perpetrators must, therefore, be informed what conduct is 
unacceptable and that they risk to be arrested if they do not adhere to the instructions 
of the police.  
                                                          
169  Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. In terms of subsection (5), land does 
not include the highways and roads excluded from the application of s 61.    
170  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 68(1). 
171  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 68(3). 
172  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 69(1). 
173  The person is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months 
or a fine not exceeding (£2,500) on the standard scale, or both. See Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act s 69(1).  
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6.3.4.1.4  Trespassory assemblies 
The chief officer of the police can, when he or she reasonably believes that an 
assembly is to be held on private land174 without the permission of the occupier175 
which may result in serious disruption to the community, or when the land, building or 
monument is of historical, architectural, archaeological or scientific importance, and 
significant damage can be caused, apply to the council of the district for an order 
prohibiting the assembly for a specified period. The Commissioner of Police for the 
City of London with the consent of the Secretary of State may also prohibit trespassory 
assemblies for a stipulated period in London.176 
A person organising a prohibited gathering, when knowing it is prohibited by such an 
order, is guilty of an offence,177 and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding (£2,500) on the standard scale or 
both.178 A person who takes part in a prohibit assembly, knowing it is prohibited by an 
order, is guilty of an offence,179 and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
(£1,000) on the standard scale.180 If a constable reasonably believes that an assembly 
is prohibited by an order, and believes that a person is on his or her way to the 
gathering, he or she may stop that person, and order him or her not to proceed in the 
direction of the assembly.181 A person who fails to comply with such an order is guilty 
of an offence.182  
These provisions can be successful applied in the South African context, since the 
Gatherings Act is not very effective in prohibiting gatherings.183 In South Africa, without 
receiving a formal complaint from an owner, the police will not on their own accord 
involve themselves when trespassers invade land. To ensure proper land distribution 
in the future, the police will need to play a more active role in guaranteeing property 
                                                          
174  ‘Land’ means “land in the open air”; see Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14A(9), and also 
the definition for ss 14B and 14C.  
175  ‘Occupier’ means “(a) in England and Wales, the person entitled to possession of the land by virtue 
of an estate or interest held by him”. 
176  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14A(4). 
177  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14B(1). 
178  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14B(3). 
179  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14B(2). 
180  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14B(6). 
181  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14C(1). 
182  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 14C(3). 
183  See Chapter 4 above. 
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rights. A similar provision where a senior police member may apply to a local 
magistrate for an order prohibiting a gathering on private land for a specific period, can 
assist to properly facilitate risks.  
6.3.4.1.5  Squatters 
Section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 prohibits a person to use violence to secure 
entry into premises. It constitutes an offence if trespassers fail to leave a premise after 
being requested to do so by an occupier.184 A person is liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding £5,000 
on the standard scale or to both.185  
Similar legislation in South Africa can assist in situations where the community helps 
to reinstate186 a person who was evicted from a premise by a court order. Frequently, 
the owner is left without any further remedy. This offence may also be fruitfully applied 
when community members decide to take the law into their own hands against 
suspected drug dealers or human traffickers. Participants of certain gatherings use or 
threaten violence against foreign nationals, entering houses or shops, to search for 
any illegal items or persons.  
6.3.4.1.6  Powers to remove unauthorised campers  
The local authority can remove persons residing in a vehicle, near highways, 
unoccupied land, or on occupied land without the consent of the occupier. The local 
authority must order them to leave the land, and remove the vehicle or any property.187 
Notice of such an order must be served on the persons.188 If a person knowing that a 
direction has been given fails to adhere to it, or enters the land within the period of 
three months, an offence is committed.189  
Local authorities in South Africa experience difficulties with an unregulated influx of 
people occupying municipal land. However, since the Extension of Security Tenure 
                                                          
184  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 7.  
185  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 6(5). 
186  By breaking open the premises, and carry possessions back. 
187  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 77(1). 
188  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 77(2). 
189  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 77(3). 
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Act and the Illegal Eviction Act must deem such persons as either a lawful or unlawful 
occupier, a costly eviction process must be followed.190  
6.3.4.2  India 
In India, trespass is classified in five categories, i.e. criminal trespass, house trespass, 
lurking house trespass, house-breaking and house-breaking by night.191 The first two 
categories show some similarities with the South-African trespass offence, and will be 
discussed below. 
6.3.4.2.1  Criminal trespass 
A person who enters a property with the intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, 
insult, or annoy a person, commit the offence of criminal trespass.192 The person is 
liable with imprisonment which may extend to three months, or with a fine which may 
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.193   
There must be an unauthorised entry into or upon another’s property or an authorised 
entry but an unlawful occupancy with the intention to commit an offence or to 
intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property.194 The offence of 
criminal trespass does not only require entering with the intention to commit an 
offence, but also provides for circumstances which do not always construe an offence, 
such as intimidating, insulting or annoying the person in possession of the property.   
6.3.4.2.2  House trespass 
A person who enters or remains in any building, tent, or vessel used as a dwelling, or 
building used as a place for worship, or a place for the custody of property, commits 
an offence.195 The person is liable with imprisonment of one year, or with a fine which 
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.196 The introduction of any part of 
                                                          
190  See para 6.3.2 above. 
191  Indian Penal Code 1340. 
192  Section 441, Indian Penal Code 1339-1347. 
193  Section 441, Indian Penal Code 1339-1347. 
194  Indian Penal Code 1341. 
195  Section 442 Indian Penal Code 1343. 
196  Indian Penal Code 1347. 
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the trespasser’s body is seen as entering and sufficient to commit the offence.197 This 
offence is specifically applicable to human dwellings, places of worship or property 
storage spaces. The Trespass Act in South Africa is more general and does not 
provide for specific categories. It would perhaps be wise for the legislature to create 
similar types of offences for South Africa’s unique problems, with applicable and 
different sentences fitting the crime. The legislation should also provide for the powers 
of the police in each situation in order to diffuse and disperse crowds effectively. 
Although cases of trespassing are generally deemed as minor in South African 
criminal courts, such cases may be time-consuming. The non-availability of the 
trespassers and their legal representatives, especially in land invasion circumstances, 
may strain the court roll for years. Community members may attend the court in 
numbers in support of the accused, causing a secondary security risk, renewed protest 
action outside courts, and witnesses to fear retaliation. The adoption of offences for 
different trespassing scenarios may assist to finalise cases more speedily in courts. 
Restorative justice outcomes can also play a positive role. 
6.4  Incitement under the Riotous Assemblies Act  
Incitement of participants by their leaders during a gathering is part and parcel of 
protest action. Incitement under the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 does not 
require that the conduct must take place during a gathering; still, in reality, an audience 
is usually present to adhere to the calls to commit public violence, or to do or not to do 
something. Incitement taking place over social media seems to be a future trend. The 
High Court and Equality Court in South African Human Rights Commission v Velaphi 
Khumalo and Others198 recognised that people are susceptible to being stirred up by 
inflammatory talk online.199 
Not only does the Riotous Assemblies Act provide for the common-law offence of 
incitement to public violence, the Act also establishes a statutory offence, i.e. 
                                                          
197  Indian Penal Code 1434. 
198  South African Human Rights Commission v Velaphi Khumalo and Others 2019 (1) SA 289 (GJ) 
(hereinafter Khumalo).   
199  Khumalo paras [90]-[95]. In para 103, it is stated: “these utterances … could indeed, be construed 
to incite the causation of harm”. 
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incitement to commit an offence under section 18(2)(b) of the Act.200 Section 17 of the 
Act confirms the circumstances in which the common-law offence of incitement to 
perpetrate public violence are deemed to be committed. Section 18 provides for the 
attempting, conspiring or inducing of another person to commit an offence. Although 
the offence of incitement is a useful tool to deter leaders from inciting their supporters 
to commit criminal deeds, the Riotous Assemblies Act is clouded in controversy, and 
seen as “stemming from apartheid-era law, out-dated and historically used to 
prosecute liberation fighters.”201   
For the purposes of these sub-paragraphs, the term ‘incitement’ is commonly used for 
the following verbs: inciting, instigating, commanding, or procuring any other person 
to commit an offence. This sub-paragraph focuses on the incitement of participants of 
a gathering to commit offences. Incitement to commit murder (when individuals or hit 
men are paid to kill) is usually a straightforward case for the prosecution, and depends 
on the facts of each case. However, when political leaders incite their supporters, it is 
difficult to distinguish between heated political rhetoric, utterances prohibited by the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, or 
incitement to commit offences. Sometimes all of above acts overlap.202 Constitutional 
rights are not absolute. To enjoy these rights, responsibility is required from leaders 
whose utterances can be acted upon by their followers.203 Leaders ought to bear 
heavier responsibility than others to help preserve “ubuntu, justice, equality-based 
heritage and shared aspirations”.204  
Although the Riotous Assembly Act is seen as stemming from apartheid-era law, it is 
still relevant today and utilised in courts. The court in Economic Freedom Fighters and 
Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others205 declared 
that when the Act was enacted, it was truly deplorable times in South Africa’s history, 
however, it is of little value in determining whether the Act is unconstitutional or not. 
                                                          
200  R v Nlhovo 1921 AD 485; Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [78]. Parliament has 24 months 
to rectify the constitutional defect; during this period s 18(2)(b) of the Riotous Assemblies Act will 
read: “any person who - (b) incites, instigates, commands, or procures any other person to commit, 
any [serious] offence” - judgment was given 27 November 2020. 
201  Most of the Act was repealed. 
202  Afri-Forum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) SA 240 (EqC). In the Khumalo-case paras 
[113]-[114], the court decided to refer the matter to the NDPP to consider possible prosecution. 
203  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [3]. 
204  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [3]. 
205  Economic Freedom Fighters 2019 297. 
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The Act must still conform to the rights as guaranteed in the Constitution as well as to 
applicable regional and international instruments,206 which will be examined below. 
6.4.1  Guiding principles on incitement to commit violence 
International and regional instruments, for example, the ICCPR and the ECHR state 
that incitement of violence, discrimination, or hostility must not be allowed. Such 
conduct is excluded from the protection of these instruments. In this regard, the 
Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa specifies that: 
…the expression aimed at in and through assemblies is protected by the right to 
freedom of expression, and includes expression that may give offense or be 
provocative. Hate speech and the incitement of violence are not protected and 
shall be prohibited.207 
Additionally, article 20 of the ICCPR provides that:   
Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law …  Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law.208 
A similar provision is discernible in the Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, 
in affirming that: 
While expression should normally still be protected even if it is hostile or insulting 
to other individuals, groups or particular sections of society, advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence should be prohibited by law 209 
Section 10 of the ECHR asserts that everyone has an inherent right to freedom of 
expression, but although this right includes certain freedoms, it likewise holds 
obligations and accountabilities for the right holder:  
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers … The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
                                                          
206  See Chapter 2 above. 
207  ACHPR Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa para [78]. 
208  South Africa signed the Covenant in 1994, and ratified it in 1998. The Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR was ratified by South Africa in 2002. See UN https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (Date of use: 8 
July 2020).  
209  Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 2010 para [96]. 
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protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary.210 
It is a well-known fact that governments must ensure that national legislation complies 
with international human rights norms. The incitement of violence is commonly part of 
different crimes, for example, public violence, hate speech, intimidation, or genocide, 
and can be utilised to destabilise the democracy of a country. Most countries recognise 
the danger of inciting people to commit violent acts since violent conduct generally 
translates into crime. Domestic laws to curb incitement of violence before the actual 
offences take place is important in order to preserve peace and order. For example, 
in New Zealand, the New Zealand Offences against Public Order provides that:  
Every person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine 
not exceeding $2,000 who, in or within view of any public place, behaves, or incites 
or encourages any person to behave, in a riotous, offensive, threatening, insulting, 
or disorderly manner that is likely in the circumstances to cause violence against 
persons or property to start or continue.211 
There is a fine line between heated political rhetoric and incitement to commit violence. 
Furthermore, the freedom of expression is protected in most constitutions, as such, 
criminal offences to curb incitement of violence must be carefully considered.  
6.4.2  Freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression is guaranteed by section 16 of the Constitution,212 
except in instances of “propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence and 
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm”.213 The purpose of section 16 of the Constitution was 
elaborated on in the case of Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting 
Authority:214   
Section 16 is in two parts. Subsection (1) is concerned with expression that is 
protected under the Constitution. It is clear that any limitation of this category of 
expression must satisfy the requirements of the limitations clause to be 
                                                          
210  ECHR s 10. 
211  Summary Offences Act 1981 s3 as amended. 
212  Section 16(1) of the Constitution provides that: “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, which includes (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or 
impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and 
freedom of scientific research”. 
213  Constitution s 16(2). 
214  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC). 
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constitutionally valid. Subsection (2) deals with expression that is specifically 
excluded from the protection of the right… Section 16(2) therefore defines the 
boundaries beyond which the right to freedom of expression does not extend… 
Implicit in its provisions is an acknowledgment that certain expression does not 
deserve constitutional protection because, among other things, it has the potential 
to impinge adversely on the dignity of others and cause harm...  There is no doubt 
that the state has a particular interest in regulating this type of expression because 
of the harm it may pose to the constitutionally mandated objective of building the 
non-racial and non-sexist society based on human dignity and the achievement of 
equality. There is accordingly no bar to the enactment of legislation that prohibits 
such expression.215 
The Constitution qualifies incitement of violence by requiring that the violence must be 
imminent. The descriptive ‘imminent’ means “something that is certain to happen very 
soon”.216 Therefore, if the government enacts legislation to prohibit conduct falling 
within section 16(2) of the Constitution, for example, not to incite imminent violence, it 
will not be seen as unconstitutional. However, not any violence will suffice, it must be 
threatening, i.e. conduct to be happening soon. The ‘imminent’ element displays some 
resemblance with the definition of the common-law offence of assault which provides 
that the unlawful and intentional act or omission must inspire:  
…a belief in another person that such impairment of his bodily integrity is 
immediately to take place.217  
Therefore, if there is no physical impact, there must be a threat of immediate personal 
violence in circumstances that lead the reasonable person to believe that the 
perpetrator intends and has the ability to immediately carry out the threat.218 The 
Constitution, however, does not refer to ‘personal violence’, only to ‘imminent 
violence’. As a result, violence can be aimed at a person or property, however, the 
circumstances must induce the reasonable person to be certain that the violence will 
take place immediately or very soon. In this regard, peaceful stands in contrast to 
violence, as violence entails the “use of physical force that is likely to result in injury or 
death or serious damage to property”.219 
  
                                                          
215  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) paras [31]-
[33]. 
216  Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary “imminent”. 
217  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 395. See the definition of assault in footnote 145 in Chapter 5 
above. 
218  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 397-398.   
219  ICCPR General Comment para [15]. See also footnote 15 in Chapter 3 above. 
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Section 16(2) of the Constitution does not constitute a limitation of free expression, 
and the section cannot have any role to play in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation of free expression.220 Legislation may venture 
across the boundary lines of protected expression, but there must be reasonable 
grounds to justify the infringement.221  
The Riotous Assembly Act provides for the criminalising of incitement to commit a 
serious offence. This offence is thus broader than section 16(2) of the Constitution 
which excludes certain expressions from the protection of the Constitution, for 
example, incitement of imminent violence. Incitement under the Riotous Assembly Act 
includes incitement of imminent violence and offences that do not contain the element 
of violence.  
Political leaders are fond of using zealous political rhetoric when addressing followers. 
It is, therefore, necessary to carefully analyse these speeches to consider whether 
these statements constitute a serious offence, falls under the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, or needs to be investigated by 
the South African Human Rights Commission.222 Such utterances may fall in the 
framework of all of above.223 
In South Africa, the government enacted supplementary legislation to support the 
objects of the Constitution. For example, the Gatherings Act already provides that no 
person may:  
…perform any act or utter any words which are calculated or likely to cause or 
encourage violence against any person or group.224  
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act was enacted to 
provide for instances where certain methods of expression are not allowed. Section 
10(1) of the Act, for example, prohibits hate speech:  
…no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words based on 
one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably 
be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to – 
                                                          
220  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [33]. 
221  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [33]. 
222  The South African Human Rights Commission is a national human rights institution mandated by 
South Africa’s Constitution s 184 to “protect, promote, and monitor human rights in the country, it 
is mandated to investigate, report, facilitate redress where applicable, carry out research, and 
educate on human rights”. 
223  Khumalo 289. See also Burchell 2019 Acta Juridica 212-214. 
224  Gatherings Act s 8(6). 
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(a) be hurtful; 
(b) be harmful or to incite harm; 
(c) promote or propagate hatred.225 
This section does not require any ‘imminent violence’, merely harm. Proceedings in 
terms of the Equality Act are not akin to criminal proceedings, and are among the 
court’s powers – in such case, referral of the matter is made to the NPA for possible 
prosecution.226 The Equality court must hold an enquiry to determine whether hate 
speech has taken place as alleged.227 The South African Human Rights Commission 
may also investigate complaints with regard to a purported infringement of human 
rights.  
Due to problems experienced with unlawful utterances in South Africa, especially over 
social media, the government tabled the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes 
and Hate Speech Bill 9 of 2018228 in parliament. The Bill provides for the offences of 
hate crime229 and hate speech,230 and defines electronic communication.231 The 
sentence applicable includes a fine and imprisonment not exceeding three years for 
first-time offenders, and a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years 
                                                          
225  The Act also provides for “prevention and general prohibition of unfair discrimination, prohibition of 
unfair discrimination on ground of race, gender, disability, harassment, dissemination and 
publication of unfair discriminatory information”.  
226  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act ss 10(2), 21(2)(n). 
227  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act s 21. 
228  Explanatory summary of Bill published in GG 41543 of 29 March 2018. 
229  Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill s 3(1) “A hate crime is an offence 
recognised under any law, the commission of which by a person is motivated by that person’s 
prejudice or intolerance towards the victim of the crime in question because of one or more of the 
following characteristics or perceived characteristics of the victim or his or her family member or 
the victim’s association with, or support for, a group of persons who share the said characteristics: 
(a) age; (b) albinism; (c) birth; (d) colour; (e) culture; (f) disability; (g) ethnic or social origin; (h) 
gender or gender identity; (i) HIV status; (j) language; (k) nationality, migrant or refugee status; (l) 
occupation or trade; (m) political affiliation or conviction; (n) race; (o) religion; (p) sex, which 
includes intersex; or (q) sexual orientation … (3) Any prosecution in terms of this section must be 
authorised by the Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction or a person delegated thereto 
by him or her.”  
230  Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill s 4(1)(a) “Any person who 
intentionally publishes, propagates or advocates anything or communicates to one or more 
persons in a manner that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to – (i) 
be harmful or to incite harm; or (ii) promote or propagate hatred, based on one or more of the 
following grounds: (aa) age; (bb) albinism; (cc) birth; (dd) colour; (ee) culture; (ff) disability; (gg) 
ethnic or social origin; (hh) gender or gender identity; (ii) HIV status; (jj) language; (kk) nationality, 
migrant or refugee status; (ll) race; (mm) religion; (nn) sex, which includes intersex; or (oo) sexual 
orientation, is guilty of an offence of hate speech… (3) Any prosecution in terms of this section 
must be authorised by the Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction or a person delegated 
thereto by him or her.”   
231  Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill s 4(1)(b). 
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for any subsequent offence.232 It will be possible to institute prosecution for inciting 
hate crime and hate speech when the Act comes into operation. The offence of hate 
speech already provides for the incitement of harm. However, Burchell foresees that 
the meaning of hateful, harmful and hurtful speech will confuse the ordinary citizen.233  
The government recently published the Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020, however, the 
date of commencement is still awaited. Part II of the Act provides for malicious 
communications. Section 14 prohibits the disclosure234 of a data message to a person 
or group of persons235 with the intention to incite the causing of damage to property236 
or violence237 against a person or group of persons by means of an electronic 
communications service. It is also an offence if a data message which threatens a 
person or a related person238 with damage to property or violence is intentionally 
disclosed by means of an electronic communications service.239 Imminent violence is 
not a requirement, it is also not necessary that the damage to property or bodily harm 
need to constitute a serious offence.  
6.4.3  Section 17 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 
Section 17 clarifies in which circumstances the common-law offence of incitement to 
public violence are committed: 
A person shall be deemed to have committed the common law offence of 
incitement to public violence if, in any place whatever, he has acted or conducted 
himself in such a manner, or has spoken or published such words, that it might 
reasonably be expected that the natural and probable consequences of his act, 
conduct, speech or publication would, under the circumstances, be the commission 
                                                          
232  Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill s 6. 
233  Burchell 2019 Acta Juridica 217-218. 
234  ‘Disclose’ in respect of a data message means to – 
(a)  send the data message to a person who is the intended recipient of the electronic 
communication or any other person; 
(b)  store the data message on an electronic communications network, where the data message 
can be viewed, copied or downloaded; or 
(c)  send or otherwise make available to a person, a link to the data message that has been stored 
on an electronic communication network, where the data message can be viewed, copied or 
downloaded.” See s 13.   
235  A ‘group of persons’ means “characteristics that identify an individual as a member of a group, 
which characteristics include without limitation, race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language, birth or nationality.” See s 13.   
236  ‘Damage to property’ means “damage to any corporeal or incorporeal property”. See s 13.  
237  ‘Violence’ means bodily harm. See s 13 and Chapter 3 footnote 89. 
238  ‘Related person’ means “any member of the family or household of a person or any other person 
in a close relationship with that person.” See s 13. 
239  Section 15. 
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of public violence by members of the public generally or by persons in whose 
presence the act or conduct took place or to whom the speech or publication was 
addressed.240  
This section is not applicable to other offences, only to public violence. Section 17 
does not constitute an offence on its own but qualifies the common-law offence of 
incitement. The common-law offence of incitement to public violence can be 
committed in both a private or public place, and can take place by way of conduct, 
speech or publication. The reasonable outcome of this conduct, speech or publication 
must be the commission of an act of public violence by a person who witnessed the 
conduct or was addressed to commit such act. As such, the consequences of the 
conduct, speech or publication must be that persons or members of the public present, 
or those hearing the speech or seeing the publication, would resolve to public 
violence.241 In the Economic Freedom Fighters-case,242 the court emphasised that: 
Even the common law criminalises incitement that could lead to the ‘high risk of a 
dangerous situation developing’. Punishing that kind of incitement is meant to 
achieve ‘the deterrence of future crime [and] restraint of the dangerous offender’. 
The risk must be fairly high and the situation sought to be created, dangerous. The 
offence thus exists to deter not just any offender, but a dangerous one, who poses 
a serious threat.243  
Section 17 specifically establishes the crime of public violence while section 18(2)(b) 
of the Act provides for the crime of incitement to commit any serious common law or 
statutory offence. In practice, the state would be able to proceed under the common 
law or section 18(2)(b) of the Act. It must be considered that other offences, for 
example, trespassing on land as part of land invasion, nearly always includes 
elements of public violence.  
6.4.4  Section 18(2)(b) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 
Section 18(1) of the Riotous Assemblies Act criminalises the attempt to commit the 
statutory offences of conspiracy, and inducing another person to commit a statutory or 
common-law offence, as follows: 
Any person who – 
(a) conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to 
                                                          
240  Riotous Assembly Act s 17. 
241  R v Nlhovo 1921 AD 485. 
242  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 25. 
243  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [48]; also see Burchell Principles of criminal law 528-529.  
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commit; or 
(b) incites, instigates, commands, or procures any other person to commit, any 
serious offence, whether at common law or against a statute or statutory 
regulation, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the 
punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence 
would be liable. 
The abovementioned amended section is applicable for 24 months after the judgment 
date,244 or until parliament is able to rectify the constitutional defect (the section 
previously was applicable to ‘any offence’).245  
The object of section 18(2)(b) is to prohibit the influencing of any person to commit 
any serious offence under the South African law, including offences stemming from 
the right to gather. Section 18(2)(b) is an absolute necessity for crime prevention.246 
Any serious offence qualifies. Van der Merwe247 argues that incitement to genocide 
may be prosecuted under the Riotous Assemblies Act read together with the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal court,248 for example, the Khumalo-case utterance 
which may possibly qualify as incitement to genocide: 
I want to cleanse this country of all white people. we must act as Hitler did to the 
Jews … Noo seriously though u oppressed us when u were a minority and then 
manje249 u call us monkeys and we suppose to let it slide. white people in south 
Africa deserve to be hacked and killed like Jews. U have the same venom moss. 
look at Palestine. noo u must be bushed250 alive and skinned and your off springs 
used as garden fertiliser.251  
                                                          
244  Judgment was given on 27 November 2020. 
245  The Constitutional Court declared s 18(2)(b) of the Riotous Assemblies Act to be invalid to the 
extent that it criminalises the incitement of another to commit “any offence” and ordered that “any 
offence” must be replaced with the wording “any serious offence”. See Economic Freedom Fighters 
2020 para [78]; para 6.4.5 below. 
246  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [66]. 
247  Van der Merwe 2013 PELJ 330-370. 
248  Van der Merwe 2013 PELJ 338, 352. South Africa acceded to the Genocide Convention in 1998. 
“The Rome Statute reflects the wording of the Genocide Convention with regards to the definition 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, article 25(3)(e) provides that in accordance 
with the Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime … 
in respect of the crime of genocide, if ... directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide. 
Article 6 of the Statute defines genocide as follows: ‘genocide’ means ‘any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.  
249  “Now” in isiZulu; see Khumalo-case para [1]. 
250  “Burned” see Khumalo-case para [1]. 
251  Khumalo para [1]. 
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The Equality Court referred the matter to the DPP for possible prosecution, however, 
the offences under the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech 
Bill,252 when in operation, may be better suited to deal with these types of utterances.  
The Constitutional Court in the case of Economic Freedom Fighters253 found that 
incitement of non-serious offences do not cause as much public harm as incitement of 
serious offences.254 The Court accentuated the fact that there will be practical 
challenges to decide what constitutes a serious offence since what is serious to some 
may not necessarily be serious to others.255 There is, however, an element of fluidity 
in relation to which offences are to be understood as serious.256 Murder, rape, armed 
robbery, fraud, human trafficking, and corruption are offences that fall within the 
meaning of serious offences. Many more crimes may fit the description, especially 
crimes that are evil by nature.257  
The term ‘serious’ is an expression or a concept that courts are familiar with. Especially 
in the context of considering an appropriate sentence, courts refer to the seriousness 
of the offence concerned. Courts should find it relatively easy to deal with the question 
on a case-by-case basis, aided by existing jurisprudence.258 Current legislation 
especially provides for useful guidelines, for example, Schedules 1, 2 (Parts II and III) 
and sections 5-8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 list offences that can qualify 
as serious offences.259 Although the Schedules to the Criminal Procedure Act include 
a number of statutory offences, they do not contain all statutory offences that could 
reasonably be said to constitute serious offences.260 The inexperience of police 
officials, prosecutors and magistrates can have a bearing on the decision what 
constitutes a serious offence. However, the facts of each case must be the decisive 
factor.   
In contrast, it is not required in the recently published Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 (of 
which commencement is still awaited) that incitement or the threat to commit an 
                                                          
252  See footnote 228 above. 
253  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 25. 
254  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [64]. 
255  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [69]. 
256  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [69]. 
257  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [69]. 
258  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [70]. 
259  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [71]. 
260  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [71]. 
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offence must constitute a serious offence. It is also not a prerequisite that the 
incitement or threat must include serious damage to property or serious bodily harm.261 
However, a reasonable person in possession of the data message, with due regard to 
all the circumstances, must perceive the data message, either by itself or in conjunction 
with any other data message or information, as a threat of damage to property or 
violence to a person.262 Any incitement or threat to damage to property or to do bodily 
harm to a person is thus sufficient. It seems, therefore, that incitement or a threat on 
social media to cause damage to property or bodily harm to a person does not exclude 
non-serious offences, or that the damage to property or violence to a person needs to 
be imminent, or to take place in a reasonable space of time.  
Although the purpose of incitement is to influence a person to commit a serious 
offence, the focus is only on the inciter’s conduct, and not on the other person’s 
(incitee) susceptibility to be influenced.263 The person may be manipulated by words 
(oral or written), movement or an act or acts. Other instances to commit the offence 
are by way of “requests, instructions, encouragements, imploration, to persuades, 
hires, put pressure on, bribes or to promise a gift”.264 In R v Radu,265 the accused was 
charged on a count of incitement to commit public violence.266 At a meeting of 50 
people, he made a speech, and used words from which it might reasonably be 
expected that the natural and probable consequence of his words would, under the 
circumstances, cause public violence by members of the public or by persons to whom 
the speech was made to.267 The court found that:   
…the criterion to be applied is not what the accused intended, but what a 
reasonable man, under the circumstances, should have expected to be the natural 
and probable consequences. It is an objective test that is to be used and when 
once the objective test is satisfied adversely to the accused, then his blameworthy 
conduct of mind, a mens rea, is established and he cannot rebut it by showing that 
his mind was devoid of any wrong intent since he is judged by the outward 
manifestations of his mind.268   
                                                          
261  See footnotes 234-239 above detailing ss 14 and 15 of the Cybercrimes Act.  
262  Section 15. 
263  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 257. 
264  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 258. 
265  R v Radu 1953 (2) SA 245 (E) (hereinafter Radu).   
266  See R v Maxaulana 1953 (2) SA 252 (E) 253 (hereinafter Maxaulana). 
267  Radu-case 246. 
268  Radu 246. 
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The Equality Court in the Khumalo-case observed that the term ‘incite’ in the context 
of section 16 of the Constitution, and section 10 of the Equality Act means to “spur on, 
rouse, to stir up, to urge, instigate and stimulate others to action”.269 It is important that 
the words or phrase must be read in the framework of the text. The court confirmed 
that this implies an objective test, and that “intention shall be deemed if a reasonable 
reader would so construe the words”.270 The circumstances in which words are used 
are therefore significant.271 In R v Maxaulana,272 the presiding officer considered the 
background or history of the matter, the speeches of others at the meeting, the conduct 
of the accused, and the conduct of the audience so as to assess whether incitement 
could be inferred.273 
It is not required that the inciter knows the identity of the person or persons incited. 
The incited persons may be a crowd or unknown people.274 The inciter further must 
have the intention to influence someone to commit an offence and believe that 
someone will act with the intention to commit the offence.275 In S v Nkosiyana and 
Another,276 the court remarked: 
…an inciter is seen as one who reaches and seeks to influence the mind of another 
to the commission of an offence. The means employed are of secondary 
importance; the decisive question in each case is whether the accused reached 
and sought to influence the mind of the other person towards the commission of 
an offence. Where the intended influence does not reach the mind of the 
prospective incitee, the offence may be one of attempted incitement, e.g. where 
an inflammatory letter is sent but goes astray. It is the conduct and intention of the 
inciter which is vitally in issue… Hence, depending on the circumstances, there 
may be an incitement irrespective of the responsiveness, real or feigned, or the 
unresponsiveness, of the person sought to be so influenced.277 
Snyman is of opinion that attempt to commit incitement and conspiracy to commit 
incitement is possible.278 In practice, the courts need to apply the above-mentioned 
principles as established by the court in Nkosiyana to ascertain if the inciter sought to 
influence the mind of the incitee towards the commission of an offence. For example, 
                                                          
269  Khumalo para [89]. 
270  Khumalo para [89]. 
271  Radu 250. 
272  Maxaulana 254.    
273  Maxaulana 254. 
274  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 259.   
275  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 260. 
276  S v Nkosiyana and Another 1966 (4) SA 655 (A) (hereinafter Nkosiyana). 
277  Nkosiyana 659. 
278  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 262-263. 
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in Economic Freedom Fighters,279 the charges read that the applicant “incited, 
instigated, commanded or procured his Economic Freedom Fighters followers and/or 
others to commit a crime, to wit; trespass in contravention of section 1(1) of the 
Trespass Act, by illegally occupying vacant land”.280 This criminal trial has been put 
on hold pending the outcome of the constitutional challenge.281 Although the 
allegations in the Economic Freedom Fighters were not tested in court, and the 
circumstances in which the utterances were made are unknown, the applicant 
reportedly expressed the following statements:  
I can’t occupy all the pieces of land in South Africa alone. I cannot be everywhere. 
I am not [the] Holy Spirit. So you must be part of the occupation of land everywhere 
else in South Africa.282 
If you see a piece of land, don’t apologise, and you like it, go and occupy that land. 
That land belongs to us.283 
Occupy the land, because [the State has] failed to give you the land. If it means 
going to prison for telling you to take the land, so be it. I am not scared of prison 
because of the land question. We will take our land; it doesn’t matter how. It’s 
becoming unavoidable, it’s becoming inevitable – the land will be taken by 
whatever means necessary.284 
When considering the words spoken, it is clear that followers and/or the general public 
are addressed, although they may be unidentified. Known as well as unknown people 
are instructed to take land. It is not required that the crowd, the followers or persons 
who listen to the words or read the words over social media, must be known. The 
instruction is sufficiently specific – go to land and take it. The instruction does not 
differentiate between occupied and unoccupied land. Therefore, the words indicate 
that people must trespass on land that belongs to somebody else (whether state- or 
privately owned) and occupy it – whether the identity of the owners is known or 
unknown. The intention is to influence a person or persons to commit an offence while 
believing such person or persons will act with the intention to commit the offence.   
                                                          
279  Economic Freedom Fighters 2019 297. 
280  Ngcobo https://www.iol.co.za/news/malema-land-grab-case-postponed-to-thursday-10122281 
(Date of use: 2 November 2020); Wicks https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-06-25-julius-
malema-appears-in-court-on-land-invasion-charges/ (Date of use: 02 November 2020). 
281  See footnote 200 above. 
282  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [7]. 
283  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [8]. 
284  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [9]. 
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The question could be asked whether the offence of trespass in contravention of 
section 1(1) of the Trespass Act 6 of 1959 constitutes a serious offence, as required 
for a conviction of incitement. The nature, extent or effect of what people are being 
incited to do must be serious, and it must be in the interest of the public to do so.285 
The incited offence must threaten serious harm or danger either to individuals, society, 
public order, property or the economy.286 Trespassing on land, as in the 
abovementioned circumstances, constitutes a daily growing problem of land invasion 
in South Africa, and constitutes a potential serious offence. It has severe political and 
economical consequences, goes hand in hand with violent conduct, and raises 
questions with regard to the dignity of destitute people. It is, therefore, suggested that 
incitement to trespass in these circumstances must be seen as a serious offence. 
6.4.5  The constitutionality of section 18(2)(b) of the Act 
In Economic Freedom Fighters, the applicants argued that section 18(2)(b) of the 
Riotous Assemblies Act is unconstitutional and invalid by reason of its over-breadth 
since the section criminalises the incitement of others to commit ‘any offence’, and 
therefore infringes the right to freedom of expression protected by section 16 of the 
Constitution.287  
The Court was of the opinion that section 18(2)(b) of the Act which criminalises 
incitement to commit ‘any offence’ is a form of expression that is ordinarily protected 
by section 16(1) of the Constitution.288 The Court, therefore, had to established if the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom. The Court pointed out that section 
18(2)(b) of the Act is necessary for crime prevention,289 and referred to the decision of 
the ECtHR in Handyside v The United of Kingdom290 – where it was noted that the 
right to freedom of expression is –  
…applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb ... Such are the demands of such pluralism, tolerance and 
                                                          
285  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [50]. 
286  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [51]. 
287  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [30]. 
288  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [34]. 
289  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para Para [41]. 
290  Handyside v The United of Kingdom No 5493/72 ECtHR 1976. 
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broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’.291 
The Court found that the Constitution does not tolerate incitement or ‘advocacy’ to 
commit any offence as a limitation of the right to freedom of expression, therefore, it 
cannot be correct to criminalise the incitement of any offence that does not pose a 
danger or serious harm to anything or anybody.292 When national interests, the 
democracy, the dignity or physical integrity of people or property could be imperilled, 
free speech may ordinarily be limited.293 Legislation that seeks to limit free speech 
must be meant to curb incitement of offences that seriously threaten the public interest, 
national security, the dignity or physical integrity of individuals.294  
When presented with opportunities to define the bounds of permissible legislative 
intrusion, courts must do so by promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Human Rights.295 The phrase ‘any offence’ is therefore overbroad and inhibits free 
expression.296 To confine the prohibition of incitement to serious offences, free 
expression must be promoted and crime prevention enhanced.297 Consequently, only 
the incitement of potentially serious offences is criminalised.298  
All legal systems do have some piece of legislation providing for attempt, conspiracy 
and inducing/inciting another person to commit offences.299 No legal system can 
function properly without such legislation.300 Law and order would suffer if the police 
were not able to intervene when people are preparing to commit offences.301 
Especially when groups of people are incited to commit serious offences, it may have 
dire consequences for the democracy of a state. Courts will not easily interfere with 
acts criminalising conduct which is prohibited by the Constitution and international and 
regional instruments. Since the Riotous Assemblies Act causes disgruntlement due to 
being crafted by the apartheid’s government, a possible solution may be to include 
                                                          
291  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 paras [45], [49]. 
292  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [46]. 
293  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [46]. 
294  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [47]. 
295  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [59]. 
296  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [61]. 
297  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [61] 
298  Economic Freedom Fighters 2020 para [63]. 
299  See Glazebrook Blackstone’s statutes on Criminal law 73-75; 359-364. As afore-mentioned in para 
6.4, the goal of section 18(2)(b) of the Riotous Assemblies Act is crime prevention. See Riotous 
Assemblies Act s 41. 
300  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 241 classifies these forms of conduct as inchoate offences.    
301  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 241. 
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legislation providing for attempt, conspiracy and incitement in a Criminal Law 
Amendment Act. 
6.5  Offences under the National Road Traffic Regulations 
Offences under the National Road Traffic Regulations 2000302 are important when 
protest action takes place on public roads. It is difficult to prove that persons act in 
concert or with a common purpose, especially during violent gatherings, therefore, it 
is easier to hold individuals or smaller groups accountable for certain conduct. Protest 
action on roads, shutting roads down, or causing damage to vehicles draws the 
attention of the general public by triggering inconvenience, losses, and damage.303 It 
is also not always clear what the cause of the protest action is. The opportunity is 
usually exploited to loot cargo from trucks.304 
This section focuses on the provisions in the National Road Traffic Act which can be 
applied by the police during protest action or gatherings on roads. Section 111 of the 
Road Traffic Act (Act 29 of 1989)305 regulates racing and sport on public roads, but 
does not apply in respect of a gathering or demonstration held in accordance with the 
Gatherings Act.306 Where there is conflict between the provisions of the Gatherings 
Act and the National Road Traffic Regulations, the provisions of the Gatherings Act 
will prevail.307 The National Road Traffic Regulations Act controls the duties of 
pedestrians,308 the hindering or obstructing of traffic on public roads,309 vehicles left or 
abandoned on public roads,310 and provisions relating to freeways.311 In the following 
sub-paragraphs, these provisions will be considered.  
                                                          
302  Published in GG 20963 dated 17 March 2000, GN R225.  
303  See TimesLive https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-08-08-protest-action-shuts-
roads-in-north-west-and-kwazulu-natal/ (Date of use: 1 December 2020).  
304  Wicks https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-06-19-cars-stoned-trucks-looted-as-
kwazulu-natal-gauteng-protests-shut-roads/ (Date of use: 1 December 2020). 
305  The section of the Act was repealed and replaced by s 317 of the National Road Traffic Regulations 
2000. It consists of the same wording, but provides that the MEC of the province gives consent. 
Section 317(5) provides that a traffic officer can immediately withdraw permission, if the event 
causes danger.  
306  Gatherings Act s 13. 
307  Gatherings Act s 14. 
308  National Road Traffic Regulations s 316. 
309  National Road Traffic Regulations s 319. 
310  National Road Traffic Regulations s 320. 
311  National Road Traffic Regulations s 323. 
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6.5.1  Section 316 ‒ Duties of pedestrians 
This section prescribes the manner in which pedestrians must behave on a public 
road. Participants of gatherings stay pedestrians for the purpose of the Act. 
Participants who are part of an unlawful gathering may be prosecuted if they do not 
adhere to the basic road safety rules. Section 316 particularises in what way a 
pedestrian must use, walk on, or cross a public road. When a sidewalk or footpath is 
available, a pedestrian may not walk on a roadway except to cross the road.312 If no 
sidewalk or footpath is available, a pedestrian must walk as near as practicable to the 
edge of the roadway on his or her right-hand side so as to face oncoming traffic.313 
When crossing at a pedestrian crossing, a pedestrian may not linger.314 Section 316(5) 
will be applicable if participants of a demonstration or gathering assemble on a public 
road, and conduct themselves in such a manner so as to constitute a source of danger 
to themselves or to other road users.315    
6.5.2  Section 317 ‒ Racing and sport on public roads 
Section 317 provides for racing and sport on public roads. The phrase ‘race or sport’ 
comprises any type of race, such as a speed trial or a reliability trial, any form of hill-
climbing competition, or sports gathering, or any other activity of any kind which may 
represent a source of danger to traffic, or which may impede, obstruct or interrupt the 
normal flow of traffic.316   
A gathering can consequently be seen as an activity, however the provisions of this 
section does not apply in respect of a gathering or demonstration held in accordance 
                                                          
312  National Road Traffic Regulations s 316(1): “Whenever a sidewalk or footpath abuts on the 
roadway of a public road, a pedestrian shall not walk on such roadway except for the purpose of 
crossing from one side of such roadway to the other or for some other sufficient reason”. Section 
316(6) specifies that: “A pedestrian may cross a public road only at a pedestrian crossing or an 
intersection or at a distance further than 50 metres from such pedestrian crossing or intersection”. 
313  National Road Traffic Regulations s 316(2): “A pedestrian on a public road which has no sidewalk 
or footpath abutting on the roadway, shall walk as near as is practicable to the edge of the roadway 
on his or her right-hand side so as to face oncoming traffic on such roadway, except where the 
presence of pedestrians on the roadway is prohibited by a prescribed road traffic sign”. 
314  National Road Traffic Regulations s 316(3): “A pedestrian, when crossing a public road by means 
of a pedestrian crossing or in any other manner, shall not linger on such road but shall proceed 
with due despatch”. 
315  National Road Traffic Regulations s 316(4): “No pedestrian on a public road shall conduct himself 
or herself in such a manner as to or as is likely to constitute a source of danger to himself or herself 
or to other traffic which is or may be on such road”. 
316  National Road Traffic Regulations s 1. 
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with the Gatherings Act.317 A traffic officer or a police member responsible for the 
safety of the public in the area where an unlawful gathering is proceeding, may stop 
the event to safeguard the safety of road users, if the performing or continuance of the 
event, in the traffic officer’s or police member’s opinion, is causing or may cause any 
hazardous or unjustifiable impediments for other road users, or even any of the 
participants in the event.318 
6.5.3  Section 319 ‒ Hindering or obstructing traffic on public road 
This section is applicable when communities close public roads by placing or burning 
objects on the roads.319 The provision prohibits anyone from putting or discarding (or 
the causing thereof) any type of object on a public road that may imperil lives or cause 
injury to road traffic.320 The normal flow of traffic is disrupted, and sometimes vehicles 
are set alight. The obstruction of roads can proceed for days before the police are able 
to calm the situation. It is difficult to prove which community members were involved, 
and who were responsible for certain conduct since the participants change from hour 
to hour. This offence assists the police to arrest the individual who can be identified, 
putting burning tires on a road, hindering other road users, or closing roads. Similar 
provisions are found in New Zealand legislation. Section 22321 of the Summary 
Offences Act 113 of 1981 provides for the obstruction322 of a public way:323 
(1) Every person is liable to a fine not exceeding $1,000 who, without reasonable 
excuse, obstructs any public way and, having been warned by a constable to 
desist, ‒ (a) continues with that obstruction; or (b) does desist from that obstruction 
but subsequently obstructs that public way again, or some other public way in the 
same vicinity, in circumstances in which it is reasonable to deem the warning to 
have applied to the new obstruction as well as the original one. 
                                                          
317  Gatherings Act s 1. 
318  See the National Road Traffic Regulations s 317(5).  
319  The National Road Traffic Regulations s 319(1) states: “No person shall wilfully or unnecessarily 
prevent, hinder or interrupt the free and proper passage of traffic on a public road”. Section 320 
provides that “if any vehicle was left on a public road in circumstances which in the opinion of a 
traffic officer, is likely to cause danger or obstruction to other traffic, it may be removed to a 
government facility and the owner shall be liable for expenses incurred”.  
320  See the National Road Traffic Regulations s 319(2): “Subject to the provisions of the Act or any 
other law, no person shall place or abandon or cause to be placed or abandoned on a public road 
any object that may endanger or cause injury to traffic on such road”. 
321  Summary Offences Act 113 of 1981 as amended.  
322  Summary Offences Act s 22(2) ‒ ‘Obstructs’ in relation to a public way, means “unreasonably 
impedes normal passage along that way”. 
323  Summary Offences Act s 22(2) ‒ ‘Public way’ means “every road, street, path, mall, arcade, or 
other way over which the public has the right to pass and repass”.  
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This section necessitates that criminal steps be implemented after being warned by a 
constable to stop obstructing a public way, therefore not adhering to an instruction. 
The offender has the opportunity to move away and escape prosecution. Section 137 
criminalises wilful obstruction,324 if a person without lawful authority or excuse, in any 
way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway, he is guilty of an offence, and 
liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 (£1,000) on the standard scale. Section 161 again 
regulates the causing of danger or annoyance to public road users.325 A person who 
deposits anything on a highway, in consequence of which a user of the highway is 
injured or endangered, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 
on the standard scale. The same applies to a person who lights any fire on or over a 
highway which consists of or comprises a carriageway. Governments cannot function 
without legislation providing for the orderly use of public roads. 
6.5.4  Section 323 ‒ Special provisions relating to freeways 
The section is applicable when participants gather on freeways or use vehicles or 
animals to block roads. The section prohibits the operating of any animal-drawn 
vehicle, or a tractor or tractor hauling a trailer on a freeway.326 No person may be on 
foot on a freeway, except if this situation is due to circumstances beyond their control, 
and they remain within an area where a valid road traffic sign indicates that vehicles 
may stop or park.327 A person may not stop his or her vehicle or another vehicle on 
the freeway unless in this designated area, and he or she is in an emergency situation, 
or when a traffic sign or traffic officer directs him or her to do so.328 No one may leave 
an animal on the freeway, or let an animal onto the freeway.329 This particular section 
prevents participants of a gathering to chase cattle or sheep on highways, or to close 
roads with busses, tractors or taxis. These charges can be brought against one 
individual or all the participants of a gathering, if they acted with common purpose.   
                                                          
324  See Glazebrook Blackstone’s statutes on Criminal law 87; the Highways Act 1980.   
325  Section 161 of the Highway Act 1980. 
326  The National Road Traffic Regulations s 323(1)(a), (f). 
327  The National Road Traffic Regulations s 323(2)(a). 
328  The National Road Traffic Regulations s 323(2)(c). 
329  The National Road Traffic Regulations s 323(2)(b) ‒ “except in or on a motor vehicle or within an 
area reserved for the stopping or parking of vehicles by an appropriate road traffic sign, or leave 
an animal in a place from where it may stray onto a freeway”. There is, according to s 323(3), a 
presumption that an animal was left or allowed on the freeway by the owner of such animal, 
unless there is evidence to the contrary.  
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Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the above-mentioned 
provisions of the National Road Traffic Regulations is guilty of an offence and liable to 
a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.330 The Guidelines on 
freedom of peaceful assembly advices that unnecessary or disproportionately harsh 
penalties for behaviour during gatherings can inhibit the holding of the events, 
furthermore, it has a unnerving effect that can prevent participants from attending. 
Penalties prescribed for minor offences must be low.331 Participants in peaceful 
gatherings must also not be subjected to criminal intervention.332 Therefore, police 
members must be well trained and informed when they consider arresting participants 
of peaceful gatherings for committing minor offences, which include traffic offences.  
The offences under the National Road Traffic Regulations Act will usually not be 
applicable when gatherings proceed in accordance with the Gatherings Act. The police 
will close parts of roads to assist the gatherings to proceed peacefully. When 
gatherings are unlawful, the Act supports the police to remove persons who do not 
adhere to road rules, and cause a danger to other road users. The Act assists the 
state to prosecute an individual who is seen to commit an offence during protest action 
or public violence. These offences are necessary to guarantee safety for all road 
users. 
6.6.  Intimidation 
In South Africa, intimidation frequently forms part of the conduct at a gathering. 
Intimidating conduct is utilised by groups or individuals to convey the gravity of their 
plight. Pressure is placed on an individual, the government, groups or the public, to 
omit or to do something.  
To differentiate between threats, intimidation and political hyperbole may create a 
problem, as seen in the approach of the court in Moyo and Another v Minister of Justice 
                                                          
330  Section 89 of the Highway Act 1980. 
331  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [222]. 
332  European Commission for Democracy through Law Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly 
2010 para [226]. 
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and Constitutional Development and Others.333 From the minority334 and majority335 
decisions, it is clear that the wording of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 can be difficult 
to apply and understand. However, the Constitutional Court336 declared section 1(1)(b) 
and 1(2) of the Intimidation Act unconstitutional and invalid.337 It is projected that the 
remaining offences in the Act will follow suit.  
Intimidation in South Africa falls under the heading of ‘crimes against bodily 
integrity’.338 Intimidation usually intersects with the offence of public violence. The 
offence also shows commonalities with other offences such as assault, extortion, 
crimen iniuria, and incitement to commit an offence. The purpose of the intimidation 
offence is to punish people who intimidate others to conduct themselves in a certain 
manner; such as not to give evidence in court, not to support a certain political 
organisation, not to pay municipal accounts, or to support strike action.339 The Act 
does not require that a group of persons are needed to commit intimidation. One 
person can intimidate a whole community. On the other hand, a community can 
likewise intimidate one person. The current offences under the Intimidation Act have 
a general, broader scope which is difficult to read and confusing to ordinary members 
of the public, therefore, the question is considered whether offences with regard to 
intimidatory conduct must not provide for specific problems experienced in South 
Africa.  
6.6.1  Definition 
The Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 prohibits certain forms of intimidatory behaviour. It 
provides for section 1(1)(a)340 ‒ intimidation by violence or threat of violence; section 
                                                          
333  Moyo and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 2018 (2) SACR 
313 (SCA) (hereinafter Moyo 2018). 
334  Mbha and Van der Merwe JA. 
335  Wallis, Maya and Makgoka JA. 
336  Moyo and Another v Minister of Police and Others [2019] ZACC 40 (hereinafter Moyo 2019). 
337  See discussion in para 6.6.3 below. 
338  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law Chapter XV.  
339  Snyman Snyman’s criminal law 401. 
340  Intimidation Act s 1(1)(a) states: “Any person who without lawful reason and with intent to compel 
or induce any person or persons of a particular nature, class or kind or persons in general to do or 
to abstain from doing any act or to assume or to abandon a particular standpoint ‒ (i) assaults, 
injures or causes damage to any person; or (ii) in any manner threatens to kill, assault, injure or 
cause damage to any person or persons of a particular nature, class or kind; shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R40 000 or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such imprisonment”. 
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1(1)(b)341 ‒ intimidation by conduct inducing fear of harm (which was declared 
unconstitutional); and section 1A(1) ‒ intimidation of the general public, a particular 
section of the population, or inhabitants of a particular area.342  
In the Moyo-case, the court stated that the offence of intimidation is directed at 
behaviour constituting intimidation, thus, the conduct must be intimidatory in 
character.343 The minority in the Moyo-case noted that there is no need for the offence 
of intimidation since intimidation is encompassed by the offences of crimen iniuria, 
assault, and public violence. The majority decision pronounced the opposite in that the 
offence of intimidation is required to protect the people of South Africa against 
intimidatory conduct.344 The court found that it was incorrect to suggest that 
intimidation is incorporated by the offences of crimen iniuria, assault, and public 
violence, although these offences may overlap.345  
The Intimidation Act does not define what intimidation entails – intimidatory conduct 
must be inferred from the provisions providing for the offence itself. However, the 
wording of the Intimidation Act is so broad that it makes reading and understanding 
difficult, especially to members of the general public. The fact that intimidatory conduct 
                                                          
341  According to Intimidation Act s 1(1)(b) ‒ “Any person who acts or conducts himself in such a 
manner or utters or publishes such words that it has or they have the effect, or that it might 
reasonably be expected that the natural and probable consequences thereof would be, that a 
person perceiving the act, conduct, utterance or publication ‒ (i) fears for his own safety or the 
safety of his property or the security of his livelihood, or for the safety of any other person or the 
safety of the property of any other person or the security of the livelihood of any other person”. 
342  Intimidation Act s 1A(a) declares: “Any person who with intent to put in fear or to demoralize or to 
induce the general public, a particular section of the population or the inhabitants of a particular 
area in the Republic to do or to abstain from doing any act, in the Republic or elsewhere ‒ (a) 
commits an act of violence or threatens or attempts to do so; (b) performs any act which is aimed 
at causing, bringing about, promoting or contributing towards such act or threat of violence, or 
attempts, consents or takes any steps to perform such act; (c) conspires with any other person to 
commit, bring about or perform any act or threat referred to in paragraph (a) or act referred to in 
paragraph (b), or to aid in the commission, bringing about or performance thereof; or (d) incites, 
instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person to commit, bring 
about or perform such act or threat, Such a person is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction 
to a fine which the court may in its discretion deem fit or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
25 years or to both such fine and such imprisonment”. See also Hoctor (ed) South African Criminal 
law and procedure HA1 1. 
343  Moyo 2018 para [94]. 
344  Moyo 2018 para [85]. 
345  Moyo 2018 para [103]. See para [85] – “If the section is struck down it will leave the police without 
any means to protect the people of the country. It will also rob them of a weapon to be used against 
anyone making threats having a broader impact, such as a threat to release a poisonous substance 
into a city’s water supply, or a hoax warning that an explosive device has been placed in a football 
stadium or shopping centre”. 
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can manifest itself in many ways aids to the confusion.346  
6.6.2  Intimidatory behaviour 
As the world evolves, new forms of intimidatory behaviour appear daily. It is important 
that police are alert and properly trained to identify and prevent intimidation. The police 
frequently do not realise that participants of gatherings are exploiting the right 
guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution347 to commit organised crime or 
intimidation.348 The intimidation may be directed towards an individual or aimed 
generally at the population, or specific sections thereof. In practice, it is usually rival 
groups or different alliances in political parties who mobilise different sections of the 
community to intimidate others.    
There are many examples of intimidatory behaviour. The proper interpretation of 
section 1(1) of the Intimidation Act requires that the offence retain the same character 
in each of its manifestations ‒ the nature of all cases must be intimidatory.349 
Intimidatory acts may manifest themselves in various ways: 
Seeking to persuade a person to vote for a particular political party, or in favour of 
strike action, by standing at the entrance to the polling station, catching their eye 
and drawing one’s hand across one’s throat, simulating a knife cutting their throat, 
is an example of intimidation by act or conduct. A bank manager who threatened 
to withdraw a customer’s overdraft if they did not vote for a particular political party, 
or against a strike at the bank, is an example of intimidation by utterance or … 
sitting outside the neighbour’s house night after night, ostentatiously loading and 
unloading a firearm. The writing of anonymous threatening letters… “If you don’t 
co-operate, I know where you live and where your children go to school”.350  
Other examples, amongst others, include smearing pig’s blood on the entrance to a 
mosque accompanied by anti-Islamic slogans, or sending a threat to the media that 
unless a prisoner is freed, the water supply of a city will be poisoned, an explosive 
                                                          
346  The court in S v Motshari 2001 (1) SACR 550 (NC) (hereinafter Motshari) 554 however determined 
that the provisions of the Intimidation Act are not applicable to quarrels between live-in lovers within 
the confines of their dwellings, since the sentence options are seen as too substantial.  
347  See Chapter 3 above. 
348  See Du Plessis https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/volksblad/20181203/28184434970 
3013 (Date of use: 10 October 2020); Du Plessis https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/ 
20181206/ 281775630233625 (Date of use: 10 October 2020); South African Human Rights 
Commission v Masuku and Another 2018 (3) SA 291 (GJ) (hereinafter Masuku).   
349  Moyo 2018 para [95]. 
350  Moyo 2018 para [96]. 
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triggered, or medicine or baby food contaminated.351  
Intimidatory conduct is regularly part of the behaviour of striking employees. As such, 
a common side-effect of strike action by trade unions and employees are unlawful 
behaviour, violence and intimidation.352 Picketing rules established for strikes are not 
adhered to and strikes are marked with acts of violence and intimidation.353 This 
conduct necessitates that employers obtain court interdicts compelling striking 
workers to adhere to picketing rules, and to refrain from acts of violence and 
intimidation, the wielding of weapons, blockading premises or interfering with 
operations. For example, in DisChem Pharmacies Ltd v Malema & Others,354 picketing 
rules were issued by the CCMA, and enforced by the court; still, striking employees 
disregarded these measures. Stones were thrown at non-striking employees, passers-
by and delivery vehicles.355 The court was of opinion that being violent or committing 
acts of intimidation lead to the forfeiture of the right to conduct a picket or protest as 
part of strike action.356 In these circumstances, the behaviour of strikers are seen as 
intimidatory and, therefore, prohibited.  
Problems are currently experienced in South Africa with groups of people calling 
themselves business forums or seemingly belonging to a political party, specialising 
in intimidating building contractors or businesses. The instigators hire people, 
sometimes paying them with a meal to participate. The unlawful gatherings block the 
entrances to building sites or businesses, demanding money, jobs or shares in return 
for guaranteeing the safety of workers on the sites. The leaders of these groups may 
have interests in rival businesses or political parties.357 Their conduct is violent and 
intimidating until their demands are met.358 For example, in the matter of Impangele 
                                                          
351  Moyo 2018 para [102]. 
352  DisChem Pharmacies Ltd v Malema & Others (2019) 40 ILJ 855 (LC) (hereinafter DisChem 
Pharmacies); KPMM Road & Earthworks (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers & Construction 
Union & Others (2018) 39 ILJ 609 (LC). See also Tenza 2018 Stellenbosch LR 471. 
353  Arnolds and Coca Cola (Lakeside) (2019) 40 ILJ 1353 (CCMA). 
354  Arnolds and Coca Cola (Lakeside) (2019) 40 ILJ 855 (LC). 
355  DisChem Pharmacies 857.  
356  DisChem Pharmacies 860. See also Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA 
Workers Union & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 998 (LC) para [13]. 
357  See Selebano https://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/gwede-toe-rafel-dinge-uit-20181127 
(Date of use: 2 November 2020) ‒ Minister Gwede Mantasha testified before the Zondo-
Commission that Gupta-companies recruited organisations to put pressure on financial institutions 
to reopen Gupta bank accounts.  
358  Otto https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/beeld/20181107/282192241999444 (Date of use: 
2 November 2020). 
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Logistics,359 the respondents were restrained by a court order from intimidating, 
assaulting, harassing, or threatening the workers of mining houses. The respondents 
were obstructing normal business activities, raising havoc, and blocking gates, 
impounding and hi-jacking mine vehicles.  
From the above case, it is evident that intimidatory behaviour is not only committed by 
utterances, but also by acts or conduct. Intimidatory words may furthermore be 
published or spoken on social media. In South African Human Rights Commission v 
Masuku and Another, offensive statements targeting the Jewish community were 
made by Masuku on a website post.360 The Equality Court found that Masuku’s 
statements fall within the purview of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. Furthermore, the 
court held that it was reasonably conceivable that, in the context of the matter, a 
reasonable person in the Jewish community, in particular a Jewish person associated 
with Wits University, would probably be driven away through intimidation and fear for 
their security. It was irrelevant whether any actual attack became likely or followed,361 
or what the intention of Masuku was when he made the statements. The court referred 
to the fact that criminal law prohibits any person from intending “to put in fear or 
demoralise”362 the general public or a particular section of the population or the 
inhabitants of a particular area by threatening acts of violence against them, or inciting 
and encouraging others to commit criminal acts against them.  
6.6.3  The elements of fear and violence in intimidatory behaviour 
The possible interpretations of the element of fear and whether imminent violence is 
required were some of the reasons why section 1(1)(b) of the Intimidation Act was 
declared unconstitutional. The reasoning of the Constitutional Court is, therefore, 
                                                          
359   Impangele Logistics paras [7]-[15]. 
360  In his post he stated, inter alia, that “‘Zionists ... belong to the era of their friend Hitler’; that ‘every 
Zionist must be made to drink the bitter medicine they are feeding our brothers and sisters in 
Palestine’; that ‘we must target them ... and do all that is needed to subject them to perpetual 
suffering’. At the rally he said, inter alia, that ‘Cosatu ... can make sure that for that side it will be 
hell’; that ‘any South African family who sends its son or daughter to be part of the Israel Defence 
Force must not blame us when something happens to them with immediate effect’; and that 
‘whether it's at Wits, whether it's at Orange Grove, anyone who does not support equality and 
dignity, who does not support rights of other people must face the consequences even if it means 
that we will do something that may necessarily cause what is regarded as harm’.” See Masuku 
paras [5]-[6]. 
361  Masuku para [54]. 
362  Masuku para [54]. See para 6.4 above; Bilchitz 2019 TSAR 373. 
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important to establish the constitutionality of the rest of the provisions of the Act.363 
Section 1(1)(a) of the Intimidation Act prohibits conduct intended to compel someone 
or persons to do or not to do something,364 yet the provision does not require that fear 
must be created when intimidation takes place although fear usually plays a part in the 
commission of the offence. Usually, victims will feel intimidated because of the fear 
created to do what they are ordered to do. Section 1(1)(a) of the Act prohibits conduct 
intended to compel someone or persons to do or not to do something. The conduct 
includes assault of or damage to any person, as well as threatening to assault, kill a 
person or damage to any person. The method does not matter. Damage to any person 
includes damage to property. The conduct needs not to be violent since it is possible 
to damage property without committing a violent act, for example hacking a business’s 
financial information. The offence is extensive not only covering bodily integrity but 
also damage to property or a threat to damage property. The offence does not require 
that the threat to cause damage must inspires a belief in another that the conduct is 
immediately going to take place.365 Therefore, a mere threat to inflict damage in the 
future can be sufficient.  
On the other hand, the element of fear is required by section 1A(1) of the Act providing 
for the intimidation of a group of persons or the general public.366 Section 1A(1)(a) 
prohibits conduct intended to instil fear or to undermine or to induce the general public, 
or a part of the community, by committing an act of violence or threatening or 
attempting to do so. The method does not matter as long as the act is violent. Violence 
includes the “inflicting of bodily harm upon or killing of, or the endangering of the safety 
of, any person, or the damaging, destruction or endangering of property”.367 Anyone 
who performs any conduct which is aimed at causing or contributing towards such act 
or threat of violence, or attempts or takes any steps to perform such act,368 or 
conspires with any other to commit such an act,369 or instigates, commands or 
encourages another to commit or perform such act or threat,370 is also guilty of the 
                                                          
363  Moyo 2019 40. 
364  See footnote 341 above. 
365  See Snyman Criminal law 447-450, the elements of the offence of assault requires that it must be 
a threat of immediate violence. 
366  See footnote 343 above. 
367  Intimidation Act s 1A(4). 
368  Intimidation Act s 1A(1)(b). 
369  Intimidation Act s 1A(1)(c). 
370  Intimidation Act s 1A(1)(d). 
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offence. The offence is extensive, not only requiring the instilling of fear (‘put in fear’), 
but also providing that the general public of part thereof be demoralised or induced to 
perform or to abstain from doing any act. The above raises the question as to how a 
court will measure the degree of fear or demoralisation or inducement of the public. 
Subjective fear or demoralisation might be induced because some people are of a 
nervous disposition. The offence does not require that the threat to commit an act of 
violence must inspire a belief that it is immediately going to take place, or possibly to 
take place in the near future, or at all. Therefore, a mere threat to inflict harm in the 
future can be sufficient. Political hyperbole may also inspire fear or demoralise or 
induce the public, or part thereof.  
The difficulty in understanding and applying the concept of fear is seen in the minority 
and majority decisions of the Moyo-case371 in the Supreme Court of Appeal. In this 
case, the constitutionality of section 1(1)(b)372 was interrogated, on the grounds that 
the section violates the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in section 
16(1)373 of the Constitution, and further criminalises any speech or conduct which 
created a subjective state of fear in any person, regardless of the intention to create 
fear.374 According to the minority decision in the Moyo-case, the text of section 1(1)(b) 
does not require that fear be caused intentionally or negligently. The minority found 
that the use of the word ‘or’ distinguishes between two situations: one in which fear is 
created, whether reasonably or not, and another in which reasonable fear might be 
created, regardless of whether it was in fact created.375 On the plain meaning of 
section 1(1)(b), it was assumed to include acts or conduct not relating to violence.376 
The fundamental problem with this section was that it obliterates the distinction 
between “true threats” and “political hyperbole.”377 The minority was of opinion that the 
                                                          
371  Moyo 2018 313. In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the cases of Moyo and Sonti were consolidated. 
In Moyo para [8], after Moyo’s request for a proposed march was denied; “he threatened to make 
sure that the complainants were removed, he threatened a repeat of Marikana, he stated that there 
will be bloodshed, he pointed fingers at the complainants, he charged towards the complainants, 
and he said that the complainants will not last at Primrose Police Station”. In the Sonti-matter, Sonti 
was prosecuted under ss 1(1)(a)(ii) and 1(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The charge originated from telephone 
calls and text messages threatening to kill and burn down a house, forwarded in an attempt to 
compel the complainant to withdraw a criminal complaint. See para [10]. 
372  See footnote 342 above. 
373  See para 6.4.2 above. 
374  Moyo 2018 para [25]. 
375  Moyo 2018 para [27]. 
376  Moyo 2018 para [28]. 
377  Moyo 2018 para [30]. 
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section creates over-breadth which could not be cured by an attempt to read it down, 
thus, it limits the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in section 16 of the 
Constitution,378 and is unconstitutional.379  
The majority, on the other hand, found that an intimidatory act is criminal if it induces 
fear or the natural and probable consequence would be that it induces fear in a person 
observing the behaviour. A person who makes the threat can be prosecuted without it 
being necessary for anyone among the public to testify that they experienced fear as 
a result of the threat. The prosecution must establish that fear would reasonably have 
been expected as the natural and probable consequence of the threat. Fear only 
qualifies if it would reasonably be expected to arise; therefore, subjective fear that 
might be induced because some people are of a timid nature would not qualify.380 The 
court found that political hyperbole requires mens rea, and that the fear must be both 
genuine and reasonable, and based on imminent harm, not a general state of 
nervousness, concern or apprehension. When conduct is lawful in the sense of 
enjoying either constitutional or statutory protection, then it is not intimidatory.381 The 
context of the threat of violence is accordingly important.382   
In the appeal to the Constitutional Court,383 the defence argued that the way the 
majority interpreted the provision amounts to an impermissible reading-in, and that the 
section was ‘read-down’ in a manner that did not accord with the text.384 Furthermore, 
that when reading-in is permissible, the interpretation accepted by the majority would 
                                                          
378  Moyo 2018 para [35]. 
379  Moyo 2018 para [50]. The minority decision was also based on the legislative history of s 1(1)(b) 
of the Act. See para [43] where it is stated that “the offence of intimidation is a product of apartheid 
era legislation that was designed to control dissent against an unjust system. It is clear that its 
purpose has been rendered constitutionally offensive in modern day South Africa”. The judge found 
at para [45] that “section 1(1)(b) of the Act constitutes one of the last and most insidious of the 
apartheid regime’s efforts to curtail freedom of expression and political action that were aimed at 
bringing that abominable regime to an end. It has no place in a free, open and democratic South 
Africa which respects, protects, promotes and fulfils the right to freedom of expression, and falls to 
be struck from our statute books”. The same argument was made in Economic Freedom Fighters 
2019 para [6.4]. In this case, the court held at para [2] that laws enacted before the hard-fought 
democracy was won, are not automatically unconstitutional. Instead, all laws, whether enacted 
prior to 1994 or in the successive democratic years, must yield to the norms, values and letter of 
the Constitution.  
380  Moyo 2018 para [107].  
381  Moyo 2018 para [138].   
382  Moyo 2018 paras [139], [147]. It is a defence to a charge of s 1(1)(b) that the accused was 
exercising the right to freedom of expression conferred by s 16(1) of the Constitution. 
383  Moyo 2019 para [40]. 
384  Moyo 2019 paras [41], [46]. 
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be overly broad due to vagueness.385 The majority accepted that “intimidation means 
some kind of incitement to imminent harm or an inculcation of a reasonable fear for 
imminent harm.”386 Therefore, inserting ‘intimidation’ under section 1(1)(b) within the 
ambit of section 16(2) of the Constitution will not infringe on the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of expression or peaceful protest.387 However, the 
Constitutional Court was of the opinion that the offence does not carry this wide 
meaning, and held that: 
...any intentional conduct that creates objectively reasonable fear of harm to 
person, property or security of livelihood is covered, then it is overbroad because 
it would criminalise protected free speech that does not incite imminent violence 
and probably also peaceful forms of protest.388  
This understanding does not resemble section 16(2)(b) of the Constitution,389 or 
appears in the text or in the context of the Intimidation Act.390 Intimidatory conduct 
provided for in section 1(1)(b) addresses ‘fear for one’s safety’, or the ‘fear for the 
safety of one’s property or security of one’s livelihood’, and does not support that the 
fear is related to actual harm or that the threat of such harm should be imminent.391 In 
the Constitutional Court’s view:  
…the majority’s interpretation of intimidation amounts to an unjustified ‘reading-in’ 
that unduly strains the text, since the section itself contains no mention of imminent 
violence. The proper reading of the section does not include incitement of imminent 
violence, but only covers intentional conduct that creates an objectively reasonable 
fear of harm to person, property or security of livelihood, therefore it can criminalise 
protected free speech and probably also peaceful forms of protest.392  
Since a literal reading of section 1(1)(b) appears to “criminalise any expressive act 
which induces any fear, of any kind, for one’s own safety, or the safety of one’s 
property, the security of one’s livelihood, or the safety of another,”393 the Constitutional 
Court found that the offence casts the net of liability too wide as it depends simply on 
the experience of fear by another.   
                                                          
385  Moyo 2019 para [47]. 
386  Moyo 2019 para [64]. 
387  Moyo 2019 para [65]. 
388  Moyo 2019 para [65]. 
389  Moyo 2019 para [66]. 
390  Moyo 2019 para [67]. 
391  Moyo 2019 para [44]. 
392  Moyo 2019 para [69]. 
393  Moyo 2019 para [44]. 
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The above arguments find application in the provisions of the remaining sections of 
the Intimidation Act. The wording ‘to put in fear or to demoralise or to induce’ and to 
‘performs any act which is aimed to cause, bring about, promote or contribute toward 
such act’ are unclear, vague and difficult to understand for unrepresented or 
represented accused. Section 1A(1)(a) of the Act can also criminalise political 
hyperbole and emotionally charged rhetoric in the context of political and industrial 
action. By not defining the meaning of fear, to demoralise or to induce, implies that 
any speech or conduct which created a subjective state of fear in any person, 
regardless of the intention to create fear, to demoralise or to induce, is criminalised. 
The Act attempts to qualify the conduct by referring to acts of violence which mostly 
can be deemed as serious. However, the Act does not require imminent violence or 
that the act of violence must be able to take place in the near future. Consequently, it 
will be difficult to identify the unlawful conduct that the provisions seek to address. 
When provisions are open to different interpretations, it does not conform to the 
requirements of the Constitution, or regional and international instruments. When a 
provision needs reading-in in order to bring it into conformity with the Constitution, care 
should be taken that the text is not rewritten in order to achieve clarity. Furthermore, 
a statutory offence must be clear so that an unrepresented accused understands the 
details of the charge, and is informed in sufficient detail. Therefore, it is foreseen that 
the remaining sections of the Intimidation Act will properly also fail the constitutional 
test.  
6.6.4  Presumptions in the Act 
Section 1A(2) and (3) of the Intimidation Act create presumptions. Section 1A(2) 
declares that:  
…if it is proven by the prosecution that the accused committed an act of violence 
or threatens or attempts or performs any act which is aimed at causing, bringing 
about, promoting or contributing towards such act or threat of violence, or attempts, 
consents or takes any steps to perform such act or conspires with any other person 
to commit, bring about or perform any act or threat or to aid in the commission, 
bringing about or performance thereof or incites, instigates, commands, aids, 
advises, encourages or procures any other person to commit, bring about or 
perform such act or threat; and it resulted or was likely to have resulted in putting 
fear, demoralise or  induce the general public or a section thereof to do or to abstain 
from doing something, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the 
accused has committed that act with intent to achieve just such object. 
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This presumption raises more problems than give answers since the prosecution does 
not need to prove that the act of violence394 or threat of violence is imminent, or will 
take place in the near future, or will take place at all. Any threatening utterance of harm 
will be sufficient to commit the offence. The act or threat must only likely result in 
putting fear in or demoralising or inducing the general public. Actual fear, 
demoralisation, or inducement is not a requirement. The presumption is too broad and 
vague to withstand constitutional muster.  
Section 1A(3) of the Intimidation Act determines that when it is proven that the accused 
had unlawfully in his or her possession any automatic or semi-automatic rifle, machine 
gun, sub-machine gun, machine pistol, rocket launcher, recoilless gun or mortar, or 
any ammunition for or component part of such weaponry, or any grenade, mine, bomb 
or explosive, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused had it in 
his or her possession to achieve the object of putting fear, demoralise or induce the 
general public or a section thereof to do or to abstain from doing something.395 The 
possession of any of the above-named items generally will put fear into members of 
the public when threatened with acts of violence. 
6.6.5  Offences of unacceptable conduct relating to witnesses 
Very few people in South Africa seem to be prosecuted for the offences created in the 
Intimidation Act.396 One reason for this supposition is that many people who have been 
subjected to intimidation are, precisely because of the intimidation, afraid of laying 
criminal charges, or to testifying about the commission of the offence in a court.397 
Particularly when intimidatory behaviour has the support of the community, huge 
numbers from the community attend court cases,398 which can be seen as passive 
intimidation. The community members are in front of the court building, in the 
passages, and in the court rooms. Their sheer numbers create fear and discourage 
witnesses to testify. In most instances, complainants are scared and of opinion that 
the courts cannot guarantee their safety, and as such choose not to testify in court.  
                                                          
394  See footnote 367 for the definition of violence as in Intimidation Act s 1A(4). 
395  Intimidation Act s 1A(3). 
396  Snyman Criminal law 455.  
397  Snyman Criminal law 455. 
398  Snyman Criminal law 455. 
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In this regard, section 18 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 
of 2004 was enacted to provide for offences with regard to unacceptable conduct 
concerning witnesses. These offences have a narrower field of focus than the 
Intimidation Act. When a person directly or indirectly intimidates or uses physical force, 
or improperly persuades or coerces another person, with the intent to ‒ 
(a) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of that person or another person as 
a witness in a trial, hearing or other proceedings before any court, judicial 
officer, committee, commission or any officer authorised by law to hear 
evidence or take testimony; or 
(b) cause or induce399 any person to- 
(i) testify in a particular way or fashion or in an untruthful manner in a trial, 
hearing or other proceedings before any court, judicial officer, 
committee, commission or officer authorised by law to hear evidence 
or take testimony; 
(ii) withhold testimony or to withhold a record, document, police docket or 
other object at such trial, hearing or proceedings; 
(iii) give or withhold information relating to any aspect at any such trial, 
hearing or proceedings; 
(iv) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal a record, document, police docket 
or other object with the intent to impair the availability of such record, 
document, police docket or other object for use at such trial, hearing or 
proceedings; 
(v) give or withhold information relating to or contained in a police docket; 
(vi) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness or 
to produce any record, document, police docket or other object at such 
trial, hearing or proceedings; or 
(vii) be absent from such trial, hearing or other proceedings, 
he or she is guilty of such an offence.400 
Although the Act does not define the verb ‘intimidates’, it alludes to the use of physical 
force, improper persuasion, or coercing someone to do something. As such, the 
section is informative towards what conduct is deemed unlawful and unacceptable. 
Although the offence falls under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act, there is no reason why it could not be applicable when witnesses in other kinds 
of cases, for example, rape or public violence, are intimidated.  
                                                          
399  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act s 1 ‒ ‘Induce’ includes “to persuade, 
encourage, coerce, intimidate or threaten or cause a person and inducement has a corresponding 
meaning”.  
400  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act s 18. 
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The Act provides that any person who attempts, conspires with any other person, or 
aids, abets, induces, incites, instigates, instructs, commands, counsels or procures 
another person, to commit an offence in terms of this Act, is guilty of an offence.401 
The offences also regulates on extraterritorial jurisdiction.402 In certain circumstances, 
even though the offence was committed outside the Republic, a court in the Republic 
have jurisdiction in respect of the offence, or the offence is being deemed to be 
committed in the Republic. Section 1A(1) of the Intimidation Act further reiterates that 
the conduct of the person who intends to put fear or induce the general public or part 
thereof, can take place in the Republic, or elsewhere. The word ‘elsewhere’ indicates 
that the person does not need to be in South Africa. 
Any person who is convicted of these offences under the Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act is liable; in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a High 
Court, to a fine or to imprisonment up to a period for imprisonment for life; in the case 
of a sentence to be imposed by a regional court, to a fine or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding eighteen years; or in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a 
magistrate's court, to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.403 
The court may impose a fine equal to five times the value of the gratification 
involved.404   
These offences are more clearly drafted and understandable to the general public than 
the broad offence of intimidation under the Intimidation Act. It will, however, depend 
on the discretion of the prosecutor under which Act prosecution is instituted. It is 
suggested that the government revisit the Intimidation Act, and consider enacting 
offences to prohibit specific conduct. It will create the opportunity to enact legislation 
with regard to intimidation that is more user-friendly and informative.   
6.6.6  Intimidation laws in England and India 
The current offences under the Intimidation Act have a general, broader scope which 
can be seen as difficult to read and understand by the general public. In England and 
India, the governments enacted legislation to provide for specific problems 
                                                          
401  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act s 21. 
402  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act s 35. 
403  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act s 26. 
404  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act s 26(1)(a)(iii). 
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experienced in their countries. The wording is more specific, therefore, more 
informative with regard to what conduct is considered unacceptable.   
6.6.7.1  England 
Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994405 provides for 
intimidation, and specifically comments on witnesses, jurors and others. Subsection 
(1) focuses on police investigation and court proceedings, while subsection (2) 
highlights harm406 done to any person: 
(1)  A person commits an offence if ‒ 
(a)  he does an act which intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another 
person (“the victim”), 
(b)  he does the act knowing or believing that the victim is assisting in the 
investigation of an offence407 or is a witness or potential witness or a 
juror or potential juror in an offence, and 
(c)  he does it intending thereby to cause the investigation or the course of 
justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with. 
(2)  A person commits an offence if ‒ 
(a)  he does an act which harms, and is intended to harm, another person 
or, intending to cause another person to fear harm, he threatens to do 
an act which would harm that other person, 
(b)  he does or threatens to do the act knowing or believing that the person 
harmed or threatened to be harmed (“the victim”), or some other 
person, has assisted in an investigation into an offence or has given 
evidence or particular evidence in proceedings for an offence, or has 
acted as a juror or concurred in a particular verdict in proceedings for 
an offence, and 
(c)  he does or threatens to do it because of that knowledge or belief. 
It is immaterial whether the act or threat is made in the presence of the victim, or to a 
person other than the victim.408 A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable 
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a 
fine or both, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.409 
                                                          
405  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 C 33 part 111. 
406  According to s 51(4) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, the harm may be financial or 
physical.  
407  Investigation into an offence means such an investigation by the police or other person charged 
with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders; offence includes an alleged or 
suspected offence, see Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 51(9).  
408  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 51(3). 
409  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act s 51(6). See also Glazebrook Blackstone’s statutes on 
Criminal law 209-211.   
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Section 21 of the Summary Offences Act 113 of 1981 criminalises conduct that 
comprises intimidation, obstruction, and hindering ‒   
1)  Every person commits an offence who, with intent to frighten or intimidate 
any other person, or knowing that his or her conduct is likely to cause that 
other person reasonably to be frightened or intimidated, ‒ a) threatens to 
injure that other person or any member of his or her family, or to damage any 
of that person’s property; or (b) follows that other person; or (c) hides any 
property owned or used by that other person or deprives that person of, or 
hinders that person in the use of, that property; or (d) watches or loiters near 
the house or other place, or the approach to the house or other place, where 
that other person lives, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be; 
or (e) stops, confronts, or accosts that other person in any public place. 
(2)  Every person commits an offence who forcibly hinders or prevents any 
person from working at or exercising any lawful trade, business, or 
occupation. 
(3)  Every person who commits an offence against this section is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding 
$2,000. 
The section provides for specific problems encountered in England. Section 39 of the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 also deals with the intimidation of witnesses:  
(1)  A person commits an offence if ‒ (a) he does an act which intimidates, and 
is intended to intimidate, another person (“the victim”); (b) he does the act ‒ 
(i) knowing or believing that the victim is or may be a witness in any relevant 
proceedings; and (ii) intending, by his act, to cause the course of justice to 
be obstructed, perverted or interfered with; and (c) the act is done after the 
commencement of those proceedings.” 
It is immaterial if the act is perpetrated in the presence of the victim, or done to the 
victim, or to another person.410 A person is liable on conviction on indictment, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or to both, and on 
summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine 
not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.  
The Serious Organised Offence and Police Act 2005411 regulates the offence of 
intimidation of persons connected with a research organisation. The category of 
persons who can be intimidated under this offence includes an employee or officer of 
an animal research organisation, a student at an educational establishment that is an 
animal research organisation, a lessor or licensor of any premises occupied by an 
                                                          
410  Criminal Justice and Police Act s 39(2). 
411  Serious Organised Offence and Police Act s 146.   
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animal research organisation, a person with a financial interest in, or who provides 
financial assistance to, an animal research organisation, or a customer or supplier of 
an animal research organisation. As evidenced by the variety of offences created in 
England on different types of intimidation, the crime is perceived as an important and 
serious offence, especially since the sentences prescribed are stern. Some of the 
offences do overlap. The wording used in these provisions is more understandable to 
the man on the street than the wording of the Intimidation Act of South Africa.  
6.6.7.2 India 
Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code clarifies the offence of criminal intimidation: 
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or 
to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent 
to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not 
legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to 
do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal 
intimidation.412 
Punishment for criminal intimidation consists of imprisonment of either description for 
a term which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both.413 Section 507 again 
provides for criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication: 
Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous 
communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the 
person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment 
provided for the offence by the last preceding section.414  
The application of the South African Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 
overlaps with the elements of these offences. Under this Act, it is possible to apply to 
a court to obtain information regarding harassing anonymous communications 
directed towards a person in South Africa.415 
Still, in contrast to the specific legislation on intimidation in India and England (as 
discussed above), South Africa does not possess such detailed laws to contend with 
particular problems such as the intimidation of truck drivers, businesses, witnesses, 
court personal, or political factions. It may be beneficial for the government to create 
                                                          
412  The Indian Penal Code, 1860 no 45 of 1860 1, Chapter XXII 1452-1454.  
413  The Indian Penal Code s 506. 
414  The Indian Penal Code s 507. 
415  Protection from Harassment Act s 4. 
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specific offences to cater for these situations. It is important that the wording for these 
offences to curb intimidation must be user-friendly and instructive since intimidation is 
regularly an element of protest action.  
6.7  Conclusion 
South Africa uses a mixture of common law and statutory offences to curb occurrences 
of public order misbehaviour. These offences were not specifically enacted to curtail 
unlawful conduct during gatherings, and have a more general application. Accordingly, 
it can be difficult for an ordinary member of the public to anticipate possible charges 
that may be raised against him of her stemming from utilising the right under section 
17 of the Constitution.  
The current supplementary offences of sedition, trespassing, incitement, road traffic 
offences, and intimidation are not adequate to deal with conduct before or at 
gatherings or public order misbehaviour. The reasons for protest and how these 
demonstrations take place are ever changing, therefore, provision must be made for 
new trends and developments. Legislation prohibiting conduct before and during 
gatherings must be easily accessible, clear, and understandable to the man on the 
street. Conduct that is unacceptable must be listed as well as steps that will be taken 
against participants if they commit offences. It is suggested that the government 
reconsiders the offences utilised to curb public order misbehaviour, and contemplate 
enacting offences to prohibit specific conduct that is problematic in the South African 
context. These offences, the powers of the police in these situations, and international 
and regional guidelines (as discussed in chapter two) must be grouped together as 
public order offences to ensure user-friendliness. 
In the last chapter of this research, a summary of the thesis will be provided, followed 
by recommendations and a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Summary 
In Chapter one, the background of this study is explained. To gather together is a 
natural human activity shared by people. Usually gatherings are of no interest to the 
law, they do not need any regulation, and take place without any involvement of the 
government. South Africa protects the right to assemble peacefully, to demonstrate, 
to picket, or present petitions in section 17 of the Constitution. However, the 
Constitution does not only guarantee the right to gather, but also indicates when this 
right may be limited. The right to gather is essential since gatherings represent the 
voice of the ordinary man on the street as a means of expressing concerns. Therefore, 
peaceful gatherings must be benefitted from as far as possible without any regulation.  
In this regard, the government has the responsibility to assist and enable its citizens 
to gather peacefully and unarmed. However, more often than not when people gather 
‒ be it peaceful or violent ‒ participants run the risk of being arrested for committing 
offences. The manner in which the government of the day reacts to gatherings 
influences the policing, prosecution, and adjudicating of offences that arise from the 
right to gather. This study focuses on offences that arise from the right to gather and 
is concerned with the question whether these offences are adequate to encompass 
current concerns, for example, the use of social media to inculcate protest. The 
offences that arise from the right to gather are differentiated from other offences since 
these transgressions are qualified by a wealth of guidelines and case law from regional 
and international instruments. Therefore, this study comprised a comparative 
qualitative research methodology where South African offences as regards to unlawful 
gatherings are compared with the selected foreign legislation and case law of England 
and India, as well as international and regional guidelines.   
Since South Africa is party to a variety of international and regional instruments, 
Chapter two investigates the application of international and regional law on 
gatherings in this country. Gatherings, whether peaceful and violent, are a constant 
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factor in South African life. The Constitution directs that international and foreign law 
are applicable in South Africa, and that courts ‒ when interpreting the Bill of Rights ‒ 
must consider international law, and may consider foreign law. Therefore, it is 
imperative to identify circumstances wherein international or regional instruments 
have already applied the right to gather when violated by a government. These 
instruments issue guidelines to aid governments to comply with international legal 
norms and standards. The guidelines assist with the interpretation of legislation 
governing the right to gather, and give meaningful context to the application of the 
right. The Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly as discussed in paragraph 
2.4.3, the Guidelines on freedom of association and assembly in Africa as elaborated 
on in paragraph 2.4.2, and the General comment examined in paragraph 2.4.1 are 
generally all in conformity, and can be seen as universal human rights standards, since 
the documents are based on case-law and international standards of human rights. 
These guiding materials are designed to assist governments to adapt existing national 
legislation to meet this standard. Existing legislation and common law offences utilised 
to curb disorder in South Africa must, therefore, be measured against these guidelines. 
Chapter three considered the duty of the government to enact national legislation to 
support and give meaning to section 17 of the Constitution. Legislation, for example, 
the Gatherings Act, must aid the Constitution by regulating the holding of public 
gatherings and demonstrations, therefore, assisting citizens to arrange protest action. 
The right is easily limited, for example, by arresting or prosecuting organisers or 
participants of gatherings. Accordingly, legislation that governs gatherings and the 
conduct of the executive when facilitating gatherings, must be reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom. Although the Constitution protects peaceful gatherings, it depends on the 
circumstances of each gathering what is deemed peaceful. Proper police training is 
essential since police conduct at a peaceful gathering may trigger violence. Chapter 
three focuses on how the Constitution guarantees the right to gather but also permits 
for limitations in accordance with section 36, as reviewed in paragraph 3.4. National 
laws and by-laws promulgated by local governments support the right to gather, but 
may also limit the right to gather to the extent allowed by the Constitution. Certain 
provisions of the Gatherings Act have already been the subject of constitutional 
challenges, for example, in the Mlungwana-case (see the discussion at paragraph 
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3.4), the court found that the criminal sanctions in section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings 
Act constitute a limitation to the exercise of section 17 of the Constitution, since all the 
appellants acquired criminal convictions for the failure to give notice of a gathering.  
In Chapter four, the Gatherings Act that regulates public gatherings and 
demonstrations is discussed. This Act confirms that every person has a right to 
assemble peacefully with other people so as to publicly communicate their opinions 
on any matter freely. The Gatherings Act must act as an instrument to insure the right 
to assemble, demonstrate, picket or to petition as guaranteed in section 17 of the 
Constitution. Accordingly, the Act focuses on safeguarding non-violent gatherings, and 
to provide for police powers in facilitating gatherings and demonstrations. The 
Gatherings Act criminalises certain unlawful conduct in relation to the arrangement of 
gatherings or while the gatherings or demonstrations are in progress. The object of 
the Act is to balance the right to gather against not unjustifiably infringing on the rights 
of others.  
Procedures are furthermore provided for persons who wish to arrange a gathering. As 
such, the first point of reference when a member of the public considers organising 
protest action, is the Act itself. However, the language used in the Gatherings Act is 
difficult to understand, confusing, and not user-friendly. Although the Act stipulates 
that notification be given of the protest, the procedure can easily be mistaken for 
permission required from the local authority, and is, therefore, also misused by local 
authorities. The provision criminalising the failure to notify the local authority of an 
intended gathering has been declared unconstitutional. However, the notification 
procedure is still in place. This decision renders an already inept Act mainly ineffective 
to provide in its purpose, since quite a few of the other offences are linked to the notice 
of gatherings. Many of the provisions of the Gatherings Act will possibly not withstand 
future constitutional muster. 
In Chapter five, the common-law offence of public violence is highlighted. This offence 
is essentially utilised by the state in cases of violent gatherings, dissent, mass-action, 
protests, or when groups of persons are fighting. An extensive range of acts, 
depending on the circumstances, fall within the definition, for example, the offence is 
applicable to the landless poor trespassing; gangs fighting; communities burning 
property; employees picketing; a private party turning violent; or soccer hooligans 
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fighting, as long as the conduct acquires serious proportions, and the intent is to 
disturb the public peace and tranquillity forcefully, or to violate others’ rights. One must 
take into account, however, that international and regional instruments allow for some 
degree of harassment, isolated acts of violence, conduct that annoy or give offence or 
temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the daily going-about of members of the 
public, while still deeming the gathering peaceful. Any of the abovementioned conduct 
will not render a gathering as a whole unpeaceful. The manner in which a police 
member interprets conduct at a gathering is consequently important to decide if the 
common-law offence of public violence has been committed or not. 
In certain countries such as England and India, specific offences have been created 
to cater for specific problems experienced with public order. These countries have 
moved away from the one-offence-fits-all-conduct-approach to enact legislation to 
cater for specific problems with reasonable sentences. In South Africa, the offence of 
public violence does not provide for a scale of serious to less serious conduct with 
correlating, applicable sentences as in these countries. It appears convenient for the 
state to prosecute any unlawful gathering conduct under the public violence umbrella.  
Some of the elements of public violence are open for interpretation, for example, the 
requirement that conduct must constitute ‘serious dimensions’. This prerequisite 
implies that participants will not be arrested or prosecuted for minor forms of violence. 
Also, the number of persons needed to commit this offence varies from case to case, 
and cannot be predicted beforehand, since it is closely linked with the requirement that 
conduct must reach serious proportions. It is assumed that the ordinary, 
unrepresented member of society will struggle to establish what conduct is 
criminalised as public violence, or when conduct will become unlawful. The 
perspective of the police also needs to be established, as it is the police members on 
the scene who evaluate conduct as forceful, violent, or in excess, and, therefore, the 
offence of public violence. It is further challenging to determine when exactly the public 
peace and order is disturbed, or the rights of others infringed, since most gatherings 
will annoy or hamper other citizens in their daily activities. The reality is that it is only 
at the end of a trial, when the presiding officer has heard and considered all the 
evidence, to conclude whether all the requirements of the definition have been met. 
The offence of public violence is, therefore, not clearly defined, and can possibly not 
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legitimately be regarded as a criminal offence.  
In Chapter six, the offence of sedition, offences under the Trespassing Act 6 of 1959, 
incitement under the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956, offences under the National 
Road Traffic Regulations 2000, and offences under the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 are 
visited. These offences constitute a piece-meal of statutory and common-law offences, 
and some were never intended to be applicable to gatherings. Participants of 
gatherings are, therefore, never certain, when arrested, to what charges they will need 
to answer. 
In paragraph 6.2, the common-law offence of sedition is discussed. After 1990, it 
seems that no prosecution was instituted under this offence in South Africa since the 
prosecution preferred to proceed with the common-law offence of public violence, 
terrorist- and related activity offences, or incitement to commit offences. In certain 
neighbouring countries such as Namibia and Lesotho, which previously formed part of 
South Africa, prosecution for sedition continued. The offence of sedition was created 
to be utilised in serious circumstances as a means of suppressing revolutionary calls 
for political and social reform, or when it is detrimental to the authority of the state. 
This offence can be abused by the government of the day to silence any criticism ‒ 
since the provisions do not qualify to which degree the authority of the state must be 
defiled or assailed, and whether this may include any censure of the state.  
The offences under the Trespass Act are discussed in paragraph 6.3. The Trespass 
Act prohibits unlawful entry or presence upon land and in buildings. This Act covers 
trespassing in general on occupied and unoccupied land, or buildings or parts of 
buildings without providing for different conceivable circumstances, or for the motives 
why persons are trespassing. It accordingly has a one-sentence-fits-all approach. 
Currently, the Act is utilised as an important tool to combat violent protest action and 
land invasion of state or private property, and to restore public order. However, there 
are different Acts in South Africa that govern eviction and occupation, which can be 
confusing to the general man on the street. Again, in contrast to other countries where 
specific trespassing offences were created for unique problems with distinct sentences 
fitting the crime, South Africa mainly relies on the Trespass Act. In England, for 
example, the legislation provides for the powers of the police in each trespassing 
situation. Participants are first informed and ordered to disperse, thereby receiving an 
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opportunity to rectify their conduct. The police powers as prescribed in the Act 
strengthen the ability of the police to facilitate trespassers, and the provisions also 
have an educational purpose; informing owners, occupiers and trespassers what to 
expect from the police in different trespassing scenarios.  
In paragraph 6.4, the common-law offence of incitement to public violence as well as 
the statutory offence of incitement to commit a serious offence under section 18(2)(b) 
of the Riotous Assemblies Act are discussed. Section 17 of this Act confirms the 
circumstances in which the common-law offence is deemed to be committed. Section 
18 provides for the attempt, conspiracy or inducement of another person to commit an 
offence. Although the offence of incitement is a useful tool to deter political leaders 
from inciting their supporters to commit criminal deeds, the Riotous Assemblies Act is 
clouded in controversy, and seen as originating from apartheid-era laws. As such, the 
Act is regarded as archaic legislation utilised to persecute erstwhile liberation fighters. 
The offence of incitement as set out under the Riotous Assemblies Act does not 
require that it must take place during a gathering. Incitement occurring by means of 
social media seems to be a growing trend. When political leaders incite their 
supporters, it is difficult to distinguish between heated political rhetoric, utterances 
prohibited by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 
of 2000, or incitement to commit serious or non-serious offences.  
The offences under the National Road Traffic Regulations are discussed in paragraph 
6.5. These offences are important when protest action takes place on public roads. In 
such situations, it is difficult to prove that persons acted together in concert or with a 
common purpose, especially during violent gatherings. Therefore, it is easier to hold 
individuals or smaller groups accountable for certain conduct under the National Road 
Traffic Regulations. Protest action on roads, the shutting down of roads, or causing 
damage to vehicles attracts the attention of the general public by triggering 
inconvenience, losses, and damage. It is not always clear what the cause of the protest 
action is. The opportunity is usually exploited to loot cargo from trucks. The Act assists 
the state to prosecute individuals seen to commit an offence during protest action.  
The Intimidation Act is discussed in paragraph 6.6. In South Africa, intimidation 
frequently forms part of the conduct at a gathering. Pressure is placed on an individual, 
the government, groups, or the public, to refrain from doing something or to do 
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something. To differentiate between threats, intimidation, and political hyperbole may 
create a problem, as seen in the approach of the court in the Moyo-case in 2018, as 
examined in paragraphs 6.6.2 and 6.6.4. From the minority and majority decisions, it 
is clear that the wording of the Intimidation Act can be difficult to apply and understand. 
In the 2019 Moyo-case, sections 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Intimidation Act were declared 
unconstitutional and invalid. It is submitted that the remaining offences in the Act will 
follow suit. The current remaining offences in the Intimidation Act are difficult to read 
and understand. The average member of the public or unrepresentative accused will 
find the wording confusing. The field of application of these offences is broad, as the 
Act attempts to include all possible conduct under the offence. Section 1A of the Act 
demands that intimidatory conduct must instil fear in, or demoralise or induce those 
being addressed, yet, these terms are not defined or explained. Although this section 
may be used to criminalise political hyperbole and emotionally charged rhetoric in the 
context of political and industrial action, by not defining these important terms the 
inference is created that any speech or conduct which generates a subjective state of 
fear in any person, regardless of the intention to create fear, to demoralise or to induce, 
is criminalised. The Act refers to acts of violence to indicate that the intimidatory 
conduct must be serious, however, the Act does not require imminent violence or that 
the act of violence must be able to take place in the near future, or at all. When a 
provision requires ‘reading-in’ in order to bring it into conformity with the Constitution, 
it properly will fail the constitutional test.  
7.2 Recommendations 
After examining the various offences rising from the right to gather in South African 
legislation as well as applicable case law on the offences arising from this right, and 
comparing how the right to gather is considered in international and regional 
instruments together with relevant legislation in England and India, the following 
recommendations can be made: 
7.2.1  Application of the guidelines in international- and regional instruments 
In Chapter two, it is pointed out that although international- and regional case law and 
guidelines are available, this guiding material is generally not part of the training 
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courses of police officials, prosecutors and magistrates. Decisions are made daily in 
courts and police stations without considering any relevant international- and regional 
case law and guidelines. Available international- and regional guidelines may sway 
the decision as to whether a participant must be arrested or prosecuted. It will be 
beneficial for the South African government to incorporate applicable guidelines in 
legislation, so as to be easily accessible not only to organisers and participants, but 
also to police members who facilitate gatherings. It is important that participants are 
informed of the limitations that accompany this right. Guidelines can assist in 
measuring the conduct of the executive with regard to the facilitation of gatherings, 
and also create a framework for the conduct of the participant.  
7.2.2  Consolidating all public order offences in one Act 
In Chapter three, it is recommended that legislation which regulates gatherings must 
aid the values in the Constitution, therefore, assisting citizens to arrange protest action 
or to gather. South Africa follows a piece-meal approach in curbing public order 
misbehaviour. Several statutory and common-law offences are utilised to bring 
perpetrators to book. Most of these offences utilised by the prosecution were not 
specifically enacted to prevent unlawful conduct during gatherings, and have a more 
general application. Hence, members of the public may struggle to grasp the extent of 
applicable law, and to understand when certain conduct constitutes an offence, 
especially when utilising their right to gather. It is consequently recommended that all 
the public order offences must be consolidated into one Act. It is anticipated that the 
constitutionality of offences under the Gatherings Act, the common law, and other 
legislation providing for offences that arise from the right to gather, will be subjected 
to constitutional scrutiny in the near future.  
7.2.3  Clear-cut definitions crucial in the Gatherings Act 
The definitions contained in the Gatherings Act must be re-examined and linked to the 
wording of section 17 of the Constitution. The meaning of the word ‘gathering’ must 
be revisited ‒ a possible solution is to delineate a ‘gathering’ as including the activities 
of assemblies, demonstrations, pickets and petitioning. The Gatherings Act also 
distinguishes between demonstrations and gatherings in terms of the size of the group, 
and where the congregation took place. Gatherings require notification (when more 
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than fifteen persons intend to gather), while demonstrations can proceed without 
notification (when less than sixteen persons plan to gather). It becomes problematic 
when a demonstration is held and people join in solidarity increasing the participants 
to more than fifteen persons. The Gatherings Act is furthermore silent on what steps 
an organiser must take in such circumstances in order to rectify the situation. In 
Mlungwana, as discussed in paragraph 4.3, the court considered that the distinction 
between a gathering and a demonstration is arbitrary and irrational, as it is unclear 
why sixteen participants is an appropriate number to require notification. The court 
advised expanding the number of people that may be convened without notice. It is 
recommended that the difference between what a gathering and demonstration entail 
must fall away. The Gatherings Act also does not attempt to exclude certain activities 
from notifications, for example, social or spiritual events. The Act must assist the 
meeting of persons for a common expressive purpose. As such, certain activities, for 
example, social, spiritual and cultural must expressly be excluded from any regulation 
by the government. 
7.2.4  Responsibilities to arrange and monitor gatherings to be streamlined 
Section 8 of the Act provides for specific duties which need to be adhered to by the 
organisers, marshals, and participants of gatherings. When organisers and 
participants do not have access to administrative and financial support, it can be 
problematic to adhere to these duties. The Act also does not provide for training to be 
provided to the organiser or marshals to support them in fulfilling their duties, for 
example, with regard to crowd control. 
Additionally, the actual arrangement of the gathering is problematic. It is difficult to 
anticipate the number of participants and the number of marshals necessary to control 
the participants. It is basically impossible to hold the organiser and marshals 
responsible if the gathering does not proceed peacefully. The possibility of being 
criminally prosecuted, when duties were not properly executed, has a chilling effect on 
the right to gather. In this regard, there are less restrictive means to keep role players 
responsible when arranging gatherings as offered in Mlungwana (see paragraph 3.4). 
In this case, the court proposed utilising non-criminal punishments, and relying on 
other existing criminal provisions that permit police to deal with protests that pose a 
risk to public order or safety. Restorative justice methods can also successfully be 
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implemented. 
The marshals employed to monitor gatherings are usually not impartial persons but 
appointed from the heart of the organisation (persons sharing the same beliefs or 
having the same political aims). This may present a problem, because to proceed 
peacefully may not be beneficial for the organisation in order to disseminate their 
viewpoints. There is furthermore no requirement in the Act that the marshals appointed 
must be present from the start until the end of the gathering. Additionally, there is no 
available instruction in the Act as regards a suitable age or age limit for marshals, 
therefore, grade 8 schoolchildren may be utilised as marshals.  
Although the Gatherings Act does not provide that the organiser is responsible for the 
costs to arrange for safety and security during a gathering, the Regulations relating to 
Emergency Care at Mass Gathering Events, as discussed in paragraph 3.5.1, are 
increasing the complexity for an organiser to arrange events involving marches or 
demonstrations. Without assistance and funds to pay for expensive medical services, 
it seems impossible to arrange an event involving more than 1000 participants. The 
Regulations, therefore, also seriously restrict the right to gather, and should be re-
considered. 
7.2.5  Amendments to the notice procedure in the Gatherings Act required 
Although the failure to notify the authorities of an intended gathering does no longer 
constitute an offence, the notice procedure as provided for by the Act is still applicable. 
Organisers still need to notify the local authority of a planned gathering, however, there 
is no consequence if they make no report. The notice procedure was regrettably not 
considered by the Constitutional Court. It is anticipated that the notification procedure 
will become problematic in the future, and that notification will only proceed in 
circumstances of planned mass action, or where the assistance of the police is 
necessary. In practice, many of the provisions of the Gatherings Act have been 
rendered ineffective since section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act was declared 
unconstitutional. Organisers are aware that if no notice was given, there is no risk that 
they will be prosecuted for some of the other offences under the Gatherings Act, for 
example, not attending a meeting called by the responsible officer (local authority).   
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It can be a time-consuming and confusing exercise for a member of the public to 
identify the person who needs to be notified of a planned gathering at the local 
authority. It is suggested that the requirement of a notification to the local authorities 
must fall away. It is recommended that the organiser or a member of the general public 
notify a designated police member (who is part of a central body) in person at the 
nearest police station, or by forwarding a simple e-mail or text message at least 48 
hours before the event. The purpose of the notification must be to inform of the coming-
together to receive assistance.  
E-mail or text message communication between the organisers, participants, and 
police could be vital tools in facilitating peaceful gatherings. Instant messaging is a 
fast and cheap way of dispensing information with regard to possible foreseeable 
problems as to routes, the names of marshals and identification. It is beneficial to 
communicate online due to the quantity of information that can be distributed. 
Information such as the cause, background, place, time, reason or guiding material 
with regard to what conduct is deemed unlawful or steps that will be taken by the 
police, can be distributed. The ease of notifying and assistance from the police will 
hopefully induce the general public and organisations to more readily inform the police 
of the intention to hold a gathering. In turn, the police will not be caught unawares, and 
will be better equipped to facilitate the gatherings and prevent injuries and damage.  
Lastly, the information required by the Gatherings Act in the notice is excessive. It will 
be difficult for a member of the public, specifically the poor, to obtain all the information 
required in the notice without assistance. In Mlungwana (see paragraph 4.4.2), the 
court found that the notice requires considerable effort on the part of the organiser, 
first to be familiar with the provisions of the Act, and then to satisfy the requirements. 
It is consequently proposed that the information required be simplified, and be made 
available digitally in the form of tick boxes. It is recommended that a central body must 
manage this information, attend the gatherings, open a consultation process during 
the gathering and investigate offences committed. 
7.2.6  Clarity required as regards consultation and negotiation in the Act  
According to the Gatherings Act, if the responsible officer is of the opinion that 
discussions are necessary, a meeting must be called with the relevant persons or 
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bodies to discuss the contents of the notice, amendments thereof, additions thereto, 
and any conditions to be met. The responsible officer must ensure that the discussions 
take place in good faith. Regrettably, the responsible officer’s perception of what ‘good 
faith’ entails may play a critical role in this process. Once the meeting takes place, the 
responsible officer is given a significant degree of discretion in deciding whether or not 
to prohibit the gathering. The conditions imposed by the responsible officer can render 
the reason for the gathering ineffective. Such excessive obligations may be imposed 
on intended gatherings organised against poor service delivery of dysfunctional 
municipalities. It was not foreseen, when the Act was enacted, that the level of service 
delivery of local authorities may be the main reason for gatherings, and that the 
notification process may aid local authorities in obstructing these intended assemblies. 
The purpose of the consultation and negotiation processes under the Gatherings Act 
is unclear when the organiser or the authorised member is not present at the meeting 
called by the responsible officer, and the responsible officer continues and imposes 
conditions. Effectively, it means that the local authority (consisting of the responsible 
officer – a single person) will decide how and where the gathering will proceed without 
the relevant parties being at the table. It seems that the responsible officer appointed 
by the local authority has the final say regarding the appointment of an organiser and 
the authorised member (member of the police), amendments and conditions, or to 
prohibit the gathering. As such, the subjective beliefs, political affiliation or views of 
one person employed by the local authority may play a part in a vital decision-making 
process. It is strange that an official of a municipality can restrict the police in 
performing their duties by withholding approval to appoint the authorised member. 
When the responsible person withholds his or her approval to appoint another 
organiser, the organisation will be unable to arrange the planned gathering, or will 
need to approach the court for assistance. It is, therefore, recommended that 
notification to local authorities fall away. 
It is recommended that in circumstances where the protection of public order, public 
safety, and the rights and freedoms of others are in danger, and no agreement could 
be reached between role-players; the police, on instruction of the central body, must 
apply for an order from a local magistrate to prohibit the gathering for a specific period 
or to implement specific conditions. The magistrate must be able to hold an urgent 
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inquiry, attended by all relevant role-players. 
7.2.7  Revision of the notification period in the Gatherings Act 
In South Africa, the organiser must give notice at least seven days before the gathering 
is to be held. When it is not reasonably possible to give earlier notice – then notice 
needs to be furnished at the earliest opportunity. However, when notice is given less 
than 48 hours before the commencement of the gathering, the responsible officer may 
prohibit the gathering. It seems that the responsible officer has the discretion to decide 
whether a notice is ‘reasonably possible’, and if it was provided at the ‘earliest 
opportunity’. The decision to go ahead to proceed with the gathering, or to impose 
conditions, may rely on the decision or whims of one person only, the responsible 
officer. This proviso puts this section at odds with most international instruments. The 
seven-day notice period grants or allows the government leverage to decide if and 
how to act against the notification. The Gatherings Act does not expressively provide 
for online notification or online facilitation of gatherings, which will progressively 
improve the notification and facilitation procedures. A simple online notification, 24 
hours before the event, to the nearest police station where the gathering will take 
place, can be adequate to alert the authorities.  
7.2.8  Training and education to be provided to all role players involved with 
gatherings 
The Gatherings Act must be more instructive, and include clear-cut guidelines with 
regard to what public order conduct is unacceptable and will result in criminal 
proceedings. The Act further needs to stipulate the powers of the police and the set 
out the distinct steps the police need to take when gatherings become violent. The 
gathering’s organiser and participants as well as members of the public must be 
informed beforehand what is to be expected from the police in certain situations. 
The police must be trained to facilitate gatherings, and to act proactively in allowing 
gatherings to take place. Although a specialised public order police unit is trained to 
manage and control crowds in order to restore public order, it is usually the local police 
members who are first on the scene, and who assist in facilitating gatherings. These 
police members, in general, did not receive any formal crowd management training, 
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was not part of the negotiation process, and are not in possession of the necessary 
equipment (specifically video apparatus and cameras) to aid with evidence in courts. 
Obtaining evidence to proceed with prosecution is further challenging when the police 
have no knowledge of the duties and requirements of section 8 of the Act. The police 
struggle to distinguish between onlookers who mingle with the crowd and participants 
committed to the gathering. It is furthermore difficult for the prosecution to prove that 
suspected participants were not intimidated to participate against their will ‒ a popular 
defence in protest action cases. Police will also require guidance on the application of 
section 9(2)(d) of the Gatherings Act that permit the use of firearms or other weapons 
in circumstances where there is an intention to damage property. Woolman is of the 
opinion that this section is unconstitutional, as discussed in paragraph 4.4.7.  
The public as potential and participant gatherers must be informed and educated with 
regard to their right to gather and what conduct is deemed unacceptable. The police 
may allow a gathering to proceed on conditions they deem fit where no notice was 
given. It may confuse citizens when they were previously allowed to continue with a 
gathering, only to be dispersed or arrested on the following day for offences 
committed. Participants of violent gatherings are also sometimes arrested to minimise 
the danger to persons and property, without a clear indication how they contributed to 
the offence. If these persons were properly informed of the procedural aspects of the 
Gatherings Act, many such issues will be eliminated. 
7.2.9 More facilitation and promotion of the Gatherings Act  
The Act must not be seen by the general public as hampering the right to gather but 
rather facilitating it. More must be done by the government to promote the Act as user-
friendly. The mind shift must also be made by communities that they can trust the 
police to facilitate peaceful protest. It may be beneficial to consider administrative fines 
and restorative justice outcomes, especially since protesting is sometimes the only 
means by which the poor may accentuate their plight. Persons must be allowed to 
gather although it may be annoying, and create discomfort to other members of the 
public. When offences are committed, for example, the destruction of property, 
criminal prosecution must follow. Social media is playing a major role in the 
arrangement of protest action; therefore, the Act must provide for online facilitation. 
The police member and a central body consisting of all relevant role players need to 
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put in place the necessary arrangements to facilitate the gathering, and must utilise 
any popular means to inform participants and the public of arrangements.  
It is evident from the above that the government must reconsider the provisions of the 
Gatherings Act, since it no longer seems functional or relevant to the current context. 
To protest is inherent to the people of South Africa, and the Act regulating the 
gathering of persons must be supportive, easily readable and understandable. 
7.2.10  Codifying public order offences 
In Chapter five, it is observed that public violence is primarily the only offence to 
prosecute the violent conduct of a group of people in South Africa. However, the 
offence of public violence is not clearly defined, which yields numerous challenges. 
First of all, it is perplexing to establish when exactly the public peace and order will be 
disturbed or the rights of others infringed, since most gatherings will annoy, give 
offence, frustrate, or hinder other citizens in their daily activities. International and 
regional instruments on gatherings allow for some degree of harassment; isolated acts 
of violence; or conduct that irritates, causes offence, or temporarily hampers or 
obstructs the daily undertakings of members of the public. The police must 
consequently be careful not to arrest all the participants of a gathering if only one 
person displays forceful conduct.  
The definition of public violence is very extensive which could lead to the ordinary 
citizen struggling to establish what conduct is prohibited, or when conduct became 
unlawful. The reality is that only at the end of a trial, when the presiding officer has 
heard and considered all the evidence, will it be clear if all the requirements of the 
definition were met. It is furthermore difficult to determine beforehand when the offence 
of public violence will be committed as the opinions of the police member, members 
of the public, the organiser or participants on the scene may differ with regard to the 
degree of conduct that is necessary to constitute ‘serious dimensions’ as required in 
the Act. The number of persons required to commit this offence also varies from case 
to case, and cannot be predicted in advance; it is moreover closely linked with the 
requirement that conduct must reach ‘serious dimensions’. To establish the exact 
number of people deemed sufficient to commit the offence is problematic. This 
uncertainty can be clarified by amending the current definition to include ‘anybody who 
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commits an act, alone or with other persons’. The meaning of what specifically 
qualifies as ‘intended forcibly’ in the definition is unclear ‒ this raises further questions 
with regard to passive resistance, and when the force or violence will be sufficient to 
constitute the offence.  
It is evident from the above that there are many obstacles in establishing the 
seriousness of each volatile gathering. This is a precarious situation since, depending 
on the seriousness of the conduct, i.e. factors including time, locality, duration, 
damage, injuries or violence, the case can be heard in the district, regional or high 
court which implies different sentences. The discretion with regard to the forum is that 
of the prosecution. It raises the question if the decision of the prosecutor was correctly 
carried out since it influences the possible punishment of the accused when he or she 
is convicted of public violence.  
To eliminate the above-mentioned problems caused by the broad definition of public 
violence, it is recommended that specific conduct must be criminalised in order to 
assist the police in removing persons displaying unwanted, threatening, or disorderly 
behaviour from gatherings before it escalates into more serious conduct. Since the 
right to gather is extensively utilised by the public, it may be fruitful to incorporate police 
powers into public order offences; thereby informing everyone what to expect from the 
police in certain circumstances. The steps the police need to take when gatherings 
became violent must be clear. An offence must be enacted for situations where 
participants fail to comply with an order issued, or did not adhere to the call to disperse 
when a gathering is violent. Although such an offence is available in the Gatherings 
Act, it is not clear if it is applicable in public violence scenarios. 
Specific consideration must be given to create offences for looting in public-violence 
circumstances or where organised crime syndicates are involved. It is a worrying trend 
that people or organised groups commit offences under the pretence that they are 
participating in gatherings, while their only intent is to loot shops, burglarize houses, 
or to rob community members. The right to gather is furthermore abused by exploiters 
who rent unemployed persons to protest on their behalf. It may be worthwhile to create 
an offence criminalising the hiring of persons to commit acts of public violence, or to 
be hired to commit such acts, or to harbour the hired persons.   
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It may also be fruitful to hold a member of the police accountable, when he or she 
received information of public violence, and without reasonable excuse fails to take all 
reasonable steps to facilitate or suppress it as soon as possible. This offence places 
a duty on the security forces to stay alert, and to diffuse disorderly gatherings. Such 
an offence may assist to prevent more participants from gathering, thwart violence 
from escalating, aid in controlling riotous behaviour, and prevent damage to property, 
infrastructure and injuries to the public. violent gatherings.  
Consideration must further be given that aggrieved parties, including the police, 
communities and municipalities, may apply to the nearest district court for a banning 
order, preventing instigators from attending meetings or visiting places where public 
violence can originate, but then again the banning order may only apply for a specific 
period of time. The police must also be permitted to stop persons on their way or 
travelling to attend violent gatherings. 
It is subsequently proposed that South Africa departs from the current one-offence-
fits-all-conduct-approach, and enact legislation to cater for specific problems. The 
codified public order offences must distinguish between different types of conduct, the 
prevalence thereof, and take in consideration more and less serious conduct with 
applicable, correlating sentences. Such codified offences must also be more 
accessible, legible and understandable to the man on the street.  
7.2.11  Abolishing the offence of sedition 
In paragraph 6.2, it is stated that the offence of sedition is extensive and open to 
different interpretations, and will, accordingly, possibly not withstand constitutional 
muster. After decades of disuse, it is still unclear what the elements of sedition 
specifically constitute, since it depends on the circumstances of each case. A member 
of the public without the assistance of a legal representation will find it challenging to 
establish how many people are required to constitute a concourse or gathering, and 
when it will become unlawful. It is furthermore uncertain if the gathering needs to 
include violence, threats of violence, or forcible conduct. Only at the end of the trial, 
after hearing all the evidence, will the decision of the presiding officer indicate if the 
offence of sedition was committed or not. It is recommended that the common-law 
offence of sedition must be abolished.  
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7.2.12  Trespassing to resort under public order crimes 
As the Trespass Act (as discussed in paragraph 6.3) is an important tool in assisting 
the police in South-Africa in removing unlawful occupiers of buildings or land, it is 
suggested that trespassing offences must resort under crimes relating to public order. 
It is also recommended that legislation with regard to trespassing must provide for the 
duties of the owner or occupier of land or buildings, which include taking reasonable 
steps to, firstly, request trespassers to leave, and, secondly, to notify the police as 
soon as possible. The police must be able to facilitate trespassers without waiting for 
a formal complaint when it is reasonably suspected that people do not have permission 
to be on land or in buildings.  
There are distinctive problems as regards trespassing in South Africa, and these 
challenges must be specifically addressed in the Act. For example, persons instigating 
others to invade land or who fraudulently sell land belonging to municipalities and 
exploit the poor to trespass, must be met with harsh sentences. Also, illegal mining 
not only constitutes a substantial economic problem in South Africa, but illegal miners 
are trespassing for the purpose of mining, damaging, dismantling and selling 
infrastructure. Trespassing by illegal miners constitute unique circumstances since 
miners trespass underground for prolonged times, and they need assistance in the 
form of food and other necessities to survive. Regular mine personnel are assisting 
illegal miners with access to the mines by smuggling desired supplies for financial 
gain. Legislation providing that assistance to illegal miners on mine property is read 
into a definition for trespassing will be beneficial.  
The Act must furthermore provide for situations where illegal occupiers move back 
onto land and into buildings after being evicted by a court order. Owners are left 
without any remedy when community members prevent the offender from being 
evicted ‒ breaking open and carrying furniture back into buildings. Such assistance 
must be included into the definition of what trespassing entails. Not allowing 
trespassers for a specified time period to return to the land may be of assistance here.  
When trespassers start to occupy land, a slow and costly court process is required for 
eviction. It is, therefore, important that the police are able and well-informed to act 
appropriately in all circumstances. It seems that the police on a local level do not 
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possess the knowledge to facilitate trespassers. The police are regularly criticised for 
their unsatisfactory facilitation of trespassers since they do not comply with their 
constitutional obligations. It is recommended that this situation be rectified by proper 
training and education as regards the prescriptions for trespassing. 
The powers of the police in trespassing situations must clearly be set out in the Act. 
This will strengthen the police’s ability to facilitate trespassers. Decisions must be 
taken by senior police officials after receiving proper training. Incorporated police 
powers will have an educational purpose, informing owners, occupiers and 
trespassers what to expect from the police in different situations. Trespassers must be 
informed of the consequences of their conduct, and then receive an opportunity to 
rectify their conduct. If they do not adhere to the instructions, arrested may follow. The 
process must be well-documented and photographed. The police must take proper 
note of the identity of trespassers and places of trespassing. The police must be able 
to stop potential trespassers on their way to join trespassers. Lastly, the adoption of 
offences for different trespassing scenarios will assist to finalise cases more speedily 
in courts. Restorative justice outcomes can also play a positive role in this process. 
7.2.13  Riotous Assemblies Act offences to be included in a Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 
As the Riotous Assemblies Act (considered in paragraph 6.4) causes much 
disgruntlement due to being created by the apartheid government, it is recommended 
that legislation providing for attempt, conspiracy and incitement be included in a 
Criminal Law Amendment Act.   
7.2.14  More specific offences to replace Intimidation Act offences 
In paragraph 6.5 of the study, the offences under the Intimidation Act are discussed. 
In South Africa, intimidation is frequently part of the conduct at a gathering. To 
differentiate between threats, intimidation and political hyperbole creates a serious 
problem, as seen in the two Moyo-cases, where sections 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Act 
was declared unconstitutional and invalid. It is anticipated that the remaining offences 
in the Act will follow suit, especially since the remaining offences in the Intimidation 
Act are difficult to read and understand. The average member of the public or 
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unrepresentative accused will struggle to make sense of these offences. The field of 
application of these offences is also overly broad, attempting to include all possible 
conduct. Certain wording in the Act, such as section 1A of the Act, are unclear and 
vague. The phrases ‘to put in fear or to demoralise or to induce’ and to ‘perform any 
act which is aimed to cause, bring about, promote or contribute toward such act’, are 
ambiguous. The section can prohibit political hyperbole and emotionally charged 
rhetoric in the context of political and industrial action. By not defining the meaning of 
‘fear, to demoralise or to induce’ implies that any speech or conduct which created a 
subjective state of fear in any person, regardless of the intention to create fear, to 
demoralise or to induce, is criminalised. The Act attempted to rectify this oversight by 
referring to acts of violence, however, the Act does not require imminent violence or 
that the act of violence must be able to take place in the near future, or at all. When a 
provision needs reading-in in order to bring it into conformity with the Constitution, it 
undoubtedly will fail the constitutional test.  
As stated in paragraph 6.6.4 above, the presumption in section 1A(2) of the Act raises 
more problems than answers since the prosecution does not need to prove that the 
act of violence or threat of violence is imminent or will take place in the near future, or 
will take place at all. In terms of section 1A(4) of the Act, any threatening utterance of 
harm can be sufficient to commit the offence. The act or threat must only likely result 
in putting in fear or demoralising or inducing the general public. Actual fear, 
demoralisation or inducement is not a requirement. These presumptions are too broad 
and imprecise to withstand constitutional muster.  
In South Africa, problems are encountered with specific situations, for example, the 
intimidation of truck drivers, businesses, witnesses, court personal or political factions. 
It may be beneficial for the government to create offences to cater for these 
circumstances. It is suggested that the government revisit the Intimidation Act and 
consider enacting offences to prohibit specific conduct. It is important that the wording 
of such offences must be user-friendly and instructive since intimidation is a consistent 




This study on the various offences rising from the right to gather in South Africa strived 
to answer pertinent research questions raised under Chapter one. A comparative 
evaluation was employed intending to provide additional and different perspectives on 
the right to gather in order to appropriately appreciate its interpretation and application 
in South African criminal law. In conclusion, it can be stated that the research 
questions of this thesis have been answered, and the hypotheses proved:  
 The current common law and statutory offences utilised to curb technical 
offences in the arrangement stage of intended gatherings, or during gatherings 
or violent conduct at gatherings are not adequate to provide for the unique 
problems of South Africa.  
 The government must assist and enable its citizens to gather peacefully and 
unarmed. Clear and well-drafted legislation on acceptable public order conduct 
will support the government to protect this right for everyone to enjoy. The 
Gatherings Act is the public’s first reference when they intend to arrange a 
gathering. Many members of the public cannot afford legal advisers ‒ therefore, 
it is essential that the Act must be accessible, understandable and user-friendly.  
 Public order offences are generally utilised by the prosecution in cases relating 
to dissent, mass action, or protest. These offences consist of piece-meal 
statutory- and common-law offences. Some of these offences were never 
intended to be applicable to gatherings. When arrested, participants of 
gatherings are, therefore, never certain to what charges they will need to answer.  
 The existing legislation and common-law offences are not always suitable to 
provide for new developments, for example, the use of social media to mobilise 
protest.  
 It is uncertain if many of the current offences will withstand constitutional 
challenges.  
 South Africa must move away from the one-offence-fits-all-conduct-approach in 
cases of public violence and enact legislation to cater for specific problems with 
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different degrees of seriousness with reasonable sentences fitting each offence.  
 The common-law offence of sedition must be abolished. 
 The Trespass Act is an important tool for the government to combat land invasion 
of public or private property, or persons trespassing with the intention to commit 
offences. The Act must clearly map out police powers and the consequences of 
unlawful conduct in such scenarios. Offences must be created for different 
situations with applicable sentences. Sentence options must also provide for 
restorative justice outcomes.  
 Offences with regard to intimidatory conduct must provide for specific problems 
experienced in South Africa.  
 The government must revisit the amalgam of current offences utilised by the 
prosecution during dissent, public violence, or protest action, and create a single 
public order Act regulating specific unlawful conduct with corroborating 
sentences. New and creative legislation is needed to regulate the coming 
together of persons in a public space, including online spaces, for a common 
expressive purpose.  
 Police powers must be clearly defined to strengthen the hand of the police to 
secure law and order, serve as guarantee for the rights and freedoms of 
everyone and to create legal certainty.  
 Existing guidelines from applicable international and regional instruments which 
guide and monitor executive conduct must be included in legislature since these 
guidelines qualify public order offences. Guidelines have an educational 
purpose, informing participants what to expect from the government, what 
conduct is deemed unacceptable and the consequences of not adhering to it. 
 It is important that the police, prosecutors and judiciary are well versed in the 
application of guidelines with regard to the right to gather since they are designed 
to assist governments to meet human rights principles.  
 New and created legislation alone will not be sufficient to prevent violent conduct 
during gatherings. The government needs to be seen to listen and act on the 
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